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This dissertation is an ethnographic investigation into the process of political 
socialization as a means to understand Nepali political culture. It focuses on 
the activities of Nepali student organizations as sister organizations to the 
Nepali political parties. It is within the student organizations that individuals 
receive both their social training and ideological indoctrination into Nepali 
party politics. Moreover, student activism in Nepal has played a central role in 
how national politics unfolds. Politics at the university level has had a 
powerful impact on statewide politics and social change through the 
mobilization of the masses, the entrenchment of political party ideology, and 
the production of career politicians. Therefore, just as the student 
organizations’ politics are the gateway into Nepali mainstream politics, 
analysis of their practices and political attitudes can provide a view into more 
pervasive conceptions and processes in the larger political landscape. In this 
dissertation I conceive of the student organizations as a mini-public that 
provides a view on how political culture plays out in general forums.  
This dissertation is the culmination of a five-year research project 
during which I observed Nepali student activists become national politicians. I 
tracked the process whereby university students become involved in national 
political life by emphasizing emergent needs while simultaneously becoming 
socialized into the politics that they are trying to change. Students continue to 
   
be at the fore of making radical political demands, standing on the political 
ground gained by the generations before them. Analysis of the experience of 
political activism as it changes across generations has served as an effective 
tool to track less easily delineated political and cultural change. Furthermore, 
focusing on interaction between activists of different generations allows me to 
understand how people personally orient themselves in the political field.  
A culturally focused study of Nepali politics is particularly relevant in 
the current context while Nepal remains on the radar of international 
monitoring groups. This dissertation analyzes how Nepali student actors’ 
discursively negotiate international political values into their repertoire. I 
argue that the ways in which universal principles are reconciled with local, 
cultural values elucidates how these activists perceive international 
democratic values’ place in their own local context. My analysis focuses on 
how Nepali political actors interpretations’ of global democratic norms are 
calculated with the recognition that they are speaking to a larger audience 
beyond Nepali citizens. The manner in which they do this is intended to insert 
themselves and their politics into a larger scope. This is an interpretative 
process that highlights both the local and the global and an interaction 
between them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Figure 1: Eight Party Rally, Basantapur Square, Kathmandu 2004 
She looked at me impressed as she heard about my research.  I was 
introduced to this central committee member of the CPN-UML at Basantapur 
Square. She was about to give a speech to a crowd of over a thousand cadres 
of the parties participating in the Movement Against Regression. Before 
ascending to the podium she explained to me, 
Student politics is the first learning place [italicized spoken 
in English]. It really matters to what extent one maintains 
what he learns in this stage. It is the first place you 
become educated. The firm understanding that is 
developed in this stage never gets erased. It is the basis 
for life.3  
                                                
3 Translation of an interaction with a Communist Party of Nepal -United Marxist Leninist 
(CPN-UML) Party central committee member, 4.3.04. 
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A week later I observed a student cadre throw a rock at a police officer, 
striking him in the helmet. I recognized him as the student volunteer who had 
gingerly guided this central committee member up onto the stage as she had 
explained the nature of student politics to me. Our eyes met and he yelled to 
me on the sideline, “This is the basis of our life.”4  
Figure 2: Eight student union cadres lobbing rocks at police!,  
Baag Bazaar, Kathmandu 2004 
This dissertation is an ethnographic study of Nepali student politics as 
“the first learning place” of Nepali political culture. The practices of Nepali 
student organizations serve as a useful lens to understanding political culture 
in Nepal. The student organizations are subsidiary organizations, or sister 
organizations, 5 within which individuals receive both their social training and 
                                                
4 Translation of an interaction with a Nepal Student Union cadre, affiliated with the Nepali 
Congress Koirala, 4.9.04 
5 The student organizations are not the only sister organizations of political parties: the Tarun 
Dal (‘youth wing’), the professional unions and the women’s organizations have become 
institutionalized in the last 40 years and are mobilized when the parties need them 
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ideological indoctrination into Nepali party politics. Therefore, just as the 
student organizations’ politics serve as socialization into Nepali mainstream 
politics, analysis of their processes and political attitudes can provide a view 
into more pervasive conceptions and processes in the larger political 
landscape. I use the student organizations as a “mini-public” that informs us 
of what people’s notions of the political are in Nepal (Fung 2003).6 
I pursued this research at a pivotal period in Nepali political history 
(2003-2008). I conducted my research during the seizure of democracy by the 
King, the end of a ten-year civil war between the state and the CPN-UML 
(Maoist) party, and the transition from constitutional monarchy to democratic 
republic. The span of my research period allowed me to observe student 
activists in every phase they have historically experienced since the first 
democratic movement in 1950. I followed student politicians in a protest phase 
during the Movement Against Regression (2001-2005) through to the Second 
People’s Movement (2006), which ousted the King; I tracked them as their 
protests shifted underground and they were jailed during the 2005 state of 
emergency; I observed them in an internal reorganization phase during the 
peace talks and interim government, during which time I witnessed their 
                                                                                                                                       
(Hachhethu 2002a). The students differ from the rest of these organizations because of their 
position in society. Often it is at university that citizens forge their political alliances. 
Indoctrination and recruitment are legitimately sanctioned duties of all the student 
organizations, and there are set processes of clientalism and coercion within the universities in 
order to recruit students not only onto party rosters but also on to the streets during protests. 
Politics on the campuses are an inevitable reality for all students. They must rely on it to 
negotiate the university bureaucratic process and negotiate it in their formal and informal 
networks. 
6 I conceive of the student organizations as a “mini-public” that provides a view into how 
deliberative processes and political culture play out in larger forums. Nonetheless, the student 
organizations are not the ideal type that a “mini-public” is meant to represent, in the sense 
that they do not accurately represent the cross section of demographic variation in society 
(Davies et al. 2005: 603). Instead, they provide a good perspective of who is interested and can 
find opportunity in politics. Despite this fact, I think the “mini-public” serves as a useful 
heuristic device to understand the political reality. 
   4 
tense joint efforts to run their campuses in accordance with their political 
parties’ national level policies while trying to position their organizations in a 
new political landscape; and I monitored their campaigning for the constituent 
assembly elections and their Free Student Union elections. In short, I observed 
a generation of student activists become politicians. 
Framing Arguments 
Politics has four aspects. The first is power: this means to extend one’s influence 
over others in the most far-reaching way possible. The second is conspiracy: this 
means that everything is fogged; there is a belief that one loses the extent of their 
influence if they were to be transparent in their action or engage in discussion; since 
they are not, this breeds distrust. The third is thought; which really means ideology.  
And the fourth is credit, which in Nepal comes out of our patriarchal patronage 
system. 
—President of Nepal Revolutionary Student 
Forum, the sister organization to the Majdūr 
Kisān Party (Workers and Farmers), 2006 
I begin with this quote to show the complex ambivalence that people 
associate with Nepali politics. As much as student politics is known to be the 
first learning place for political actors, politics is equally considered to be a 
dirty game. Considering this, why do people get involved and invested in 
politics? How do they justify this investment as a contribution to society? In 
this dissertation I take seriously that for my interlocutors, politics is not 
merely personal but also that the personal is political.  Through the eyes of the 
students and other political actors, I assess their categories, their actions, and 
their explanations for their actions in order to examine the personal within 
politics and how people build their identities and their social world around 
political participation. In other words, I examine how people living within the 
political system engage with it, interpret it, and create their reality from it.  
This approach aims to contribute to an anthropology of “the political” 
in the sense that Jonathan Spencer has laid out: 
   5 
The anthropology of the political is, then, the 
anthropology of ‘the political,’ that compelling but 
morally unsettling space in which friend is 
differentiated from foe. It gives us an enduring 
object, the working of agonism in social life, and a 
wonderfully rich set of problems to grapple with. 
(2007: 180)7 
I approach the complications inherent in establishing representative 
democratic practice and consider questions that emerge from that struggle: 
How is it affecting the relations Nepali citizens have with one another? What 
types of being does it offer Nepali citizens? What productive or problematic 
possibilities can result from the reconstruction of the Nepali nation-state? 
(Spencer 2007: 73, 180). 
I address these questions through ethnographic accounts that provide a 
view into the “way of doing politics” in Nepali political organizations 
(Lichterman 1996). My analysis aims to explain how Nepali student 
organizations’ internal political processes and attitudes toward them are 
shaped by traditional and contemporary political values and anxieties. I use 
the method of political ethnography in order to “access the processes, causes, 
and effects” of broader political attitudes (Tilly 2006: 410). I will demonstrate 
how political attitudes, values, and anxieties inform the ways in which 
students map claims of democratic practice onto their political processes. I 
                                                
7 In the chapter entitled “For an Agonistic Model of Democracy,” Chantal Mouffe proposes to 
“redescribe” liberal democracy in terms of “agonistic pluralism” in order to acknowledge the 
tension between the constitutive dimensions of the political, which she argues is a result of the 
social contingencies that comprise the political (2000: 80-107). She distinguishes between 
varying social contingencies in order to define the necessary ground for democratic 
interaction. She explains, “ [T]his is why I propose to distinguish between two forms of 
antagonism, antagonism proper—which takes place between enemies, that is persons who 
have no common symbolic space—and what I call ‘agonism’, which is a different mode of 
manifestation of antagonism because it involves a relation not between enemies but between 
‘adversaries’, adversaries being defined in a paradoxical way as ‘friendly enemies’, that is, 
persons who are friends because they share a common symbolic space but also enemies 
because they want to organize this common symbolic space in a different way” (2000: 13). 
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approach this analysis with the consideration that political culture is a 
relationally based set of evolving norms. Similar to E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s 
analysis in his famous ethnography of the Nuer (1940: 265), I conceive of 
political behavior as a distinct type of social behavior, which is informed by 
the relational context that one is in. He focused on kinship and territorial 
systems as the factors that affect the range of political behavior. In the Nepali 
context, political ideals and shared history create a locative terrain reminiscent 
of Evans-Pritchard’s territorial systems, and shared practices and networks are 
superimposed onto relational distinctions, which are often expressed in filial 
terms. 
But I must emphasize that although I rely on Evans-Prichard’s analysis 
of political behavior vis-à-vis territorial systems, I depart from his emphasis 
on political abstraction. My analysis resists the classical political 
anthropological sensibility to abstract to a level in which social processes are 
stripped of cultural specificity and distilled to functional explanations that 
focus on calculated instrumentality (Bailey 1963; Fortes and Evans-Pritchards 
1940; Turner 1957).  Rather, I embrace the cultural idioms that put the ethical 
dimensions of the political front and center. In this regard, I am taking a cue 
from Jonathan Spencer and incorporating the “politics of semiotic excess, of 
transgression, of occasional violence, of humor and entertainment, love and 
fear” (2007: 15). It is not my intention to contain the political in the way 
traditional political anthropology has done, but rather to map out Nepali 
student activists’ logic of their own politics, as messy as it might seem to 
others. For me this involves deconstructing the local, regional, and 
international, as well as cultural, religious, ideological, and philosophical 
influences that shape their politics. I see these influences working in a 
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dynamic form that involves domination and subordination, persuasion and 
coercion, collaboration and resistance, acculturation and interpretation, and 
obedience and creative play (Guha 1982, 1989).8  
The role of political movements (āndolan) as a political and personal 
process emerges as a defining theme in this dissertation. As a focus of 
analysis, social movements have allowed social scientists to understand 
various types of subversive communal action that challenge the dominant 
order of things. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) define social 
movements as an articulatory process; they are an intervention that expresses 
what Alain Touraine (1988) refers to as individuals’ deliberate self-production 
of society. They fall under the domain of social action that constructs what 
counts as political (Assies 2000: 290). But in the context of Nepal, I argue that 
individuals do not produce social movements so much as the āndolan 
produces the political individual and places him or her in the larger social 
sphere of politics. For this reason, my focus on social movements is not meant 
to highlight the spectacle of contentious politics, but rather to contextualize it 
in the everyday lives of the student activists.  I focus on how social 
movements allow them to craft their personal narrative out of a larger shared 
political narrative.  
Furthermore, this dissertation highlights how the position of student 
activism in Nepali political history reveals the struggle of varying claims. This 
is not merely a political struggle but one more common to general society: the 
one between institutional culture and group autonomy.  It is for this reason 
that political movements play such an important role in shaping the identity 
                                                
8 Ranajit Guha conceptualizes the practice of politics as discursively “braiding, collapsing, 
echoing and blending” idioms, which he contrasts to the western social science attempt to 
order these idioms in a way that reveals the relationship between dynamic modernity and 
inert tradition (1989:270). 
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of each activist generations. The student organizations are the tool of political 
agitation deployed by the parties. Yet it is through their action and their 
struggle in the movement that they gain some sense of autonomy and are able 
to articulate their voice on the streets.  The party influences this voice but the 
students do inflect with their own sense of what should be accomplished in 
the space of the streets that is cordoned off for them (Snellinger 2007). In other 
words, the public forum of the streets allows the students to emphasize what 
the political demands ought to be. Although they may have the ability to 
affect the public’s expectation of what politics is and should be, they don’t 
have the luxury to affect policy once they have secured power for their parties 
(Snellinger 2005 and 2007). I analyze how the āndolan provides student 
activists entrée into contentious politics. It is an inviting forum of 
revolutionary effect but ultimately if they want to have a substantial impact, 
the students must embrace the political system that they want to change. I 
demonstrate how this occurs in small mundane ways more often than on a 
grand scale.  
I extend this analysis to illustrate the circulation of investment in which 
Nepali student activists participate. I examine how their investment in the 
party system and universal political ideals motivates their activism, and how, 
as public actors, they encourage the public as well as international analysts 
and diplomats to invest in them, and by extension the political party system. I 
consider the ways their tactics allow them to find space within the political 
limitations they encounter and how their creativity encourages others to 
expand their notions of the possible within the confines of political 
uncertainty. 
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Indeed the circulation of investment spans a scope larger than Nepal.  
The international presence in Nepal has incorporated a vast array of 
international actors into Nepal’s political situation, which has affected Nepali 
citizens’ relationship with one another, with foreigners, and with the political. 
This dissertation analyzes how Nepali student actors’ discursively negotiate 
international political values into their repertoire. I argue that the ways in 
which universal principles are reconciled with local, cultural values elucidates 
how these activists perceive international democratic values’ place in their 
own political context. My analysis focuses on how Nepali political actors 
interpretations’ of global democratic norms are calculated with the recognition 
that they are speaking to a larger audience beyond Nepali citizens. The 
manner in which they do this is calculated to insert themselves and their 
politics into a larger scope. This is an interpretative process that highlights 
both the local and the global and an interaction between them, or what 
Spencer calls “translation and translatability” (2007: 10). 
My analysis of this discursive practice is guided by Spencer’s assertion 
that the presence of liberal political institutions has not necessarily produced 
liberal political subjects (2007: 176).  Rather, the effects of the political create 
unexpected outcomes that push the limits of social and political imaginary, as 
well as political theory. My analysis works from the basis that universal norms 
are not inert, but are comprised by the dynamism of interaction, which 
involves interpretation, translation, and the negotiation of concepts between 
actors. In this regard, the interpretive process of universal political norms into 
Nepali politics mirrors the radical indeterminacy that is in inherent in Claude 
Lefort’s description of democracy (1988). The translation of universal political 
ideals into the local context or the attempt to map local political happenings 
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onto universal norms of democratic rule of law and governance engenders a 
ubiquitous contingency the way that democracy itself does. I particularly 
address this in my analysis of the political conception of youth in chapter four, 
my analysis of inclusion in chapter five, and my analysis of internal political 
practice in chapter seven. 
Given that politics is an ongoing discursive process based on multiple 
contingencies, I embrace a traditional anthropological method in order to 
capture the import of the political: I listen to what people say they do and 
watch what they actually do; my analysis engages the discrepancy between 
the two and treats it as a relevant aspect of the political (Spencer 2007: 116). It 
is for this reason that this dissertation takes the position that politics is as 
much a performance as an ideological construct. As a performance, politics 
plays out the hopes of what could be as a way to establish authoritative 
norms. Politics is a discursive exercise between diverse groups’ perspective of 
what is “traditional” and what they push society to aspire for.  In this regard, I 
analyze what is culturally at stake in the performance of politics.  As Alexei 
Yurchak has noted, “The performative dimension of this act did not describe 
reality and could not be analyzed as true or false; instead it produced effects 
and created facts in that reality” (2006: 76). I pursue this position as an attempt 
to understand the cacophony of political assertions in order to bring me closer 
to different people’s understandings of what was, what should have been, 
what is, and what ought to be.  
The final underlying tenet this dissertation relies on is the analytic 
frame of youth and intergenerational interaction in order to understand 
political actors’ main performance, the ongoing crafting of a non-linear 
narrative of Nepali politics, one that involves a merging of past, present, and 
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future. I focus my analysis on student activists’ relationships with their party 
leaders on a personal level and in the institutional dynamic of mother and 
sister organizations, how students orient themselves in the political landscape, 
people’s conceptions of student politics’ role in various political eras, and both 
public and personal political memory (chapter three). I analyze not only the 
performance and accompanying rhetoric but also question how political hopes 
have manifested in the particular forms that they have. 
The Nepali student activists’ claim to represent the youth generation 
serves as a particular assertion in their political performance. This 
dissertation’s focus on the students’ claims to a particular age demographic is 
meant to explore the kinds of social dynamics that are at play as people 
circulate between different contexts of recognition. My aim is to examine what 
it means to make generational claims of representation and whether such 
claims can truly transcend other recognized demographics, particularly class, 
caste, and ethnicity. Yet I must note, this is not a stagnant demographic that 
one inhabits for life. Rather, it changes alongside the unfolding of Nepali 
political history. Johan Fornäs has argued that young people serve as a canvas 
on which society casts its hopes and fears (1995:1). In this regard, Nepali 
student activists serve as cultivators of political hope, encouraging the public 
to invest in the political possibility that is to come. Within the limited scope of 
the streets, campuses, and in media coverage, they embody the possibilities 
that the political can encompass. By emphasizing the combination of their 
current experiences of political marginalization and future potential, they 
present themselves as a source in which their peers and the public can invests 
their hopes. This dynamic obviates the reality that they are the ones who will 
hold power tomorrow as elite politicians. This dissertation argues that the 
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reason the youth demographic has been capable of transcending all other 
demographic categories is because of its fleeting nature as an aesthetic 
community; people pass through it, but they do not remain blank canvases 
forever. With this in mind, I will consider what these students’ claims tell us 
about the political. This analytic perspective allows me to demonstrate the 
dynamic force of the political, which is as much expressive, performative, and 
relational as it is instrumental.  
The Historical Context9 
Nepali students have long had an integral role in Nepal’s political 
development. Nepal’s formalized struggle for democracy is marked by the 
revolution of 1950, a political maneuver coordinated between the Nepali 
Congress and King Tribhuvan to overthrow the Rana regime, which had 
monopolized political power since 1846.  Multi-party democracy with a 
constitutional monarch was established after the King fled to India for refuge 
and the Nepali Congress conducted a military assault on the Rana state 
infrastructure.  Many of the participants in this rebellion were students who 
had been exiled to India in 1947 for participating in the student movement 
Jayatu Sanksritam (‘Victory to Sanskrit’).  This student movement was the first 
recorded organized protest by students against the Rana regime.  At the time, 
Sanskrit was the only subject offered at Nepal’s only post-secondary 
institution, Trichandra College (known at the time as Rani Pokhari Pathshala). 
It was surprising to students that the Rana regime submitted to their demand 
for an expanded curriculum, which encouraged them to continue their 
struggle to include the humanities as well.  But the authority of the Rana 
                                                
9 A more detailed account of Nepali student political history is outlined in Snellinger, 2005, “A 
Crisis in Nepali Student Politics?: Analyzing the Gap between Politically Active and Non-
Active Students.” Peace and Democracy in South Asia Journal 2 (Fall): 14-30.  
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regime had tolerated enough; they ordered raids on the campuses, imprisoned 
students while others were exiled to India.  Many of these exiles were the 
founders of the Nepali Congress and later the Communist Party of Nepal.  
They participated in Mahatma Gandhi’s Quit India movement, which greatly 
influenced these future politicians’ struggle for democracy in Nepal (Hoftun, 
et al 1999: 5).10 
The students’ role in politics was shaped by key historical events. The 
one that has most definitively framed their political character is the Panchayat 
era when multi-party politics were banned. During that time student politics 
came to represent the struggle for democracy. On the campuses the student 
organizations were legally allowed to engage in the open democratic exercise 
of election competition. These elections served as a proxy for multi-party 
democratic political processes lacking at the state level. Due to the political 
space afforded to students on the campuses, they became the hands and 
mouths that disseminated political ideology for the underground parties. Due 
to this position, they proved amongst the most capable in organizing the mass 
protests of the 1990 People’s Movement that led to the reinstatement of multi-
party democracy.  
Since multi-party democracy in 1990, student organizations have taken 
on a very different role.  They are still utilized by the parties but the dynamic 
in which the parties were purely dependent on them has changed.  They have 
quickly fallen into the role they serve today as subsidiary organizations, and 
they have become the gateway to national party politics. Norm-oriented 
student movements have become an institutionalized way to put pressure on 
                                                
10 Many Nepali students studying in exile in Varanasi and Patna during the mid-seventies also 
participated in J.P. Narayan’s movement (Sampurna Kranti Andolan).  
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the campus administrations, parliament, and government-sponsored 
industries to prioritize educational and economic issues. Because these 
movements are often disruptive to public life and their benefits are disputable, 
the Nepali public considers these movements an entrenched political tactic of 
the students as party appendages. Another aspect of the students' role as 
subsidiary organizations is political indoctrination. During the decade of the 
Maoist People’s War (1996-2006), the Maoist student organization actively 
indoctrinated students and teachers in their stronghold areas. But this process 
not only occurred at the underground level; indoctrination and recruitment 
are legitimately sanctioned duties of all student organizations affiliated with 
national political parties. Furthermore, the student organizations’ form and 
roles have changed dramatically in the 1990 post-democratic era; their new 
ability to pursue careers in party politics has undermined their role of being at 
the forefront of democratic and social activism. This dissertation analyzes the 
process in which the students negotiate this tension in order to be granted a 
place as legitimate leaders by the public, while also navigating the prescribed 
hierarchy of their party. 
The more recent political situation from 2001 to 2008 could be 
conceptualized in simple terms as a tripartite struggle for power between the 
Maoists, the King, and the political parties.  Since 1996, the Maoists had been 
actively involved in a rebel insurgency that gained significant power in many 
of the remote districts outside Kathmandu valley.  With the claim that he will 
restore peace and security, the King twice—in 2002 and 2005—seized the reins 
of democracy by dismissing parliament and instating royalist bureaucrats to 
run the government and oversee the Royal Nepal Army’s protracted armed 
conflict with the Maoists. The political parties and their student organizations 
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spent over five years on the streets protesting the King’s actions, which they 
argued disregarded the democratic constitution. Since February 2005, the 
King’s dismissal of parliament and the closure of democratic space have 
jeopardized the foundation of student political organizations and mainstream 
political parties. As a result the parties chose to negotiate with the Maoists and 
they were able to successfully organize nationwide mass-protests in 2006, 
which deposed the King’s government. In November 2006, the Maoists and 
the political parties successfully negotiated peace talks and led an interim 
government that prepared the country for constituent assembly elections.  In 
March 2008, Nepal held peaceful constituent assembly elections; all parties 
accepted the outcome of the Maoist majority government.  During the first 
session of the constituent assembly in May 2008, Nepal was officially declared 
a republic. Since then the Maoists have been trying to establish themselves as 
a valid political party in a multi-party system in order to create consensus on 
the constitutional, administrative, and economic restructuring of the state. 
Through the turbulent times of the last decade, Nepali student activists 
have had to adapt their approach in order to place themselves in the larger 
regional and international political discourses, as well as reclaim support from 
the Nepali masses as being a viable alternative for Nepal’s political future. It is 
at this juncture that I focus my dissertation in order to understand how 
students make meaning of their political struggle and the process through 
which they become politicians.  
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Figure 3: Eight Student Unions cadres igniting an effigy of the King 
Baag Bazaar, Kathmandu 2004 
The Politics of State and Societal Structuring 
I provide this brief sketch of the formation of the Nepali state in order 
to demonstrate what student activists are referencing when they conjure 
notions like Nepal, Nepali citizens, democracy, and justice as the motivating 
factors for their activism. Nepal has been considered to varying degrees a 
failed state during the time of my dissertation research. Nonetheless political 
parties, citizens, governments, and international organizations have invested 
in the codification process of the state of Nepal either by supporting or 
challenging it. This section provides context for the investment in the category 
of the Nepali nation in the way that Brubaker defines,  
‘Nation’ is a category of practice, not (in the first 
instance) a category of analysis. To understand 
nationalism, we have to understand the practical 
uses of the category ‘nation,’ the ways it can come 
to structure perception, to inform thought and 
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experience, to organize discourse and political 
action (1996: 7). 
Here I will outline how the state project has informed the perceptions of the 
Nepali political actors with whom I worked.   
The state project is an act of ideology, one that is incomplete and must 
be continually enforced or inculcated. One of the leading tasks of the state 
project is to fog its incompleteness so the state appears to be a legitimate 
power (Abrams 1977). In order to understand the dynamic form the state 
takes—to grasp it as a continual process of dissidence, cooptation, and 
compromise—one must look not only at the elites’ project but also for the 
loose ends and slippages (Sayer 1994); to uncover the “mask, which prevents 
our seeing political practice as it is.” (Abrams 1977: 58). In the case of Nepal, 
this involves tracking the negotiations and machinations that structured the 
nation-state as the only Hindu kingdom in the world (Bista: 1991; Hufton, 
Reaper and Whelpton: 1999; Gellner: 2001, 2002). Some are more familiar with 
the Nepali state from the viewpoint of ethnic dispossession, which has been a 
mobilizing issue of the Maoists and Janajāti (ethnic minorities) communities to 
question the basis of the state of Nepal (Dahal, 2006; Des Chene 1996; Forbes 
1999; Gaenszle 2000; Gellner, Pfaff-Czarnecka & Whelpton, eds. 1997; Gellner 
ed. 2003; Gellner 2003; Guneratne, 2002; Hangen 2000 & 2007; Holmberg 2000; 
Lecomte-Tilouine &  Dolfus, eds.  2003; Levine 1987; Onta 1996; Shneiderman 
2009; Sharma 2007; Tamang 2008; Turin, M. 2000). However, I am more 
familiar with elite contestations for power to run the state.  In this dissertation 
I will not try to debunk the legitimacy of the Nepali state but rather track 
different aspects of how it is manufactured and how all sides have 
participated in it through the contestation for resources, power, and 
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representation.11 This method of analysis underscores how the state-making 
enterprise has had to co-opt resistance through compromise and repression in 
order to shape the assumptions and attitudes of the nation as a state.12 In sum, 
this dissertation is based on the supposition that the construction of the 
nation-state of Nepal has involved balancing elite power interests with 
alternative, albeit majority, marginal minority, and international notions of 
what Nepal as a state should be.  
Prithvi Narayan Shaha described his newly consolidated kingdom of 
Nepal as the “true Hindustan, a garden where four varnas and thirty-six jāts 
bloom” (Sharma 2002: 25). This maxim has come to glorify the acceptance of 
diversity in Nepal, diversity that is contained within the “true Hindustan.”  
Whether Prithvi Narayan Shaha’s intentions for tolerance in 1769 were 
genuine,13 one can track the agenda to make Nepal a Hindu territory, from a 
kingdom to a nation to a nation-state.14 This process has come to be known as 
sanskritization. 
                                                
11 Although Nepal has not been colonized by foreign powers, its construction could be likened 
to that of colonial states because it was the project of a small group of elites not representative 
of the larger citizenry, with influence from the international world, mainly Britain and India 
(Burghart 1984).  Therefore the approach post-colonial studies has taken to track the 
establishment of colonies and the post-colonial nation-state is conducive to demonstrating the 
power consolidation process in Nepal that pushed the nation to become a nation-state 
(Chatterjee; Cohn; Corrigan and Sayer; Guha; Memmi; Metha; Mitchell).  
12 The distinction I am making here between nation and nation-state involves the process of 
taking national “unity” (what is contained within the borders) and organizing it through 
government, administration, infrastructure, education, and a precarious balance of consensus.  
This allows nations to define themselves within the representative frame of the nation-state, 
which has been the way that countries have interacted and negotiated with each other in the 
modern era (Burghart 1984: 101). 
13 Dr. Mark Turin informed me that while researching the Regmi archives he discovered the 
little-propagated fact that this famous quote of Prithvi Narayan Shaha’s was a response to his 
failed attempt to contain all of his conquered territory’s diversity within the four varna caste 
system. 
14 For detailed account of the intercultural and intracultural contexts in which the idea of the 
Nepali nation-state was formed please consult, Richard Burghart article “The Formation of the 
Concept of Nation-State in Nepal” (1984). 
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In 1854, the Muluki Ain (law of the country) was established in order to 
codify the law and the traditional social conditions nationwide (Höfer: 1979).  
It outlined the behavioral sanctions of groups according to their assigned caste 
classification and delineated the interactions between citizens according to 
Hindu law (e.g., from whom one can receive water, with whom one can eat, 
marry, copulate, etc.). Throughout the Rana rule, the local leaders of the 
diverse groups of Nepal had to negotiate expectations of the regime in order 
to maintain varying degrees of local autonomy.15  In 1964 many of these legal 
statutes were adjusted to follow the first constitution of King Mahendra’s 
democratic partyless system, known as the Panchayat (Höfer 1979).  But 
neither during that time nor in the democratic constitution of 1990 was the 
caste system abolished (Hufton, Reaper and Whelpton: 1999; Sharma 2002). 
Nonetheless, many ethnographic studies have demonstrated that despite the 
distance of the central government, its practices insidiously penetrated local 
tradition because the government administration had incorporated leaders at 
every level, allowing them to profit if the governing system was ensured 
(Holmberg 1989; Gellner  (ed.) 1999; Guneratne 2002; Levine 1989; Ortner 
1989; Whelpton 1997).16 
                                                
15 There are many works of scholarship that illustrate how ethnic groups’ terms of surrender 
to Prithi Narayan Shaha, and their subsequent relationships with the central government, 
determined how these groups’ identities as citizens of the nation-state developed (Adams 
1995; Burghart 1984; Des Chene 1996; Fisher, W. 2001; Fürer-Haimendorf 1964; Gellner 1997; 
Guneratne 2002; Höfer 1979; Holmberg 1989; Levine 1987; Ortner 1978 & 1989; Parish 1994; 
Pignède 1993 [1966]; Schneiderman 2009; Whelpton 1997). For example: David Holmberg’s 
work on the corvée labor system agreements between the central government and the Tamang 
communities demonstrates the classification process the Tamang underwent in order to be 
citizen-subjects of Nepal (1989: 23-47, for more general explanation see Burghart 1984). Arjun 
Guneratne documents the process by which the Tharus became bonded labors, when high-
caste Parbatiya (middle hills) cheated them out of their land with the support of the 
government, after the eradication of malaria made the Terai region more hospitable to 
cultivation (2002). Sherry Ortner’s work establishes that due to their remoteness and 
connection with Lhasa’s religious ruling class, Sherpas had much less interaction with the 
Nepali government (1978; 1989).  
16 Much like the attempts by the Shaha dynasty and the Rana regime to classify Nepal’s 
diversity, anthropology began as a cartographic enterprise that attempted to understand and 
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Nepal has used moral order to collapse the gap between what is and 
what should be.17 The King of Nepal is believed to be an incarnate of Vishnu, 
the sustainer of order. The country is his property and with every successive 
generation, this myth has ensured him the right to rule.18 During the Rana 
regime (1846-1951), Rana leaders further entrenched the moral order by 
establishing themselves as the vessel through which Vishnu ruled; they 
became protectors of Vishnu’s order and the King became a figurehead.  It 
was during the Rana regime that state festivals and religious ceremonies left 
the confines of the royal temple and became an obligation of all citizens.19 
Dasain is the largest ceremony and is still practiced today as an official state 
holiday for which six days of leave are granted. This festival is a nationwide 
celebration of the triumph of good over evil.20 Essentially, Dasain was meant 
to ensure the Rana and subsequent governments’ governing hierarchy, 
because people in every stratum need to sacrifice on behalf of their superiors 
and they receive alms in exchange. It is an annual ritual that is meant to 
reinforce the social and political order of the entire country (Krauskopff & 
Lecomte-Tilouine, eds. 1996). 
In 1990 the multi-party democratic constitution outlawed 
discrimination on the basis of religion, yet it still identified Nepal as a Hindu 
kingdom under the jurisdiction of a democratic constitutional monarchy. Even 
                                                                                                                                       
place Nepal’s diversity within its remote geography and relation to the state. This occurred 
despite the fact that close study of political subjects was strongly discouraged by the 
Panchayat government (Gellner 2003b: 12). 
17 “States can be defined in terms of economics, politics, or morality” (Gellner 2003b:1). 
18 The 2001 royal massacre, which resulted in what some call strategic deaths to shift the line 
of succession to Gyanendra and his progeny, has been considered a conspiracy that reveals 
the logical fallacies of the King’s divine right to rule.  
19 Until 2008, Thirteen of the nineteen state holidays were Hindu. (Sharma 2002: 29). 
20 Dasain commemorates a great victory of the gods over the wicked demons. The main 
celebration honors goddess Durga’s slaying of the terrible demon Mahisasur, who terrorized 
the earth in the guise of a brutal water buffalo. In the Ramayana lord Ram’s success in 
slaughtering Ravana is attributed to the evocation of goddess Durga. 
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those politicians who have challenged the right of the King’s absolute rule 
have gone to receive tika (blessing) from the King in an official capacity.  The 
tika blessing is commonplace in political ritual across party lines.  Even the 
Maoists adorned their soldiers’ foreheads with the red rice paste and draped 
them with marigold garlands as they went off to the battlefields. And still 
today, even after the abolishment of the monarchy and the Hindu nation-state, 
politicians draw on Hindu religious metaphors in their speeches and political 
rituals. These metaphors envelop references to the nation and land in order to 
create a shared sense of solidarity, a sense of responsibility to act for the good 
of the nation. The Hindu references are used seamlessly alongside liberal 
democratic discourse. I am not arguing that this rhetorical device is a direct 
grab for the monarchy’s traditional foothold on power but there use suggests 
the currency these metaphors are perceived to have. All of these issues I have 
cited highlight either the agenda or acts of complicity of Nepali statesmen in 
maintaining a social order that was originally inspired by a Hindu worldview, 
whether it be a guise for absolute monarchy, Rana rule, Panchayat monarchy, 
representative democracy, or democratic republic.  Framing Nepal as a Hindu 
nation was the official agenda for two hundred and thirty-eight years.  
Therefore every entity that has either supported or challenged the Nepali state 
has had to do so on those terms.  
Just as Nepal had particular cultural and religious ways of internally 
dealing with the construction of its citizenry, its particular geographic position 
influenced how it dealt externally with the construction of itself as a nation-
state.  The Panchayat government (1960-1990) marked the end of isolationism. 
It was thirteen years after the Cold War’s beginning and India’s 
independence.  Nepal’s geographic position between India and China became 
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a geopolitical position of interest to both sides during the Cold War.  Nepal 
opted for a policy of non-alignment, which allowed it to court India, China, 
and the U.S.A. for foreign investment to develop national infrastructure and 
governance.  Nepal entered into geopolitics in the era of the nation-state, and 
it needed to become one in order to negotiate with foreign powers. The 
development discourse of India certainly made an impact on Nepal. Like the 
newly independent India, Nepal was struggling to contain all that was within 
its borders. As Chatterjee has explained,  
All politics is now sought to be subsumed under 
the overwhelming requirements of the state-
representing-the-nation.  The state now acts as the 
rational allocator and arbitrator for the nation. Any 
movement which questions this presumed identity 
between the people-nation and the state-
representing-the-nation is denied the status of 
legitimate politics. (Chatterjee 1986: 168) 
This presented a challenge to King Mahendra who had recently usurped 
control from the squabbling ineffective political parties, who were 
subsequently banned.  Not only did he need to establish order within Nepal, 
but also he needed to present the state of Nepal to the international world, as 
one of consensus that was on the road to rational state governance and 
administration. The Panchayat government recognized the potential power 
and wealth that could be consolidated through the process of modernization 
(Panday 1999).  Development pushed Nepal to become dependent on external 
powers in order to foster the citizens’ reliance on the state as the provider of 
basic necessities.21 But since maintaining Panchayat power took precedence 
                                                
21 Krishna Hachhethu contrasts peoples’ refusal to accept state aid after the 1934 earthquake 
because it was a sin to take the King’s property (rājyvas) with the growing dependence on the 
state through the Panchayat era to show the impact of development and social services on 
peoples’ conceptions of the state’s responsibility (2002: 165). 
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over the welfare of the citizenry, development ultimately produced little more 
than institutionalized corruption; it served the old and the new proprietary 
classes rather than the larger public (Panday 1999: 254).  
Development served not only as a means for government officials to 
amass wealth or a carrot to invest Nepal’s diverse citizenry in being citizens, 
but foreign investment protected Nepal’s borders.  The possibility of being 
usurped into India has always been a grave concern for Nepal.22  The 
investment from other foreign nations was an investment in Nepal as an 
independent nation-state.23  King Birendra’s 1976 diplomatic initiative to 
establish Nepal as a “Zone of Peace” is most often described as a plan to 
attract investors, to pitch Nepal as the Switzerland of South Asia  (Shaha 
1982). But it also served another purpose.  It juxtaposed Nepal’s peace with 
India’s communal violence to advertise Nepal as a successful nation-state. 
Such manufacturing of image encouraged international treatment of Nepal as 
a nation-state, which protected it from Indian encroachment and citizens’ 
doubts.24  
Although the post-1990 democratic government categorically 
abandoned the use of Panchayat governmental organizational infrastructure 
                                                
22 Much of Nepal’s nationalism has been constructed based on this fear of Indian imperialism. 
Since there is so much dependence on India for economic support, port access, and political 
legitimacy (by all political actors), Nepali politicians must carefully balance courting India to 
their advantage without seeming like lackeys serving Indian interests. 
23 One could argue that the maintenance of Nepal as a Hindu nation also ensured Nepal’s 
autonomy. India is a secular nation with many influential orthodox Hindus who have 
engaged in both political and violent struggle to establish their influence. They revered Nepal 
as a Hindu nation, an ambition they have for India. If it were to be annexed, then Nepal 
would have become secular. Something even moderate Hindus have mourned since the 
dethroning of the King in 2008.  
24 This policy created the notion of Nepal as a Himalayan Shangri-La that many western 
tourists found comfort in as Nepal began slowly opening up to tourism in the late seventies.  
Since the Maoist People’s War, the end of Nepal as a Shangri-la has been lamented by scholars 
of tourism (Thapa 2003), diplomats (Chang-Bloch 2005), and mainstream journalists (Dubin 
2004), whereas some public intellectuals and political scientists have debunked the myth of 
Nepal as a Shangri-la in the first place (Bohara et al. 2006, Dixit 2005). 
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and policies, it was not going to forego the aid game for development dollars.  
With the deregulation of non-governmental agencies and many other services, 
Nepal went from being a socialized system to one of free-market competition 
with minimal regulation.  Every sector was opened to foreign investment as 
both governmental and private endeavors negotiated the remaking of Nepal 
as a democratic, free-market, civil society. At first the NGO and INGO 
discourse contributed to the image that things were changing in Nepal, and 
democracy was the major contributing factor.  But ultimately “NGO-ization” 
made Nepal vulnerable to all of the typical downfalls of poorly guided 
investment, reliance on transnational expertise, and the re-entrenchment of 
local power due to the need for middlemen (Pigg 1997: 265).  Local elites 
quickly mastered the discourse of democratization, civil society, and 
empowerment in order to maintain their positions of power while funneling 
money into their areas to do with as they saw fit (Tarnowsky and Harper 
2002).  
International non-governmental organizations (INGO) and non-
governmental organizations (NGO) in Nepal have served as an alternative 
bureaucracy to the state that makes knowledge claims based on its 
transnational networks and material resources (Shaha 2002). Development 
projects were no longer five-year plans implemented by the Panchayat 
government. Rather, the donors came to the fore, people started to understand 
that USAID, DFID, the IMF, and the World Bank, as well as private donors, 
were the ones who were responsible. Implementation was left to INGOs and 
NGOs and the government became peripheral. Since the democratically 
elected government was doing little for local municipalities, let alone running 
parliament smoothly, this factor seriously undermined the democratic parties’ 
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claims to state power that is meant to represent and provide for its citizenry. It 
was the realization that both democratic government and development aid 
contributed less to improvement of peoples’ lives and more to corruption and 
maintenance of traditional power structure that fueled the Maoist People’s 
War (Thapa and Sijapati 2004). This was the turning point from developing 
state to soft state, which after ten years of armed conflict was considered 
closer to a failed state. In this sense, Nepal had fallen victim to the new 
imperialism, development (Harvey 2003).  
The reality that the international world is an influential legitimating 
power for the various political factions is underscored by the fact that the 
United Nations became the mediator in the 2006 peace talks, there were a 
number of external monitors present in Nepal during the 2008 Constituent 
Assembly elections, and the United Nations’ Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) has 
since been an ongoing mediating force.  This dissertation focuses on Nepali 
political articulations of international values as they couch them in local 
historical and cultural references. I demonstrate how Nepali politicians’ 
simultaneous pandering to the international forces and local masses creates a 
rhetorical fog that has perpetuated traditional elite strangleholds over state 
power and resources. My ethnographic data demonstrates that the student 
political actors have become acculturated into this environment and have 
become even more adept at this double speak than their political leaders. 
Furthermore, in the context of this dissertation, it is important to 
understand the role of education in the state project. Public education is a tool 
of the modern state apparatus to inculcate or socialize citizens. The modern 
social sciences have established that schools are places where socialization, 
rationalization, productivity, and efficiency are taught in the desired formula 
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to subjugate the masses (Adler and Adler 1998; Bourdieu and Passeron 1979 
[1964]; Bryant 2004; Faiman Silva 2002; Ferguson 2000; Hall K. 2002; Holland 
and Skinner 1996; Lesko 2001; Levinson, Foley, and Holland (eds.) 1996; 
Moffatt 1989; Stambach 2000; Willis 1977). In this regard, education is similar 
to other governmental institutional organizations; its agenda provides a view 
into the state idea (Mitchell 1991).  
There were barely a dozen schools and only one college in Nepal before 
the Panchayat era; by the end there were over 25,000 schools throughout the 
country.25 A USAID-sponsored grant for education was the first development 
project in the post-Rana regime. It built schools, trained teachers, and created 
curriculum (Dixit 2002: 193). The Panchayat government used education as a 
means to generate patriotism among the younger generations.  The official 
rationale was to train the diverse citizenry to think of themselves first as 
Nepali citizens and secondly as their jāt. The curricula were designed at the 
central government level to ensure that every student was receiving a uniform 
education. This was done by teaching Nepali and Sanskrit, and teaching a 
history that glorified the King’s dynasty and disparaged the suppressive Rana 
regime.  Hinduism served as a pedagogic tool; the imagery and mythology 
often found its way into textbooks (Ahearn: 2003; Dixit 2002, Onta 1996b; 
Sharma: 2002). Furthermore, most of the teachers were high class Brahmans 
who had the best access to education.  This established a bifurcation between 
the children’s private lives and public lives; at home they spoke their mother 
                                                
25 The number of secondary school students in 1950 was 1,680, in 1991 it was 421,709, and in 
2004 it was 543,764. The number of university students at the Masters’ and Ph.D. levels in 1950 
was 250, in 1991 it was 110,329, and in 2004 it was 207,211. (Spotlight, May 1st, 1996 in Hoftun, 
et al 1999: 95, also see, Nepal Education Ministry: 
http://www.moe.gov.np/stats/stat_ugc.php).  
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tongue but at school they needed to be Nepali citizens conversing in the state 
language and learning state sanctioned materials (Holland and Skinner 1996).  
At the university level state claims were more openly contentious.  
Those who were fortunate enough to advance to such a high level were often 
urban middle and upper-class, and the upper-caste from villages outside 
Kathmandu valley.  Since the royal takeover of the democratic government in 
1960 the university has been one of the main places were the state has been 
challenged (Snellinger 2005).  But the Panchayat government countered 
dissent by establishing its own student organization, the Rāstrabādi Bidhyārthi 
Manḍal (National Student Forum). It was justified as a forum for ambitious 
individuals to align themselves with the Panchayat administration to secure 
future jobs.  But it also enabled pro-Panchayat students to compete in the Free 
Student Union elections; this allowed the government line to be propagated in 
the only open environment of political contestation.  
After the Panchayat government’s attempt to ban student organizations 
was overruled by the Supreme Court (1973), the new education policy was 
implemented with sponsorship from USAID (1975-1979). One of its official 
statutes was the abolishment of student politics in order to ensure the progress 
of the policy’s implementation (Snellinger 2005). At an objective level, the new 
educational policy was a step toward western education; it introduced a 
semester system with regular exams, which left little time for politics, whether 
underground or overtly. Many still regard this education policy with 
suspicion as a Panchayat machination that did not address the needs of the 
students, but rather implemented policy that eliminated dissent under the 
justification of foreign aid pressure. 
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Although education was used as a way to establish the state, the 
institutionalizing of education also served as a gateway to, as well as a 
foundation for, the democratic movement. A little-known factor that 
contributed to the Panchayat government’s demise is the National 
Development Service (1975-1978).  This program was implemented as part of 
the new education policy of 1975.  It required master’s students at Tribhuvan 
University to perform a year of service involving a training program in 
practical implementation of first aid, agriculture, teaching, and local 
development, ten months on a village stay to work with local Panchayat 
officials, and the submission of a village report to the central government.  
Over ninety percent of the districts were involved. This program was the 
Panchayat’s answer to sustainable development that also provided 
surveillance of local administrators.  But in reality the students took advantage 
of this process in order to politicize village leaders and locals.  The program 
did serve to unify the country but in a way unforeseen by the Panchayat 
government. It set the stage for the nationwide referendum that allowed 
banned political parties to campaign nationwide, which resulted from the 
intense agitation and strong demands of the 1979 student movement (Rana 
1995: 422-425). Although the parties lost the referendum, it was the second 
step in mobilizing the country against the government; on their next try a 
decade later they were able to rally enough support to win multi-party 
democracy (Snellinger 2006).26  
According to the 1990 constitution the King remained the chancellor of 
Tribhuvan University and Mahendra Sanskrit University, but as a figurehead 
                                                
26 Of the 7,111,000 registered voters, 2.4 million voted for the Panchayat system and 2 million 
voted for the multi-party system (Hoftun, et al 1999: 93). 
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who merely rubber-stamped all official activity, including appointments and 
curriculum on all Tribhuvan-affiliated campuses.  Although the position of 
chancellor was meant to be purely symbolic, so was the position of 
constitutional monarchy, yet the monarchy’s role has been easily manipulated 
to actively govern twice since 2001, with the justification of Article 127 of the 
constitution. During the royal takeover of 2005, the proposal to make the King 
the chancellor of all other Nepali universities, including the nation’s only 
private university, Kathmandu University, had been of concern to some 
university professors and students. They perceived this to be an attempt to 
reestablish the King’s influence over the universities.  The 2005 New National 
Education Act27 of the rājparishād (the governing counsel appointed by the 
King) had also raised eyebrows among those suspicious that the King desired 
to refill the vacuum of patriotic influence that was inserted into Panchayat 
curriculum. This was an agenda that the political parties never took advantage 
of, they did little to shape curriculum to inform students on what it means to 
be a democratic citizen (Snellinger 2005).  These maneuvers testify to the 
vulnerable position of educational institutions, which continue to be a 
battleground for nationalist, monarchist, Maoist, and international influence. 
The 1990 Jana Āndolan (People’s Movement) that brought multiparty 
democracy was hoped to transform the nation-state of Nepal. But it has since 
been critiqued as a high-caste grab for power in urban areas that had been 
                                                
27 One of the more contentious steps of the 2005 new education policy was the insertion of a 
picture of King Gyanendra, the Queen, and the Crowned Prince Paras (who has little public 
support to inherent the throne) on the first page of all textbooks.  It was around this issue that 
the student organizations and the political parties framed the new education policy as a 
means for Gyanendra to maintain his illegitimate rule. I tracked the cases of five students who 
had publicly burned new textbooks in defiance of the order. They were arrested and remained 
in jail under the Public Securities Act for three months. The day they were released they again 
repeated the act in the courthouse and were detained for another month. 
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generating for thirty years.28 Although there are different views of who 
participated in the Jana Āndolan, it must be conceded that it was an ideological 
struggle over different visions of what life ought to be in Nepal, how the state 
should be run, what society should look like, and who should participate in 
making these decisions.  It is understandable that it took thirty years to get 
people to the streets since the first period of democracy; thirty years was about 
the span of time in which shared memory no longer included experiences of 
democracy in the 1950s. People could be swayed by how the political parties 
framed democracy in the possibilities of the future with no direct memory or 
experience of the inefficiency and power politics that it entailed during the 
1950s. 
For many it was just a regime change that did not centrally impact their 
lives. Particularly in the countryside people were vulnerable to the same 
hardships that has plagued them for generations: poverty, feudal conditions, 
and marginalization. But nonetheless the rhetoric had changed. Many 
received democracy by way of radio, magazines, and teachers emphasizing 
individual choice, progress, and success (Ahearn 2003: 16, Fujikura 2003). 
Moreover, the landscape of the urban areas was altered in various ways. 
Deregulation allowed the private market to pick up where the government 
had slacked: media, education,29 and telecommunications. Liberal free market 
philosophy is based on the premise that in order to have a thriving economy, a 
stable state must be established, and in order to maintain a stable state a 
strong civil society must be created.  This was the job of development. The 
presence of donor agencies, NGOs, and INGOs fueled the desire to create a 
                                                
28 The governments during both Panchayat rule and after the 2005 coup have been more 
diverse than at any time during multi-party democracy. 
29 The Education Statistics of Nepal Education Ministry of 1999 reported that of the 25,599 
schools in the country, 8,547 of them were private. 
   31 
civil society in which everyone could participate and from which everyone 
could benefit. Protection of free speech enabled people to speak out, and 
Nepal had entered the protest era where most anything was open for 
contestation (Lakier 2007). Student groups and unions regularly protested 
government policy. The Janajāti movement (ethnic minorities movement) 
developed where minority ethnic groups embraced their identity as a basis for 
equal access and representation (Lawoti 2005). And the ultimate protest was a 
ten-year civil war that polarized people in the civil war between the ideologies 
of Maoism, democracy, and monarchy.30 Ultimately, the masses spoke out in 
favor of a democratic republic in the 2006 People’s Movement and the 
Constituent Assembly elections of 2008.  The last fifteen years have 
highlighted that liberal democratic values and communist ideals have 
contributed to undermining the Hindu rule.  
Nepal is now in the process of state restructuring in order to undo the 
structural and symbolic violence caused by the construction of the Hindu 
nation. An era called “new Nepal.” Will Nepal ever truly belong to its people, 
so that the state represents and provides for all of its diversity? Throughout 
my research I have witnessed UN advisors, American politicians, international 
journalists, and other international agents seek out student politicians to 
provide alternatives to the political impasse.  These individuals were 
                                                
30 The citizenry was torn over this King’s 2001 and 2005 take over; many thought that the 
parties failed at their project of democracy and that peace and security are more important 
than the right to vote for ineffective, corrupt politicians. In February 2005 a fair sector of the 
population was hopeful; they felt the King’s move was decisive and perhaps could bring 
stability to the country.  But over a year later, people became less tolerant of the increased 
restrictions on civil liberties, the dwindling economy, and the continued violence. The reason 
being, the King did not capitalize on the Maoists’ four-month ceasefire in order to negotiate 
peace. From September 2005 the parties and the Maoists had been in a series of talks to 
establish a united agenda in which to regain power in the name of the people, which 
culminated in the People’s Movement II in April 2006. At that point the demand for republic 
became as audible as the call for complete democracy was two years before. 
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consulting all sides to get a balanced overview, and meeting with the younger 
generation of leaders was meant to provide them a necessary perspective.  Yet 
only about five students have been relied upon in this capacity, four of whom 
are upper caste men from one of the two Nepali Congress parties, the other a 
female janajāti from the mainstream communist party (UML (Akhil)).  It is this 
group of students with a few dozen other student political and civil activists 
who attend the INGO or diplomatic workshops on governance, transparency, 
and civil society. Often the students are picked for their proficiency in English. 
When these students are asked to cite the problems that have led to the 
political crisis, they cite exclusivity and even have solutions to address it.  Yet 
they never refuse an invitation to speak nor have they been successful in 
implementing their suggested changes in their own organizations. Therefore 
what this dissertation attempts to capture is that reform is only ever partial, 
even from political generation to generation. 
In closing, I would like to emphasize Nepali political actors’ investment 
in the Nepali state. The greeting amongst politicians and student activists, 
particularly the Nepali Congress members, is “jaya Nepal” (victory to Nepal). 
As an articulation, it is an investment in a political state in which they believe. 
Among one another this greeting may be routinized but when they engage 
outsiders in it, they are symbolically forcing them to participate in the act of 
confirming the longevity of Nepal. What I have tried to demonstrate here is 
that very few are disputing the borders of Nepal; rather they are disputing 
how what is inside those borders should be organized. I attribute Nepal’s 
status as a state to the geopolitical situation. The elites (who begin as student 
activists) who have historically vied for power are the ones who continue to 
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capitalize on this situation in order to maintain their status and construct 
Nepal, as they deem appropriate. 
Paternalism and the Role of (Fictive) Kin Networks 
Since the Nepali state has come out of a patriarchal, caste-based 
paradigm, paternalism and insular networks are not merely themes but serve 
as social norms in which people must operate. Understanding this has been an 
important part of analyzing my ethnographic data, specifically how relations, 
community, and family serve as important themes that affect political 
behavior and interaction. In his book Fatalism and Development, Dor Bahadur 
Bista discusses group behavior and the own person (āphno mānchhe) cultural 
phenomenon that is prevalent in Nepali society, particularly in politics and 
government bureaucracy. He argues that there is a compulsion to create an 
inner circle where a sense of safety and security can be derived.  He asserts 
that “The distinction between the group ‘us’ and the rest as ‘them’ manifests 
itself in every walk of social, cultural, political and economic life. Everything 
inside the circle of ‘us’ is predictable and the rest is external and 
unpredictable. Therefore, there is a constant need to maintain the boundary” 
(1991: 97). In a place as diverse as Nepal, differentiating between people is 
culturally endemic. Historically it was done on the legal level through the 
caste system strictures set out in the Muluki Ain, which were imposed on the 
social level in public and private interaction.  By maintaining spheres of 
influence, people are able to feel a sense of control and enforce some order 
into what is otherwise a very diverse place comprised of different religions, 
languages, traditions, and bloodlines.31   
                                                
31 According to the 2001 census there are fifty-nine ethnic groups and thirty-eight caste 
groups, a dozen major religions observed, and over one hundred native languages spoken in 
Nepal (See Lawoti 2005: 88)  
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There are also a multitude of political parties that span the ideological 
spectrum.32  They all have their own rich histories, ideologies, and practices, 
which people define as institutional culture. The institutional cultures operate 
as social guides that allow political actors to identify themselves and others in 
the larger political culture. They provide the parameters in which participants 
create their own group identities, which as I demonstrate in chapter six, are 
influenced by what they understand their internal culture to be and how they 
understand others to identify it. They allow political actors a way to 
distinguish their place and the place of their group in the larger politics. 
Mutual recognition between actors of political institutions is a necessary part 
of national politics. The āphno mānchhe phenomenon encompasses the process 
of social self-invention in Nepali politics through the process of differentiating 
who is on the in and who is on the out. 
Just as establishing insular networks is an entrenched custom of Nepali 
political culture, the opposite—mapping kin relations onto social interaction—
is common as well. The common Nepali practice of creating fictive kin 
relations not only establishes the social hierarchy within every interaction, but 
it is a symbolic act of connecting people.  The pervasiveness of family 
metaphors in political rhetoric allows for this as well.  Politicians often make 
filial references in speeches to draw the crowd into unity.  It is commonplace 
to hear the opening sentence of a speech contain the words “brothers and 
sisters and friends of Nepal.” Furthermore, females draw on family metaphors 
to claim a place in politics.  I often heard female activists assert that a family 
cannot run a household without women, so how can political parties run the 
                                                
32 Sixty-one political parties registered with the Election Commission for the 2008 Constituent 
Assembly Elections. 
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country without women. For this reason, I interpret people’s filial metaphors 
as an endeavor to make social connection and to appeal to people’s sense of 
social duty.  Moreover, even though there is an inherent hierarchy to kinship, 
people perceive it as less divisive than a client-patron relationship. A family 
works toward a common goal, the maintenance and betterment of the shared 
lineage; similarly a party works to enact a shared ideology into practice.  
Therefore, emphasizing kin relations is meant to deny the tradition of 
patronage, which is pervasive in politics but the existence of which causes 
anxiety. 
In this dissertation I examine the predominance of insular networks as 
well as the impulse to create fictive kin relations in order to understand how 
the students make social connection as well as place themselves and others in 
the political landscape.  
Theoretical Frame: The Pendulum between Democracy and Post-Democracy 
Much has happened since I first began focusing on Nepal’s political 
situation. As I have done this research I have come to realize that political 
struggle, intrigue, violence, and repression have had a consistently prominent 
place in Nepal’s political history. Yet what has struck me most about the 
political situation in Nepal is its monotony. People’s lives go on as they 
experience all the turmoil; arrests, tear gas, lāthi charges, disappearances, and 
banishments from parties and the nation are as much a part of life as 
weddings, births, and natural deaths, which people often celebrate or mourn 
alongside with arresting officers, political opponents, or the King’s 
appointees.33  Yet it must be emphasized that this is a privileged experience 
                                                
33 Since the army officers, police officers, politicians, and bureaucrats tend to be of high-caste 
status, they find themselves interacting with each other in varying situations.  Their social 
dynamics range from obligatory mingling in filial and social situations to violent opposition. 
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and perspective. Common citizens’ lives have been torn apart because of the 
activities in which these elites engage. My focus on the normality that political 
turmoil plays in Nepali politically elite experience directly addresses what 
Geertz claimed has always been troublesome for our discipline: “[H]ow can 
we bring the articulations of power and the conditions of it into some 
comprehensible relationship?” (2000: 130). In this dissertation I attempt to do 
this by explaining Nepali political culture through analysis of what comprises 
the political and how politics is conducted.   
In order for my analysis to capture the nature of politics and the 
political as I have observed it in Nepal, I have chosen to use Jacques Rancière’s 
political philosophy, laid out in his book Disagreement. I argue that due to the 
consistency of political struggle in Nepali political history—which some have 
called a way of life—people recognize the constructed nature of politics. 
Politics is an act of constant negotiation over meaning, agenda, and direction, 
and it aims to order social relations. Rancière’s political philosophy has 
allowed me to frame my analysis to highlight the ebbs and flows of Nepali 
politics in the unfolding of life, a mundane stream of events, which is fueled 
by ruptures, that may be either positive or negative and rarely leads to 
resolution but through ongoing contestation brings possibility. 
Rancière argues in a lecture entitled Eleven theses on Politics that “the 
essential work of politics is the configuration of its own space. It is to get the 
world of its subjects and its operations to be seen” (1996). In his book 
Disagreement he distinguishes between the social and the political.  He 
describes the social as a complex domain in which the “policing logics,” 
                                                                                                                                       
The range of interactions creates flexibility to give political favors or assert threats when it is 
deemed beneficial. 
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dictate the way things are structurally distributed among social groups; it 
defines the ways in which it is possible to configure public space34 and who 
has a voice in it. Politics questions the hegemony (“policing logics”) and how 
goods and privileges are distributed within it. For Rancière this makes politics 
a contentious act that calls into question the order of things. In a post-Marxian 
style, Rancière contends that political action unveils the social, because it 
highlights the controversial distribution of places and roles that comprise the 
social (Rancière 1999: 18). Politics constantly emerges from questions 
traditionally thought of as social because it renders apparent who is qualified 
to say what a particular place is and what is to be done in it. It is for this 
reason that I am using his theoretic frame, to better understand what 
comprises the social and its relationship to the political. As I conceptualize it, 
politics can serve a similar analytic role as social movements have. Politics 
unearths contradictions in the social that render the constructive processes of 
culture, and individuals more transparent (Escobar 1992). 35  
In this dissertation I demonstrate that politics in Nepal is revered for 
being the act that Rancière describes, an unveiling of the unjust aspects of 
social interaction, but it is also dictated by a predominant social, or “policing 
logic” that defines what is political.36 I approach student politics from the view 
that since students are new to the practice of politics, then the simultaneity of 
their experience of being socialized and defining their own subjectivity is 
more obvious. Therefore, a focus on student politics makes apparent 
Rancière’s claim in regard to democratic politics: “[I]n politics, subjects do not 
                                                
34 Politics is an inquiry into the distribution of spaces. It asks, “What are these places? How do 
they function? Why are they here? Who can occupy them?” (Rancière 2003: 201) 
35 In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Ernst Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argue that since any 
social order is a specific pattern of power relations, then politics needs to be seen as 
constituting the identities of those who engage it (1985). 
36 Laclau and Mouffe define the policing logic phenomenon as hegemony (1985). 
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have consistent bodies; they are fluctuating performers who have their 
moments, places, occurrences, and the peculiar role of inventing arguments 
and demonstrations—in the double, logical and aesthetic, sense of the terms—
to bring the non-relationship into relationship and give place to the non-
place”  (1999: 89).  My ethnographic examples reveal that through their own 
intervention into politics, Nepali student activists’ claims to democracy as a 
practice for and by the people not only highlights the need to recognize the 
political rights of all citizens but also the frequency with which they are 
covertly denied.  In other words, their fumbling for a place in politics reveals a 
situation in which “non-places” continue to go unacknowledged.  
Yet politics is not simply the unveiling of social distribution of 
recognized and unrecognized subjectivities; it is also an investment in the act 
of unveiling and reconstructing. A central argument in this dissertation is that 
the historical experience for Nepali political actors has been a pendulum that 
has swung between the poles of political activism and parliamentary politics, 
with stints underground or in exile during repressive regimes. Many people 
view the elites’ claimed democratic struggle as a cynical move for power.  This 
dissertation complicates that perspective. The actions of some political leaders 
resonate with Rancière’s contention that “[D]emocrats themselves have 
always remained suspicious of democracy. Those who have fought 
strenuously for democratic rights have often been the first to suspect that 
these rights were only theoretical, still a mere shadow of true democracy” 
(1999:96). In this dissertation, particularly in my focus of organizational form 
in chapter six and democratic practice in chapter seven, I analyze the 
ambivalence that people experience in putting their ideals into practice.  
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The basis of Rancière’s whole argument in Disagreement is that the 
commonly accepted ideal of “democracy” is really “post-democracy.” He 
differentiates the two by arguing that democracy, often violently, reveals the 
difference between those who are counted and those who are not, whereas 
post-democracy obfuscates subjectivities and erases politics by claiming that 
all are citizens and all have an equal, albeit unrecognized, voice. Rancière 
describes post-democracy thus: 
Post-democracy is the government practice and 
conceptual legitimization of a democracy after the 
demos, a democracy that has eliminated the 
appearance, miscount, and dispute of the people 
and is thereby reducible to the interplay of the state 
mechanisms and combinations of social energies. 
(1999: 102) 
Rancière would consider the establishment of “new Nepal” and its goal to 
restructure Nepal into a more inclusive state as “post-democracy.” Whereas 
most Nepali citizens welcomed “new Nepal” because it has meant peace, 
security, and the promise of a more just state-structure, yet its basis is 
comprised of the same political elites who rely on consensus in order to 
establish political policy.  In this dissertation I demonstrate that the emphasis 
on consensus in Nepal’s politics inevitably leads to further conflict because it 
involves political erasure and the usurpation of subjectivities. The only way to 
regain a distinctive identity is to return to āndolan protest in order to reveal 
one’s lack of place in the “police logic” of “post-democracy.” In this regard, 
Nepali political history has mirrored Rancière’s political paradigm, which 
argues that post-democratic consensus can only result in eventual 
disagreement, which leads again to democracy. Politics encapsulate this entire 
process; it is the continual contestation over distribution and meaning.  
   40 
In order to grapple with the political contradictions that my 
interlocutors encounter, I analyze the attitudes and practices of deliberation, 
consensus, vote casting, and inter- and intra-party splits and mergers through 
the frame of Rancière’s political paradox: in their attempts to create equality 
and inclusion political endeavors end up erasing distinct identities. 37 I also 
analyze political sensibilities in regards to ideology, organization, and 
working style in order to grasp the concept commonly held by Nepali political 
actors of “freedom within control” and how it simultaneously fuels people’s 
sense of political being while limiting their ability to achieve their political 
ideals.   
Furthermore, an underlying argument of Rancière’s political theory is 
that politics is the act of establishing subjectivities.  He argues that in order for 
the unheard to be heard, they must use the predominant discourse, thus 
becoming eclipsed by “police logic.”38 I use this assertion as my basis for 
analyzing elite political culture. I argue that anyone who wants to establish 
inclusion in the Nepali state will have to articulate it in a way that resonates 
with the sensibilities of the dominant discourse.  This is particularly true since 
consensus is the ideal form of negotiation propagated by all the influential 
powers, including the democratic parties, the Maoists, and the United 
Nations’ Mission in Nepal.  
                                                
37 In Disagreement, Rancière claims that “Political philosophies, at least those worthy of the 
name, the name of this particular paradox, are philosophies that offer a solution to the 
paradox on the part of those who have no part, either by substituting an equivalent role for it, 
or by creating a simulacrum of it, by performing an imitation of politics in negating it” (1999: 
65). In his analysis he refers to the achievement-elimination of politics in the following terms: 
archipolitics (Platonic), parapolitics (enlightenment liberalism), and metapolitcs (Marxism to 
deconstructionism). 
38 “They (plebians) execute a series of speech acts that mimic those of the patricians: they 
pronounce imprecations and apotheoses; they delegate one of their number to go and consult 
their oracles; they give themselves representatives by rebaptizing them.  In a word they 
conduct themselves like being with names” (Rancière 1999: 27). 
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The necessity for familiar language is also my impetus for taking 
political rhetoric seriously.  As I have established, there are a number of 
influential voices in the establishment of the Nepali state’s dominant discourse 
that are beyond local historical and cultural actors, including international 
humanitarian and aid organizations. For this reason, I discursively analyze 
political rhetoric in order to understand the speakers’ underlying references. 
Such analysis reveals the tactic of double speak, whereby political actors 
deploy rhetoric that resonates simultaneously for a number of different 
communities as a means to fog their intentions. In much of my observation, I 
found rhetoric to replace action.  Everyone engages in rhetoric as if it is action 
but often it is a deferral of action. When people are frustrated they will accuse 
others of talk (bhanai) and no action (garai), rhetoric defers implementation. 
Action is an ideal end point but many find that they receive resistance for 
moving toward action, for that reason talk continues to remain the safe stance, 
an abeyance of action postpones closure.  I analyze catch phrases like “new 
Nepal” and “inclusion” that people from different political perspectives have 
latched onto without ever defining. These phrases became amorphous 
signifiers rather than specific references, which create an appearance of 
consensus but again only in words, not in action. I argue that this may not be a 
merely duplicitous approach, but rather that it provides politicians freedom 
within the limits that appealing and seeking approval from so many varying 
interests necessitates. 
Chapter Outline  
In the following chapters I examine the meaning and place of politics in 
various transactions, contexts, and themes, with particular attention to the 
struggle and aspiration that people invest in their political lives. 
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The first chapter places me in the field.  My field site was a place of 
contentious politics, in which my interlocutors experienced heavy 
surveillance, especially during the street protests and state of emergency from 
2001 through 2006. In this chapter I describe my methods as well as my 
successes and challenges in navigating a heightened political environment. 
My approach allowed me to gain access to many political actors’ perspectives 
and lives, as well as their organizations’ programs and internal practices, all 
while keeping my interlocutors, research assistant, and myself safe. I also look 
at the limits of participant observation in the context of studying politics.  
Anthropologists have long held this technique as a key approach to 
penetrating people’s representations of themselves. Yet I quickly realized that 
full participation (giving speeches, shouting slogans, or throwing rocks) 
would limit my abilities to do an in depth study of student organizations.  I 
consider how doing research from the sidelines serves as a benefit in 
polarizing environments, and also how it requires one to maximize data 
gathered from the margins, particularly political rhetoric.  
The second chapter focuses on how Nepali students embrace the 
political as a personal endeavor. I consider how Nepali political actors 
reconcile their political ideals with the mundane of politics. I explore why 
people emphasize politics as a pure form of public service. I demonstrate how 
self-imposed discipline allows student politicians to substantiate larger forms 
of Nepali political imaginary as a real part of everyday life. I particularly focus 
on the narrative of suffering and struggle in order to show how it contributes 
to the construction of political identity. In the third section I analyze politics as 
a mode of being that provides opportunity and social connection. I establish 
that politics is a mode of being in which actors deploy different coping 
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mechanisms, such as speculation and ambiguity in order to participate 
socially in a larger political process over which they have very little control. In 
the last section, I explore the attitudes that students emphasize as the proper 
orientation within which to engage in politics, namely optimism as opposed to 
cynicism. These attitudes do not merely insinuate a positive frame; rather, 
they indicate the living of one’s daily life in a way that exemplifies how 
society should be restructured. I argue that this rhetorical strategy indexes 
what the mode of politics, as political actors see it, should be couched in 
discipline and sacrifice.  I analyze how people talk about these categories of 
being in Nepali politics as a means to manifest what they feel politics ought to 
be. 
The third chapter focuses on the role of political history. It is not a 
historical overview but rather it provides the relevant political background by 
analyzing the rhetorical patterns that the activists employ to tell the story of 
Nepali political history. I will consider how this orients student activists 
toward potential political horizons by referencing the struggle of political 
movements. I focus on political movements and protest not only to 
demonstrate how people situate history but also to reveal how history is 
conceptualized and experienced. Political movements are not only historical 
designations; they also shape people’s individual experiences and their place 
in the social and political landscape. I argue that political movements are key 
events that are historically referenced while they are concurrently reenacted as 
an opportunity to mark student activists’ place in politics.  In other words, in 
the experience of protest there is a simultaneous sense of rapid newness and 
of nothing new at all, which I link theoretically to the tension between political 
and social change and cultural transmission. 
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Chapter four problematizes youth as an entrenched social category, one 
that is a complex dynamic between a traditional age-set structure and the 
process of political becoming defined by global, rights-based discourse. I 
consider the idea of youth as a discursive practice within Nepali politics, 
examining how the trope of generation (and related themes of kinship and 
family) fits into the internal cultures and power dynamics of political parties 
and their student organizations. This chapter draws on interview material and 
ethnographic accounts of how youth and generation are employed by actors 
in the Nepali political contexts, in order to explore the role of “youth” as a 
concept in mediating power relations within political parties. I demonstrate 
how the manipulation of the category of youth reveals how politics has 
become a holding pattern, as opportunities for political positions have 
diminished, yet still serves as a socializing designator. 
The five chapter focuses on elitism. I argue that whatever Nepali 
politics is to become, it will become so in response to its foundations as an 
elite, high-caste male culture. I analyze historical and ethnographic data to 
demonstrate the degree to which politics has traditionally been an elite, high-
caste male enterprise favored in a nation-state that developed out of a caste 
paradigm. I then analyze the influencing factors that have caused a shift in 
discourse to a globally elite enterprise that favors a rhetoric of inclusiveness. I 
consider the degree to which this new discourse can truly impact politics 
when it continues to reference the traditional party system. I analyze how both 
minorities and women have been limited in the party system and demonstrate 
that in order to find a place they must either cultivate their voice in a way that 
resonates with dominant political norms or rely on real and fictive kin 
networks. 
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The sixth chapter attempts to complicate organizational theory. I 
analyze the aesthetics of organization in order to understand the perpetuation 
of political party mythos and how it fuels the political imaginary. I argue that 
people are invested in links between ideology and organizational form, as 
well as between working styles and lifestyles, which highlights the 
contradictory nature of the larger political mythos on which their parties 
thrive.  They attribute these connections to institutional culture, which not 
only provides them an identity but also allows them to identify other actors in 
the political field. In this chapter I closely examine the organizational 
structures into which the Nepali student politicians are being acculturated. 
This focus allows me to analyze how these students’ aspirations are framed by 
the political order within which they operate. I also explore the degree to 
which the discrepancies between ideology and internal practice 
unintentionally serve as feedback loops that create unanticipated downfalls 
for the participants, which are perceived by others as negative political 
culture. I also examine the underlying anxiety that political actors feel from 
this trend as another obstacle in the streamlining of theory and practice.  
The seventh chapter focuses on the internal governing practices of the 
student organizations in order to understand what is at stake in the political 
restructuring of Nepal. In reality, people have very different conceptions of 
democracy, which are based on varying ideology, practices, processes, and 
traditions that are not necessarily informed by liberal democratic values.  
What type of democracy works best? There are many varying forms that are 
currently being contested—multiparty democracy or people’s democratic 
republic, proportional or first past the post system, consensus or majority 
vote. In this chapter I analytically compare Nepali political activists’ various 
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notions of what democracy is and what processes it entails, with how Nepali 
student organizations engage democracy on an internal, institutional level. 
Using firsthand ethnographic data from the national conventions of the 
student organizations, I analyze how these student organizations are 
demonstrating their democratic capacities in light of making the “new Nepal.” 
In sum, this dissertation describes politics as a process of human action 
that is entrenched in a particular place but influenced by varying histories, 
ideologies, personalities, and sensibilities in a way that establishes it as a 
culture in and of itself. Through the ethnographic study of student activists, I 
provide textural understanding into the way they do politics.  Rancière 
described politics as “…the art of warped deductions and mixed identities. It 
is the art of the local and singular construction of cases of universality” (1999: 
139). Anthropology prides itself on studying the local. Here I take Nepali 
political culture as my analytic. Mine is a case study of the incongruity that 
lies between democratic theory and practice. I do this to reveal the terrain of 
politics in the Nepali context in order to push the theoretical bounds of 
democracy. This entire endeavor is meant to align our abstract ideals more 
closely with the form they take as human action. 
Note on the Text and Terminological Choices 
I have based my transliteration on the standard diacritic practice for 
transliterating Devangari script according to the International Standardization 
Organization (ISO 15919), except when it comes to the letters च and छ. For 
these letters I follow the standard Nepali transliteration practice, I write ch for 
च (c in the ISO system), and chh for छ (ch in the ISO system). I use diacritics 
and italicize transliterated terms throughout the text. I do not use diacritics or 
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italicize proper names and terms that are commonly used in English (for 
example, Panchayat). 
There is a debate in academic and ethnic activists circles regarding the 
designator “Nepali” versus “Nepalese.” 39 This debate highlights the politics of 
recognition in post-colonial South Asia. During their colonial rule, the British 
used the term “Nepalese” to refer to people who were citizens of the nation-
state of Nepal. In English, “Nepalese” was the accepted term until the last few 
decades during which time the term “Nepali” gained currency. This shift was 
an attempt to move away from colonial prescribed terminology to a term that 
more accurately reflects the ethnonym as it is spoken in the Nepali language 
(Nepali are the speakers of the Nepali language). Since the 1990’s there has 
been debate around these terms in ethnic activists circles, the contention is 
that “Nepalese” is more inclusive because the British colonial administration 
used it designate all the people of Nepal, whereas “Nepali” implicitly 
excludes people whose mother language is not Nepali. Furthermore, the term 
Nepali can be confusing since it is a language; a designator for people of 
Nepali origin in Nepal, India and abroad; as well as a descriptor for all things 
culturally, bureaucratically, and politically connected with Nepal.  
Nonetheless, I have chosen to use the term “Nepali” because it is the term that 
my interlocutors use. To make things clearer, I do not use Nepali as the noun 
referring to people but as a descriptor that details who or what I am 
specifically referencing. For example, I refer to the citizens of Nepal as “Nepali 
citizens,” political actors as “Nepali political actors,” and the state of Nepal as 
                                                
39 For a more detailed overview and the history of this debate please see Chalmers 2003 
chapter five; Gellner 2003 introduction; Hutt 1997 113-116; and Shneiderman 2009: 13-21. 
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the “Nepali state.” I only use the noun form of Nepali to reference the state 
language.   
   49 
CHAPTER ONE: 
FIELD METHODS: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AS AN ETHNOGRAPHIC 
SITE 
My analysis of my interlocutors’ internal knowledge production 
process dovetails with how I made sense of the knowledge production process 
of the social sciences before I went to the field. I have used the questions that I 
asked of social science literatures as a framework to apprehend the meaning 
my interlocutors make from their own categories, namely: What do the 
categories that they work with stand for?  What is the extent of those 
categories’ instrumentality? How does their usage of those categories connect 
them to their peers in politics and their interlocutors in their everyday lives 
and the international world?  And what purpose does that connection serve? 
In this chapter I outline my approach to these questions in the field. I describe 
how the field situation set the parameters for my study, and how my 
methodology affected the data I collected and the way I chose to analyze that 
data. 
My interlocutors are informed intellectuals who often think about the 
issues on which I engaged them in a more “reflexive fashion” than I did 
myself. There are discrete negotiations in research that “studies up” (Marcus 
1998; Holmes and Marcus 2005; Nader 1972).40 Annelise Riles (2006) and Sally 
Engle-Merry (2005) posit that the new focus on professional process such as 
human rights circulation, development work, and activism poses a challenge 
to the ethnographic method. Iris Jean-Klein has cited this as well in the realm 
of working with activists. She posits that our interlocutors are “new subjects” 
                                                
40 In “Commitment as an Analytic: Reflections on Nepali Student Activists Protracted 
Struggle.” PoLAR (Political and Legal Anthropology Review) 29(2): 351-364, I argue that focusing 
on the categories that students’ use to engage their own context is not studying up or down 
but horizontally (p353).  
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in the sense that they have adopted the representational and analytical tools 
that we have traditionally privileged as our own (2003: 557). This is not merely 
an issue of “democratizing anthropology” by teaching grassroots activists the 
tools of ethnography (Paley 2001, 2002). Rather, we must recognize that our 
subjects are intellectual peers who perhaps have different ends, but are 
nonetheless engaged in similar means of knowledge production, interacting 
with similar global categories and negotiating them in their own way. What 
Jean-Klein makes explicit is the process of a global knowledge production and 
our position within it, and she offers an innovative way for us to continue 
contributing to this process, especially since we can no longer have a 
proprietary attitude concerning our methodologies. They serve others’ ends—
including those of transnational organizations, activists, and even state 
powers—in ways that we may have never considered. In order to move our 
analysis to the next level we need to engage others’ usages of anthropological 
methodologies as means to push our own discipline’s boundaries.  
One of the main issues in these debates is the question of how to 
achieve theoretical balance between the larger systems of political economy 
and the representations of heterogeneity, ambiguity, and emergence, and our 
own field observations without giving readers a sense of vertigo (Assies 2000: 
305). Rather than scramble to keep up with rapidly evolving forms41 of 
contentious politics (Jean-Klein 2003: 311), I have accepted the ever-changing 
political situation as the basis from which I analyze how my interlocutors 
navigate the ambiguity and uncertainty of their daily lives. Therefore in my 
approach I have tried to take my interlocutors’ experiences as a process that 
                                                
41 I address this more in chapters three and four when I analyze the process of tracking 
emergence and its limitations.  
   51 
ran parallel to my own navigation with knowledge’s indeterminacy, and 
interpreted the aesthetic form of their actions as a potential that can challenge 
the limits of our knowledge. Riles suggests the method of circling back, 
“engaging intellectual and ethical origins from the point of view of problems 
that now begin elsewhere.  In other words, fieldwork entails self-consciously 
reencountering the subjects…as a source of intellectual surprises and as point 
of engagement for anthropological problems” (2006: 63). I have endeavored to 
do this not only with my interlocutors in the field but also with 
anthropological archives as an artifact. Particularly focusing on temporality, 
youth, and intergenerational interaction, this dissertation is an endeavor of 
circling back onto key anthropological problems in order to incorporate my 
forefathers into my analysis in a way that “commits to standing in two 
temporal places at once—past and present—and hence to the pull of the past 
into the present” (2006: 63). This has been my attempt to surpass the 
limitations of tracking emergence while still demonstrating the forward 
orientation of my interlocutors. 
These questions and my approach to them became more salient after I 
received the Wenner-Gren Foundation’s request for a “risk assessment 
report.”  One issue I was asked to address was how I would deal with 
“becoming involved or giving the appearance of becoming involved in 
underground political movements...[and attracting the attention of] Indian 
and Nepalese officials who might see your research as foreign involvement in 
politically sensitive issues.”  The concern is a valid one with which I am 
familiar; the maintenance of neutrality has been a continual issue of 
negotiation for me in the field (with students, party members, government 
officials, and the American embassy). The Wenner-Gren Foundation’s 
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inquiries were useful because they forced me to articulate not only my field 
approach but also my own personal position in my field site. Furthermore, it 
allowed me to articulate my vision of anthropology because the review 
committee’s concerns were partially an inquiry into what anthropologists 
should be doing.  My research has never been advocacy. I had chosen to 
research student politics in Nepal because there has never been an in-depth 
study of the topic that has been nonpartisan; I wanted to offer both 
anthropology and Nepalese studies a nonbiased ethnography of Nepali 
student politics. Therefore, I have taken the Wenner-Gren foundation’s 
concern as a challenge to redefine (both for us and for host governments or 
institutions) what anthropological fieldwork could be doing in politically 
tumultuous field sites. This dissertation is the product of my attempts. 
Methodology 
My research was a top down project. I worked at the political center in 
Kathmandu with the central committees of the student organizations and 
political parties, from which I followed the students’ political activities on 
campuses and in districts throughout the country. I worked across party and 
student organization lines with the major political parties and their student 
organizations.42 I was fortunate to have established rapport with the student 
politicians in 2003 during the ongoing political protest campaign, which 
provided me a first hand view of their life as activists, on the streets, 
underground, and in the hospitals, courts, and jail. Tracking the students 
during this tumultuous period allowed me access to their internal 
organizational processes as well as their inter-organizational collaborations 
                                                
42 Due to splits and mergers this number has varied at different phases of my research but 
ranged from seven to ten student organizations. 
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and competitions, and students’ interactions with their political party leaders. 
It also allowed me access into students’ and politicians’ homes and their 
personal lives, which provided me with a view of how they incorporate the 
politics into their personal life and the personal life into their politics.  
On a day-to-day level I followed students on the streets during their 
protest rallies and observed political programs of the student unions and 
political parties on campuses, at Town Hall and other public gathering places, 
during which time I listened to political speeches or just passed the time with 
students who passively participate in the activities by being present but really 
used these gatherings as an opportunity to socialize amongst themselves or 
rub elbows with party leaders. I visited the student central committee offices 
and campus offices to observe the students’ daily planning activities and how 
they spent their down time. I attended official and clandestine meetings 
between cadres, student and party leaders whenever I was invited along. I 
also followed student activists to their party leaders’ houses or offices, which 
usually occurred in the morning before the day’s activities began. During the 
Free Student Union Elections, I travelled to multiple campuses and observed 
the campaigning, voting, and vote counting in order to get comparative data 
on how the student unions competed against one another.  During the student 
unions’ internal elections I travelled throughout the country with central 
committee leaders to observe the campaigning, voting, and vote counting of 
the central committee elections, the district level elections, and campus level 
elections. I also travelled with central committee student leaders during the 
constituent assembly elections campaigns; during the campaigning process I 
travelled to over thirty districts to observe the students’ role in the campaign. I 
also conducted formal and informal interviews with a number of student and 
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party cadres, student leaders, ex-student leaders, politicians, ministers, 
campus chiefs and professors, policy makers, political analysts, and 
journalists, as well as international actors who were active in the political 
process. I also befriended a number of journalists and analysts with whom I 
would regularly meet in order to gather informal analysis and receive 
feedback on my own analysis.  Although my research activities may sound 
rigorous, I have to admit that much of my time was spent having tea with my 
interlocutors either waiting for something to happen or processing what had 
happened after the fact. It was during tea that I became familiar with the 
sociality of politics, which included moments of honesty but more often 
diplomacy, patience, and uncertainty idling away the time between the big 
political moments. 
The issues of method and representation were continually at the 
forefront of my mind during my fieldwork. I have felt palpable pressure from 
many different sectors concerning the focus, scope, approach, and conclusion 
of this study. The contributions that anthropologists have offered to the 
ongoing challenge to craft the ethnographic method and the ethics of 
representation have impacted how I conceived these negotiations. For 
instance, Riles relies on a conceptual exercise of defining negative space as a 
way to push beyond the obvious in her data in her book Network Inside Out 
(2001: 22). Iris Jean-Klein echoes this approach in her study of Palestinian 
activism. She uses Roy Wagner’s observation strategy of figure-ground 
reversal (privileging what lies beneath the more explicit explanations that are 
presented) in order to focus on form rather than the more obvious evidence of 
what seems political to us in the context of “global categories” (2003: 570). I 
have focused on people’s conceptions and categories, physical artifacts, 
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relational interactions, political ritual, and the rhetorical and physical forms 
that political imaginary takes, in order to apprehend what the political is to 
my subjects outside the “global categories” and what in turn informs their 
own and, hopefully, our conceptions of “global categories.”  
This epistemic endeavor is further substantiated by Julia Paley’s 
declaration that the anthropological focus on democracy and social action is 
not only ethnography of political process but ethnography as political process, 
in the sense that we are exploring competing constructions of what is political, 
the contested meanings, and the forms of power and resistance (2001). 
Ethnography needs to be a flexible practice that does not itself get caught up 
in the crafting of an irreversible, distinct pathway toward final analysis.  I 
understand Paley as saying that when ethnography is crafted as open-ended 
analysis it is a political process, one of ongoing contestation. But as Ruth 
Benedict proved, talking about culture’s dynamism does not replicate it in 
ethnographic narrative form (1934). In my analysis I have tried to use 
ethnography as a way to capture the dynamism and stagnation of Nepali 
political life, as well as the reasons and anxieties that political actors mask or 
deny these aspects.  
One of the major components of my field methodology is what I call 
sideline observation. It differs from the traditional ethnographic method of 
participant observation because it barred participation. When studying 
politics, participant observation is not possible, particularly if I wanted to 
respect the Wenner-Gren’s concerns and the stern warnings of the American 
embassy. Participant observation in my field site would have involved 
shouting slogans, throwing rocks, burning effigies of the King, vandalism, 
giving speeches, spreading rumor, conspiracy theorizing, and much more. I 
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was not prepared to engage in such activity in order to come to better know 
my interlocutors’ experience. Viewing these processes from the sidelines 
provided me the critical distance to understand how these acts were informed 
by their ideology and political history, and in turn cemented these things in 
Nepali political imaginary and shaped their identity. But I was strategic; I did 
not resist complete participation. For instance, I did engage in the process of 
fictive kin relations as a measure of protection and entrée into different 
political networks. This sort of engagement allowed me to experience the 
nuance of social circulation that fuels Nepali political culture. 
My field observations that I gathered from the sidelines were 
substantiated by interviews I had with various people who either have 
experience in or with Nepali politics. I found interviews to be a fruitful part of 
my research because they not only cleared up uncertain data and 
misinterpretations, but they provided me with taped records of people’s 
rhetoric, how they make meaning of different political processes, and how 
they represent politics to me. In order to respect the guidelines put forward by 
Cornell’s IRB, I always received verbal consent, informing the interviewee that 
their responses were confidential and they could refuse to answer questions if 
they so chose. I would also show them the questions before the interview 
began in order to prepare them for what I expected and allow them to relax 
and focus on the direction of the interview. 
Through my experience of trial and error I was able to streamline the 
interview process.  I came to understand when I should ask closed or open 
questions depending on what information I was pursuing.  When it came to 
theoretical and conceptual issues, I found it productive to inform the 
interviewee what my focus was and how I had been conceptualizing the issue 
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before asking them for their own analysis. This provided them with a 
framework in which to respond. I discovered this was necessary because if 
people did not understand the larger reasoning for my inquiry they would not 
ask me to clarify but rather talk about whatever issue they thought was 
relevant, usually resorting to political talking points.43 
I used people’s responses in interviews and interactions, as well as the 
issues that arose at political programs and in media, as a means to hone my 
own analytic themes. From 2004 onward, I had established rapport with a few 
interlocutors to the degree that our conversations were reciprocal, in the sense 
that our conversations allowed us both to wrap our heads around 
contemporary political issues both mundane and abstract. For them it allowed 
them to process what their strategy should be, and for me it was an 
opportunity to connect it to larger trends in my ongoing analysis. During my 
research period of 2006 through 2008, I took full advantage of our dynamic.  I 
had a few key informants with whom I would draft my interview questions in 
order to word them in a way that other interviewees knew what I was 
seeking.  This was particularly useful for the more abstract, theoretical, and 
conceptual questions I was trying to craft. Furthermore, the process of 
collaboratively drafting questions provided me a view into how my 
interlocutors apprehended knowledge and what categories they used in order 
to do so.   
The scope of my project became a lot larger in 2006 after the student 
activists were no longer on the streets together. I had already realized that my 
                                                
43 For example, after asking a number of questions about a specific policy, Bāl Akhil (children 
united), I would then inform my interviewees that I was asking so many specific questions 
concerning this topic because I was thinking about the impact of intergenerational interaction 
in Nepali politics. I would then ask them what they thought about intergenerational 
interaction in Nepali culture and how it translates into politics. This allowed me to get some 
very interesting answers that informed my theoretical approach. 
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project needed to be a top down project, focusing on the central committees of 
the student organizations in Kathmandu in order to grasp the makeup, 
history, and ideology of all the organizations in a way that would allow me to 
pursue a comprehensive analysis of student politics. But it was not until 2006 
that I had to come to terms with the reality that the amount of time I spent 
with each organization and the access I received from them was unbalanced. 
My research is more informed by some organizations than others.  A major 
factor for this is that the four largest organizations (NSU (K), NSU (D), 
ANNFSU (Akhil), and ANNISU (R)) are larger political machines that conduct 
more activities, have a greater number of cadres, and get more exposure in the 
press—their parties have a larger influence on the public sector. Another 
factor is that I established some very close contacts in the NSU (K), NSU (D), 
and ANNFSU (Akhil) during the years of street agitation. I had built rapport 
with their students and their party leaders and therefore had more access and 
contact with them. Furthermore, as I establish in chapter six, the student 
organizations’ working styles and approaches differ.  The degree of exposure 
that the student organizations were willing to subject themselves to varied. 
The ANNISU (R) specifically was not willing to let me observe them unless 
they were on cue.44  
I have tried to reconcile this by gaining enough of an understanding of 
all nine organizations in order to make distinctions between them or make 
disclaimers from the generalities upon which I base my analysis. This 
limitation has also required me to take their rhetoric and ideology seriously. A 
number of the people whom I interviewed would not get past talking points. 
                                                
44 A volleyball game with a few ANNISU (R) cadres at Padma Kenya campus was the closest I 
got to an informal interaction. 
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Therefore I needed to engage discursive analysis on what they were willing to 
focus. In some chapters, specifically chapters thee, four, and five, I fully 
engage people’s representations as they have provided them to me, while in 
other chapters, specifically chapters two, six, and seven, I use ethnographic 
observations to complicate those representations and contextualize them in 
day-to-day political practice. This encompasses my approach to provide a 
view of how Nepali political actors make meaning of the rhetoric and 
ideology as the basis of their political and personal identities.  
Ultimately, this dissertation endeavors to reveal the inversion of Nepali 
political culture in the sense that Roy Wagner describes (1975).  Inversion is 
the process whereby one inverts the invention/convention dynamic in order 
to maintain a status of ever flowing invention and have it accepted as 
convention (Culture) (ibid. 100-101, 122). What I have tried to emphasize 
through my analysis is Nepali political actors’ role in making the convention 
that they invert in order to resonate on local, national, and international levels. 
This inquiry is a circling back to an early anthropological focus on the 
relationship between parts and wholes, which has informed how I analyze 
Nepali political culture (Bateson 1935; Benedict 1934; Fortes 1958; Leach 1961; 
Malinowski 1984 [1922]; Radcliffe-Brown 1952 [1935]; Wagner 1975). 
Ethnographic Moments 
In this section I consider some obstacles as I navigated my way through 
my research.  A number of these obstacles came from my attempt to grapple 
with both pragmatic and ethical issues that arose in my research. Here I 
demonstrate how I came to find opportunity in these obstacles or at least 
signposts that not only steered my direction but also became “aha” scenarios 
as I analyzed my field notes. These experiences were “ethnographic 
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moment[s]” in the way that Marilyn Strathern describes: “We could say that 
the ethnographic moment works as an example of a relation that joins the 
understood (what is analyzed at the moment of observation) to the need to 
understand (what is observed at the moment of analysis)” (1999: 6). These 
experiences made me realize the central role that circulations of influence play 
in Nepali politics, and that they do not fall directly along ideological lines—
rather, people have seemingly conflicting loyalties that they strategically use 
to their advantage when they can. Furthermore, these scenarios affected how I 
have come to understand the role of Nepali political history and ideology as 
rhetorical tools and tactics of communal indoctrination.  
Even though I was not interested in doing advocacy, I found a non-bias 
approach to be more complicated than I had originally expected. I soon came 
to realize I had little control in the way others saw my research. James Henslin 
made the key observation that people almost instinctively associate the 
researcher with the research that he or she is doing, as if the topic says 
something implicit about the researcher (1972: 55 in Sluka 1995: 287). For me 
to be studying Nepali political culture in the midst of an ongoing political 
movement and civil war made me, in the eyes of Nepali citizens, a supporter 
of the political cause.  Even though I observed from the sidelines, the students 
referred to me as the “observer activist” (avalokan garne āndolankāri) or the 
“sideline activist” (sīdmā basne āndolankāri). At first I took this seriously, trying 
to explain that I was a non-biased observer that took no sides. But when a 
couple of students pushed me on this, asking, “You don’t care what happens 
in Nepal?” I responded that I did care; I supported what the citizens want. 
They became very self-satisfied because they interpreted my response to mean 
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that I did support them because they were fighting for the people’s right to 
decide the future of Nepal; therefore I was an āndolankāri.45  
Indeed, I quickly recognized that during the agitation my attempts at 
non-biasness were in vain. Even if I myself wanted to maintain a non-bias 
position, people were going to place me whether I liked it or not. I quickly 
came to experience June Nash’s observation that “in a revolutionary situation, 
no neutrals are allowed” (1976: 150). Nonetheless, I wanted to try to balance 
my sympathies, so it did not appear that I was partial to one party or another. 
I soon came to realize that was a much more complex endeavor than I had 
originally thought. Avoiding such appearances meant knowing the nuances of 
my field that I was in the process of sorting out—specifically, the recognition 
that people across all sectors are connected to one another in ways that are 
often predicated on political lines. For my interlocutors there were no neutrals 
either.  
I learned this the hard way in the spring of 2004. I was familiar with the 
concept of mukh patra (mouth piece), politically affiliated news journals, but I 
did not know how endemic they were. Risha had suggested to me that I 
should give an interview.  She said it would give me exposure so people 
would know me before I approached them. She pitched this as an advantage 
because my reputation would precede me. Her friend was a journalist at a 
political weekly, and she could arrange for him to interview me. I was 
hesitant. I did not want to be asked political questions.  She said she could 
arrange this. Then I asked if it was a mukh patra and she admitted that they 
had more access to Nepali Congress politicians and so they tended to rely on 
them for analysis. But she assured me that it was a respectable political 
                                                
45 Based on an interaction I had with students from Shankar Dev campus on 2.6.04.  
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weekly, known for its strong analysis.  She insisted that people of “all political 
stripes” read it, especially to know what the NC were thinking. I agreed to the 
interview but said that I may refuse to answer questions.  The interview was 
tame. It was comprised of questions regarding my research, why I chose 
Nepal, what my background in Nepal was, and what I would like to get 
accomplished while I was here on this research visit.  The reporter was very 
cooperative and even sent me a proof of the article before it was published.46  
The week the article was published I received an email from Mike Gill, 
the director of the USEF-Nepal Fulbright Program, asking me if I knew 
anything regarding the article written about me.  I emailed back that I had 
given an interview to Deshantār that was arranged by my friend. He emailed 
me back asking me about the one in Pratispardha. The embassy press attaché 
had discovered the article and sent it to the director of the American Mission. 
The embassy was very upset and demanded that Mike take action to refute 
the article’s claims.47 The article was attached to the email.  I opened it up and 
it was a brief biography of me stating that I claimed to be a Fulbright student 
studying student political consciousness but really I was an anti-Hindu CIA 
agent who was giving tactical support to the Maoists.  They cited my trips to 
the Maoist heartland, Rukum, Rolpa and Dolpa—which I took in 1999 during 
my study abroad program with the School for International Training—as 
proof of my nefarious activities. I was shocked and felt violated; they took 
factual information about me and turned it on its head. I was about to meet 
with Akash so I immediately called him to ask what I should do. He described 
Pratispardha as a small royalist mukh patra that is not taken seriously; they are 
                                                
46 Based on an interaction that occurred on 3.4.04. 
47 Mike Gill wrote a letter on behalf of the embassy to Pratispardha insisting that the article was 
slander and that they must refute it or the embassy would take action. They published his 
letter in their next edition.  
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viewed as more of a tabloid than an analysis journal. He explained that they 
always came out on Sunday instead of Friday like the other weeklies. Their 
tactic was to peruse all the other political weeklies, choose articles, and rewrite 
them from a royalist viewpoint that, Akash said, “was based not on fact but 
manufactured lies. Hence the name, Pratispardha, which means competition.” 
He said that I was probably targeted because of the Deshantār article, and then 
he inquired why I interviewed with Deshantār in the first place. I explained 
that Risha had convinced me it was good exposure.  He laughed and said, 
“Well you have received exposure for sure.  Now everyone knows you are a 
threat to the monarchy, which is a good thing. The āndolankāri[s] will respect 
you.”4849  
It was then that I understood that I had little control over what side 
people thought I was on. I had inadvertently convinced the students that I was 
“on their side” (Huizer 1973: 21 in Sluka 1995: 287) and other people were 
going to place me either where it suited them or where it made obvious sense 
to them, depending on their agenda. I slowly realized that there was nothing 
particular about me or my actions that compelled people to place me.  They 
were making sense of me the way they made sense of everyone around them. 
In Nepali culture people have attachments and loyalties on which their 
spheres of influence are based. Every act is part of the give and take of social 
exchange. Therefore they interpret everyone else’s actions as an indicator of 
what spheres they operate within. For them the notion of non-biasness is self-
                                                
48 Based on an interaction that took place on 3.11.04. 
49 One thing I learned the hard way was no interviews. I also learned to avoid the television 
cameras at political programs and at protests because when I was captured on film it often 
ended up on the evening news. Then I would then receive calls from people asking me why I 
did not attend their program that day, or worse I would attract the attention of the U.S. 
embassy. On a few occasions when meeting new people, they would recognize me as the 
foreign āndolankari shown on the evening news.  
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defeating, it gets one nowhere. What I saw as a necessary orientation to access 
my desired broad view of politics, my interlocutors saw as a limiting act that 
eliminated the prospect of social opportunity and indebtedness.  
My only defense against people’s tendency to socially and politically 
categorize me was to be as transparent as possible. A friend of mine, who was 
the planning chief of Tribhuvan University when we first met, once told me 
that my business card had become ubiquitous. He had seen it in the wallets of 
so many people—students, party leaders, professors, journalists, police 
officers, and security forces. He said, “They all know who you are.” I said, “I 
am not sure they know who I am, but at least my card marks my institutional 
affiliation.” I explained to him what I have explained to all my interlocutors: I 
need to know the perspective of all sides in order to get an objective, rounded 
view to analyze. I did my best by telling every side the same thing about my 
research and trying to appear as non-biased as possible.  
Transparency was particularly important when I began interacting with 
the state authorities. I knew they could threaten the safety of my project and 
the students with whom I worked. I was also aware that they would probably 
avoid my questions either through defensiveness or seduction.50 These officers 
surprised me because they were cordial, often friendly. They appeared to 
engage me in an earnest fashion on the more general and abstract questions 
that I asked and were quite adept at not answering questions that had to do 
with the current events. More often than not these interactions and interviews 
were insubstantial. But it was my attempt to get everyone’s view of student 
politics. Plus I saw the officers on the streets arresting students, firing tear gas 
                                                
50 Antonius C.G.M. Robben describes seduction in a politically contentious field site as a social 
strategy whose literal purpose is “to be led astray from an intended course” (1995: 83). 
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at them, or dodging their rocks. I knew they saw me, but introducing myself 
to them on the streets never seemed appropriate—because there was too much 
tension.  Furthermore, I wanted to meet them in this capacity before I had to 
ask them favors like visiting detained students.51  
I never established what I would call rapport with army or police 
officials, but being familiar with them and coming to understand their 
relationships with the students and party members was useful. I had an 
“ethnographic moment” during my research stint in 2005, as I was collecting 
people’s experiences about being underground after the King’s February 1st 
2005 takeover and trying to visit the people who were still in jail. It was 
during an interaction with a police captain who was overseeing the security at 
Āshkhal, Shankar Dev, Biswabhāsā, and the law campus. A student activist 
friend who has close ties with this captain introduced us. On this captain’s day 
off he allowed me to come into the barracks so that we could talk in a private 
setting. During our conversation, he said to me,  
You know this is all a drama, right? Tomorrow we 
might be on the streets under the order of G.P. 
Koirala or maybe even Prachanda arresting royalist 
protestors. Our job is to stop the havoc and 
maintain security for Nepali citizens. We have no 
investment in suppressing any particular group. 
Our superiors decide that.52  
At the time his justification seemed like a complicit attitude to me. I did not 
press him on it, but I immediately thought of all the disappearances that the 
Royal Nepal Army and security forces were responsible for during the civil 
                                                
51 My attempts to make connections with the security and police officers in 2004 were 
particularly useful, because after the King’s takeover in 2005 the situation became more 
restrictive. I was relieved that that many police officers and security forces recognized me 
because they were more suspicious of everyone’s actions and inquiries, especially since the 
Red Cross, Human Rights Watch, and other international monitors were then observing them. 
52 Translation of an interaction with a police captain on 7.2.05. 
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war. But later I realized it was something that I needed to hear in order to get 
beyond the “sides” of politics that were being entrenched both on the streets 
and in the jungle, particularly through the media representations and 
international assessment of the political situation. It made me realize that the 
political terrain is ever shifting and I needed to be as flexible in my perception 
as political actors are in their collaborations, cooperation, and competition. 
 
Figure 4: Police storming Ashkal campus  
Bikritimandap, Kathmandu 2004 
A few nights later I went to a wedding of a party leader’s daughter 
with a couple of the student activists. I was surprised to see a number of 
security forces, police, and army officers there. Pawan was explaining how 
they were all connected to the party leader. Some of them were blood 
relatives, some related through marriage, others were school friends, and 
others he said were just opportunistic. Then he pointed at a police commander 
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and said, “That is the one you should meet if you want to visit Akash in jail.” 
He looked around to see if Akash’s mother was present.  He said it would be 
best if she introduced me. She was not there so Pawan marched me right up to 
this commander as he was shaking hands with the bride and her father and 
introduced me, explaining that I wanted to see Akash and asked when would 
be a good time. The introduction was awkward timing for the commander but 
perfect for us.  His eyes quickly glanced at the party leader, who was looking 
on, then he looked at us and said, “You should come tomorrow when Akash’s 
mother comes.  We have orders that only family can see him, so that is the best 
way.”53 It was at that time that I grasped how insidious yet effective nepotism 
is. It was serving me in my research as much as it serves my interlocutors’ 
political agendas.  
It is not my intention to minimize the violence and trauma that was 
experienced during the last decade and a half in Nepal. When I was following 
the students on the streets from 2003 to 2005, I recognized that they were 
relatively safe; they were on the streets, fighting the police in public with the 
media and international organizations tracking it minute by minute. After the 
King’s takeover in 2005 there was serious concern that the mainstream 
politicians and student activists would be vulnerable to disappearances and 
torture.  But they were fortunate because local and international human rights 
activists mobilized efficiently to ensure the state forces knew that their actions 
were being watched. In this sense, my interlocutors before 2005 remained 
relatively safe because of their elite status and connections with influential 
people and organizations both domestically and abroad.54 
                                                
53 Translation of an interaction on 7.11.05. 
54 For instance, a friend of mine agreed to check up on some of the student leaders who were 
arrested during the King’s takeover in 2005. He was an established journalist who went on to 
do political analyst work in 2003 with The International Crisis Group and later became the 
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When I returned in 2006, I was hit with the reality that Nepal was a 
nation suffering from the aftermath of war. I quickly had to come to terms 
with it in the purview of my field as I incorporated the ANNISU (R) and the 
CPN-Maoists into my study. The very first time my research assistant and I 
went to the ANNISU (R) office we had an experience that made me realize the 
gravity of the situation. During our meeting with the ANNISU (R) president, 
the conversation eventually came around to the inevitable, where people are 
from, specifically their village. I asked the president where he grew up. Then 
he asked my companion where he was from. My companion told him 
Duradanda, Lamjung. Then the president asked him if his last name was 
Adhikari. My companion said, “No.” This leader’s serious, distant expression 
broke into what seemed to be a relieved smirk. After the meeting my 
companion told me why he was relieved. The Maoists killed a teacher by the 
name of Muktinath Adhikari from his village in 2001. They hung him from a 
tree in the town square. He had refused to pay the Maoist tax when nobody 
was protesting the Maoists. It was an awful trauma for the village. They have 
since cut down the tree because the villagers could not stand to look at it. Due 
to the widespread negative publicity that the killing received, Baburam 
Bhattarai, a CPN-UML (Maoist) central committee leader, eventually made a 
public apology, saying it was a mistake, an overt act of force that would be 
avoided in the future. The ANNISU (R) leader was relieved that my 
companion was not an Adhikari, but nonetheless he was a neighbor and 
                                                                                                                                       
national advisor to Ian Martin, the head of the United States Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). I 
was in America at the time and very worried that these students would be disappeared. I 
communicated with him on email after he made the rounds to the detainment locations. He 
told me he had located where a number of the students were being held but was not able to 
see them.  He told me that he warned the commanding officers, “I am watching you and so 
are others. If you do anything to these detainees the international world will know.” He then 
told me about all the international organizations that were monitoring the situation, including 
visiting the detention centers to locate arrested activists. Conversation occurred on 4.23.05.  
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family friend of this man.55 These situations concretized the reality of ten years 
of violent warfare and the degree to which it was a part of my research. The 
violence of both the state and the Maoists was an inevitable factor in social 
interaction.  
The ANNISU (R) president, who had himself lost family during the 
war, gave me a book he had written. I interpreted it as a Maoist cadre’s 
attempt to deal with the aftermath of their decade-long war. The book, You 
Have Become Immortal; It Has Been My Yearning (Timi Amār Bayo, Mero Mutu 
Chudiyo), establishes that as a Maoist this ANNISU (R) president is the 
reader’s brother, the party is the family to the people, and he and his cadres 
have fought for the reader’s freedom and betterment. The book addresses the 
atrocities of the People’s War, and why the violence was necessary: to raise the 
consciousness of the society in order to achieve justice for everyone. The book 
gave me perspective on how the ANNISU (R) students were processing their 
experiences of the war and coming out of it. I realized that every interaction 
would be seeped in their ideology. There was no way around it; their ideology 
was their way of expressing their worldview and it is what they used to justify 
inconsistencies that did not match up with their political ideals.  I came to 
understand that their ideology would need to be my basis for understanding 
how they made meaning of their struggle and what it meant to be a student 
activist. 
Field Experience Snapshot: Āndolan and Post-Āndolan Experience 
It is important to address the differences in my field experience in 2003 
to 2005 during the street agitation and in 2006 to 2008 when the students had 
left the streets. I was fortunate to have established rapport with the students 
                                                
55 Based on an interaction with the ANNISU (R) president on 11.9.06. 
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during their political protests in 2003, which provided me a first-hand view 
into their life as activists, on the streets, underground, and in the hospitals, 
courts, and jail. I became a consistent presence in their lives at a time of 
intensity and danger. As a result I gained recognition amongst the student 
activists and established some close relationships. Tracking the students 
during this tumultuous period allowed me access to their internal 
organizational processes as well as their inter-organizational collaborations 
and competitions, and students’ interactions with their political parties. When 
I returned in 2006 to pursue my Ph.D. dissertation field research, I was able to 
rely on these established relationships to continue my study in more depth, 
focusing on student politics beyond street activism. The distinctions in my 
own experiences between āndolan and post-āndolan are relevant because they 
reflect the larger observations that I make about political life on the streets, 
during campaigns, and in everyday political life.  
One major challenge that I faced when I returned in 2006 was the 
simple one of time management. During my previous research stints I worked 
with all the student organizations except the Maoists, who were underground. 
After 2006 I had nine student organizations that I needed to juggle, and they 
were no longer united on the streets. Previously, I would go to the streets to 
meet whomever I wanted. Particularly in 2004, the students’ protest programs 
had become routine; I knew what time and where I had to go in order to meet 
with dozens of students from all the different organizations. I had the added 
benefit of being seen by hundreds of student activists on a daily basis; I was 
with them, interested in their activities. After 2006, I had to adjust to arranging 
separate meetings with students at their organization offices, going to campus, 
and juggling political programs throughout Kathmandu, invariably missing 
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key events because I had to choose between political programs. Furthermore, 
none of my regular contacts felt I was not giving them enough time; I was 
constantly hearing complaints that “I had gone missing.” In the past I may not 
have spent any more time with them, but they saw me every day on the 
streets, and I was a consistent part of their lives. Moreover, the street agitation 
provided more urgent matters than having tea with me, which after 2006 
seemed to become a highlight for the students.56 
Another difference that came to the fore in 2006 was the increased 
competition amongst the student organizations. I had begun my study at one 
of the most opportune times in Nepali political history, while the students 
were on the streets together during a necessary alliance.  I was studying their 
movement, so of course I would need to work with all of them to understand 
it. The students accepted this, and in the past I found it simple going from one 
organization to another when they were on the street.  They were working 
together for a single goal; they needed each other, and their power came 
through the strength in numbers gained by their union. Yet I was aware that 
there was a deep mistrust between the student organizations that varied in 
severity from campus to campus, where these mistrusts played out personally 
often in the forms of extreme violence. In 2006 I saw the students slowly 
reverting to inter-party competition, and with it came political machinations.  
One of the reasons I felt so sensitive to the students’ resistance to me 
working with all organizations was that I sensed that they were keeping score. 
Before I was studying the student movement, but after 2006 I was studying 
the student organizations. My study became something else over which they 
                                                
56 A number of people referred to politics as a protracted tea drinking activity. Sometimes I 
would hear it described as “men drinking tea,” at other times politicians were referred to as 
“tea drinkers.” After 2006 I faced the problem that the student politicians were drinking tea in 
too many places for me to keep up with them.   
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could compete. I came to recognize this when the students were frustrated 
because I was no longer a daily part of their lives. This frustration was not 
simply because I was too busy to visit, but it was rooted in the fact that I 
didn’t have time specifically for them.  
Unfortunately this pressure pulled me in tiresome directions, but I also 
tried to make an opportunity of it. For instance, if it was not for my 
willingness to be strung along, while continually insisting that I was pursuing 
a non-bias study of student politics, I would not have had such an opportune 
meeting with the ANNISU (R) president. The new president of ANNFSU 
(Akhil), whom I had known now for three years, had attempted on a few 
occasions to undercut my claimed neutrality. One day during the 2006 peace 
talks he called me in the morning to inform me that his organization was 
planning a demonstration to demand that the peace talks be successful.  He 
told me to come to the office at eleven.  I went because I was free at that time 
and I had not been to one of their programs in over a week. When I arrived I 
discovered that no demonstration was planned, but rather there was a nine 
student-organization meeting to draft a joint statement demanding the success 
of the peace talks.  It soon became apparent that he strategically arranged for 
me to be sitting in his office as the other student organization leaders arrived. 
A couple of the student leaders that I did not know (including the ANNISU 
(R) president) would not come into the office after they saw me, presuming 
we were having a meeting. A few of the other student leaders with whom I 
had longstanding contact came right in and chatted with me. One was 
particularly excited because we had not met since I had returned to 
Kathmandu. The ANNFSU (Akhil) president had not expected this 
camaraderie because he seemed surprised when a few of the other leaders 
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suggested we go have tea to catch up before they began their meeting. The 
ANNFSU (Akhil) president quickly declined this suggestion; the meeting 
began without tea and without me. He instructed me to wait outside; we 
would continue after their meeting was over.  
Although I felt inconvenienced and was not keen on the idea of being a 
pawn, I was able to turn the situation into an opportunity for myself. As the 
meeting broke up and the leaders were waiting for the press release to be 
typed for them to sign, I introduced myself to the ANNISU (R) president, who 
kept averting eye contact.  I knew most everyone in the room, so it was quite 
natural when I said, “I have worked with all these gentlemen and their 
organizations for the last three years.  I have not had a chance to work with 
your organization because you have been underground. You are the missing 
link in my research. I hope I can work with you.”57 This turned out to be the 
perfect context to meet him. I was able to establish that I worked with all the 
other organizations and convinced him that the other student leaders were 
taking my research seriously. After that day he answered my calls, and within 
a week we scheduled our first meeting.  
In closing, I would like to emphasize that my research was as 
protracted as the students’ political movements or their conventions. The 
breadth of time and scenarios in which I observed the students allowed me to 
focus on discrete aspects of student politics as the students were pursuing 
them. I saw the student organizations work together in unity to bring down 
the monarchy; I saw them retrench their leadership and internal order during 
the peace talks in order to distinguish themselves from the other student 
                                                
57 Interaction with the ANNISU (R) president at the ANNFSU office, nine organization joint 
meeting, 10.9.06. 
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organizations and political parties during the constituent assembly elections. 
Observing them in such varying scenarios allowed me to have a nuanced 
perspective on a generation of student politicians’ experience becoming 
national politicians. All of this has informed my analysis of Nepali political 
culture and their place in it as political actors. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE MUNDANE AND THE IDEAL: POLITICS AS A PARADOXICAL 
ASPIRATION 
A common philosophical premise asserts that politics entails the 
preservation of established values or the pursuit of a better life (Strauss 1959: 
9-10). A main ambition of politics for some is to maintain the dominant 
societal values, but for many others it is an assertion of what is possible. 
Richard Rorty deemed the political project of democracy as a form of social 
hope (1999). Conversely, Hannah Arendt reminded us that politics is 
imperfect (1958).  My fieldwork reveals both of these two aspects work in 
unison. I have regularly observed the reality that as quickly as politicians fuel 
public hope, they disappoint. Since they hover between the politically ideal 
aspirations of societal perfection and the corporeal reality that weighs them on 
this earth, politicians disappoint the public’s expectations and hopes of what 
ought to be.  
In this chapter I push back against the ambivalence that Jonathan 
Spencer says is inherent in studying the state, “to engage the state is to engage 
with the world of ‘dirty politics’; to be aware of its ‘sublime’ qualities, of 
rationality and justice, is to be reminded by its profane failings in the world of 
dirty politics…” (2007: 142). Rather than focus on the state, I focus on actors 
who have aspirations to cultivate the state in a particular way. I engage their 
own ambivalences regarding the “sublime qualities” and “profane failings” by 
considering their politics in its ideal sense, the way Nepali political actors 
would most frequently present it to me, and I also explore how people 
reconcile the existence of its opposite, the politically mundane or the typical 
dismissal that politics is a dirty game.  I refer to the existence of both poles and 
   76 
people’s rhetorical and performative attempts to reconcile them as a paradox 
of politics.  
In analyzing how Nepali political actors reconcile the ideal and 
mundane of politics, I will explore why people emphasize politics as the pure 
form of public service. In the second section I will analyze the narrative of 
suffering in order to see how it contributes to the construction of political 
identity. In the third section I focus on politics as a mode of being that 
provides opportunity and social connection. Within this analysis I will 
consider how student cadres deploy different coping mechanisms and 
disciplines to substantiate larger forms of Nepali political imaginary as a real 
part of their everyday lives. In the last section, I will explore the attitudes that 
are emphasized as the proper orientation in which to engage in politics, 
namely optimism as opposed to cynicism. I argue that is a framework for 
living in the way one wants to restructure society.  The students’ discursive 
strategies index what the mode of politics ought be, as they see it couched in 
discipline and sacrifice.  I will analyze how people talk about these categories 
of being in Nepali politics as a means to manifest their political aspirations.  
Politics as Social Service or Profession? 
In Nepal, when someone is asked why he or she has chosen to be a 
politician, they usually begin by discussing politics as a public service to 
improve the society. What follows varies. Sometimes it is a more refined 
articulation of what public service should be; at other times it segues into the 
secondary reasons of why the person has chosen such a path. The current 
public sentiment holds that those secondary reasons are what truly motivate 
politicians and that calling politics “public service” is duplicitous. But this 
claim must matter to political actors because I consistently heard it articulated 
   77 
by politicians and students. In order to understand this more fully, I asked my 
informants if they thought politics should be considered a profession or if 
those who engage in politics should have other professions in which they are 
invested. In this section I will outline people’s varying views in order to 
explore the two contradictory sides of politics, politics as social service and 
politics as opportunity. This analysis is meant to illustrate what inspires 
people to insert themselves into both the ideal and the mundane that politics 
entails and how that act of insertion helps people make sense of their place in 
the social landscape.  
Tatsuro Fujikuro argued that one should not merely consider the 
economic or structural explanations for why people joined the Maoist 
movement, but rather one needs to understand that the national development 
schemes that cropped up in varying forms since the 1950s created new forms 
of collective imagination. Enrolling in or supporting the Maoist war “was not 
simply a mechanical response to an economic problem or an expression of 
frustration in the face of individual deprivation…. It entailed rather, a 
commitment to, and participation in, a particular—revolutionary—way of 
envisioning the world…” (2003: 24).  The commitment to a way of envisioning 
the world is not solely the domain of the Maoist movement. I argue that any 
form of political participation is a collective expression of how people not only 
envision the world but how they want to assert that vision in order to ensure 
their political ideal becomes political reality.58 It is this idea that fuels the 
sensibility that politics is a form of social service; one is giving oneself to a 
cause to make one’s nation a better place.  
 
                                                
58 Sudipta Kaviraj argued in his essay on representative democracy in India that the “culture 
of representative democracy is a way of imagining the world.” (1998: 148) 
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Figure 5: Student volunteers on crowd control duty,  
Ratna Park, Kathmandu 2004 
Nonetheless, politics is also linked with power and access to resources.  
For this reason, there are two sides of politics, the assertion of a better life for 
all and the distinct opportunity to enforce how and who benefits from a better 
life. This quote from a leftist student leader from a small student organization 
captures this paradox of politics: 
Naturally, the people who have come to politics 
cannot work in both the private and public 
sectors…Our society perceives political 
participation as twofold, on the one hand there is 
the negative perception that one who becomes a 
political leader becomes spoiled. On the other hand 
it is perceived as a social responsibility. For that 
reason, a person who desires to be involved in 
politics should have a clean image; he should not 
have greed and vested interest. He has to think 
about the future of the society and the country. He 
could not be a politician if he thinks only about 
himself, his family, or his region. The politician has 
to be able to represent the society as a whole. I 
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suppose in this sense, the ones who do pure 
politics are useless in the eyes of the contemporary 
society since they could not give the proper 
attention to their household... One who does 
politics for the people is always running for the 
sake of others. Those who put politics second, after 
managing their family life, are the opportunists…59 
As his words demonstrate politics is meant to serve something higher than 
you or your family, it is meant to serve the country and the citizens. I have 
heard people describe it as devotion, one similar to religion. Marie Lecomte-
Tilouine focuses on the religious notion of sacrifice in her article on Maoist 
conceptions of martyrdom.  She cites the Maoists’ ascetic-like renunciations as 
“the Brahmanic and ascetic self-sacrifice to the fire” (2006: 68). Yet political 
devotion does not guarantee otherworldly results the way Hindu practice or 
filial devotion does. Rather, it secures the betterment for the generations to 
come in this world, within the nation.  This may explain why filial metaphors 
are so commonly mapped onto political relationships.  In the ideal form, it is 
expected that one will put one’s party and politics first rather than the family. 
But in order to convey that, the political actors need to draw on common 
sensibilities that emphasize the esteem they should have for one another and 
the party.  The loyal sensibility of filial ties resonates and is used to affect 
political actors.   
In my interlocutors’ articulations of politics as public service, they have 
likened politicians to ascetics. Yet they must also be statesmen, a position 
through which they must translate their political ideals into material form 
                                                
59 Translation from an interview with ANNFSU (Ekikrit) student union of Jana Morcha ML 
(Ekikrit), 5.19.04. 
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within the institutional and state structures.  A UML fallen leader60 described 
the transgression from ascetic to corrupt in the following anecdote:  
Our society has inevitably changed just like other 
societies. In the feudal era, there used to be landed 
gentry and the peasants. Some used to grow crops 
whereas the others could afford to put their time 
toward politics in the name of social service, which 
was fine, right? You see, that was the time when 
only the landed gentry would be involved in 
politics. It was an upper class pursuit. Society 
gradually underwent change; yesterday’s feudal 
mode of production no longer exists. The capitalist 
mode of production was introduced and the 
people tended to migrate to the towns from the 
villages... During this process, society developed a 
great extent. After all, the middle class is the clever 
class… The class that has come into modern 
politics is neither from the landed gentry nor is it 
of the sanyasi [renunciate]. The leadership has come 
from the middle class. The middle class people 
rarely rise to the upper class, except one or two. 
One who goes to the upper class is the one who has 
linkage with power; one who has been successful 
at balancing resources and opportunities… 
What has happened here is an interesting picture 
of the statesman. His image is that of the sadhu 
[holy man] and santa [hermit]. He is the one who 
claims to be devoted wholeheartedly to serve the 
people and the nation. He is the yogi [ascetic] who 
is determined to perform what Mahatma Gandhi 
had not been able to successfully accomplish. But 
he has the monthly expenditure of more than sixty 
thousand rupees. This is the amount he spends in 
his lodging and food. He travels in a Pajero61 that 
costs more than 4 or 5 million rupees. Ten years 
ago, he was not a leader. But now, he lives in a 
                                                
60 This leader was at his political peak during his student years and has since been deemed an 
“intellectual” (a position with little policy influence) in the UML ranks because his actions 
during his tenure as a student leader actively challenged party leadership and their 
commitment to internal democracy.  
61 Pajeros are Indian sports utility vehicles that are associated with the corrupt political culture 
that transpired in the mid-1990s, known as the Pajero era.  During Sher Bahadur Dueba’s 
tenure as Prime Minister beginning in 1995, he increased the pensions of all parliamentarians 
by tenfold and repealed import taxes on Pajeros and Prados vehicles for all parliamentarians.   
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grand building, which he owes to his links to 
power and resources. My contemporary friends 
have grand buildings, the boys who were junior to 
me. They are neither landed gentry, producers, 
service holders, peasants nor farmers.  In addition 
to this, they are not laborers, managers; nor do they 
have any firms. They are only politicians. But 
where does their money come from?62 
Indeed, the allure of politics mirrors the paradox of politics. The historical 
trend to centralize the state’s power regularized the distribution of power 
from the state to the local level in the Panchayat system. The Panchayat 
system relied on village elites to enforce their mandate, which reinforced the 
positions of tribal leaders and state bureaucrats.  After 1990, those who had 
been considered fighters for democracy and freedom took the reigns of state 
power.  They not only became the ones who made decisions on all matters 
pertaining to the state but they gained access to the resources. It is for this 
reason that the 1990 democratic movement marks the transition of politics 
from being an ascetic endeavor of the landed gentry to a corrupt endeavor of 
opportunity seekers. After 1990, those who fought and sacrificed 
underground found themselves in the position of being the state caretakers.  
More recently the Maoists are experiencing the transition from the war in the 
jungle to politics in parliament (Hachhethu 2009).  
What the Nepali case makes clear is that politicians successfully 
embody the two poles of the ideal and the mundane when they convince the 
populace to put faith in them to control the external world through their 
knowledge. Yet people often have a hard time collapsing the two poles in 
order to make sense of the politicians’ actions. On the one hand, they 
charismatically represent all of the possibilities of removing the mundane  
                                                
62 Translation from an interview with a UML central committee member, 5.13.04. 
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Figure 6: Political homage to party leaders and political martyrs on the 
NSU(K) district convention stage, Badrapur, Jhapa 2007 
from public life; on the other hand, they are people who are limited by 
institutions and human shortcomings. A Nepal Student Union cadre indicated 
this conundrum in the following explanation: 
Politicians have to make the people be more 
inclined towards them than towards God. God 
never tells you to take your life for him, but a 
leader may even tell you to die for the political 
cause. A leader has to be able to make his cadre 
follow an ideology or an ideal. For all this to 
happen one has to be qualified and well-rounded, 
one has to be able to manage everything, even 
supporting his cadres in order to enable the success 
of the political cause. This is why money is 
essential to politics. It’s so worldwide. Leaders 
must have command of money. This is a must. 63 
                                                
63 Translation from an interview with an NSU (K) campus president, 5.17.04. 
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Another student leader affiliated with NSU (D) nicely emphasized this point 
when he said that, “politics is glamour.” He clarified this claim by focusing on 
political leadership. He said, “It is difficult to become a leader, once you arrive 
to power there is prestige [ijāt].64 People will follow he who has power. And 
this is the reason people are attracted to politics.”65 These students’ 
explanations reveal that there are actual mundane necessities that politicians 
must embrace in order to successfully institute their ideals. This is why Nepali 
political actors have built a narrative that highlights their ideals and ideology 
as their motivation to serve, to underplay the role that power, leadership and 
wealth play in their politics.  
It is for this reason that some people found my question about needing 
to maintain an alternate profession outside of politics to be crass. These 
individuals felt that inevitably, people will use their political position to the 
advantage of their secondary profession; they are contradictory ambitions.66 
Those who made such a point felt that politics should not be considered 
within the professional realm at all because it leaves it vulnerable to 
corruption, hence the emphasis on service. One student explained to me that 
the aim of a profession is social standing and monetary gain. Such ambitions 
are impure in politics, where one is required to work for the sake of the nation 
and absolve the suffering of its people. Politicians are expected to sacrifice 
themselves and their social comforts for something higher, although not 
                                                
64 Mark Liechty analyzes the meaning of ijāt for the modern Kathmandu middle class in a 
different way.  In his book Suitably Modern: Making Middle-Class Culture in a New Consumer 
Society (2003), he translates ijāt as respectability and status.  For middle-class Nepali citizens it 
has less to do with impressing people through gaining prestige as this student leader 
describes and more to do with making sure that one’s actions do not jeopardize one’s family’s 
status or image of respectability. 
65 Translation from an interview with an NSU (D) central committee leader, 11.15.2003. 
66 Statement based on assertions from interviews with ANNFSU (ML) president, 6.18.04, 
ANNFSU (UML) central committee member, 5.3.04, and Pragitishil treasurer, 6.2.04. 
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otherworldly, but of this world. Professionals, on the other hand, have a 
responsibility to their professions and their families, on which they must 
focus.67 For this reason, there is an anxiety in the accusation that politicians 
look after their own self-interest (āphno swārtha herne). Such behavior is the 
opposite of what people espouse when they describe politics as a selfless 
endeavor (niswārtha dhāngale). This is particularly important because as one 
student argued, “It is through politics that one can best move society forward 
because politics impacts every sphere of society.”68 A self-interested politician 
is a common phenomenon, but it still makes people uncomfortable because it 
reveals the mundane imperfections that are inevitably a part of politics. 
A major issue that underpins the politics as social service sensibility is 
class and, historically, caste. In order to selflessly give themselves to politics, 
politicians need to be able to sustain themselves and perhaps their families.  
When I asked the question concerning politics and professions, one student 
cited B.P. Koirala, the father of Nepal’s democratic movement.  He said that 
Koirala had written that if one cannot afford to fill his own stomach or that of 
his family, he should not go ahead in politics. One can find ways to become 
politically aware and help the cause but ultimately his attempts to be pure will 
be undermined if his everyday necessities are not taken care of. But on the 
other hand, Koirala urged those who have the time and the means to give to 
the organization. This student reasoned that a politician needs to survive just 
like anyone else, but corruption must never be a temptation. Therefore it helps 
if one has a little property to support oneself, then one can be dedicated to 
politics.69 This student’s explanation expands on the previously quoted UML 
                                                
67 Statement based on assertion from interview with ANNFSU (ML) president, 6.18.04. 
68 Translation from an interview with ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee member, 5.3.04. 
69 Interview with Pashupati Campus VP NSU, 12.8.03. 
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leader’s reference to the landed gentry pursuing social work. It is expected 
and respectable for people who have means to give back, and it is suspect for 
people who do not have means to attempt to do so because they are unable to 
give in a selfless way.  
Another UML central committee pointed out that politics was 
undeniably an aspect of labor production because those who do it are 
connected to their families’ business. That is the nature of joint families; they 
are linked to one another, including each other’s professions and businesses. 
The patriarchal property supports political endeavors. If the endeavors are 
successful they will ensure the legacy of that property or business because it 
was the source that supported politics as social work. In this sense, he said, it 
brings goodwill to the family, which has donated to a pursuit other than the 
family deity. He argued, politics cannot be disconnected from labor 
production. He was very adamant that I not forget this point because, he said, 
for politics to impact labor production and strive for class equality, its 
connection to the process must be clear. To his dialectical mind, he felt that 
labor, family, property, and politics are interconnected, and it is to the 
detriment of all these aspects to give politics some disconnected, transcendent 
aura. By doing so, class equality would never be achieved.70 This leader’s 
pragmatic explanation may be more grounded than most people’s I heard, but 
it is still riddled with implicit assumptions that undermine equality for all.  
A campus leader from this party leader’s sister organization made this 
clear when he lamented to me that politics is only for the educated. Those who 
are educated come from families who were able to invest in them.  He said, 
                                                
70 Interview with UML (Akhil) central committee member, 6.1.04. 
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If your family cannot invest in you, you will not be 
able to invest in the country, at least not at the 
prestigious level of full-time politics. If you cannot 
do it full-time, people do not consider you selfless, 
rather you are looked upon as an opportunistic 
dabbler.  You can see how that keeps those who 
must earn their food through labor away from 
politics.71   
This is yet another aspect of how people conceive politics.  For the most part, 
those who believe it is crass to professionalize politics are leftists that believe 
in a complete restructuring of society in order to bring class equality.  Yet it is 
undeniable that in order to do “pure” politics, one must have some financial 
security, which in the context of Nepal puts one’s family in the position of 
exploiters.  Therefore only the landed gentry have been the vanguard of pure 
class struggle.  This is similar to the impasse that Lenin came to when he 
realized that the poor could not overcome their own situation but rather 
needed to be lead by the vanguard class through the Bolshevik party (Arendt 
1963: 66).  For Gramsci the organic intellectual fulfilled this role, the local with 
the wherewithal to pursue a better life for all (1971). 
It is perhaps for this reason that in Nepal those outside politics spurn 
those who do it. I gained a view into these perspectives when meeting families 
whose sons and daughters were involved in the street agitations since 2001. If 
politics was a family affair, then the family usually embraced their child. But if 
they were not previously involved in politics they would refer to their child as 
broken (bigreko) because they chose to connect themselves to a seemingly 
corrupt, nepotistic system that was not seen to produce competent 
individuals. The general public did not believe that politics was social service 
but rather an opportunity for the mediocre to rely on the entrenched power 
                                                
71 Interview with Pashupati Campus ANNFSU President, 12.4.03. 
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structure to get under the wing of leaders who are in the business of 
reinforcing their own power. During the Movement against Regression, I met 
one student’s mother outside a prison as she delivered food to her son.  I said 
to her, “You must be so scared, this must be hard for you.” She retorted,  
What is hard is worrying about my son’s exams 
that he has no opportunity to study for. Who 
knows if he will take it. He would rather throw 
rocks on the streets.  The leaders say it is for the 
good of the country but what good is it for the 
country to have a bunch of leaders who can’t even 
pass their exams?  We need doctors, lawyers, 
teachers, and engineers, not leaders. How can 
everyone be a leader?  My son, he may have had 
some potential for an occupation [jagir] but now he 
is as broken as our country.72 
Her frustration resonates with an older Panchayat and later Nepali Congress 
leader that I interviewed.  He went on a tirade when I asked him the question 
regarding politics and professions. He said that the corruption of democratic 
politics had ruined the country. He asserted that this notion of politics being 
the sole profession encouraged students to drop out of life.  He noted that this 
was to the advantage of the leaders because their cadres did not even have 
skills to protest their orders or the financial independence to defy them. He 
said, “This idea of politics as public service has created a nation of beggars.  
Rather than politics being for the good of the country, it has bankrupted the 
country.”73  
It is for this reason that political movements are embraced as the 
underpinning of political service. They are palpable scenarios of political 
sacrifice.  They provide urgency to the cause that justifies the existence of 
                                                
72 Interaction with NSU student protestor’s mother, 6.31.05. 
73 Interview with Panchayat Party and Nepali Congress ex-minister, 5.24.04. 
   88 
politics.  But even within political movements, the façade of the purity of 
politics crumbles. A number of established politicians who were key players 
in historic democratic movements lost the constituent assembly elections in 
their districts because they were perceived as corrupt. During the constituent 
assembly election campaigns, a shopkeeper from Tanahun district told me, 
“We are through with corrupt leaders, we have suffered too much and now 
we will only vote for people who know sacrifice.  The Maoists have proven 
themselves in their political struggle.”74 The Maoist candidates won a number 
of seats for this reason, causing an unexpected upset in the constituent 
assembly election results. The results serves as a prime example of an NC (D) 
party leader’s lament; that corruption caused “leaders who had struggled for 
thirty to forty years to collapse within a year. Their sacrifices had proven they 
could be ministers that could do good by the people and because of their 
corrupt ways, within a year they were deemed incapable.”75 Such demise 
represents the unraveling of the ideal of pure politics and also underscores the 
necessity for a shared investment in politics as social service that allows 
political actors to further themselves and their political agendas. I will now 
analyze how people enact this narrative in their everyday life in ways that 
emphasize their political action as service that is couched within suffering and 
sacrifice. 
The Identity of Suffering  
The narrative of suffering and sacrifice underpins the notion that 
politics is public service. Sacrifice and suffering substantiate political identity 
across ideological lines. The experiences of suffering unite individuals in 
                                                
74 Translation of an interaction with a Tanuha shopkeeper, 4.2.08. 
75 Interview with Nepali Congress (D) leader, 6.19.04. 
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political organizations, and their individual experience expands and reinforces 
the historical weight of party politics in Nepal. In this section I will 
demonstrate that indexing histories of sacrifice and suffering is a key political 
tactic used to corral or mobilize student activists within the party’s agenda.  
During the Panchayat era (1960-1990), all party politics were banned. 
Most major party politicians have spent time underground, jailed, or exiled. 
These experiences became a de facto rite of passage into Nepali politics. But 
these experiences also galvanized activists in their struggle for democracy and 
political justice.  The most recent example of this is the Maoist students’ 
experience during the People’s War. Due to their history, ANNISU (R) was 
not able to lay a convincing organizational claim to the democratic and class 
struggle that came out of the Free Student Union during the Panchayat years. 
Despite homage to the early communist leaders, 76 their organizational 
narrative begins with their underground experience during the People’s War 
(1996).77 Their orientation is based on a shared experience of being 
                                                
76 The communist parties of Nepal have one of the most sordid, complicated histories of splits 
and mergers that I have seen in all of my studies of political parties. For a comprehensive 
visual of this please see Thapa and Shivapati 2005: 44. 
77 The ANNISU (R) is not considered an old student organization. Despite the fact that Maoist 
sympathizers have been active as students in the communist movement since the 1930s, there 
had not been an official Maoist student wing until the organization of the CPN (M) in 1995. 
Even at the beginning, there was only a loose student following of the Maoist party. They 
served as a support extension into the campuses during the Maoists’ time in parliament. Yet 
they never participated in Free Student Union elections on campuses nor had they established 
themselves as an entrenched sister organization (Dangi 2007). Really, their official formation 
began after the Maoists put out their forty-point demand to parliament. From 1996 to 1998 
they served as proselytizers for this political manifesto. As the Maoists went to the jungle to 
begin their revolution, the students of ANNISU (R) stayed on the campuses and informed 
their fellow students of the progression of the People’s War, impressing upon them the need 
to support the Maoists. It was not until the Maoists were tagged as terrorists during Operation 
Romeo that the ANNISU (R) focused on providing physical support for the war in an official 
organizational form. After the declaration the students had to forgo their overt indoctrination 
practices and go underground.  ANNISU (R) chose to go underground and into the jungle 
with the Maoists.  It was at this time that its responsibilities broadened and encompassed roles 
not traditional to Nepali student organizations.  The ANNISU (R) students still worked on the 
campuses to spread Maoist influence, brokered educational demands, and enforced school 
closures nationwide, but they also worked as journalists and analysts covering the war, 
soldiers, local educational overseers, judges in the people’s courts, campaigners, and 
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underground. This common experience of hardship unites the Maoist 
students, buttressing the strength of their individual and organizational 
discipline. Jeffery Alexander describes the experience of cultural traumas as a 
way to relate and form common identities; he writes, “Insofar as they identify 
the cause of trauma, and thereby assume such moral responsibility, members 
of collectivities define their solidary relationships in ways that, in principle, 
allow them to share the sufferings of others” (Alexander 2004:1).  The 
ANNISU (R) students formed their personal identities, their organizational 
identity, and their internal culture based upon their experiences of shared 
sacrifice and struggle during the People’s War, which they claim has 
connected them to the public.  
ANNISU (R) students argue that the students’ perspective allows them 
to easily grasp Maoist ideology and that they were well positioned to 
implement that ideology into an action plan during the war.  Their rationale 
was that they could recognize the problems but were young and not yet 
invested in the feudal traditions that reinforced the societal inequalities. Their 
generational orientation allows them a new repertoire in which to frame 
political progress and the means for achieving it (Tilly 1995).  They recognized 
that there was opportunity in a changed society and were therefore devoted to 
societal transformation. Many ANNISU (R) students have described the 
experience of being underground during the war as formative; some even 
claimed it as their coming of age.  
                                                                                                                                       
recruiters. During their time underground the ANNISU (R) was most prevalently known for 
the closures of schools, particularly private schools, and for forcing them to pay a tax that 
would go toward “people’s education” in order to create an equitable education system for 
all.  This tax was not used to fund education but to fund indoctrination and the furthering of 
the Maoists’ propaganda campaign. But overall, they filled the roles that needed to be filled in 
order to make the war a success and address what they saw as the fundamental needs of the 
people in the parallel government that the Maoists had set up in their stronghold areas.  
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All of the ANNISU (R) students I spoke with about their experiences 
underground recalled them nostalgically. Even those who lost their partners, 
relatives, or friends, those who spent time in jail or experienced torture, still 
count being underground as one of the most productive experiences of their 
life. They believe that it allowed them to witness the everyday realities of 
Nepali suffering. The students explained that the common people’s experience 
informs and reinforces their political philosophy. As one student phrased it, 
they came to “see what our political ideology and struggle are based on.”78 
They not only were able to observe the reality that inspired their philosophy, 
but they experienced it as well. They attributed their deep connection to the 
public to these experiences while they were underground. As one student 
explained, 
I think that had I not gotten involved in this 
political movement for change, I would have been 
born and died like any insect in the world. I have 
been able to win many people’s hearts and read 
many people’s minds. I would never have got the 
chance to know about the people in their real-life 
situations. We obtained knowledge about the 
diversity of suffering as well as joy within the 
Nepalese society.79 
The experience of being underground enabled them to transcend their 
individual traditional identities and social backgrounds. They believe that 
their relations with all sectors of Nepalese society allowed them to break from 
those past identities and study Nepal purely from a class perspective. 
Furthermore, many students claimed that it was when they were 
underground that they learned about their own capacity to endure suffering 
                                                
78 Translation of an ANNISU (R ) central committee member’s interview, taken on 10.12.07. 
79 Translation of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, taken on 11.12.07. 
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and they have built their identities around it.  They came to know they could 
sacrifice anything for their political ideals because they had sacrificed 
everything and saw progress from it.80 The Maoist student president looked 
me directly in the eye after describing how they had dug a hole and buried 
ninety-two of their cadres in Magdi, and said, “We now know what we need 
to do to make our ideal real.”81 The Maoist students attribute their conviction 
to follow through on their political agenda to these experiences. They pride 
themselves on knowing better than other student cadres what is at risk and 
they believe it is worth it to achieve their ends.  
Nonetheless, the other student organizations have had a longer history 
of suffering and sacrifice to reference. It goes back to the repressive times of 
the Rana regime (1846-1950) and includes the underground years of the 
Panchayat era and every student and political movement since that time, 
including the most recent that led to the downfall of the King. It has become 
commonplace for political leaders to repurpose this history for their own 
intentions. A striking example of this was during the NSU (D)’s national 
convention. The thing that registered for me as I observed these student 
cadres coping with the hardship that resulted from their leaders’ 
disorganization, was the way in which the leaders justified it.  During their 
closed session,82 which happened three days later than planned, the student 
                                                
80 In the article “Commitment as an Analytic: Reflections on Nepali Student Activists’ 
Protracted Struggle” I analyze the rhetorical use of continual struggle in order to understand 
how student activists affiliated with the democratic parties make meaning from their political 
activity. (Snellinger 2006) 
81 ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, taken on 10.12.07.  
82 The closed session is the second event of the convention after the open session and the 
release of the delegate list. During the closed session the political, educational, fiscal, and 
social reports are presented. Following the closed session the students must approve the new 
constitutional amendments. Then the candidates are officially nominated, followed by 
campaigning, the casting of votes, the counting of votes, and, finally, the announcement and 
victory rally.  Therefore the closed session should ideally take place on the second day first 
thing in the morning.  At both NSU conventions they did not take place until at least the third 
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leaders uncomfortably acknowledged the physical and logistical 
inconveniences. The then-current president sympathized with the students, 
admitting it was difficult to endure the heat and mediocre food and 
accommodations in Nepalganj. He then reframed the uncertainty of their 
political process in order to mobilize the students. He said,  
I want to remind you that we too, your leaders, are 
suffering.  We are not sleeping until we complete 
this convention in a healthy and successful 
manner.  We are willing to suffer because we are 
dedicated to the norms of democracy and 
providing you with your rights, just as we know 
you are dedicated to the struggle to not only fight 
for, but maintain democracy in Nepal.  Your 
experience at this convention strengthens your 
conviction and dedication to struggle for your 
country.83  
The student leaders often couch their inefficiency in the larger rhetoric of 
political struggle. Rather than admit that their inability undermines the future 
stability of their organization, they framed the results of their disorganization 
in way that fueled the students’ sense of struggle for their rights.   
In general, the students’ response to this approach is dismissive.  They 
said the leaders had become full of themselves (as they say in Nepali: “thulo 
manchhe bae sakyo”, trans: “he has become a big person”) and no longer 
consider the impact of their actions on those who brought them to their 
position of leadership.  This response, I think, captures the general public’s 
attitude as well, yet these students tolerate it for other reasons, because they 
have an ideological and social attachment to politics, upon which they base 
                                                                                                                                       
or fourth day. In the case of the NSU (D) closed session they did not even have all the reports 
planned.   
83 Translation from a speech of an NSU (D) central committee member at the Nepalganj 
national convention, 7.13.07. 
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their identity. They justify their investment through their activism as well as 
the rhetoric, both of which encapsulate the larger political narrative of 
democracy and justice. 
 
Figure 7: Nepali Congress (D) party leaders on the NSU (D)  
national convention stage, Nepalganj, Banke 2007 
Politics as a Mode of Being 
Before I continue to explore politics in its ideal form, it is important to 
understand the students’ position for perceiving it as an opportunity. The 
mundane aspect of politics engenders opportunity for Nepali student activists 
and in turn, their participation creates a public that is both invested in and 
socially legitimates Nepali party politics. For them political causes resonate for 
a reason, so it is important to understand how politics guides students’ actions 
and crafts their lives. Most people do not see themselves as pursuing a self-
interested career; they see possibility to effect change where others have 
   95 
failed. For this reason, I consider Mary Zournazi’s assertion that we should 
not focus on what is “meant to be” in terms of a better life, but rather we must 
understand what sustains people, the link between people’s desire and their 
motivation that embeds them in the world (2000: 15). She does not suggest 
that we forego the forwardness of utopian temporal orientation but that we 
focus on its momentum, which is in the everyday. Indeed, much of the 
students’ political life is getting through the everyday, whether it is protesting 
on the streets, campaigning for their party, hiding underground, being 
detained in jail, or showing up at the party office so people won’t forget their 
faces. These everyday acts sustain the larger shared meanings of ideology, 
sacrifice, and politics as service that comprise the political narrative that in 
turn gives weight to these everyday acts. Here I will focus on the students’ 
everyday act of speculation in order to understand how it sustains them and 
gives them a place in the political sphere.  
When I was at the NSU (D) national convention in 2007, I heard a 
particular theory as to why students become active in politics. Many had 
explained the appeal of politics as a conundrum of their middle class position.  
These young men were from high-caste, middle-class homes where they were 
expected to achieve beyond what their parents had; yet they said there was no 
opportunity for them.  It was inappropriate for them to do “small work” like 
agricultural or physical labor because it was below their family status. They 
were raised to aspire for something that was out of their reach, opportunities 
that they conceptualize as only truly available to people of the higher class 
with better connections, education, and monetary access. One student said to 
me, “In my father’s day, securing an occupation [jagir] was what was 
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expected, but for us, we must find a profession [pesha].”84 He explained that 
often men are trained to take over their father’s occupations or a family 
business. But in the last generation they have become more broadly educated; 
they must pass the School Leaving Certificate and then go to college. So of 
course they are expected to put their training to use, to find prestigious work 
that will improve themselves and their family’s class status.85  
What these students indicated to me was that since uplifting modern 
opportunities were not available, they did politics. This is particularly true in 
times of political instability, when standing up for one’s rights contributes to 
the fight for political justice. For the students, politics is not necessarily doing 
anything but a way to fill their time with something that seems respectable. 
Within politics they found a cause and at the very least they will gain 
connections or an opportunity to carve out a profession. If not, then they will 
serve as a support network to their friends who might be able to secure a 
political position, and then at least they are connected to someone of influence. 
What this sentiment indicates is that, for these students, doing politics is not 
only about investing in an opportunity but grasping for an orientation and 
identity in life that is respectable within a traditional context where other 
traditionally accepted or modernly conceived opportunities are not readily 
available.  
These are not students who have to work for their family to survive. 
They are not expected to necessarily do something but rather expected to be 
                                                
84 Translation of an interaction with an NSU (D) student cadre, 7.12.07. 
85 Many western and Nepali academics have researched how development and education 
have affected people’s career aspirations and how the lack of opportunity has lead to social 
and political instability as well as outmigration. (Ahern 2001, Fujikura 2003 & 2001, Pigg 1992, 
Tamang 2002.) 
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something. Politics for them is a mode of being.86 The reason people can be so 
tolerant of the uncertainty within the political parties and student unions is 
that for them it is not about an effective agenda of productivity, it is a social 
lifestyle that is justified by their activism. Their political participation connects 
them to other elites who can reinforce their social position. Some of them will 
rise to the top and dictate the policy and future path of the country, and the 
rest will be connected to them through networks of obligation, traditionally 
known as the chakari (sycophantic) or aphno mānchhe (own person) system in 
Nepal (Bista 1991). Both the networks and the investment in them justify 
everyone’s energies, which are substantiated by the ideological underpinnings 
of their politics. 
It is for this reason that speculation is such a common pastime for the 
students. I realized this while sitting on the middle of a bridge over the 
Naranghad river at 11:30 at night hearing a group of six NSU (K) male cadres 
guess whether their leader would run for president.  They had been playing 
this guessing game for over three hours, their beer bottles now empty and 
they were smoking the last of their cigarettes.  The only way this conversation 
differed from the one we had the previous night was that they had come up 
with new possible outcomes and how these might affect them.  As I grew 
impatient with mentally noting their passive verbal constructions, I asked 
them, “Why don’t you think Akash will run? Everyone loves him and thinks 
of him as a leader.”  They shook their heads and looked at me as if I were 
                                                
86 I am not referring to being here in a phenomenological sense but rather being in the sense 
that Ghassan Hage lays out in Against Paranoid Nationalism. He bases his notion of being on 
Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological frame, in which society is the mechanism for people to create 
socially significant lives for themselves (2000). Here I conceive of being similar to the way 
Hage conceptualizes social hope: as “social routes by which individuals can define a meaning 
in their life” (2003: 15). Political modes of being allow student cadres to sustain themselves 
and their political aspirations during uncertainty and situations beyond their control. 
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naïve. Prabal said, “You always ask why. If someone asked me what 
anthropology (manabshastra) is, I would say the science of why.” He 
continued, “You know why, the party leaders is why.” I replied, “Then why 
are you still discussing possibilities that won’t transpire?”  Samrat interjected, 
“We have to be prepared for every possibility, let’s see what will be (heraun ke 
hunchha).”87 
Indeed, the students’ capacity for speculation went beyond my own. 
They can go on for hours guessing what outcomes might be and how they 
would be affected, without once analyzing why things have occurred as they 
have. At first I found this lack of analysis surprising.  Yet I soon realized that 
they are not interested in the why because if they engaged these questions, 
then they would have to confront the fact that they have little control in the 
process. Rather, they are wrapped up in a suspended state of uncertainty and 
powerlessness. Speculation allows them to maintain an investment in the 
process, to feel they are involved even though they cannot directly affect it. 
This is part of the larger dynamic of doing politics for general cadres, 
especially in less ideologically driven parties.  They need something to grasp 
onto in the political process, a process in which they invest time and energy 
but upon which they have little impact other than crowding streets, shouting 
slogans, and throwing rocks at the police, casting a vote in an often 
undemocratic process, campaigning and spreading the party’s political 
influence, attending political programs and speeches, or contributing to 
various levels of patronage. 
 
 
                                                
87 Translation of an interaction with NSU (K) cadres, 5.25.07. 
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Figure 8: NSU (D) student cadres at constituent assembly  
campaign program, Bharatpur, Chitwan, 2007 
It is important to emphasize that the way in which these students 
embrace speculation differs from the “culture of speculation” that Edward 
LiPuma and Benjamin Lee describe in financial markets (2004: 43). The Nepali 
students are not assessing the risk involved to maximize their mobility or 
opportunity; they are not asserting any agency by “playing the field” (ibid: 
43).  Rather, for them, speculation is a coping measure; it is how the students 
sustain themselves in situations where the outcome is beyond their control. It 
is not only the abeyance of power but an active denial of agency.  
In this sense they not only embrace the ambiguity but continue to 
produce it through their speculative habits. Ira Sharkansky argues that when 
end points are hard to quantify, ambiguity can be a useful measure of active 
coping in order to avoid a closure that would disappoint. Active coping 
includes: 
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[E]fforts to salvage something from a difficult 
situation; to keep a process going in the 
expectation of greater opportunities or holding off 
greater loss; surveying options and recruiting 
support; changing expectations in the face of 
conditions that are not likely to change in the short 
range; and ranking priorities in order to achieve 
the more important things at the expense of less 
important things. (1999: 5) 
Similar to ambiguity, speculation highlights indeterminacy that is central to 
democratic politics (Lefort 1988). How student activists take advantage of 
ambiguity is part of their repertoire of progression in their political ambitions 
and survival on a personal level. Speculation allows the Nepali students to 
continue on in times of personal and political ambiguity.  
Yet the students’ habit for political speculation also signifies 
ambiguating agency in the way that Debbora Battaglia defines when she 
argues that Tobrianders strategically conceal or reveal their agency in order to 
cast a doubt on Malinowski’s classification of Trobriand social hierarchy 
(1997). While the students’ speculation may be an abeyance of agency, it also 
conceals their potent potential. As an act, speculation simultaneously invests 
in the political process while deferring frustration in a way that obfuscates the 
power dynamics within the political landscape. I have been surprised by how 
acquiescent student cadres generally are. They have to be put in extreme 
situations of discomfort or be explicitly denied what they consider to be their 
right before they become infuriated. But the tipping point provokes them to 
extremes, and they protest in forms of vandalism and violence. The specter of 
the students’ rage is their political potential. The political leaders try to 
harness it by directing their frustration at the monarchy, the state, or other 
political parties in the form of public protest. But history has proven that the 
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students are quite capable of making their own party and student union 
leaders the focus of their destructive protests. 
 
Figure 9: NSU (D) cadres protesting during the closed session  
of their national convention, Nepalganj, Banke 2007 
Indeed, it is a delicate balance for the party and student leaders to 
maintain the general student population’s patience as they continue to try it. I 
observed this at a few student union national conferences in 2007. They were 
disorganized to the degree that the student cadres were left to wait days for a 
process that was only supposed to take three days. Each day was full of the 
unknown. The students would wait on the streets outside the halls for hours; 
only to receive directives immediately before a program began. Many of them 
became sick with heatstroke and dysentery. The poor conditions were 
tolerated until voter lists were released and the students saw that the lists had 
been manipulated to influence election results. In two of the conventions this 
incited violence against the leaders, vandalism of both party and public 
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property, and clashes with the police. These students had traveled from all 
corners of the country merely to find out that they had been cut from the voter 
list. At this point these students had gone from patient tolerance maintained 
by political speculation to extremism as a means of asserting themselves. 
I interpret the students’ mode of political being and their habits of 
speculation in the context of a phrase they often use, heraun ke hunchha, “let’s 
see what will be.” In the introduction, chapter three, and chapter four I argue 
that the students’ political approach is an aesthetic orientation, which I base 
on Jacques Rancière’s assertion that politics is an aesthetic act because it is a 
willful disassembling of representation; in his words, it constitutes “a kind of 
community of sense experience that works on the world of assumptions, of 
the as if that includes those who are not included by revealing a mode of 
existence of sense experience that has eluded the allocation of part and lots” 
(1999: 58). The notion of “as-if” is a familiar one to anthropology, although in 
anthropology it references possibility rather than assumption (see Riles 2010). 
Leach employs it in his book Political Systems of Highland Burma to 
demonstrate that ritual acts are more a supposition of an ideal state rather 
than an assertion of political reality (1954: 281). He argued that ethnographers 
focus on the ideal rather than the empirical as much as do the rituals they 
study (ibid: 283). These two perspectives of “as-if” capture the two poles of the 
student cadres’ mode of political being; possibility is part of their ambiguating 
agency, which they exercise through speculation, and assumption occurs 
when they assert their agency to reveal the hypocrisy of their political process.  
In his book Habits of Hope, Patrick Shade purports a pragmatic 
orientation that is open to the possibilities that are to come in one’s life (2001: 
135). He clarifies that embracing faith is “acting as-if” with no pursuit of an 
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end but rather a focus on the process of testing one’s beliefs by reconstructing 
the means for the desired effect.  “Faith is conviction not about how things are, 
but rather about how they may be” (ibid. 76). Shade’s pragmatic approach to 
hope is the process by which one draws connections between ends and means 
in light of the different possibilities or contexts in which they can occur. Hope 
is the open-ended process of revelation that allows one to conceive of 
possibilities beyond the present. In chapters three and four, I have used Ernst 
Bloch’s famous metaphor of “not-yet” to demonstrate how Nepali student 
activism dynamically captures political aspirations of the past and present, 
and reframes it with a future orientation in order to direct the public toward 
tomorrow, when they will be in power. They do this by emphasizing what has 
not been accomplished and the possibilities that they envision. “Not-yet” 
consciousness is not merely an orientation toward assessing what has not been 
accomplished and accomplishing it, but rather it is a continual perspective of 
openness “where every end again and again becomes a means to serve the still 
utterly opaque…final goal” (1986 [1959]: 1375). In politics that opaque goal is 
political ideology, the envisioning the world in a particular form. There may 
be a focus on discrete ends but there is no preference for closure. Nepali 
student politicians are flexible in their rhetoric, narrative, and action in order 
to work toward their goals. Similarly, the student cadres exercise coping 
mechanisms to defer closure but keep the process within the bounds of their 
political values by holding their leaders accountable.  
Personalization of Politics 
Jacque Rancière claimed that democracy had a profound effect on 
political philosophy not because democracy is a set of institutions or a 
particular formation of a regime, but rather it is a “way for politics to be” 
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(1999: 99). But as I have established, politics also allows a way for people to be. 
Student actors identify their party and its ideology as the best way toward a 
better life for themselves and society. It is in a sense a personalization of 
politics. Yet people very often deemphasize the personal aspect of politics and 
focus on their political affiliation and ideology. In this regard, the ideal and 
the mundane of politics are contingent upon one another, two sides of the 
same coin, yet people prefer to focus on the ideal. The mundane serves as an 
underbelly that not only reveals the imperfections of politics but could also 
jeopardize the entire enterprise.  
When interviewing someone new, the first thing I ask is, “Could you 
please shed light on your personal political history?” I started to notice that 
the more leftist the individual was the more they eschewed their personal 
life.88 The ANNISU (R) president response to this question sums up this trend: 
Our history lies within the history of the 
organization where we work and the movements 
done by the organization. We are different in the 
sense that bourgeoisie first think about “I” and 
“My” and then only go to [think about] “Ours” 
[Hamro]. In our case the foremost thing is “Our 
Organization,” “Our History,” and “Our 
Movement”; “I” is a secondary factor. You have to 
understand us and our organization in this light. In 
spite of all this, I would like to tell you [what you 
want to know] since “we” are public figures.89  
He then went into detailing his own background. After I noticed the trend I 
removed the word personal and just asked them to shed light on their political 
                                                
88 Point made by ANNISU (R) student leaders and activists in conversations and interviews 
taken on 10.12.07, 12.4.07, 11.12.07, 1.8.07, 7.7.07. 
89 Translation of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, taken on 10.12.07. 
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background.  Even then I received responses such as, “ my political 
background is the history of the party.”90 
This particular attitude begs the question, how do these cadres 
consistently forgo their personal identity to uphold their party ideology? One 
way that I observed was in the sensibility of optimism (āshabādi).  I kept 
hearing from the mouths of Maoist students that you “must be optimistic, that 
you must cast aside cynicism [nirashabādi].”91 As they expounded upon their 
points, it became obvious that they were referencing a deeper sentiment.  
After hearing this repeatedly, I stopped one student and said, “I have heard 
Maoist students make this distinction between yourselves and other student 
activists. What does the word āshabādi encompass for you?”  He said, 
We locate our life within our political struggle. We 
believe that we have to be optimistic to achieve our 
aim; we have to be optimistic in our work and 
struggle. We need to be determined and 
undeviated. Not just in our lives but also our 
lifestyle. In our smallest action we must live up to 
our ideals. If we do not live up to our aim through 
our daily lives, then how do we expect it to 
manifest in society? This is the difference between 
us and others. This is the difference between an 
optimist and a cynic.  It’s not about our personal 
gain but that of the society.92  
The Maoist students’ emphasis on optimism captures Gramsci’s maxim 
“pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.” The original maxim of 
Gramsci’s was the masthead for the weekly journal he edited called Ordine 
Nuovo: Rassegna Settimanale di Cultura Socialista.  Gramsci was trying to 
                                                
90 Translation of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, taken on 10.12.07, 
12.4.07. 
91 These two words technically translate as hopeful and hopeless respectively, but optimism 
and cynicism capture their meaning more closely in this context.  
92Translation taken from an interaction with an ANNISU (R) student cadres, at the Sita Paila 
commune, 11.30.07. 
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emphasize that the foundation for our logic must be based on critical theory, 
whose premise is opposition.  Without a pessimistic intellect one will not 
observe the opposition that is inherent in dialectical epistemology. But in 
order to avoid despair, this must be coupled with the conviction that positive 
change can occur: not an intellectual deduction from observed facts, but a 
determined decision, an act of will, regardless of the conflicts of reality that 
one faces.  A pessimistic intellect without optimism will merely creates a 
stagnant cynic. 
The context in which I had pressed this student may have invited this 
tone.  We spoke at a Maoist student co-op that I was visiting specifically to get 
a sense of how they lived their everyday lives and how the organization was 
inserted into their lives.  Nonetheless, his explanation captured what other 
students insinuated through their use of the words “optimism” and 
“cynicism.” He further explained that this was regularly impressed upon 
students in their trainings and discussions, so it is a deliberately shared ideal. 
Nonetheless, this sensibility goes beyond the Maoists’ indoctrination. This is 
also a general political value, as illuminated by the concept of organization as 
expressed by an ex-student leader from NSU (K).  He explained to me that the 
most important matter for a political organization is not their ideology but 
their activists’ commitment to it. This commitment must be directed toward a 
mission over and above the students’ private affairs. 93 
So why, as admitted by most everyone, do the Maoist students have 
more ability to meld their theory (or political ideals) into practice than other 
students affiliated with other organizations?  One reason is that the Maoists’ 
mission is a complete restructuring of society, politics, culture, family, and 
                                                
93 Translation of a former NSU (K) central committee member’s interview, taken on 11.16.07.  
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individual lives, whereas other student organizations’ missions are more 
narrowly defined, a struggle for democracy, republic, and/or a socialist state 
structure. Other activists’ struggle, especially in latent periods, does not 
encompass every facet of their lives. They can disconnect their family or 
private lives from their political lives, which they can cordon off to the street 
or party office. Yet, when one is in the middle of struggle, conviction makes 
sense. It is for this reason that all the political parties are oriented toward the 
incompleteness of their political movements, because it provides them with a 
metaphorical frame that emphasizes commitment and discipline to the parties’ 
ambitions. 94  One student from a smaller leftist party highlighted this when he 
was describing how leadership in his party was determined.  He said that 
since their cadres are taught the notion of sacrifice and devotion, only those 
who fully incorporate this into their behavioral pattern prove their leadership 
capabilities.95   
Regardless, most student activists contextualize their activities as 
serving the larger good of their party and it is hard for them to separate their 
politics from their lifestyle. This became apparent to me after I interviewed a 
female student from the ANNFSU at my apartment. On the bus to her office 
she told me she had hepatitis A and this was her first outing in a month. As 
we were waiting for our separate appointments in the party office, she began 
to yawn. I asked her if she was tired.  She shrugged as she continued yawning 
and pointed to a poster behind the president’s desk. It was a picture of 
Krishna Bhatarai, one of the formidable leaders of UML who was active 
                                                
94 This is a point that I discuss in chapter three and is accurately depicted in this quote: “Our 
character has been that none of our movements have been complete; it means it has yet to be 
completed.” –Current minister on the difference between student movements of today and of 
his day 
95 Translation of an ANNFSU (Ekrikrit) central committee member’s interview, taken on 
11.10.07.  
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underground for much of Panchayat rule.  Below his portrait there was a 
quote that said, “In politics there is no such thing as exhaustion.” I had just 
heard this activist’s background and I knew that she had experienced a tenth 
of the hardship of this leader, but she still identified with him because she 
chose to carry on the mission he began. She had created an identity through 
living up to those ideals.96 Her ability to commit to her leader’s political 
mission indicated that for these students the personal is political as much as 
the reverse, politics is personal. They embrace this by enacting their political 
aspiration on an individual scale as much as on a societal scale. 
Figure 10: NSU (K) campus leader,  
Padma Kenya Campus, Kathmandu 2004 
                                                
96 Translation taken from an interaction with an ANNFSU (Akhil) student cadres, at the central 
committee office, 11.25.07. 
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Conclusion 
As I demonstrated here, the aesthetics of politics as public service can 
serve as a net for what political aspirations are and how they drive societal 
change or maintain tradition. The way in which people articulate it through 
the notions of suffering and sacrifice serves as a fine example of capturing 
political imaginary in the sense that we can understand people’s political 
actions and motivations through the categories they employ. Here I have 
contextualized the historical anxiety and uncertainty that Nepali politics has 
come to represent. The analysis that I put forward is meant to provide a 
nuanced view of how political power and its conditions are accepted with 
ambivalence, how people focus on their ideals in order to justify their political 
investment (even turning their ambivalence into complicity), and how people 
cope with the outcomes. I have attempted to do this by analyzing Nepali 
student political actors’ categories through their actions and their explanations 
thereof in order to understand how for them the personal is political, 
something upon which they build their identities and their social world, 
which is encompassed by political participation in their everyday lives. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ĀNDOLAN JARINCHHA!: THE MOVEMENT CONTINUES 
Our view has been that none of our movements 
have been complete. This means it has yet to be 
completed. –Current minister on the difference 
between student movements of the different 
generations, 2.4.07 
History is a constructive, discursive process (Foucault 1972; Rancière 
1994; Touraine 1998). Those that frame the discourse of history are the ones 
who dictate what is possible in the past, present, and future. For Nepali 
political actors, this process is the basis of their political imaginary, because 
they tell and retell the facts of their history in order to establish their sense of 
self, agenda, and aspiration. In this chapter I heed Malinowski’s assertion that 
what is of interest to fieldworkers is not a past as it actually was but rather as 
it is remembered (1938: xxv-xxixii in Spencer 2007: 58). For this reason, I focus 
on political movements and protest not only to demonstrate how people mark 
or reference history but also to reveal how history is conceptualized and 
experienced and the socio-cultural weight that recollected themes like political 
movements have in the present. With this as my basis, I argue that political 
movements are key events that are historically referenced while they are 
concurrently reenacted as an opportunity to mark one’s place.  Political 
movements are concurrently novel and ritual because they signify both 
political change and the generational transmission of politics. Throughout this 
chapter I will also analyze people’s sense of the unfinished in order to 
demonstrate the central role the āndolan (movement) plays in Nepali political 
imaginary and its perpetual forward momentum. 
This chapter focuses on the mythos of Nepali political history as 
artifacts for their political imaginary. Political imaginary as a category 
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encompasses collective notions of the contemporary. It may be informed by 
myth but it is molded by people’s sense of history in a dynamic way; it is a 
result of the collective dialectic with the social and physical surroundings. I 
consider the artifacts that comprise the Nepali historical narrative of politics as 
an expression of hope rather than one of myth. Myth has been commonly 
analyzed to grasp collective understandings of societal and cultural form but 
its transcendental position keeps it from being a comprehensive heuristic to 
understand what motivates people.  As social change occurs, myths in large 
part remain static; for that reason myth can only provide a partial explanation 
for people’s orientations and aspirations. Myth’s boundaries are not 
contingent upon temporal limitations. It transcends time and often represents 
people’s notions of themselves as individuals or as a collective regardless of 
time or circumstance. Therefore, myth is a symbolic analytic that may inform 
hermeneutic analysis but cannot provide empirical data that can be placed 
within a time frame. Rather, the temporal orientation of hope has provided 
theorists a paradigmatic alternative to the limits of synchronic and diachronic 
bearings. 
Hope is an “intellectual emotion,” the act of postponing desire (Averill 
1996: 24). It is both imaginative and grounded; it perceives the possibilities 
from what already is.  Ernst Bloch warns that hope must be grounded in 
“docta spes” or reality principle (Kauffman 1997: 49).97 As I will demonstrate 
through my data, hope has the unique ability to obviate the conceived 
                                                
97 In his essay “On the Present State of Philosophy” (1950) Bloch argues that the three 
categories, “Front,” “Novum,” and “Matter,” that are central to the dialectic process 
presuppose hope. “Front” is the most advanced phase in which the next phase is not decided. 
“Novum” is the possibility of “‘not-yet’-consciousness,” or “‘not-yet’-become.”  And “Matter” 
is “What-Is-according-to-possibility, i.e. that which is defined in terms of conditions by what 
in each case is capable of appearing historically, and What-Is-in-possibility, i.e. the real 
substratum of possibility in the dialectical process.” He describes matter as the “substance in 
which our future, which is also its own future, is delivered.” (1986 [1959]: 1371). 
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endpoint. It is the process of deferring what cannot be attained in the present 
(Mar 2005: 365). In a sense it is an act of one placing one’s agency in abeyance 
(Crapanzano 2004:100). Despite long-term uncertainties, hope has the ability 
to temporalize potential, giving it a sense of future. Furthermore, the open-
ended quality of hope allows it to be a shared objective fueled by the 
alternatives that individual perspectives can bring to it. 
This chapter demonstrates how the Nepali political actors, particularly 
the students, are continually enacting hope by sustaining a sense of the 
unfinished.  Since they thrive during contentious political action, they will put 
political foreclosure in abeyance in order to become cultivated in a political 
system that cannot currently offer them any opportunity other than being an 
activist. I will use the analytic of hope to track how the students’ “not-yet” 
orientation is the means by which the collective base envisions the 
possibilities.  
Ritualized Novelty: A Historical Narrative of Political Movements 
As a focus of analysis, social movements have allowed social scientists 
to understand various types of subversive communal action that challenge the 
dominant order of things. Social movements were given special precedent 
because they seemed to be directly accessible to the masses in ways that 
legislative, political, and policy processes of the state were not. As political 
action, social movements are often considered the anti-system way to impact 
the system.  But their impact is broader than that, because they affect social 
discourse and values. They claim to disseminate ideas to the larger public, 
which has the potential to impact the mainstream political process by affecting 
voting trends and public opinion. In other words, they are meant to shift 
public priorities concerning political and social issues. They serve as 
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contemporary collective action that can “announce to society that a 
fundamental problem exists in a given area. They have a growing symbolic 
function; one can probably speak of a prophetic function. They are a kind of new 
media” (Melucci 1985: 797 in Escobar 1992b: 407).  
The study of social movements springs from modern social and 
political theories concerning social and economic (Marxist) revolution. 
Touraine was the first to describe the emergence of new social movements 
(NSM), which emphasized identity and cultural autonomy rather than state-
centered political power (1988).  But others have been skeptical of the 
bifurcating effect of marking a new era of social movements (Escobar 1992a; 
Gledhill 2000).  They argue that the emphasis should not lie upon an essential 
difference between what has become termed the new social movement and 
traditional political action. There has not necessarily been a shift in the way 
people conduct protest; rather, one should conceptualize the difference as a 
new analytic orientation to how political action is assessed. Following 
critiques that modern social theory generalizes and homogenizes individual 
experience, traditional social movement theory has also been dismissed as 
flattening the diverse dimensions of social action and actors’ agendas. Cast in 
this light, NSM theory tried to focus on the more molecular struggles over 
identities, ideas, and traditions in order to complicate the tendency to set 
social movements within the larger structural parameters of state and global 
political and economic power.  Nevertheless, there has been an implicit 
tension in how social science balances the more macro-level, political-
economy approach and the focus on specific strategies of everyday resistance 
(Abbleman 1996; Assies 2000; Chuang 2004; Edelman 2001; Escobar 1992; Giri 
1992; Inoue 2004; Skylair 1998).  
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This tension does not only exist in the social sciences.  It is also a 
tension in how activists derive meaning from their actions, how they deem 
their political action should be assessed. In Nepali politics, they manipulate 
the “prophetic function” of the movement in order to justify their political 
agendas, ideology, identities, and everyday lives. Political movements are not 
only a way to show how people mark or reference history but also serve as a 
metaphor for how political history is conceptualized and experienced. In this 
section I will put the āndolan in “political time” and “political space” in order 
to demonstrate that it may be considered a heightened and intensified event 
but it has an entrenched place in the Nepali political norm (Spencer 2007: 120). 
It is the āndolan that frames their political goals within larger societal 
definitions of rights and responsibilities in order to highlight the wrongs of 
the current social order and the possibility for the change that the activists 
want to bring. And for the political actors themselves, it is the āndolan that 
serves as a metaphor for things happening, political history unfolding at 
extreme paces. Nonetheless, much of the political action is historically 
repetitive. On an abstract level, the āndolan can be interpreted as a reenactment 
of key political events. There is a simultaneous sense of rapid newness and 
nothing new at all. Here I will demonstrate why the āndolan is so central to the 
Nepali political culture and how, through strategic framing, political actors 
have generalized it to justify all their political action.   
The crux of the student and political actors’ emphasis on the āndolan 
lies within the conceptual category of framing processes. Mayer N. Zald’s 
(1996: 262) definition of frames is worth noting: 
Frames are the specific metaphors, symbolic 
representations, and cognitive cues used to render 
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or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode 
and to suggest alternative modes of action. 
Focusing on framing processes highlights how movements strategically 
articulate themselves in order to appeal to the masses. A movement must 
define the implications of success and failure from within the cultural system 
that can identify the agenda that they support. In other words, the demand for 
change and the means of change must exist within one common social 
framework that must be familiar to people yet also suggest the possibility for 
change. Nepali political actors have nurtured the importance of the āndolan 
through the mobilization of culture, ideology, and discourse in similar ways, 
not only to gain the attraction of the public but for themselves. They have 
done this to such a degree that now it is a referential composite of their entire 
endeavor as well as justification for it. 
The āndolan (movement) in Nepali political culture has come to 
represent the social movement in the sense that social movements serve as a 
democratic alternative that can confront issues of justice and representation 
despite the structural limits of the system (Hachhethu 2002b; Krämer 2002; 
Lawoti 2005; Pradhan 2002; Thapa 2004). The āndolan refers to political 
struggle. It is a somewhat nebulous concept because there are historically 
discrete movements that take form from different issues—political, social, 
ethnic diversity, or gender rights. Yet in Nepali politics the word alone 
indicates the entirety of a person’s experience in politics.98 When Nepali 
political actors talk about “the movement continuing,” they mean that they 
                                                
98 For example, the students that I was on the streets with in 2003-2006 use the word āndolan to 
refer to their action since the Movement Against Regression through The People’s Movement 
part two. An older political activist will include the first People’s Movement and perhaps the 
student movement of 2036 (1978) in his reference to the āndolan, depending on what he has 
experienced. For the ANNISU (R) students, āndolan also refers to the Maoist movement. If 
they want to specifically cite the contribution of their party, they will discuss the Maoist War 
the Jana Yuddha (People’s War). 
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will continue their struggle, which began in 1950 with the first rebellion 
supporting multi-party democracy. Over the years the concept of āndolan has 
come to incorporate and represent different agendas.  For that reason one 
must consider a person’s background and political affiliation in order to 
understand what they mean when they use the term āndolan. Furthermore, 
Nepali political actors assign meaning to or claim the description of “āndolan” 
for most of their political action. This tendency particularly reveals the gap  
between the hyper-idealized category that student movements are social 
movements and the public opinion that student movements are an entrenched 
political tactic of the students who serve as party appendages.  
Figure 11: Eight Student Unions cadres protesting during the  
Movement Against Regression, Baag Bazaar, Kathmandu 2004 
Nonetheless, Nepali political actors don’t see any discrepancy in their 
definition of the āndolan because as a broader concept it provides effectiveness 
not only to student movements but to all their actions. The Nepali student 
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activists and politicians have a firm grounding in political and sociological 
theory and therefore know what defines a social movement. They make these 
academic definitions meaningful through their own culturally prescribed 
notions of what is political. The way in which Nepali politicians and students 
employ the āndolan as an ideal type is what gives their political being weight 
within the context of Nepali political culture and history.  
The student movements are very important to the political parties 
because they have caused historic leaps in their accomplishments. In short, 
they have regularly changed the political tide. It was the students who were 
exiled in India who helped King Tribhuvan overthrow the Rana regime in 
2007 (1950). It was the student movement of 2036 (1978) that caused King 
Birendra to allow the national referendum of 2038 (1980). The joint students’ 
movement of 2004 was another example of seizing an opportunity to push 
forward their political agenda. After the government was unable to charge 
arrested students with sedition, the students had the political advantage to 
transgress the normative political demands and call for a republic. They 
radicalized the discourse of the political parties’ Movement Against 
Regression. In all these cases,99 the student movements’ impact on the state 
was that they forced the state to react and reform in order to rebuild itself 
(Tarrow 1996). 
Traditionally speaking the students have wavered between educational 
and political movements.100 When the government is an active democracy, 
                                                
99 For a more detailed account of these movements and a more complete history of student 
movements please see my article “A Crisis in Nepali Student Politics?: Analyzing the Gap 
between Politically Active and Non-Active Students” (2005). 
100 In the article “Student Movements in Nepal: Their Parameters and Their Idealized Forms” I 
analyze the student activists’ shift between education movements and political movements as 
shifting involvements in student movements from norm-oriented agendas to value-oriented 
agendas (2007: 276). Philip Altbach distinguished between the “norm-oriented” movement, 
one concerned with pragmatic goals and generally the product of a specific limited issue, and 
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whereby their mother organizations are in power, they focus on the 
educational sector as the place to press their agenda for change. The 
educational movement is done on the downtime, to fill in the gaps between 
political uprisings. Nonetheless, these two types of movements are collapsed 
both historically and rhetorically. It is true that many political uprisings came 
out of the suppression of educational demands during the Panchayat rule. 
More recently, however, the students have claimed to be on the streets 
fighting for students’ rights and roles, yet they bar general students from 
going to school by calling strikes or compelling them to engage in street 
agitation rather than attending classes.  
Jonathan Grossman’s analysis of the slogan of South African youth 
activists, “liberation before education,” in the last years of apartheid is a useful 
perspective on the convergence of political issues and educational access 
(2004: 61). One must consider, “Whose liberation? Whose education?” In 
Nepal both the parties and the student activists derail the country’s education 
system in the name of justice often without considering if this is something the 
public wishes them to do on their behalf. The emphasis on the āndolan itself 
highlights the discrepancies between the students’ and the parties’ sense of 
end point and the public’s threshold for political struggle at the expense of a 
secure life. Particularly the student activists’ orientation over the last few years 
reconfirms the entrenched political process of getting ahead in politics 
through struggle, which extends people’s sense of what is left to be achieved.  
The Maoists are the most straightforward about this discrepancy 
because they don’t hold the pretension that education comes before politics in 
                                                                                                                                       
the “value-oriented” movement, which is concerned with broad, ideological issues (Altbach 
1967: 87). 
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any scenario.  Their interpretation is more holistic; basically they feel that 
everything is political. As one Maoist student explained to me,  
If we are only seeing the branches of a mango tree 
and expect that it will bear mangoes, our thinking 
will not be holistic since a mango tree has its 
roots—if they are rotten then the branches cannot 
bear fruit. In the same way, if we say that we are 
concerned with [the] educational sector and don’t 
care about other sectors like politics, we will never 
be able to obtain our objective.101 
For them, education is a right, therefore fighting for that right on behalf of the 
citizens makes it a political issue. Weaknesses in society inform their 
educational agenda, which they feel only a political approach can solve. One 
Maoist student said to me, “If education is not strong the society will be weak, 
therefore we need to focus on education, we need to restructure it in order to 
prepare people to properly live in society, have the proper ambitions to serve 
society, not themselves.”102 He also commented that it is through education 
that people learn political ideology and the ability to engage in politics.  
Nonetheless, the Maoists’ sensibility captures the reasoning of other 
politically affiliated students even if they don’t articulate it in the same 
ideological terms.  For instance, in May 2003, it was not until Devi Lal Poudel, 
a student in the district of Palpa, was shot dead that the student movement 
over the rising price of petrol took a new turn to assist their mother parties in 
the Movement Against Regression. The students immediately demanded the 
resignation of the King’s appointed prime minister and the reinstatement of 
the Parliament. A student leader said to me, “It was at this time that we 
realized what was at risk. The issue was no longer about our right to 
                                                
101 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, 12.4.07.  
102 Translation of an interaction with an ANNISU (R) Lalitpur district leader on 11.24.06. 
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education or the price of petrol but the principle of protesting the price of 
petrol. Our democratic rights were at stake and that changed the nature of the 
movement. It had to change. There was so much more at risk, including the 
honor of a martyr.”103 After this, the students stepped up their support for the 
five-party joint movement as sister organizations. The basis of all the student 
movements is their right to protest. It becomes an overt political issue when 
they feel that right is being compromised, but all of their āndolan activity is an 
expression of their political agenda. They use the political movement to 
substantiate their other movements in a larger historical narrative of just 
action for the people. 
Figure 12: Political program commemorating the first  
anniversary of Devi Lal Poudel’s death, 2004. 
                                                
103 Translation of an interview with an NSU (K) central committee member on 12.4.04. 
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In his analysis of the Y2K frenzy Jean Baudrillard wrote, “[t]he only 
thing we try to imagine is how to get rid of our history which weighs so much 
and then start all over again” (1998). The emphasis of the āndolan does this and 
also the opposite.  Rhetorically it gives weight to the historical 
accomplishments of the political and student movements in order to justify all 
of politics. But it also provides a categorical openness; every āndolan allows the 
possibility to start all over again.  This aspect is a tacit denial of the ritualized 
entrenchment of the āndolan in Nepali political history. There is necessity for 
this denial because it is through the āndolan that each generation becomes 
politicians. I now turn my focus to how individual political actors locate 
themselves in Nepali political history through their own experience of āndolan.  
Locating Oneself in Political History 
Students and politicians incessantly utilize historical events as 
buzzwords in order to highlight a particular role the students have played. 
This allows them to insert themselves into the political terrain and establish an 
identity within it. By continually referencing these events, they become vague 
enough that they are abstracted and then become the substantial 
underpinnings for political imaginary. They create an ideal that allows them 
to have a shared sense of what politics has been, should be, and what is 
possible.  It is at the same time amorphous and limited because it is self-
referencing on both an abstract and a tangible level.  For instance, political 
history is referenced in speeches through metaphors of land, country, or 
religion in ways that point to tangible facts and definable boundaries but 
insinuate an abstract sense of the possible.  
This tactic also places people in their proper position within the 
political structure.  To be in politics one must be an activist. It is how one 
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begins one’s political career. All students, regardless of their political 
affiliations, continually refer to themselves as āndolankāri (activists) or, more 
surprisingly, krantikāri (revolutionaries).  One would expect the Maoists and 
leftists to feel comfortable with claiming the krantikāri title, but all the student 
organizations use it to designate themselves as active agents for change. I even 
heard the term krantikāri used to greet the students at the NSU (D) 2007 
national convention. They claimed the title regardless of the fact that the NSU 
(D) did not participate in the eight-joint-student-union movement in 2004 and 
their party leader had served as the prime minister appointed by the King 
during the Movement Against Regression. 104 Still, they referred to themselves  
 
Figure 13: Eight Student Unions’ cadres vandalizing a  
government vehicle, Baag Bazaar, Kathmandu 2004 
                                                
104 In 2004 Sher Bahadur Deuba accepted the position of King appointed prime minister and 
was then ousted again in 2005 when the King led a military coup.  The CPN-UML party also 
decided to join the 2004 government that the King asked the parties to put together. Their 
student organization, ANNFSU (Akhil), was actively against the move, yet they did not have 
enough control or influence and as a result had to withdraw from the eight-joint-student-
union movement in 2004. 
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as such because they had participated in the People’s Movement part two. Just 
like all the other student organizations they highlight the history of 
movements and link themselves to it. By doing this they confirm their place as 
contentious political actors.  
The action of the state identifying people as āndolankāris further 
reinforces their place in the political realm. It is both an individual feat and a 
public display of accomplishment. During the height of the Movement 
Against Regression, I observed a number of people negotiating with the police 
to let them reach Ratna Park before they were arrested. The police would 
thwart their protests in Jamal, Putali Sadak, or Bir Hospital, dragging people 
toward the police vans.  I asked a student why everyone was only willing to 
be arrested after they reached Ratna Park.  He responded, “Ratna Park was 
the heart of the 1990 People’s Movement. It was where thousands from the 
general public (amjanatā) joined hands with the activists and marched toward 
the palace to make the King surrender.  We are āndolankāri, we expect arrest 
but it means more to get arrested at democracy wall.”105106 People needed to 
get arrested to mark their participation in the movement.  But this action is 
obviously glorified because being arrested in particular places that have 
symbolic meaning for the history of the movement means more than being 
                                                
105 Democracy wall was at Ratna Park intersection and commemorated the protest of the 1990 
People’s Movement and the ongoing Movement Against Regression. The ANNFSU (Akhil)’s 
office, known as the red house (rato ghar), was at that intersection since the 1970s. Their office 
served as a logistical hub for both the 1990 People’s Movement and the Movement Against 
Regression from 2001 to 2004. From 2004, after the Movement Against Regression protests 
intensified, there was a ban on public gathering in particular areas. Ratna Park was one of 
them. Anyone found protesting in these designated spots was immediately arrested. After the 
King’s takeover in 2005, the ANNFSU (Akhil) was evicted from rato ghar and the building was 
torn down. The King’s government destroyed democracy wall and built a pedestrian bridge in 
order to curb protest.  After 2006, democracy wall was rebuilt, and the ANNFSU (Akhil) 
erected a garden dedicated to the political struggle called Republican park containing a statue 
of one of their fallen leaders. In 2006, the ANNISU (R) opened their first central committee 
office since they went underground during the People’s War in the Ratna Park intersection.  
106 Translation of an interaction with an ANNFSU (Akhil) student cadre on 5.13.05. 
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arrested in an anonymous gully. In this sense the activists act out what has 
come before in order to feel they are truly a part of the movement. 
 
Figure 14: Eight Party activists being arrested, Ratna Park, Kathmandu 2004 
The students not only gain recognition from their leaders by being 
arrested but it is through this process that they join the annals of āndolan 
history. In 2005, I joined a few Nepali Congress central committee members in 
order to visit some student leaders who had been detained at the central jail. I 
had independently tried to get access to these students but the security forces 
denied my request.  When they saw me with the political leaders they 
apologized to me, saying they were not aware of my connections.  We were all 
lead to the police chief’s office. It was a large office with couches surrounding 
the perimeter, enough for our entire entourage of over a dozen to sit 
comfortably. The police chief sat at his desk and chatted with the leaders 
while we had tea and waited for them to produce the students. As the 
students entered, everyone was very friendly with one another. There was no 
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tension.  The main NC leader asked the students if they were ok, if they were 
being treated fairly and getting what they needed.  They silently nodded as 
the police chief looked on.  The leader then said, “I remember all the times I 
stayed here. What years? It was definitely in 2017 (1960) and then a couple 
times during the Panchayat era.  It was less crowded then and you could not 
bribe the officers for cigarettes.” He then turned to the police chief and said, 
“You were not here then, were you?  You were too young.  I think you must 
have been a schoolboy mandale107 when I was here.” Everyone laughed. The 
police chief shook his head and said that he had not been working at that time 
but that he was in 2036 (1978). Then, pointing to a second-tier leader, he said, 
“You were jailed here then, weren’t you?” The other NC leader said yes and 
started recalling his experience in 2036. The leaders and police proceeded to 
reminisce about their experiences in jail together for over twenty minutes. 
During this time the students sat silently and listened.108 Later one of the 
arrested students told me that he will know that he has achieved the status of 
party leader when he is “sitting in their seats” telling his experience to other 
arrested students in the police chief’s office.109 The experience of jail makes one 
a part of the political club. By jointly claiming the title of āndolankāri, political 
actors are able to transfer their own experience across the generations, 
mapping the glory of the ongoing political movement onto those to come. This 
not only gives credence to the students’ experiences of hardship, but it also 
reinforces the party leaders’ identity, which comes from their activist 
experience. It allows them to lay claim to the space that the students have 
                                                
107 Mandale is the term for someone who is considered a lackey of the King.  Its etymology 
stems from the pro-Panchayat student organization the rāstriya bidyārthi mandal (national 
student council). For a more detailed history of the organization and the term mandale, see 
Snellinger 2005. 
108 This interaction took place on 6.03.05. 
109 Based on an interaction with an NSU (K) student leader on 8.15.05. 
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historically occupied despite the fact that they occupy roles that dictate the 
political mainstream.   
The whole process is mutually reaffirming.  The students’ reputation as 
āndolankāri not only enables them to make their mark in politics but also 
provides them with a false sense of autonomy.  Ultimately they are sister 
organizations to the political parties.  They may be a part of the Free Student 
Union but everything they do is for their party.  It is on the streets during their 
public protest that they are able to critique the political system that their 
mother organizations are a part of.  The political parties allow them this space 
because they know that if the public supports the students, then the public 
will support them.  The streets are the space that the parties cordon off for the 
students to be the forefront of their āndolan. Nonetheless the student activists 
feel true freedom during the āndolan. A student activist explained the 
realization that the āndolan provided for the students in the following way:  
Yesterday, the student organization’s role was only 
to powerfully assist the parties. They were treated 
as nurseries, which used to supply plants for the 
parties. In the nursery the seeds used to be watered 
and fertilized. The role of the student organizations 
was limited to this... and to produce cadres for 
Nepali Congress. But now because of the students’ 
movement and the faith that we have obtained 
(from the public), our role is not that ...We have 
come to realize through the movement that we are 
the force with the most potential. We are 
interfering to be able to point a finger at the parties, 
saying that you cannot compromise with the King 
in an inappropriate way. This means we are also in 
the mainstream of politics.110 
The students are eager to highlight any progress they make because in reality 
their ability to influence politics is very limited. They must rely on relations of 
                                                
110 Translation of an interview with an NSU (K) central committee leader on 1.24.04. 
   127 
patronage in order to rise in the ranks of the parties (Hachhethu 2002a; Pfaff-
Czarnecka 2004; Upadhya 2002), while simultaneously convincing the public 
that they can be effective politicians who can provide alternatives to their 
mother organizations’ policies. These idealistic articulations of autonomy are 
meant to both contest and conceal the underbelly of political constraint. Such 
perceived autonomy gives purpose to the students’ struggles, which allows 
them to have the conviction they need to sustain the dedication and passion 
for their protracted āndolan. Regardless ideals hover over reality and 
sometimes they fail to coalesce within the structural limitations of the political 
system that the students are entrenched in. 
Furthermore, the compulsion to do the āndolan has molded Nepali 
political culture because it has created a social orientation of opportunity 
within incompleteness. A president of a campus union admitted to me that he 
had been studying at that campus for twelve years.  I asked him why, 
observing that he is either very studious or very lazy.  He said it was not 
about that, he said it was his political platform.  It had taken him that long to 
get up in student politics and he wanted to continue with it, so he will stay at 
the campus and continue being active in student politics until the 
opportunities come that allow him to work his way up the political 
hierarchy.111  This is not an abnormal experience.  All the student 
organizations’ presidents are between the age of thirty and forty.  What it 
highlights is that those who want to gain from politics outnumber available 
political opportunities.  It is for this reason that students hold so tightly to the 
opportunity to engage in protest through political and educational 
movements. Their identity is wrapped up in movements because that has been 
                                                
111 Based on an interaction with ANNFSU (Akhil) president, 10.2.06. 
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the way they have historically effected reform and gained notoriety.  One 
student highly critiqued the impulse of protest as a means to promote oneself 
in politics. He explained that the way people have become known and 
politically groomed has been through the āndolan, not through dedication to 
their party’s ideology or palpable leadership abilities. He said that the 
tradition of politics based on rock throwing and vandalism, rather than 
political ideology, policymaking, or governance, is hurting Nepal.112 
The students’ traditional role of being at the forefront of political 
struggle has successfully brought political change. Nonetheless, the post-
peace talks period from 2006 through 2008, which everyone has heralded as a 
hopeful time, had been marked with a sense of stagnation and uncertainty for 
the students. They had to wait to see how their parties would negotiate their 
position on the new political frontier. It was a defining moment because the 
students not only had to live up to the role they established for themselves 
during their protest phase, but they needed to create relevant a forum for 
themselves, one that will provide them an active role in a situation in which 
their parties are in the government. It was difficult for the students to come to 
terms with the limits of their subjectivity but they also tried to exercise their 
agency in order to overcome those limits. They struggle for a fixture that 
reinforces rather than crushes their sense of what they have accomplished, 
what influence they have, and how they can continue to affect change that 
fulfills their own ideas of what the political scenario ought to be. Nonetheless, 
what has become apparent is that they don't know how to operate without 
protest and political unrest. The younger students in particular have never 
                                                
112 Account based on an interaction with an ANNFSU (Ekikrit) central committee leader on 
8.7.05. 
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experienced anything else in their political careers. They had been fighting for 
something they don't know how to exist within.  It is within political 
instability that they have come to find meaning, autonomy, and a sense of 
agenda. Political instability has been the opportunity in which they made a 
personal investment. Perpetual struggle is not only people’s political 
orientation but their social orientation as well.  It is how they have positioned 
themselves and made meaning of their actions in society, as well as created a 
strong community of cadres who jointly engage this struggle. 
Temporal Bracketing: Collapsing the Past, Present, and Future 
When Herbert Kitchelt posited that political systems are able to cope 
with substantive complexity but not temporal complexity (1993: 25), he was 
referring to social movements’ orientation to the past and the future, from 
which activists are trying to impact change in the present. A policy may claim 
to be future-oriented, but it is always grounded in the present and must be 
executed within contemporary constraints, whereas social-movement 
processes are based directly in a relationship between time and transgression 
(Jordan 2002: 40). Social movements seek to affect degrees of structural change 
on the basis of which the future can be constructed. This approach could be 
past-oriented, future-oriented, or both simultaneously, but either temporal 
location can be used to criticize and transform the present. The āndolan has 
been an ongoing demand to secure political, economic, and social justice. The 
Nepali political actors have three fixed points, the establishment of multi-
party democracy in 1950, 1990, and 2006, which allow them to frame the 
possibilities for the future in ways that people recognize, while providing 
room for the imagined changes they want to bring (Roka 2004; Upadhya 2002). 
The movements’ grammar of politics is not structurally confined to the tropes 
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of the present, which can make it difficult for institutions to react to it without 
adopting the social movement’s language, which some argue can cause subtle 
changes in the political order itself (Jordan 2002; McCarthy 1996). For the 
Nepali political order, the gradual changes that occur from the āndolan are 
what sustain it and entrench it as an order. 
Nepali political actors make meaning of the past as a means not only to 
motivate and justify their political struggle but also to provide forward 
momentum to a destination in front of them. Nepali political history, 
particularly framed by the āndolan, is an important tool that grounds people’s 
sense of what has happened, what has been accomplished, what is unfinished, 
and what role they can and should play in the continual process of struggle. 
The process of citing these events is what makes them historical. The continual 
referencing of them mythologizes them, and their unintended consequences 
are collapsed into the purpose of the current event in order to mobilize people 
to some possible future.  
Indeed, discourse plays an important role in the process of framing 
each āndolan. This is most prevalent in political speeches and the media. 
Politicians and student politicians employ rhetoric for change to convince 
people of the possibilities that would open up if they were to mobilize. 
Urgency, agency, and possibility are highlighted in political speeches in order 
to inspire people to mobilize against the state. Urgency is framed as 
temporality in this way: “If you act against injustice today, you can ensure the 
necessary change for tomorrow.” In Nepal, the metaphors in the speeches 
tend to be religious, relying on Hindu metaphors that incite people’s sense of 
agency and responsibility. Such metaphors imply not only that citizens should 
have rights, but also that it is their responsibility to fight for those rights. 
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These metaphors are also commonly known references that people are 
familiar with, which can create a feeling of solidarity (Hachhethu 2002). 
Metaphors of the nation and land are also meant to do this, a sense of 
responsibility to act and support is insinuated by referencing shared notions 
of solidarity, like family, religion, and country. In all these strategies, 
possibility is set in the past, present, future, and in metaphors that transcend 
temporality. 
Ritualized political events are another major aspect of framing 
discourse. Political events are not only ritualized because they are reenacted 
but they are also referenced in a way that raised them to mythic status in 
political history. An example of mythologizing events through repetition was 
how people cited the 2004 nationwide mini-referendum campaign on 
campuses and their impact on the public’s sentiment toward the monarch. In 
2006 during the peace talks, I continually heard party leaders and student 
activists mention this campaign as an example of how the students play a 
central role in politics; students organize awareness programs such as these to 
inform the student population as well as represent this population’s voice in 
ways that compel the general public to support them. A number of people I 
interviewed after the People’s Movement part two claimed that their 
organization had spearheaded this campaign.113  The way they described it, I 
at first doubted they were discussing the mini-referendum campaign that I 
                                                
113 The following people claimed responsibility for their party spearheading this campaign: 
CPN-UML central committee member in an interview on 10.12.06, CPN-UML foreign 
department member in an interview on 10.13.06, ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee member 
in an interview on 10.18.06, NSU (D) central committee leader in an interaction on 10.30.06, 
ANNFSU (Akhil) general student cadre in an interview on 11.1.06, CPN-UML central 
committee member and head of the ideology department in an interview on 11.2.06, CPN-
UML central committee member in an interview on 11.3.06, ANNFSU (Akhil) central 
committee member in an interview on 11.10.06, CPN-UML central committee member in an 
interview on 11.12.06, ANNISU (R) campus leader in an interaction during the national 
education referendum, 11.23.06.  
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had closely observed in 2004.  They were describing it as if it were a 
systematic campaign that had been carried out on every campus by their 
organization.  The various mini-referendums that I had observed were ad hoc 
programs of symbolic protest. The mini-referendum had been first carried out 
by a campus president of NSU (K) who was adept at organizing satirical, 
symbolic protests.114 Since it had become an immediate media attraction, other 
campuses began carrying out this type of referendum.  But it was never an 
organized campaign. In fact, there were news articles at the time raising 
doubts as to whether the referendum results were indicative of public 
sentiment because they were not being executed in a systematic fashion.115  
In one interview while a student was carrying on about the impact of 
this program and how his organization had been key organizers, I asked him 
which year it occurred.  When he told me 2004, I said, “Oh yeah, I was here for 
that.  Prabal started that trend on Pashupathi campus, correct?” He was a bit 
disoriented and taken aback that I had a perspective that countered his.  He 
said, “I don’t remember who had the original inspiration for the program, but 
since we had a stronghold at most of the campuses at the time, we oversaw it 
as an organized campaign.”116 Everyone wanted to claim responsibility for the 
2004 mini-referendum because they wanted to ascribe it with historic 
importance. The reason being is that the referendum plays a central role in the 
imaginary of political struggle.  It began with the 1981 nationwide people’s 
                                                
114 In 2006 this student was an NSU (K) central committee member.  When he organized the 
first mini-referendum he was the NSU (K) campus president of Pashupati Campus. In 2005 he 
was also jailed for organizing a dog felicitation, whereby the students felicitated five dogs in 
the manner that the King is felicitated when he goes to villages. Each one of the dogs 
represented each level of holiness (or authority) the King holds. The King’s title is shri panch, 
which roughly translates to majesty of the fifth realm.  The prime minister holds the title of 
shri tin, majesty of the third realm.  
115 Himalayan Times May 13, 2004, Kathmandu Post May 11, 2004.  
116 Translation from an interview with an ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee member on 
10.18.06. 
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referendum that determined whether the Panchayat government would 
remain in power or multi-party democracy would be established. Since then it 
has become a political tactic to prove one’s party agenda has public support.  
It allows political actors to capture the public sentiment of what should be 
based on what the current system is.  
During a 2007 ANNISU (R) mini-referendum over the issue of 
nationalized education, the central committee president explained to me that 
the mini-referendum was a good way to gather the opinion of the students 
and organize it into a political agenda. He also mentioned the 2004 mini-
referendum over the monarchy but did not claim responsibility for it because 
his organization was underground at that time. Yet there was a performative 
dimension to the referendum that he was not willing to admit. This became 
apparent when my research assistant commented that there should be a third 
option on the ballots for an educational tier system. He said, “I am sure you 
know that it is a more complicated issue than if the national education is 
necessary or not.”  The president chastised him, incredulously saying, "What?  
In referendums there are only two choices, yes or no.  Is there a middle state 
between having a King and not having a King? You know that is not how it 
runs."  I then asked him to reconfirm whether that was the proper way to 
conduct a referendum because in the 2004 mini-referendum the students 
provided three choices, active monarch, constitutional monarch, or republic. 
He replied, "I don’t know what they did in 2004 because I was underground, 
but if that is how they did it, it was not in the historical spirit of the 
referendum.  In 2036 (1981) there were two choices, the Panchayat system or 
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multiparty."117 His narrow approach to gathering public opinion was informed 
by the “spirit of history,” but it also set the parameters of the possible from 
which people are expected to choose, in this case in a way that fits within the 
Maoist political agenda. This is just one example of how I observed political 
actors use history to inform and justify what “new Nepal” should be.  
I must emphasize that the students not only want insert themselves 
into history but also they affect the direction of political history. For example, 
Akash—an ex-student leader who has been sidelined by his party despite 
being very charismatic and popular—has come to different conclusions 
concerning the potential future of parties based on their history. He asked me 
what I thought of him starting his own party. He explained that on the streets 
during the Peoples’ Movement part two in April he discovered that a number 
of the students and uneducated youth who were the driving force behind the 
agitation did not support NC, UML, or the Maoists.  They were fed up and 
disgruntled. They were on the streets because as disposed male Nepali youth 
they welcomed an opportunity to fuel their frustrations. They fought because 
they wanted change in the system.  That was about all they could articulate. 
These youth do not feel that any of the parties represented them, their needs, 
or their desires for how change could happen.  He said,  
There is a large untapped constituency of youth 
out there. They want to support something that 
resembles what they want for Nepal. Establishing a 
party with a platform of change for the young 
generation could gain support for a long time. 
With every coming new generation there will be 
appeal to work for what they see is necessary.118  
                                                
117 Interaction with the ANNISU (R) president during the national education referendum on 
11.23.06. 
118 Translation based on an interaction with an NSU (K) ex-central committee member, 
10.30.06. 
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Figure 15: Student cadres’ evening torch rally, Maitidevi, Kathmandu 2005 
At first I was a bit surprised because it seemed as if he was intuitively taking 
my theoretical musings on the students’ future-orientation toward change and 
its lineage throughout Nepali political history, and capitalizing on it in order 
to make a palpable political agenda. As we continued discussing this, I 
realized that he was not picking any cue up from me, but rather he was 
following the traditional process of doing politics in Nepal.119 What he was 
seeing as a niche political market is no different than any other political 
party’s ambitions at the time of their genesis.  His motivating buzzwords—
youth, fulfillment and empowerment—were different. Of course they would 
be, he is part of the generation who has been seeped in international 
governance and civics trainings. He talks about politics in a way that may 
                                                
119 In the article “Commitment as an Analytic: Reflections on Nepali Student Activists’ 
Protracted Struggle,” I argue that by looking at Nepali politicians’ generational perspectives 
on events and their place in those events, I am able to analyze, within brackets, the {past, 
present, and future} process of politics in a multidimensional way (2006: 357). 
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differ from his elders, but what he sees as a new approach is a perpetuation of 
the political system, struggle for the unattained. When I realized this, I 
wondered, how would he be able to pitch the platform of doing the work of 
the new generation, which would require a willingness to efficiently cycle 
through leadership so that it will be representing the youth demographic? It is 
not only an issue of willingness but overcoming the structural challenge of the 
lack of opportunity in the larger Nepali political system. I speculated out loud, 
“The risk of party collapse due to the unsuccessful transfer of power to the 
younger generation seems too high. Are you sure that the party will last for 
more than one youth generation?”120 He said this was the very reason why he 
was considering starting this type of party; change in leadership is what 
would distinguish them from the other parties and identify them as novel, 
countering the stagnancy of the other parties.  
Akash never started his party. Instead he took an NC-appointed seat in 
the constituent assembly. When I asked him about it he said, “My work is in 
the party now; I’ll try to influence things in the party and in the constituent 
assembly. Therefore I don’t think I can convince people I am a youth. I 
suppose that party will have to wait for someone of the youth generation to 
pick up the torch and light it.”121 As Akash’s aspirations demonstrate, Nepali 
students’ discourse and action is best understood as a strategic deployment of 
Ernst Bloch’s “not-yet” consciousness.  Bloch locates the fresh strength of the 
new in youth, who are the voice of tomorrow that consists chiefly of “not-yet” 
consciousness.  He argues, “If youth occurs in revolutionary times, that is, 
during a time of change, and if it is not duped into screwing its head 
                                                
120 Translation based on an interaction with an NSU (K) ex-central committee member, 
10.30.06. 
121 Translation of an interaction with an NC constituent assembly member, 10.2.09.  
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back…then it really does know what the forward dream is all about” (author’s 
emphasis, 1986: 117).  Bloch’s engagement with the concept of youth is 
rudimentary, but his in-depth analysis of hope and utopian thought as a “not-
yet” orientation of possibility serves as a useful frame in which to understand 
the expanse that the category of youth engenders in Nepali politics, which I 
will analyze in more detail in chapter four. As I have observed, the students 
reference history as their basis for what is unfinished in order to define their 
future orientation. They claim their position as youth who are not “screwing 
their heads back,” in order to convince the public that their agenda is a viable 
alternative for the future. In this sense, Nepali students’ method is a pragmatic 
approach of employing contingencies. They identify historic contingencies in 
order to shape the Nepali public’s understanding of what should be.  In other 
words, they engage in temporal improvisation in order to politically legitimize 
their position  (Greenhouse 1996, in Miyazaki 2004: 146). This allows them to 
collapse the past, present, and future into the brackets that fit their own 
aspirations. And as the frontrunners of the āndolan, this temporal orientation 
has dominated Nepali political imaginary.  
Conclusion: History as Rhetoric 
I was at a friend’s house and the television was set to the Kantipur 
news channel. It was merely background noise to me; I focused on becoming 
acquainted with her newborn son. But then some melodramatic music blared 
and I became distracted. I glanced at the television and saw a montage of film 
clips of the April āndolan.122 I was transfixed as I watched these images that 
substantiated three years of my life as a researcher. A male narrator’s voice 
sensationally announced, “They fought on the streets against regression,” as 
                                                
122 The height of the People’s Movement part two is often referred to as the April āndolan. 
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an image of a student activist’s bloody head flashed onto the screen. He then 
said, “They fought in the jungle,” with a display of an image of Maoists toting 
guns through a Himalayan rice paddy. He continued, “They fought 
throughout the country,” and an image of the Madheshi movement in the 
south panned across the screen. The announcer proceeded, “The Nepali 
people came together to claim their nation,” and images of the April āndolan 
rapidly flipped on the screen.  He proceeded, “They decided…” with the 
display of a picture of party leaders shaking hands after they brokered the 
2006 peace talks.  “And you voted” was declared as an image of a woman 
casting a ballot was shown.  He culminated by saying, “This glorious process 
has brought us into unity to create a ‘new Nepal.’” As he declared this, the 
words Sambidhan Sabhā (constituent assembly) glided onto the screen in three-
dimensional devanagari. The introductory clip ended and the camera fuzzily 
panned the constituent assembly hall to show the day’s proceedings in C-
SPAN style live footage. I was shocked to see that over three quarters of the 
seats in the hall were empty.  I said to my friend, “All that [referring to the 
clip] for this?” She clarified, “All of the last eight years for this.”123   
This experience summed up my return visit in 2009. I was saddened to 
observe the general disgruntlement of my contacts from all sectors. Everyone 
was so hopeful when I left after the 2008 constituent assembly elections. But 
after a year and a half of the constituent assembly, with the attempted firing of 
Nepal Army commanders, which lead to the resignation of the Maoist prime 
mister, everyone was pessimistic. There were six months left to write the 
constitution and little had been decided, everyone was fatalistic about the 
reality of an extension. I knew the students had been eager for the People’s 
                                                
123 This scenario took place on 9.18.09. 
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Movement part three since the completion of the second People’s Movement.  
I heard them pining for it during the peace talks and throughout the 
constituent assembly election campaign.  But I dismissed their longing for the 
streets as them stuck in a routine, ideologically enmeshed in what Hannah 
Arendt referred to as “permanent revolution” (1963: 51). But it was not until 
2009 that I realized that the āndolan orientation cannot be solely designated to 
political actors because I heard my even-tempered drinking buddies who 
analyze politics as journalists and with the United Nations Mission in Nepal 
say that what is needed for a way out of the current political impasse is “low-
level conflict” that will “reveal what side everyone was on.”124 It was then that 
I fully grasped the weight of the historical narrative of Nepali politics. The 
āndolan is the process of clarification that fuels people as it unfolds, which 
people later cling to during times of stagnation. In a word, Nepali political 
history has become more than effective rhetoric.  
In The Names of History, Rancière establishes that what counts as 
historical facts is indicative of what has been misnamed, unnamed, obscured, 
or altogether ignored. For this reason, he asserts that the discursive process of 
writing history is a “poetics of knowledge” from which the discipline of 
history was invented out of a western sensibility of the scientific, political, and 
literary. He implores historians not to misrecognize these elements as the basis 
of their discipline, which is a constructive process (1994: 101). In this chapter I 
have tried to articulate the “facts” that comprise the narrative of Nepali 
political history and the mythologizing process by which these facts are 
substantiated. It is indeed an invention but an invention with a purpose.  The 
āndolan as a frame gives purpose to their narrative and the āndolankāri 
                                                
124 This conversation took place on 10.2.09. 
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provides a role for people to play. A student leader defined their role to me in 
this way: 
Of course the struggle for democracy has become 
more real. Without struggle change has not 
occurred anywhere. Where there is struggle, there 
is change. The principle has been accepted [made] 
where there is conflict there is change. In other 
words we can talk about historical dialectical 
materialism. Marx says the hitherto history of 
human civilization is the history of class struggle. It 
means where the struggle happened, change took 
place. Change does not happen where injustice and 
exploitation are accepted. We have to follow the 
principle that no change comes without struggle. It 
is for this principle the student organizations are 
formed. When the need comes we must fight.125 
This is a very palpable reality for the students; they are fighting a struggle that 
has been fought for generations. The students as āndolankāri are oriented 
toward Rancière’s notion of “democracy,” subjectifying what has been left out, 
in order to ensure their leaders have an opportunity at “post-democracy” or 
restructuring the order of things.  But as I will demonstrate in chapter seven, 
the leaders are rarely able to substantiate the students’ vision in their political 
reforms, let alone broker consensus amongst the adjoining parties in order to 
create reform. This perpetuates the sense of the unfinished and reenergizes the 
students just as the political parties are losing the support of the public. To 
some this process may seem like an inefficient, self-serving cycle, but as I have 
demonstrated here, political actors have cultivated a historical narrative that 
emphasizes this process as a struggle for a higher awareness. This was 
substantiated for me during a discussion with an ANNISU (R) student leader 
about their proposed education movement. Near us there was a group of 
                                                
125 Translation of an interview with the Nepal Revolutionary Students Forum on 6.10.05. 
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rowdy young men who were taking up more than their share of public space.  
At one point in our conversation this student said to me, “If I did not 
understand the historical struggle of the Nepali people, then I would be like 
them, with nothing to do, no opportunity, no direction, merely adding to the 
problems.”126 
 
Figure 16: Student cadres lighting up torches for an evening rally,  
Maitidevi, Kathmandu 2005 
                                                
126 Translation of an interaction with an ANNISU (R) district leader on 11.24.06. 
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CHAPTER 4 
IMPERFECT REPLICATION: THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCT OF YOUTH 
How does Chandra get introduced at political rallies as a youth student 
activist when he is a 45-year-old, ex-student activist who is now a Nepali 
Congress member? The first time I heard this introduction I dismissed it as a 
mistake.  The second time I heard it I asked the student sitting next to me, 
“Why do they call him a youth?  Plus he is no longer a student leader, why do 
they not introduce him as a party member who was a former student leader?”  
The cadre was only half-listening to the speech program, while 
simultaneously texting on his phone and chatting with a few other students.  
He responded, “Well, he is younger than Shyam ji [the master of ceremonies] 
and maybe the organizers think he will be more attractive to people if he is 
introduced as a student leader.” Then he scanned the crowd and said, “There 
are a lot of students here. They must take joy in listening to student leaders. 
After all Chandra ji fought for the nation for a long time. He was active in both 
the movements of 2036 BS [1979] and 2046 BS [1990]. He can inspire others. ” 
During the third event I attended where Chandra was introduced as a student 
leader, I needed to know what he thought about this misnomer, so I waited to 
ask him.  Chandra explained to me with a sigh of resignation, “I am still a 
youth because my aspirations remain unfulfilled. What I have fought for has 
yet to be attained. What I fought for as a student is what students are still 
fighting for. We fight together. Maybe after the constituent assembly elections 
it will be attained.  Maybe then I will become a central committee member of 
Nepali Congress and be introduced as a former student leader. Maybe.”127  
                                                
127 This description is based on conversations I had with Nepali Congress and NSU activists in 
March 2006 before the NSU convention of 2006. 
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In Chandra’s words, youth is a state of deferment. It is common 
knowledge that something is amiss in Nepali student politics: participants 
(especially the student leaders) are often beyond the age of traditional 
university student. In this chapter, I consider why the category of youth in 
Nepali politics expands beyond its traditional definition in both Nepali and 
western cultural frames. From Bloch’s “not-yet” orientation that I outline in 
chapter three, I will analyze the varying contingencies that are employed in 
order to understand the categorical resonance of youth in Nepali political 
culture.  I will focus on a number of factors including the influence of 
international definitions of youth that have shaped donor policy and universal 
rights based sensibilities, the role of students in Nepali political history as 
activists in street and revolutionary movements, and the system of politics 
itself, which has become a holding pattern as opportunities for political 
positions have diminished. I argue that these various factors have lead to the 
manipulation of the category of youth, which illuminates the internal power 
dynamics in Nepali politics. I will place this analysis in the literature on youth 
that concentrates on social reproduction in order to demonstrate how the 
social science focus on youth highlights the tension between the social desire 
for perfect replication and the inevitable result of imperfect replication (or 
social reproduction).  
In the first section, I will provide a review of the relevant literature in 
order to demonstrate the analytic potential of the category of youth in 
understanding societal reproduction and change. In the second section, I will 
focus on how global conceptions—more generally western—of youth have 
impacted the Nepali cultural category of youth.  More specifically, I will 
demonstrate the discrepancies between the ways in which the category of 
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youth is deployed in Nepali politics versus how it is conceived in general 
Nepali society.128  I argue that this has been directly impacted by the currency 
that donor and international policy makers give the youth demographic.  In 
the third section, I will address specific anthropological theories of youth and 
intergenerational interaction.  From them I will provide a view of how youth 
becomes a deployed category through interactions in the Nepali generational 
hierarchy; this analysis demonstrates that youth is an “entity with relationship 
integrally implied” (Wagner 1991: 163). I will show how the related themes of 
kinship, family, and the Hindu life cycle metaphorically index notions of 
hierarchy, as well as reveal the internal power dynamics of the political 
parties. I will analytically employ these three themes in order to demonstrate 
how people place their personal experience in the larger history of shared 
political struggle.  
Youth as an Analytic Frame 
Youth serves as an interesting frame of analysis because the category is 
meant to define people who are more acutely negotiating what Terry Turner 
calls the “problem of reconciling the sociocentric and egocentric perspectives 
in society” (Turner 1985: 91). The term that Turner coins to describe the act of 
cultural preservation among the Kayapó, “replicating,” captures the tensions 
that the category of youth embodies.  In analyzing the structure of Kayapó 
myth, he draws parallels between the constitution of society and the 
transformation of the mythic hero, which serves as the pretext for the general 
self-replication of fire in ritual practice. In Turner’s analysis, fire is a metaphor 
for the Kayapó cultural system.  Within ritual, the gaining of control over the 
                                                
128 For analysis that focuses on the conception of youth in other forums of Nepali society, see 
Evans 2009; Korht & Maharjan 2009; Liechty 2009; Zharkevich 2009.  
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pattern of transformation coincides with the process of social transformation. 
This is the act of becoming socialized. The ability to replicate that pattern is 
the ability to socialize others.  The act of perfect replication puts one in a 
position of power. Society becomes, in Turner’s words, “a process of reflexive 
self-replication of the process of (re)producing a socialized individual and the 
social group within which this occurs” (ibid: 97).  This ritualistic tradition is 
not universally pervasive but the ideals implicit in this cultural dynamic echo 
the hopes of transmission for which many cultures strive.129 To study youth is 
to foreground the tension between individuals’ agency and the structural 
power of social institutions that are meant to acculturate them.  The notion 
that social actors must negotiate between pressures to conform and the desire 
to be creative—to have an individual identity and agency—has been common 
throughout Euro-American anthropological theory.130 Individuals within the 
social category of youth make strategic choices in order to navigate these 
opposing tensions. It is for this reason that the category of youth is a valuable 
mode of analysis for anthropology to track change in processes of social 
reproduction (Cole and Durham 2007). 
In the last decade the study of youth has been rediscovered as a 
mainstream anthropological inquiry.  In 2002, Erika Friedl asked in an 
Anthropology News article, “Why are children missing from textbooks?” (2002: 
                                                
129 The notion that one is an incarnate of one’s ancestors is well documented (Malinowski 1929; 
Mauss 1967; Stathern 1996).  Otherwise, the individual has been defined as a person by the set 
of social relations, of which kinship is the basis (Fortes 1958; Leach 1959; Radcliffe-Brown 
1952[1939]). 
130 Marilyn Strathern has critiqued this postcultural conception of “human beings as 
ontologically prior to the cultural milieu they create” (Rapport 1998: 111) in order to debunk 
the human rights model based on a liberal form of personhood (Strathern 2004). She reminds 
us that the individual is a compilation of many subjectivities, and in many cultural contexts 
those predicated upon social relations of kin, class, and caste are given higher priority than 
the individual that the Euro-American model has come to represent. As this chapter 
demonstrates, these very subjectivities are the markers from which people navigate the youth 
category, particularly kinship and generation. 
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19 in Durham 2004:590).  The same year Tobias Hecht published an edited 
volume on children in Latin America entitled Minor Omissions (2002) (also see 
Amit-Talia 2001 and Hirschfeld 2002). There had been a disciplinary lapse in 
this topical focus, ever since Margaret Mead documented coming of age 
(1928), Evans-Prichard classified age-set systems (1940), and Victor Turner 
coined the term “liminality” to describe the ritual space that is embodied 
between childhood and adulthood (1969).  More recently, youth has served as 
an insightful conduit for anthropology to track the impacts of modernity, free-
market systems, development and globalization on local culture (Amit-Talai 
1995; Berliner 2005; Bryant 2004; Cole 2004; Cole & Durham 2007; Durham 
2004; Fong 2004; Kürti, 2002; Liechty 1995 and 2003; Marr 1998; Marr and 
Rosen 1998; Pilkington 1994; Rigi 2003; Sharp 2003).  
The renewed attention to youth has also coincided with a general shift 
in youth culture studies. The previous approach studied the stages of either 
childhood or adolescence. Now analysis focuses on youth agency and how the 
youth generation interacts with normative social practices that are meant to 
socialize them. Furthermore, the category of youth allows us to tracks social 
change.  These contemporary inquiries have been more suited to current 
anthropology’s theoretical sensibilities.  Deborah Durham captures this new 
turn when she writes,  
But the sense that youth have been missing comes 
as much from the failure of previous paradigms 
that did study youth—a structural functionalism 
that emphasized social control over creativity, a 
psychological anthropology that has not tangled 
with new ideas of biopolitics, and a cultural 
anthropology whose main problematic has been 
enculturation into local traditional practice—to say 
anything interesting to today’s theoretical 
developments (2004: 591).  
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Social science has been encouraged to look more seriously at the nature of 
individuals and groups of individuals in society due to shifting social 
configurations, political reorganization, cultural politics, and social 
movements (Wohl 1979). The current study of youth is just one of many 
studies concerned with the process of social reproduction and transformation 
that fuels anthropological study. Moreover, similar to social movements, the 
study of youth unearths contradictions in the social that render the 
constructive processes of culture, the social, and the individuals within them 
more transparent.  
It is commonly accepted that society has a particular investment in 
youth, as does youth in society. However, the way in which this relationship 
has been defined is still a point of discussion for anthropology.  As a social 
category it varies in cultural form. Yet the term “adolescence,” which most 
commonly marks youth, has become the codified psychological and biological 
category within the life process that designates a period of individuation and 
crisis (Lesko 2001; Rice 1990). It is a modern product whose origins can be 
traced to the rationalization process of science and societies.  Mary Bucholtz 
posits that adolescence, as a universal stage, has been useful because it 
highlights selfhood and process rather than a state, yet it confines the category 
to a teleological structure that frames youth as incomplete; there are more 
stages to finish (2002: 528).  This approach to youth is problematic on a 
number of levels. First, it serves as a universal category that is not contingent 
upon cultural context. Furthermore, it approaches youth from the perspective 
of adulthood.131  Rather, Bucholtz observes that the shift to the broadly 
                                                
131 Margaret Mead’s book Coming of Age in Samoa (1928) is commonly thought to have set this 
adult-centric approach in ethnographic studies but she did not begin this trend.  Malinowski 
(1922), Radcliffe-Brown (1952 [1932]), and then Benedict (1934) and Batteson (1958 [1936]) all 
studied initiation rituals as part of the life processes.  
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conceived marker of youth is located in the present; it is based on individuals’ 
situatedness. The category of youth does not assume that childhood or 
adolescence is a bracketed classification that serves as a rehearsal to become 
an adult. Furthermore, this category allows for the possibility that individuals’ 
subjectivity may not even be oriented to adults (ibid. 527). Rather, it “imparts 
to youths as to adults a degree of consciousness that goes beyond any one 
situation—an awareness that each moment is part of a range of cultural 
possibilities” (Amit-Talia 1995: 231, see also Hirschfeld 2002). As the focus on 
youth increases in both scholarly and policy realms, we are finding that it is 
becoming a more flexible category of the social that is continually being 
contested and renegotiated by a number of individuals both within and 
between societies and cultures. 
Global Currency and Variable Conceptions of Youth  
On the surface, youth in Nepali politics could be understood in the 
positivist, modern social scientific approach. It is based on the South Asian 
cultural conception of life stages, which cordons youth as a stage in the larger 
life process. Yet Mary Bucholtz’s post-modern supposition, that the category 
of youth is a descriptor that brackets an individual’s situatedness, has allowed 
me to analyze the implications of the category beyond the obvious Hindu 
strictures. In this section, I will demonstrate that in the context of Nepali 
politics, youth is instrumentally employed as a categorical tool.  I argue that 
both these analytical approaches contribute to how people make meaning and 
deploy the category of youth.  In other words, for the very reason that youth is 
now accorded its own autonomy outside the strictures of “adults to come,” 
the category is contested and manipulated by both adults and young people. 
They recognize the potential of these claims that autonomy belongs to those 
   149 
who are expected to hold power in the future. The accepted “awareness that 
each moment is part of a range of cultural possibilities” (Amit-Talia 1995: 231) 
is the very reason why youth has the political currency it has; this socially 
acknowledged category allows flexibility. In politics, flexibility means 
malleability to the advantage of oneself and one’s group. In fact, the process 
by which youth is contested and manipulated in Nepali politics is a collapse of 
the modern and post-modern analytical orientations that have been used to 
deconstruct the category of youth in the social sciences. This point is further 
elucidated by the fact that youth, as a social category, is relationally 
determined within each interaction and is therefore ripe with all the socio-
cultural possibilities that interaction can entail, including but extending 
beyond youth as a manipulated category of the “not-yet.” 
Global notions of youth and “donor speak” impact the possibility of 
what youth, as a Nepali category, should entail. Politicians, student leaders, 
and non-governmental agencies feel they must speak to these notions in order 
to appeal to the donor community as well as align local attitudes with larger 
notions of what the place of youth is in a “just” nation-state. It is important to 
emphasize the degree to which cultural conceptions of youth are affected by 
external or global notions of youth, especially in a donor recipient country like 
Nepal (Boyden 1997).  
It is now universally acknowledged that youth is a demographic that is 
both affected by and brings about change.132 Based on a report the United 
Nations put out in 1981, Braungart and Braungart argue,  
                                                
132 The two most comprehensive review articles are Boyden 1997 and Ackerman, Feeny, Hart, 
and Newman 1997, which provide numerous citations on development reports and the role of 
children and youth as a targeted demographic as well as critiques of universal notions of 
youth. 
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[I]n many societies some of the traditional 
explanations for political behavior, such as social 
class, political party, and personality are losing 
their potency, while age may become increasingly 
important in understanding politics, especially 
with rising youth populations in developing 
nations and rapidly expanding aged populations in 
advanced societies. (Braungart & Braungart 1986: 
208) 
The international community (specifically donor and development agencies) 
has an influential voice regarding what notions of justice, democracy, 
representation, and governance should be in Nepal (Fujikura 2001; Pigg 1992; 
Tamang 2002). For all these reasons, youth is one of the main target groups in 
the participation, empowerment, consciousness, and capacity building 
programs of the international donor and aid agencies. This in turn makes 
youth a powerful register for non-governmental agencies that are seeking 
external funds to run their programs.  
Therefore, the manner in which the concept of youth is defined in 
broader international conversations often gets deployed in Nepali political 
culture so that it fits within those general international conceptions. This 
allows the category to become more flexible while seemingly suiting 
universally “consensual” notions of youth. The following quote from a Maoist 
minister captures this quite well: 
If you see the history of the world what we find is 
that the drastic change comes because of the 
students and the youths… In some countries the 
big movements and revolution occurred because of 
the contribution of the students. ... In this process, 
the energetic youths and students have a big role to 
play. …The role of the student organization is 
significant in holding the Constituent Assembly 
polls, which has become a part of the peaceful 
solution to the continual armed struggle in Nepal. 
It [the Maoist student organization] has a great role 
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in holding the Constituent Assembly polls in a free 
and fair manner. Furthermore, youth have a central 
role in spreading the awareness about the 
importance of the republican set up in the 
villages.133   
The way this leader describes youth would perfectly fit a mission statement 
that an international donor could read while checking off the key components 
of the formula that would turn Nepal into a successful, modern nation-state: 
peace, ballots, participation, awareness, republicanism, and fair elections. The 
statement is also in line with the peace accord signed by the Maoists and 
political parties in November 2007. The United Nations’ Mission in Nepal 
(UNMIN) mediated the negotiation of this peace accord and all of the 
participating parties have sanctioned it.  
This minister also highlights youth’s historic role in revolution through 
societal and political change, which references the relevance of the youth 
demographic to international donors and policy makers. Yet despite the fact 
that it suits these politically correct registers, it also articulates the spirit of the 
Maoist agenda for a republic. He may have measured his words in light of the 
fact that I am an international researcher but this type of language is 
consistently used in political speeches given by students and politicians in 
order to define the role and importance of youth in Nepali politics. I have 
observed this in action since the 2006 peace talk and constituent assembly 
election period, the defining phase of “new Nepal.” The student activists have 
endeavored to include the larger youth population beyond their talking points 
in political programs. They are trying to make their voice relevant by 
representing the needs of those who have been left behind by the era of 
                                                
133 Quote translated from an interview with a central committee member and minister 
of the CPN-UML (Maoist) party taken on 1.18.07. 
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democracy and development. Such attempts are meant to create an 
environment of inclusivity in which they demonstrate the ideals of democracy 
at work. A student leader explained to me at a union sponsored youth football 
match, “It is up to us, the youth, to show the world what Nepal’s democratic 
potential is. We will begin amongst our own sector and eventually it will 
become institutionalized.”134 This student leader emphasized that such 
programs can serve as an example of inclusivity to the generations before and 
after them. But his explanation also reveals, as does the Maoist leader’s, that  
“donor speak” fuels the students’ sense of who they are in Nepali politics, 
which runs parallel to Nepali political notions of what political freedom 
should ideally be. 
Moreover, the concept of youth in general Nepali society has been 
influenced by global consumer markets as well as by western notions of the 
development of an individual through the process of schooling and career 
making.135 For this reason, I asked people of varying social spheres what the 
difference is between notions of youth and generation in Nepali politics 
versus the larger society. Their responses have made it apparent that, 
historically, Nepali politics has had a more segmented definition of youth 
compared to the larger society because it is the domain of the educated elite. 
Indeed, student politics is a product of the university system. It became 
particularly entrenched during the Panchayat era when multi-party politics 
was banned. At that time, student politics came to represent the struggle for 
democracy. On the campuses the student organizations were legally allowed 
to engage in the open democratic exercise of election competition. These 
                                                
134 Quote translated from an interaction with ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee leader 
4.28.07. 
135 Mark Liechty addresses this in his work on the burgeoning middle class in Kathmandu 
(1995 and 2003). 
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elections served as a proxy for multi-party democratic political processes 
lacking at the state level. The space afforded to students on the campuses 
shaped their role as the hands and mouths that disseminated political 
ideology for the underground parties (Snellinger 2005). The structural set-up 
on the campuses may not have revealed anything that was hidden but their 
actions articulated what was possible, particularly for coming generations.  
The very experience of the university environment out of which Nepali 
politics comes cordons off a section of one’s life that is passed over in other, 
more traditional, subsistence lifestyles wherein people go from being children 
to parents within the same household. On this basis, I have argued that the 
Hindu life cycle is one of the defining influences of what youth means in the 
Nepali political contexts (Snellinger 2006). As a cultural metaphor it sets 
expectations on life, a general societal sense of where one should be and what 
one should be doing at the various stages of life, in other words, what 
experiences individuals should be gaining at different times. This supports the 
notion of a period in life wherein one should cultivate oneself and be 
cultivated by society through education, which aligns more closely with 
western notions of youth. Furthermore, it provides an ideal way for society to 
run in order to be continually replicated. The life cycle can be conceptualized 
as a boundary imposed in order to insure perfect replication. 
Yet it should be noted that the orthodox view of the Hindu life cycle136 
comes out of the elite, high-caste, male culture that assumes an opportunity 
for education and training in a profession.  This may be a common cultural 
                                                
136 The Hindu life cycle is a traditional path that high-caste men must roughly follow in their 
lives in order to fulfill all the functions that a man should traditionally undertake, taking first 
from parents and then from society (mainly through education), giving to society through 
work and raising a family, and finally giving to god by retracting from society and focusing 
on spirituality. 
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concept, yet I argue that the Hindu life cycle is not very relevant to the lives of 
farmers and others living subsistence lifestyles that are traditionally common 
in South Asia, nor to those who are not of the higher echelons of the caste 
system, who have not had the traditional privilege of educational access. 
Youth, in the modern sense, has only become a more defined life stage for the 
general Nepali population in the last few decades as access to education has 
become more egalitarian. This trend has allowed education to be an 
opportunity for alternative professions other than ones inherited from one’s 
father and grandfather (Dixit 2002; Holland and Skinner 1996; Liechty 1995; 
Sharp 2003; Snellinger 2005; Stambach 2002). 
The Hindu life cycle may be a native paradigm in which to understand 
the cultural category of youth but it is necessary to deconstruct all the 
definitive facets of this concept because I have found that in Nepali politics the 
age range that encompasses youth is often larger than is defined in general 
Nepali society. According to the Association of Youth Organizations Nepal 
(AYON), youth comprise the age range of sixteen to thirty-five,137 whereas in 
politics it is claimed to be fifteen to forty. Yet in actuality, political references 
to the youth generation often incorporate those who are sixty-five and below. 
A Maoist female student told me the reason for this variance is because they 
“define youth as the people who can take risk even in the challenging 
situations and progress along the line of their political ideology.”138 Those who 
do not have anything tangible to lose are mainly the ones who take risk for 
ideals, and those who take political risks are considered youth. Her 
                                                
137 This is a liberal age definition of youth. Most of my informants stated that the youth 
generation comprises the age range of 16 to 30. The two most prominent civic youth 
organizations, Youth Action Nepal and Youth Initiative cap the age range at 30 and have an 
organizational statute that no one older than 30 can serve in a leadership position.  
138 Quote translated from an interview with a female student leader of ANNISU (Maoist) taken 
on 7.7.07.  
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explanation signifies belief in the powerful claims attached to the concept of 
youth. 
When I inquire about the distinctions between youth in Nepali politics 
and general society, people first cite the age differences but then they go into 
further detail. Their explanations point to a range of issues. They say that in 
actuality the second tier of leaders, some of whom are as old as sixty-five, are 
also considered youth. The reason being is that too many people are invested 
in the opportunity of politics and the top leadership is unwilling to forego 
their positions of power. Furthermore, it is common to see people older than 
forty who are student leaders. The entire hierarchy of politics has become a 
holding pattern.139  Those who must wait (having nothing tangible to risk) are 
defined as the youth because they are the ones to come, oriented to the “not-
yet.” I heard it explained in this way: 
In [the context of] Nepali politics, Girija Prasad 
Koirala views Ram Chandra Paudel as youth.140 
One day, after I put my son and daughter on the 
bus, the conductor said to me, “please grandfather, 
quickly get off or stay on.” My daughter after 
returning home expressed surprise that the 
conductor used the word grandpa for me. But in 
politics, I am still a youth [laughs]…You may be 
seeking this meaning, no? …[laughs] …I think our 
life expectancy is 55 years, no? In this sense, how 
many people can really be in the youth stage? It 
may be natural to say youth to a person who is up 
to 30, perhaps 35. I think the word was invented by 
those in power in order to minimize the challenges 
                                                
139 Mark Liechty described the prevalence of youth as a cultural category, which is "always 
already" a problem, in his comments as discussant on the panel entitled, “An Exploration into 
Nepali Cultural Conceptions of the Category of Youth.” He proposed that we consider that 
“the social constitution of youth as a category in a way signals the presence of a "problem 
population.”” Once that category is entrenched, there is the societal task to contend with those 
within it. (South Asian Conference, Madison WI 10.18.08.) 
140 Gijira Prasad Koirala served four terms as prime minister between 1990 and 2008 and was 
the most influential leader in Nepali Congress until his death in March 2010. He was in his 
mid-eighties.  Ram Chandra Paudel is a central committee member of the Nepali Congress, 
and is currently serving as the peace and reconciliation minister.  He is about sixty-five.  
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from those who are their juniors. This is so in the 
context of politics. It is a derogative term to 
sideline the juniors from power in the pretext that 
they are not mature and experienced enough. 
Thus, this is a word invented to exclude some 
people from power.141  
In this sense youth is negatively dismissed as being immature or 
inexperienced. I have observed party committees interfering with student 
organizations’ internal democratic processes on the basis that the students 
were too immature and inexperienced to be able to conduct an election in a 
“spirit of healthy competition,” as a Nepali Congress district vice-president 
phrased it.142  The leaders who gave me this excuse were the same age as the  
Figure 17: Police maintaining the peace at the Free Student  
Union Election Day, Trichandra College, Kathmandu 2004 
                                                
141 Quote translated from an interview with a central committee member of the CPN-UML 
party taken on 1.14.07. 
142 Quote based on conversations with Nepali Congress (Koirala) Jhapa district leaders during 
NSU (K) Jhapa district convention on 2.10.07. 
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UML party leader I have just quoted. This is a negative fallout of the 
manipulation of the youth category. Any generation can dismiss those below 
them as youth in order to keep them from reaching their full potential. At 
other times this same potential is claimed during positive deployments of the 
term youth, which is exploited by the party leaders to mobilize students for 
the parties’ benefit. 
Ultimately, those who have more experience feel they need to guide 
those who have less experience. The relational description of the party or 
party leaders as guardians of the students and their organizations is 
commonplace.  This causes tension, particularly for parties in which there is 
no explicit hierarchical party structure but the party’s practices contradict 
their rhetoric of autonomy and advancement through a democratic process.  A 
student leader of a smaller party, the Laborers’ and Farmers’ party, claimed to 
have solved this tension by having a set structure in the party,  
In our party cell we have three types of members. 
Those who have gathered the experience above 
fifty years comprise the first group. The second one 
is the group that is between thirty and fifty. And 
the third one is ours, the students. This is how we 
have tried to integrate our party. This is the system 
of the Chinese Communist Party.  It is a natural 
process. Immature leadership needs time so three 
levels are needed for good leadership. It is the 
process of handing down responsibility.  It should 
not be a set grasp of power by leaders where they 
never give it up.143 
In this party structure there is no uncertainty as to what people’s roles are, 
which allows the party to run more as a unit than as a factional process.  Yet it 
is much easier for this dynamic to exist within a party that has a more rigid 
                                                
143 Quote translated from a conversation with a student leader from the Nepal Revolutionary 
Student Front on 1.9.07. 
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ideological base than one that is more populist.  For cadre-based parties, 
ideology transcends generations. They recognize that, as one student 
explained, “What we believe in is Marxism, Leninism and Maoism. This is a 
theoretical matter. Though the generations may change, the binding force is 
the principle. This is our way of bridging the gap.”144 Student organizations 
like the ANNISU (R) and the Nepal Revolutionary Student Forum, are not 
deluded that they are autonomous from their mother organizations. Rather, 
they see themselves as wings that represent a particular set of the population.  
This may be the reason why they can maintain more party cohesion; there is 
no sense that their mother parties are interfering in their affairs because their 
affairs are not separate from those of their party. From what I have observed, 
it is the democratic parties whose ideological party lines are not as rigid 
wherein intergenerational struggles for power are most common. Interestingly 
enough, these struggles take shape as ideological struggles over what the 
party’s stance and direction should be. 
The students recognize that youth claims resonate on the local and 
global level. They strategically use their position as youth, with an alternative 
voice and a source of new vision, as a rallying point to gain a more central role 
in politics.  When asking what “new Nepal” should be, many students insert 
the role of youth into the process. One student leader proposed that there 
should be a youth parliament.  His logic was simple: “new Nepal” equals new 
rules and policies, which have to come from new leadership, which only the 
new generation can provide.145 Students usually claim that they are the new 
generation and those before them belong to the old generation. I was told that 
                                                
144 Quote translated from an interview with an ANNISU (R) central committee leader on 
11.11.07. 
145 Quote taken based on a political speech given by a NSU (P) student leader at the 
TriChandra campus convention, Kathmandu on 3.22.07. 
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every generation has a similar orientation to the previous one.  As one leader 
remarked,  
I used to say that my father was an orthodox, old 
and conservative person. It was so because my 
father was not able perceive the change of the 
times. In the same way, my son labels me as an 
orthodox because he uses the Internet, whereas I 
belonged to the age of plough and spade.146  
In other words, what youth can offer is based on the accomplishments of the 
previous generation but pushes the boundaries of what their parents conceive 
is possible.  This dynamic is the process of social reproduction rather than 
social replication. There may be only a subtle difference between these two 
concepts, but reproduction is less mimetic than replication; it allows room for 
variation and external influences through the transmission process.  
Intergenerational Effect and Social Shifting 
As I demonstrated in chapter three, I have observed politician and 
student leaders’ techniques that collapse the past, present and future in order 
to create particular political imaginaries. My analysis of youth and 
intergenerational interaction is meant to capture how the historical processes 
of Nepali politics manifest in non-linear fashion as deployed political 
narratives with a future orientation. For the most part my focus has been on 
student activists’ relationships with the party leaders both personally and 
through the mother organization and sister organization dynamic and 
people’s conceptions of student politics’ role in various eras, which affect 
people’s sense of their personal political experience and how they personally 
                                                
146 Quote translated from an interview with a central committee member of the CPN-UML 
party taken on 1.14.07. 
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orient themselves in the political landscape. This focus has been my attempt to 
understand the extent of social change in Nepali politics.  
Tracking social processes has been a preoccupation of anthropology for 
many years (Turner V. 1969). Franz Boaz was the first anthropologist to 
propose that history must be central to our anthropological analysis (1928). 
This provided the primitive with a history, a temporal dimension, which 
involved change in the primitives’ lives. As colonialism’s impact increased, 
anthropologists became aware of marked changes in our interlocutors’ lives; 
we needed to reorient our analyses to those changes. But the theoretical era of 
globalization has brought the sense that things are ever-changing, and our acts 
of reorientation cannot keep up. One of the challenges in crafting social theory 
is how to capture ever-emerging social dynamics within the cultures that we 
observe. Anthropology has been challenged with the question: will my 
analyses and observations be relevant by the time they become public 
knowledge?  Or could anthropology be nothing more than a snapshot of a 
particular time/space frame? Hiro Miyazaki notes that in order to avoid this 
limitation, anthropology has adopted the larger social scientific aesthetic of 
emergence.  Rather than foreclosing our observations with conclusive analysis, 
the aesthetic of emergence allows our knowledge to be “provisional, 
contingent, and ongoing” (2004: 138).  Yet Miyazaki observes that the trend of 
this aesthetic has not allowed for a reorientation, rather it is tracking the world 
as it emerges.  He warns that this puts our discipline’s knowledge in jeopardy 
of merely mirroring how we see the world emerging, which does not avoid 
the “belatedness in relation to the now of the world” (author’s emphasis, 2004: 
136).  The process causes our knowledge to be prospective; it limits the 
possibility of representing forward momentum.  Miyazaki feels that “Where 
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knowledge does not seek its own radical reorientation, hope ceases to be the 
engine of knowledge” (ibid. 139). 
What Miyazaki is referring to as hope is not an object of study but a 
method of orientation, specifically temporal orientation.  Miyazaki’s approach 
relies on Bloch and Benjamin to make sense of his interlocutors’ strategic use 
of the past in a “not-yet” orientation (or in Benjamin’s term “past hope” 
(1992[1973])) in order to conceptualize and sustain the future possibilities.  
Michael Taussig’s analysis in Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man 
elucidates a similar point. His reliance on Bloch’s concept of “nonsynchronous 
contradiction” serves as a useful tool to understand the nuance of the 
discursive strategies of the Putumayo Indians in their employment of magical 
realism. They subvert the myths of the sacred and secular in colonial 
narratives of conquest and redemption by reworking them into expressions of 
resistance and revolution. The images (or what Bloch calls archetypes 
1986[1959], 1998, 2000[1964], Benjamin refers to as montages (1992[1973])) of 
the past are repurposed to serve the hope of a better future (1987: 166).  Both 
Miyazaki and Taussig use this method to link our interlocutors’ employment 
of the past with the analysis of our own knowledge practices and the possible 
directions they can take. 
Deconstructing the category of youth in Nepali politics is my attempt to 
track social processes within a temporal context that situates anthropological 
knowledge. Youth is an analytical category that highlights social change as a 
process of imperfect replication (or reproduction), while emphasizing what 
cultural strictures attempt to perfect social replication. Jennifer Cole posits that 
in order to understand social change one must observe how relations are 
transformed in the interactions between generations (2004).  She employs Karl 
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Mannheim’s theory of “fresh contact” as a means to understand how youthful 
practices impact generational relations. This theory sketches the obvious point 
that generations are formed by different historical experiences.147  These 
experiences shape a generation’s way of life and can consequentially 
transform social and cultural norms.  This may happen on a mundane level 
such as consumption practices and the like, but it can bring about massive 
social change when generation gaps are presented with a perspective clash. 
This potential leads to the manipulation of the category of youth by 
various parties to serve personal, social, or political agendas.  Deborah 
Durham has observed the varying deployment and dismissal of the category 
of youth as a space of social contestation in Botswana (2004).  Her 
observations of who constituted the youth and how the category continually 
shifted did not fit into analytic definitions of youth.  Durham relies on Evans-
Pritchard’s age-set systems from his book Nuer as her theoretical basis. Age-
set systems allowed Evans-Pritchard to conceptually capture the relative 
nature of social positions that only derive their relevance in relation to other 
groups; the nature of one’s position shifts with every relational interaction 
(1940). She extends this idea to incorporate the linguistic term “shifter,” in 
order to establish youth as socially deictic, or a social shifter (2000 and 2004).  
The flexibility that Durham inserts into Evans-Prichard’s original theoretical 
frame allows her to understand strategic deployment of the category “youth” 
as political action.  It can give actors who position themselves as representing 
youth a currency to voice their “new” agendas or allow people to dismiss 
                                                
147 To Karl Mannheim’s defense, this was quite an innovative observation for his 
contemporary period.  He was using a historical materialist approach to support his argument 
that generations must be socio-historically differentiated at a time when they were considered 
biologically and psychologically different.  This move away from a physical science 
explanation allowed him to account for change as a sociological process. 
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youth-claimed actions on the logic that the actors are not youth (2004: 592). A 
modern usage of age-set systems demonstrates how social categories are 
mobilized as agentive acts. 
Durham’s field observations concerning youth and how she has 
theoretically conceptualized them is similar to the way I have in my own 
research, yet I have focused it more from the view of intergenerational 
relations as Cole engages in her work, in order to demonstrate the “not yet” 
orientation that Nepali student activists take. In Nepal the position of youth is 
indexical as it shifts from one relational interaction to another incorporating 
the necessary discourse (Durham 2004:253). In my research I have tracked the 
indexical variations of youth in the relations students have with their party 
leaders, political patrons, families, peers (constituents), the public, the media, 
international forces, and the state.  From my observations, which I layout in 
chapters three, six, and seven, I conclude that these variances reveal multi-
layered struggles for autonomy, loyalty, legitimacy, subservience, 
cooperation, compromise, and political power. Elitism further explains these 
dynamics as I demonstrate in chapter five. As I will demonstrate, the cultural 
notion of small and big person (sano manchhe/thulo manchhe) is another 
indexical construction that plays out in similar fashion to generational 
interaction within Nepali politics (Bista 1991). 
Within sociology the notion of generational interaction has been much 
debated (Braungart and Braungart 1986; Kertzer 1983; Lipset & Ladd 1971; 
Marias 1968; Markides 1978; Ryder 1965).  Ryder argued that there should be a 
distinction between cohort and generation because what many sociologists 
were analyzing was more like age-set systems in the Evans-Prichardian sense 
than a kinship, descent concept.  Therefore the term generation “is a relational 
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concept bound to the realm of kinship and descent; it is not an appropriate 
tool for dividing societies into segments or populations into aggregates” 
(Kertzer: 128). Yet within anthropology, the relational aspect of the term 
generation is what draws us to it as an analytic frame.  It becomes situational, 
shifting within interaction, but it still references a topical stronghold of our 
discipline, kinship (Fortes 1958, 1959, 1969; Leach 1959; Lévi-Strauss 1969 
[1949]; Radcliffe-Brown A.R. 1952[1939]).  
In the Nepali context, it is clear that I must use the term generation 
(pusta) because that is the word used to refer to this sort of interaction.  As I 
will demonstrate, it is very much a filial reference because politics is 
referentially based in a kinship orientation.  This is important to understand 
because it highlights that the significance of youth in Nepali political culture is 
not based on the Eurocentric dichotomy of individual versus society.  But 
rather it indentifies the social aggregates that define youth as a cultural 
category. Roy Wagner cogently captures this phenomenon in his definition of 
the fractal person. He writes, “People exist reproductively by being ‘carried’ as 
part of another, and “carry” or engender others by making themselves 
genealogical or ‘reproductive’ factors of the others.” (1991: 163). Similarly, 
youth is an inherently relational assemblage comprised of socially constructed 
filial connections and shared political histories.  
I specifically asked some informants about intergenerational interaction 
in Nepali culture and in the political context. Not surprisingly, a number of 
people focused on family in their responses. Some talked about generations 
through the metaphor of family. An ANNISU (K) student explained this 
predominance in the following explanation, 
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As the proverb goes ‘Family is the first school of a 
human being.’ First of all he spends his life at home 
and then he goes out into society. Therefore, the 
first political impact comes from the family and 
then the teachers and friends. But people treat the 
party as if it is primordial and that it why they 
refer to the party as a family.148 
Others spoke about it in the context of politics being a family business; 
whether or not people actively get involved in it, they know about it from a 
young age and it affects and inspires them. Furthermore, simulated family 
relations are a part of all aspects of Nepali culture; one is quickly placed in a 
web of fictive kin relations that are not blood but have social significances that 
are strategically advantageous to some and disadvantageous to others, 
depending on how one ranks in the interaction.149  This is an obvious aspect of 
social interaction that no one can avoid. Therefore, the fact that the family is 
raised as a metaphor in the context of political generational interaction alludes 
not only to a sense of duty, but to a social hierarchy that is ever shifting within 
interaction. 
Nonetheless, I have also heard contradicting references to the metaphor 
of family. The Laborers and Farmers party student, whom I previously quoted 
describing ideology as the bridge between generational gaps, followed his 
explanation by saying, “This is not a thing like father and son in a family, 
where often principle cannot bridge the generation gap” (See Snellinger 
2006).150 This references how the party structure is set up and the internal 
political culture of the party. In the more ideological parties it is through 
                                                
148 Translation of an interaction with an ANNISU (K) Padma Kenya campus leader. 7.7.07. 
149 The kinship term applied in social interactions is not determined merely by age but rather 
by one’s notoriety and social influence.  In other words, I may be referred to as older sister by 
someone who is older than me because I rank higher in the social realm of things and he may 
have to depend upon me for assistance since he lacks the same amount of influence.  
150 Quote translated from a conversation with a student leader from the Nepal Revolutionary 
Student Front, which is affiliated with the Laborers’ and Farmers’party on 1.9.07. 
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knowledge and commitment to the political philosophy that one proves one’s 
ideological dedication to the party’s goals. In less ideologically based parties, 
one proves one’s dedication to a leader who has risen through political 
strategy, coalitions and connections within the party. A CPN-UML leader 
explained this to me while lamenting the CPN-UML’s change in character 
after democracy.   
 We used to think that our only objective was to 
make the movement a success. We did not have the 
feelings of big and small. Neither would we 
consider who would be the parliamentarian, 
minister, or party leader. There was the culture of 
collective decisions based on shared ideology. 
There was not much hierarchy in the 
organizational structure. It was not the relationship 
like that of a patron and a client and leader and a 
cadre but instead, it was more like a family. After 
all, it is a relationship of comrades that we must 
establish. Moreover, it is the matter of collective 
decisions. This is not a matter of compulsion but of 
collective commitment.151  
It is clear from this quote that there are different conceptions of the family and 
the party as a family.  One is based on a collective commitment whereby 
things are run in an egalitarian way.  But there is also the metaphor of the 
family as hierarchy, which can involve struggle. People’s use of the metaphor 
of family is tied to the sense of what binds a party. There are two things that 
unite a party and make it distinctive from others, one is ideology and the other 
is the social connecting of networks and individual personalities.  All of the 
parties in Nepal consist of a varying combination of both of these aspects. 
To understand the resonance that the category of youth entails in 
Nepali politics, it is important to recognize that the use of the metaphor of 
                                                
151 Quote translated from an interview with a central committee member of the CPN-UML 
party taken on 1.14.07. 
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family in all its various forms indicates a sense of stewardship and 
responsibility. One student leader described a critique he received that 
surprised him and pushed him to think about what the parties’ ultimate 
responsibilities are.  He said that someone asked him, if you can't run your 
hostels how do you expect to manage a republic? The student leader admitted 
this individual had a very good point. He said  “The hostel is our house 
[domain] and we need to prove we can take care of it just as we can take care 
of our own Nepal.”152 This type of metaphor captures the responsibility of 
running the country in a style that harks back to a two hundred and thirty-
seven year history of monarchy.  In a monarchy, the ruler must take care of 
the subjects that occupy his land.  The very tradition of patronage and 
paternalism that has been the basis for Nepali politics comes out of this 
history. Rather than a King taking care of his subjects, the responsibility has 
been transferred to the political parties, who must now prove that they are 
able to take care of the general public in a way that best serves Nepali citizens, 
while also maintaining the support of their cadres by balancing political ideals 
and patronage.   
Furthermore, the metaphor of family is rhetorically used in Nepali 
politics. As I demonstrate in chapter five, female politicians use references to 
family in their speeches in order to claim a legitimate place in party politics.  
They argue that if it takes a family to run a household, then all the filial sectors 
are necessary to run the country. A female student informed me that these 
references are common because they resonate. She said “Even the party 
                                                
152 Quote taken based on a political speech given by a NSU (P) student leader at the 
Trichandra campus convention, Kathmandu 3.22.07. 
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structure mimics the family, we are the sister organization and our party is the 
mother organization.”153 
Indeed, the Nepali cultural metaphor of the joint-family nicely mirrors 
the relationships within the political parties. The family is idealized as an 
egalitarian unit that works together for a common good. The CPN-UML 
leader articulated this sensibility in the quote I previously provided regarding 
the felt need that his party reorient its internal interactions on the basis of a 
collective commitment, more like a family than a hierarchy of leaders and 
cadres. Yet it is known that the joint family unit is one of tension (Bennett 
1983). There is an apprehensive inter-reliance between the relations of old 
(patriarchs) and young (sons), or between those who are currently in power 
and those who will take the reins in the future; each depends on the other to 
carry on a lineage that is prosperous and productive. The unit benefits from 
remaining together rather than splitting into smaller groups but it “is one of 
interdependency fraught with tensions between competition and solidarity” 
(Snellinger 2006: 357).  
This tension extends through the filial metaphor into politics. It 
represents a struggle between institutional culture and the autonomy that 
students find implicit in the “not-yet” orientation.  It is for this reason that the 
political movements play such an important role in shaping the identity of 
each generation. The student organizations are the tool of political agitation 
deployed by the parties. Yet it is through their action and their struggle in the 
movement that they gain some sense of autonomy and are able to articulate 
their voice on the streets.  The parties influence this voice but the students can 
inflect their own sense of what should come in the space cordoned off for 
                                                
153 Translation based on a conversation with an NSU (K) female student leader on 2.15.07. 
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them on the streets (Snellinger 2007). In other words, the public forum of the 
streets allows the students to emphasize what the political demands should 
be.  But even though they may have the ability to affect the public’s 
expectation of what politics is and should be, they do not have the luxury to 
affect policy once they have secured government power for their parties 
(Snellinger 2005 and 2007). 
A party’s cohesiveness, or for that matter its very existence, relies on 
the past, the present, and the future.  It is for this reason that in Nepali politics, 
generations are often referenced according to political movements.  Just as 
political memory is conceptualized within the different political movements, 
the political movements differentiate the political generations. It is 
acknowledged that from each political movement, the participants therein 
gained a set of experiences that not only made them activists and future 
politicians, but also distinguished them from the activists and politicians 
before them and those who will come after.  This is a cycle of tense reliance, 
because they are fighting for a common cause but through each movement the 
experience of struggle and the progress that results are the very things that 
differentiate the current activists from those before. Not only does each 
movement’s young activists gain experience, they also gain experience in 
making their own claims, which may refine or completely differ from those of 
the previous movement. A Maoist leader explained this as a dialectical law of 
development, or as he said, “negation of the negation.”154  The new (or young) 
will challenge the old order, the very people who brought them to the position 
in which they could be a challenge, because the old order challenged those 
                                                
154 Quote translated from an interview with a central committee member of the CPN-Maoist 
party taken on 1.18.07. 
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before them. He understands this process of progress in the Marxist dialectic 
of negation within the larger trope of historical materialism.  
When I have asked frustrated people how to minimize generation gaps 
they reply that interaction is important. Interaction between political 
generations makes things smooth; it creates a harmonious dynamic that is 
devoid of interruptions or jolts in perspective.  Whereas gaps are described as 
causing contradictions because if, as a CPN-UML leader stressed, “there can 
be no adjustment between the higher and lower level of the party, [then] there 
exists the possibility of the top disregarding the voices of the grassroots, those 
below, and therefore disregarding the ground realities.”155 This may not only 
impact the ruling order today but it will impact their successors tomorrow, as 
well as jeopardize the survival of the party. It is for this reason that I have 
used the theme of intergenerational interaction to deepen our understanding 
of what the concept of youth entails in Nepali politics.   
Youth is not merely a category in which a group of similarly aged 
people is lumped together.  Within it there is also a hierarchy by which one 
wields one’s influence and higher position over those who are younger (or less 
influential). The influence over those who are younger further entrenches 
one’s position, which is relational; in some scenarios one’s position is as a 
leader and in others as youth (or the coming generation). For this reason, 
youth is a malleable position based on the social dynamics of the interaction. 
Evans-Prichard argued that an actor’s position is determined in the relational 
context of social interaction (1940: 263).  This is similar to the concepts of big 
and small person (sano manchhe/thulo manchhe) in Nepali culture. Most people 
                                                
155 Quote translated from an interview with a central committee member of the CPN-UML 
party taken on 1.14.07. 
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are both big and small people in different aspects of their lives.  These are 
modes of being that one simultaneously embodies.  To achieve big person 
status in all interaction is the ultimate goal. The same is true of youth. In 
politics one only leaves this category when one is in the top leadership.  Until 
then, youth can be looked at as a classification of those who are waiting for 
what is to come; youth is varying degrees of emergence.  
As I have demonstrated, the potential value of youth as an analytic has 
a different power than the Kayapó value of perfect replication of a ritual. 
Rather, it tracks the social and political imaginary through interactions of 
sociality and struggle. In my focus on generational interactions, I endeavor to 
go beyond Cole and Durhams’ work by conceptualizing how people’s 
positions motivate them to bring about political and social change through 
their actions and discourse.  I also analytically arrange the categories as such 
to grasp temporality in a way that contextualizes history without 
circumventing the non-linear dimensions of the procedure of politics. In 
approaching generations’ different perceptions and experiences, I focus on the 
preoccupation with certain pasts in the Nepali political imaginary, ones that 
are forward-oriented yet based on the unfinished (Snellinger 2006). In 
analyzing this, it is not appropriate to take a Marxist historical materialist 
perspective, because of its linear orientation. Nor is a utopian analytic 
approach suitable, because the Nepali sense of political temporality is not 
devoid of the past and present, which are constantly referenced in their future 
“not-yet” orientation. Rather, the Nepali sense of political temporality 
collapses the three in order to create particular political imaginaries that are 
vague enough to manipulate in ways that make them shared.  In other words, 
like intergenerational interaction and the concept of youth, temporality is 
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relational and malleable in ways that allow flexibility in how people conceive 
the past, present and future in various interactions.  
Conclusion: Delayed Transmission 
In Nepali politics the very gravity of the category of youth highlights 
the fact that something has to be done with a surplus of adults. One can see 
that the traditional life stages are askew. The octogenarian leaders, those who 
are in the Hindu life cycle of sanyasi, should be withdrawing from society, yet 
they are refusing to retire from politics (Snellinger 2006: 257). When asking 
about the concept of generations in Nepali politics and how they are defined, 
a democratic leader explained to me that this has changed since multi-party 
democracy. He said that before, there used to be the new generation and the 
old generation.  The leaders were the old generation.  The new generation 
consisted of those who had not had the opportunity to hold power within the 
party; they were junior, still learning and of course they differed in their 
conceptions of what was possible. But since the leaders are refusing to retire, 
this simple distinction between old and young no longer represents the 
reality.  Now, he claims, there are over four generations in politics, all at 
different ranks or “period[s] of waiting. They make meaning of this waiting 
through their attempts to impact the political system.” 156  In other words, 
politics becomes the process whereby people of all ages attempt to initiate 
change and establish their own influence over others in abeyance for actual 
power.  Similar to the continuing struggle for democracy, opportunity for 
political leadership is being postponed; it does not line up with the Hindu life 
cycle.  Therefore, categories such as youth are being extended to incorporate 
                                                
156 Quote translated from a conversation with Nepali Congress (P) central committee member 
and minister on 9.16.07 
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people of additional generations into micro-categories of emergence and 
waiting.  
Chandra’s experience that I describe in the introduction illuminates the 
multi-valence of the category of youth in Nepali politics. On a practical level, 
putting him in the youth classification is meant to inspire young people so 
that they will relate to his words. The term registers him in the same social 
space as them, one that indefinitely delays leadership power. To him, it 
indicates his unfulfilled aspirations.  Both on a personal level and a political 
level there is still more to be accomplished, which provides a forward 
momentum. It also reveals the fact that the party establishment has sidelined 
him and many of his colleagues.  Rather than rewarding him for his 
dedication by promoting him, party leaders continue to applaud him for a 
position that is no longer relevant to his circumstance. Yet misidentifying him 
does not put him outside the group. It instead places him in the loop of being 
socialized by leadership, while allowing him the opportunity to socialize 
others that are younger than him. People are continually experiencing varying 
roles within the process of being socialized or socializing. Consistent political 
participation is the only way for people to spread their influence; it is the 
guarantee for advancement. Therefore, many people like Chandra continue to 
invest in politics. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SPEAKING IN ORDER TO BE HEARD: ELITE ENTRENCHMENT IN 
POLITICAL CULTURE 
The act of claim-making is political in Nepal. Political struggle, 
particularly democracy, is done in the name of the “people” as if the people 
are common citizens on equal footing. Yet the very act of democratic struggle 
for the people obscures the fact that those who are fighting have historically 
had many more rights and opportunities than the people they claim to be 
fighting for. The activists, particularly the students, make claims of public 
unity under the guise of political suppression. This denies the reality that 
there are multiple experiences within the realm of political suppression. The 
collapsing of identities into one identity in order to challenge authority 
eclipses the multiplicity of experiences, which are invested in securing 
recognition within the state system. This takes on a particularly precarious 
form when the people who have historically challenged the state are the ones 
at the top of the social order.  In Nepal this has limited minorities by 
conscripting them to a voice that resonates with the speech acts of high-caste 
activists.  
In this chapter I will analyze how Nepali politics has simultaneously 
been a dispute for a place of influence over the law as well as a reinforcement 
of the spirit of the law, high-caste male domination. My main premise is 
framed by Rancière’s argument that in order for people to do politics 
(question the policing logics) they must articulate their points in a language 
that will be understood.  “In a word they conduct themselves like being with 
names” (1999: 24). In this chapter I establish that many of those who do 
politics claim to be fighting for justice of the unnamed even though they 
themselves have always had names. This analysis demonstrates the nature in 
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which identity claims are conscripted in Nepali politics, the trend of activists 
fighting for position in the policing logic but claiming to be doing politics on 
behalf of the unnamed. Ultimately, my endeavor in this chapter is to capture 
the subtleties of this cultural reality that one must fit oneself within in order to 
be heard in the Nepali mainstream political sphere. This attempt is based on 
the premise that  
Political subjectification redefines the field of 
experience that gave to each their identity with 
their lot. It decomposes and recomposes the 
relationships between the ways of doing, of being, 
and of saying that define the perceptible 
organization of the community, the relationship 
between the places where one does one thing and 
those where one does something else, the 
capacities associated with this particular doing of 
those required for another. (ibid: 40) 
Here I consider how the Nepali political struggle has been a particular process 
of subjectification that has attempted to restructure communal relations within 
the state but has also substantiated the social structure that ensures political 
activists’ position. Rather than look at how marginal groups (women, lower 
caste, ethnic groups) are excluded from politics, I am choosing to focus on the 
dominant culture that they must acculturate into in order to fit within or they 
will discover there is no space for them within the state structure.157  
This is a particularly poignant time to analyze elite entrenchment in 
political culture since the social order of the state and dominant politics has 
collapsed with the abolishment of the monarchy and current restructuring of 
                                                
157There is a lot of ethnic activism in Nepal that does not attempt to fit into mainstream 
politics, but this will not be my focus in this chapter.  My reasoning for this echoes that of 
these ethnic activists. They are separate from dominant party politics because they are not 
willing to curb their efforts to correspond with high-caste male values. I feel until this gap can 
be reconciled, there will not be a genuine place for ethnic activists in mainstream politics, 
which has huge implications for the reconstruction of the state through the constituent 
assembly process.  
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the state through the constituent assembly. Ever since the success of the 2006 
April uprising (The People’s Movement Part Two), the three main talking 
points have been: “new Nepal,” “inclusion,” and “secular republic.” Ten years 
of Maoist war were responsible for bringing these issues to the forefront of 
both the political and social arenas. The Maoists wanted to contextualize all 
inequalities—caste, ethnic, and gender inequality—under the rubric of class. 
Yet the poor have been living with inequality and suppression for generations, 
which they have defined through the particular historical and cultural 
experiences of their community. Some minorities are not willing to flatten 
their experiences into the one category of marginalized class. For this reason, 
there has been tension in these differing conceptions of exclusion and how 
they should be addressed in “new Nepal.” A prominent example is the 
Madheshi movement of 2007 that not only defines unique class, caste, and 
linguistic exclusion but also regional exclusion.  
In this chapter I will probe both the intimate spaces and formal self-
representations (Herzfeld 2002: 27) of high-caste male students as well as 
female and ethnic minority student activists in order to understand how they 
conceive of the social order in politics and what space it affords them. I argue 
that in order to understand what comprises the political, it is just as important 
for one to focus on people’s self-representations because it is within those 
representations that you come to understand how people make meaning of 
their experience and social surroundings. I do this by first considering what 
the entrenched nature of politics is and how political actors have naturalized 
their position in political struggle in order to maintain their status as elite 
stakeholders of the nation. In the second section I address the limits that 
female activists experience in politics.  In the third section I demonstrate that 
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there are hegemonic political behaviors that encourage men to thrive in 
politics, and women who embrace such behaviors to be judged. This dynamic 
encourages women to rely on familial and social ties in order to advance in 
politics, which reinforce the nepotism that is endemic in Nepali politics. In the 
fourth section I complicate the demand for a secular republic by 
demonstrating how a Hindu orientation as a political stronghold that Nepali 
political actors embrace despite their attempts to remove the monarchy from 
the state paradigm. The larger theme of this analysis is to demonstrate the 
political tendency to collapse multiple identities into a singular entity in a way 
that limits how citizens can be politically effective.  
Elites of the State: High-Caste Political Dominance 
By the last year of my field research, I had a pretty sound grounding in 
the construction of the Nepali state but wanted to understand how the student 
activists understood it and how it impacted their sense of what exclusion and 
inclusion have been in Nepali politics.  In this section I will analyze the 
different responses I received in order to portray the entrenched nature of 
identity in political struggle. This focus is meant to understand elite “means of 
orientation,” which dictate the dominant norms (Elias 1978 in Shore 2002: 4).   
It is not that people of minority status have not been a part of Nepali 
political history.  There have been many who have contributed and even 
reached positions of notoriety.  Yet regardless they have not been able to 
impact the normalization of high-caste domination in the parties. When I 
discussed the extent of space for alternative voices in the parties, the most 
prevalent response I received was that people must accept dominant 
traditions in order to make it in the parties. There was very little space for 
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alternative voice beyond rhetoric. A Maoist-appointed ambassador explained 
it in this way,  
Our party organizations are such that nothing 
beyond the interest of the party leaders can take 
place. If you want to remain in the party you have 
to abide by this. Otherwise where can you go? If 
you give up the party you will suffer more, you 
have no influence on the outside. Outwardly, the 
party leaders talk about democracy, but inside 
their party they favor submissive characters. They 
create slaves of their cadres and make policy 
barriers. Of course this would discourage the 
minority people from participating in the politics. 
But where else do they have to go?158  
This final query was a question I was often posed with: is it more effective to 
work outside the party system or to be curtailed within it? Most political 
actors did not think it was useful to work outside the party system. They felt 
that there is a lot that must be accomplished on behalf of minorities and 
women but they can’t be expected to fight the battle on every front alone. If 
people want to get to a place of influence they must work within the 
established political system, and the fallout to that is compromise in order to 
last within that system. One student leader admitted,  
Women and the minorities in the parties are under 
a lot of pressure. They are well habituated in 
limiting their voice in order to advance in the party 
system. But now they are facing external pressure 
from their communities to speak out. They face 
two options, either to slowly in a low and non-
confrontational way raise the voice of minorities 
within the party, which is a place of influence 
throughout the country and in the state apparatus, 
                                                
158 Translation of an interview with a Maoist-appointed ambassador, Madheshi activist, 
4.15.08. 
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or to form a new party, which may not be 
influential in policy making.159 
Ultimately people are faced with the choice to work within the system to make 
incremental but perhaps substantial change or they can abandon the system 
and try to work from the outside. Most people I spoke with believed that 
working outside the political system had little impact because it was only 
through the parties that people are able to affect the state system and 
governing apparatus. It makes obvious sense that the students thought it was 
more useful to work within the party system; they have invested in it and it is 
where they have found meaning. Furthermore, students pointed out to me 
that Nepal has been marred by multiple forces struggling for equality and 
opportunity. Many of my informants felt that the party system was a civilized 
venue for these various struggles. They saw no other alternative than for 
minorities to accept conscription from the system in order to have a mere 
presence in a sphere of influence. Because the party system is their means of 
orientation to apprehend politics; their perspective on its necessity enforces a 
particular norm of political participation. 
What these activists don’t realize is that there is little incentive for 
minorities to participate in party politics, especially on the individual level. 
The explanation I received from an ethnic minority student activist captures 
minority resistance to participating in mainstream politics. He explained to me 
that historically minorities have not felt encouraged to participate because 
there is no guarantee but to lose oneself in the parties.  He explained that 
everyone knows that only the high-caste rise to the top; they dominate and 
that causes a “psychological hesitation.” As a minority activist, one becomes a 
                                                
159 Translation of an interview with an ex-NSU (K) central committee member, 11.16.07.   
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token of ethnic diversity within the party, a mere veneer of inclusion. He 
asked me, “Who wants to participate in such a system? It is not very 
inviting.”160  
A Madheshi leader referenced M.N. Srinivas’s “Theory of 
Sankritization” to explain what has traditionally happened in Nepali politics. 
He said, 
The problem here is if you are a person belonging 
to [a] lower caste or religious group, you have to 
transform yourself as an elite in order to make it in 
politics. It is a big challenge. You were a Dalit 
leader but you became a Brahman. Then he calls 
the person who belongs to his own caste and 
religion dirty or illiterate. In mainstream society 
change means imitation. Therefore, in regard to 
caste, the leaders who come from the lower caste 
transform only themselves and the rest of them 
will be in the same low level.161  
This leader summed Nepali politics up as three groups. The first and most 
prominent are people of elite status that speak for the downtrodden—
traditionally as the party leaders through Nepali political history have done in 
speaking for the “people” or more recently as what has happened in the 
Madheshi movement when the landowning elite spoke for the peasant and 
labor masses. The second group contains people from minority groups who 
conform to the elite system to the degree that they no longer affiliate with 
their roots. The third sectors are those who work outside the political system. 
But for those who choose to work within the political system, they must 
assume an elite orientation that prioritizes the supremacy of their party over 
                                                
160 Based on an interaction with a NSU (D) ethnic student leader, 11.28.07. 
161Translation of an interview with a central committee member of TMDP (Terai Mades 
Democratic Party), 4.18.08.  
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the people they claim to represent. He argued you must compromise in this 
way in order to be effective within the party system. 
This leader saw the system as bigger than Nepal, and he reckoned that 
it could not be easily bypassed. He pointed out that the international 
organizations favor people who speak English as their trusted interlocutors.  
In his perspective this is backwards because those who need the 
empowerment don’t have the educational background to know English 
because it is not necessarily relevant to their everyday lives.  His critique was 
trenchant and expanded beyond the Nepali political system to encompass all 
forms of structural power. He even implicated himself in the social dynamic, 
as well as me. His was a serial Foucauldian analysis, which made me feel as if 
there is no way to be outside the system if one wants to claim existence. So 
why bother attempting to effectuate change? The very act of trying insinuates 
complicity.  
 It is indeed true that one who is invested in asserting change becomes 
implicated in the system itself.  Roy Wagner reminds us, “Social form is not 
emergent but immanent” (1991: 172). It is one of the paradoxes of politics: 
people themselves are not only an issue of scale as Wagner argues in his 
interpretation of big men as fractal persons, but their aspirations are too. 
Activists represent both a part and the whole of their community as they carry 
out their own, their community’s, their political party’s, and their country’s 
aspirations. I demonstrated this in chapter two when I discussed the 
personalization of politics; they embrace the entirety of their ideology from 
which their personal identity is manifested. But it is a common tendency to 
collapse both the person and their aspirations and see the totality as the 
surface reality, at which point it is easy to be critical of people’s voice as 
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representatives of their community when the particulars of those voices seem 
to be erased. Their presence is usurped by the whole, and they no longer 
represent the unique part that they contribute.  Similarly, Marilyn Strathern 
describes the concept of big person in Melanesian society as an individuals’ 
ability to take the sentiment of the group and embody it as their individual 
purpose, when she writes: “The transformation of ‘many minds’ into ‘one 
mind’ constitutes an attempt to focus sequences of action upon the self” (1991: 
210). Both Strathern’s and Wagner’s analysis allude to the challenges that 
Nepali minority activists experience. In order to become influential (or a big 
person) their voice needs to collapse all the voices they would like to represent 
into one voice that resonates within the system of which they are critical. Yet 
this structural reality limits minority activists’ endeavor to reveal that the 
dominant voice does not include all those bodies present in the society, or 
from Rancière’s perspective, their role is to name the unnamed. How can they 
achieve this when they continually need to figure out how to fit within the 
entrenched system and are then seen as the whole of that system? I will now 
analyze some minority student activists’ experience in balancing this attempt 
with their own survival and success within the student organizations.  
One of my main informants regarding this matter is an ethnic Magar 
female student leader. The first time we discussed this issue she went into a 
long description about how politics has been an exclusive system with little 
opportunity for minorities and women. She then reiterated all the talking 
points of political exclusion that people commonly gave me when I asked 
about the possibility of success for women and minorities in the party system.  
I then asked her what her personal experience has been. How has she 
managed to get ahead? She responded, 
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Student: I am the vice-president now... Within a 
year I have to compete for the position of president 
and for this, I have to obtain the ticket. If I spoke in 
favor of women, people won’t like this. Therefore, I 
should not speak in their favor. I have to observe 
silence. Others can speak about this but not me. If I 
raised this issue it gives a bad impression that I 
want to stir things up. It is fine to stir things up on 
the street in order to point your finger at others, 
but you should not point your finger at the party.  
Interviewer: Really, in no free form are you able to 
raise this issue? 
Student: No, I should not address it. This is the 
reason why I speak less now than I did before. 
Even if I raised a trifle issue I would be blamed for 
doing it for myself, not the party. Therefore, it is 
really hard to accept this paradoxical coexistence. 
Even now, people don’t easily accept my silence. 
When I was in the junior posts, I was not treated as 
competent as others so I could say what I wanted, I 
was not assumed to be an influential voice. But 
now since I am competing for the high post, people 
see my role as meaningful, therefore I must 
diminish my voice to maintain my position. It is 
ironic, I am finally at a place where people expect 
me to do something but I can’t. Regardless, raising 
the voice of the voiceless is mere rhetoric; no one 
raises it in any true sense.  
Interviewer: One has to observe silence in order to 
obtain a high post? 
Student: Only those who are powerful are talked 
about. 
Even today, women are considered as “sari” and 
she is not considered capable of taking the 
leadership position. This is a feudalistic culture, 
our Nepali culture. You must prove yourself to be 
what you are not to get a high post.162 
This student leader’s explanation resonates with Strathern’s analysis that the 
agency big men are perceived to have is one of self-interest: “Political 
                                                
162 Translation of an interaction with ANNFSU (Akil) Vice President on 11.26.07. 
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aggrandizement or striving for prestige is inadequately likened to possessive 
individualism in so far as that it misses the transformation of the big man 
himself” (1991: 210). In the context of Nepal, people dismiss minority 
intentions to bring minority voices into a prominent place in politics as a self-
aggrandizing endeavor. One high-caste student cadre described it as a 
blackmailing tactic to secure a position that the minority might not be 
qualified for.163  These types of attitudes insidiously suppress attempts to 
diversify politics in a way that is truly inclusive of the Nepali citizenry. 
When I discussed this topic with the recently elected president of NSU 
(D) he informed me that he could not nominate more than one janajati to his 
central committee. The NC party leaders had recommended as much.  It was 
after receiving this suggestion that he realized if he were to be too vocal about 
minority representation in politics, he would be looked at as an ethnic activist 
and he would no longer receive promotion from student and party leaders. 
They would consider his purview too narrow. Yet he told me, 
In spite of all this, I don’t stop raising the voices of 
the janajatis, women, Karnalis, and Madheshis. But 
I have discovered it is less risky to do so by 
encouraging others to join in student politics rather 
than actively critiquing the system. Why I do this 
is? … I have changed one of the sayings of Plato. 
He said, “If good people don’t join in politics they 
have to be ready to be ruled by the bad ones.” 
What I say is, “If Janajatis, women, Madheshis, and 
Dalits don’t join politics they have to be ready to be 
ruled by others.” There are just two alternatives, to 
be active or to be ruled. In this sense, my duty is to 
inspire minorities to join in politics and I do this as 
best I can.164  
                                                
163 Based on an interaction with an NSU (D) student on 11.18.07. 
164 Translation from an interview with NSU (D) president on 11.28.07. 
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I know that this student’s popularity amongst his peers is based on the 
attitude he explains here.  On women’s day he texted every female student 
activist he knew in all the student organizations to wish them a happy 
women’s day and encouraged them to continue participating in politics 
because they were a key component in the political system that the students 
wish to establish. I was with a few different female student activists as they 
received the message and they expressed appreciation. Months afterwards 
various female student activists cited his gesture as a sign that things were 
changing when I asked them about the issue of inclusion in politics.   
This student leader may have an exceptionally positive attitude, but the 
fact that he is not particularly marginalized may be a contributing factor. One 
of his fellow student activists, a high-caste male, pointed out to me that this 
student leader cannot be considered marginalized because his family has been 
in politics for four generations, since the beginning of the Nepali Congress’s 
history.  Furthermore, he does not speak his mother tongue and he grew up in 
the Terai region, where he was identified as a hill person as opposed to a 
janajati (ethnic) as he would have been identified if he were to have been 
raised in the hills.  This distinction is due to regional identity politics. Hill 
people are more prominent in the myth of the Nepali state. Even though 
different communities may have been politically marginalized, they are 
accepted as being native to Nepal, and as nationalists since their communities 
surrendered to Prithi Narayan Shah and accepted his rule in the latter half of 
the eighteenth century, which was the basis of the modern Nepali state. Those 
from the Terai region, on the other hand, are met with suspicion by the state 
because many have blood ties to India. Their Nepali heritage is often 
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questioned.165 Therefore, it makes sense that the most successful janajati 
student activists would be from the Terai.  As they grew up their hill heritage 
ensured their national identity rather than differentiating them from the high-
castes. It may have just been a superficial level of inclusion, but it was one that 
allowed them to identify enough with the political project in order to be 
successful within the political system. This student leader’s background 
provided him with an elite orientation in the state of Nepal and in politics; 
therefore he was able to find success in that realm where others of his named 
ethnicity may not have.  
This is true across party lines. One of the more obvious signs that these 
power structures are reoccurring is when one takes notice of who is in 
leadership roles even in the Maoist party despite their institutional effort to 
raise issues of exclusion. During the People’s War they had organized a 
unified army, which was based on multi-generational frustrations of 
marginalized groups. But these marginalized groups were not merely 
interested in class justice; they wanted recognition for their communities, both 
local autonomy and a place in the state. Furthermore, the Maoists have been 
strategic in placing ethnic minorities and women in positions in the interim 
government and they had the most diverse constituent assembly candidate 
roster and ran on the platform that supported state restructuring to comprise 
of autonomous ethnic regions. For that reason, they won the majority during 
the constituent assembly election. Yet in a lot of ways they have a similar 
party structure as the other parties: they have the women’s group, they have 
                                                
165 This issue was particularly palpable during the citizenship drive in 2007.  Many people 
were very nervous about giving so many people of Terai origin citizenship because they 
believed they were Indian, or if not, they assumed to be loyal to India since their natal families 
were Indian. People of all backgrounds, political leanings, and education levels expressed fear 
that Nepal would be usurped by India if they were too lax with the citizenship screening. This 
attitude indicates how deep regional biases run in Nepal.   
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the Tamang, Magar, Madheshi, and other ethnic group freedom armies (mukti 
sena) who have since become the political wings for these different ethnic and 
marginalized groups. And the majority of the central party leadership is still 
high-caste men. They cite the above efforts as their actions toward inclusion 
but don’t see an issue with their party leadership because ultimately their 
main focus is class struggle. Once they achieved a place in the mainstream 
government, class struggle became the all-encompassing approach to 
exclusion, which fogs the individual ethnic and marginal discrimination that 
they highlighted in order to recruit these people in the first place. 166   
Furthermore, the political rhetoric across party lines changed once the 
issue of inclusion was at the political center of state restructuring. There was a 
slight shift from referring to the excluded in the multiple (janajatis, Madheshis, 
Dalits, and women) to a term that encompassed them all in the single: adhivasi 
(original inhabitant). This term has precedent because it is the term that is 
used in India in determining tribal status for minority communities. A Maoist 
leader explained to me that in this context, India is considered a reasonable 
political standard since it is a federal republic that has a history of 
incorporating excluded groups into the state, education, and bureaucratic 
ranks. Yet there is another reason why the term adhivasi quickly became 
popular during the constituent assembly elections, because it created the 
situation where social, religious, and ethnic background does not matter as 
long as one can establish that they are “original inhabitants.” The term 
categorizes people’s belonging to the land that is within the confines of Nepal 
and collapsing the difference between them. Use of this term was particularly 
                                                
166 Analysis based on interaction with ANNISU (K) central committee member on 11/26/06, 
an interview with an ANNISU (K) central committee member on 1/8/07, and a Majdūr Kisan 
student leader on 1/9/07. 
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predominant during the citizenship drives when there was latent anxiety of 
Indian interference in Nepal through the increase of Madheshi citizens, whose 
heritage is doubted by many Nepali citizens from the hills.  
The larger question is how do the multiple marginalized groups find a 
place in the state when the political history, tradition, culture, and leadership 
represent all that they are not and is continually attempting to collapse them 
into a singularity? I will now focus on how women have experienced 
becoming part of the singular citizenry and how it has affected their 
experience in politics. 
Political Limits 
When I discuss politics with general Nepali citizens, a lot of them 
describe Nepali politics as a process of amassing influence, wealth, and 
leadership roles. One of my regular exercises when I was moving from 
political programs throughout the city was to ask taxi drivers how they would 
describe Nepali politics to a foreigner. One taxi driver who picked me up at a 
program commemorating the integrations of the Nepali Congress parties said 
to me, “Politics is so-called leaders playing the game of leading. Everyone 
aims to be the leader; those who are successful are leaders who actually have 
followers and can broker compromise. It is a major distraction; people focus 
too much on building their own influence and don’t really do anything 
useful.”167 After he said this to me, I began to wonder, if this is such an integral 
aspect to being successful in politics, how does it impact who gets ahead in 
politics?  After all, not everyone in Nepali society is bred to lead, nor does 
everyone yearn to spend their energy trying to be influential. That does not 
                                                
167 Translation of a conversation with a Kathmandu taxi driver, 10.24.07. 
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necessarily mean that such individuals have no interest in making a social or 
political impact.   
I asked Risha, an NSU central committee member, about this and she 
started laughing.  She doubtfully quipped that I had only started noticing this 
dynamic in politics. She explained, 
People say that women don’t rise in politics 
because they are limited or don’t have the capacity 
or consciousness to be politically active. They 
won’t say that women are incapable because that 
makes them sound sexist.  But what do they mean 
by limited? That they are suppressed and can’t 
enter into politics? Perhaps, but it is more than 
that.  As you have observed, one must be 
influential or connected to influence in order to be 
successful in politics.  What does that involve? It 
involves either having your own people or being 
relentlessly cunning, better yet, both. Women’s 
connections are usually limited to their families. 
Furthermore, it is considered socially inappropriate 
for women to be relentlessly cunning.  So how do 
women become successful politicians? The thing 
that limits them most is the judgment of others.168  
What Risha was tacitly telling me is that the traits that make a successful 
Nepali politician are traditionally acceptable for high-caste men, mainly: a 
superior conviction in your ideology and ability. Moreover, politicians need to 
be well educated and have broad social networks. These are not privileges 
that women traditionally had.  Women are beginning to have access to 
education and are expanding their social networks, but they are still expected 
to publicly conduct themselves in particular ways. The qualities that one must 
assert in order to rise in politics are still not considered respectable for women 
to engage. I will now analyze how women describe the limits they confront in 
politics.  
                                                
168 Translation of an interaction with an NSU central committee member on 11.02.07. 
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In her article “Legalizing State Patriarchy in Nepal” Sierra Tamang 
explores what constitutes women in the state of Nepal.  She focuses on the 
legal structures of women’s rights in the Muluki Ain during the Panchayat era. 
She argues that it was during this era that patriarchy shifted from the 
domestic sphere to the legal sphere, wherein women’s rights and roles as 
daughters, wives, and mothers became legally sanctioned. She argues, “In 
Nepal, gendered citizenship must be understood in the maintenance of 
masculinized Hindu rule; the attempted homogenization of Nepal’s diverse 
population and creation of ‘the Nepal woman’ (legally and otherwise) as a 
chief instrument for achieving all the above” (2000:152). She demonstrates 
how the Brahmin and Chettri families were the models on which to define the 
citizen nucleus, the family. The Hindu family became the template in which to 
define women. Based on this the Panchayat government pursued 
development (bikaas) within which women were to be modernized, “the 
illiterate and ‘conscious-less’ women of Nepal had to be ‘awakened’ from their 
pitiful, superstition-ridden lives and move forward to help develop the 
nation” (2000: 133). In this section I will demonstrate how women continue to 
feel limited despite bikaas.  The basis of these limitations is the Hindu filial 
paradigm that informed Muluki Ain’s construction of the Nepali female 
citizen. 
An ANNFSU (Akhil) female student informed me that a woman’s 
ability to be influential was not only an issue of access to education but also 
the forms of labor that society values.  She proceeded with the Marxist 
feminist critique that traditional women’s work is invisible in the labor 
scheme because it does not provide money to the household.  She said you can 
increase women’s consciousness but someone still has to raise children and 
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oversee the domestic sphere. She argued that in a Hindu society, the 
traditional division of labor is not going to quickly change. It is for that reason, 
she felt, that women must assert that their labor is just as valuable as men’s 
labor; only then will their status elevate accordingly. She said to me,  
My parents are progressive in some ways but still 
traditional. For instance, they are very proud of me 
because I am actively changing our society.  But I 
always have to remind them that my sister-in-law 
is just as important.  Her tasks of taking care of the 
household, raising my cousins, contribute just as 
much to our family and our society.  When they 
see her role as important, maybe then her lineage 
will make it into our history and her work will be 
respectable enough for all to do, which would free 
women to pursue other ways to contribute.169 
Her point resonates with what the anthropological study of women has 
established that “the social system engenders the gender system” 
(Mukhopadhyay & Higgins 1988: 484). This student argued that there must be 
a paradigm shift in the social system in order for women to find equality. She 
continued to refine her point, maintaining that women’s traditional labor must 
be valued differently. She claimed that this has provided the grist for social 
and political movements. But until women figure out how to make a stand 
without being co-opted by traditional political leaders, then there will be no 
large shifts in the movement paradigm. 
Another consistent description I heard that keeps women not only out 
of politics but also from speaking out in general is the proverb “a hen should 
not crow” (pothi basna hunna). One ethnic female student leader explained, 
In the Nepali culture it is said that a hen should not 
crow. It is taken as ominous; it is taken as a sign of 
bad luck. The assumption of a hen should not crow 
                                                
169 Translation of an ANNFUS (Akhil) central committee member’s interview on 11.25.07. 
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establishes the assumption that females—whether 
they are the daughter, daughter-in-law, mother, 
sister—then they should not speak in the presence 
of males. The society has never encouraged those 
women who came up to speak with courage. 
Women who speak out are not encouraged with 
compliments like “good girl,” “good daughter.” 
No, rather they are referred to as “bad women” and 
“characterless women” [spoken in English]. In a 
society like this, it is really risky to become 
involved in politics or to speak out. You are judged 
by your family and your family is judged by 
others.170 
This student leader’s explanation of the limits that women experience in 
politics captures a social truth.  Based on the experience of tradition, women 
perceive themselves as less socially flexible than men. In The Gender of the Gift, 
Marilyn Strathern argues that Melanesians are neither singular nor plural, 
relying on McKim Marriott’s description of “dividual” in South Asia, which 
he juxtaposes to the western individual171 (1990: 13).  As I established in 
chapter four, People embody multiple social forms, which they realize in 
different relational contexts.  Based on this notion, Roy Wagner created the 
concept of the fractal person (1991). Both of these conceptual approaches are 
relevant to understanding Nepali people and how they navigate their social 
lives, especially within caste scriptures. As this quote demonstrates women 
may be “dividual,” embodying multiple social relations, but the roles they are 
able to embody are prescribed roles that are dictated by hegemonic 
expectations of how women should behave and socially interact.  
                                                
170 Translation from an interview with an ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee member on 
11.26.07. 
171 “Persons—single actors—are not thought in South Asia to be "individual," that is, 
indivisible, bounded units as they are in much of Western social and psychological theory as 
well as in common sense. Instead, it appears that persons are generally thought by South 
Asians to be "dividual" or divisible. To exist, dividual persons absorb heterogeneous material 
influences.” (Marriott 1976: 111, cited in Strathern 1988: 348) 
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Figure 18: Female activists struggling to avoid arrest,  
Baag Bazar, Kathmandu 2004172 
Indeed, the social interactions that they pursue must have particular 
reference points in order to be socially acceptable.  These reference points are 
often limited to a kinship paradigm or involve women being submissive in 
public. Not only are metaphors that reference nature used to describe the 
mandated behavior for women, but also the society has relied on religion to 
cordon women to particular spheres and roles. A male Maoist student 
explained it to me in this way: 
From the perspective of women, men are the gods. 
For an instance, Shiva is considered as a god and 
women are supposed to act like his wife, Parvati. 
But people do not consider Parvati a god and 
equally worship her. Therefore, the concept was 
formed that males are the gods, which the females 
serve since they are responsible for the religious 
ceremonies in the households. This is one of the 
                                                
172 Street protest has been a historically accepted activity for all Nepali citizens regardless of 
gender or caste. 
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factors why the women cannot go ahead; the very 
cultural concept, women, has prevented them from 
going ahead. The tradition was such that the males 
took the females not as the equal collaborator but 
just a helping hand to fulfill the male objective. On 
the one hand, the women are socially prevented 
from progressing since they are taken as a crowing 
hen if they try to go ahead. That is considered 
unnatural.173 
Female students have told me that religious tradition is a huge obstacle; it is 
the basis for societal prejudice. A gender that is not worshipped in the 
orthodox religion will not be taken as seriously as one that is.  
This was substantiated for me on a road trip with some NSU (K) 
students as we went to different district conventions. Tanuja addressed it 
during a pit stop when I inquired why she had been frantically singing 
devotional songs to Shiva for the last two hours. She was obviously frustrated 
with the outcome of the district convention; every time someone tried to 
rehash an event, she cut him off with a Shiavas devotional song. She replied, 
“No one has listened to me all weekend long. Now they want to discuss all 
that went wrong at our convention.  I don’t want to hear it.  They interrupted 
me before but they won’t interrupt my songs to Shiva (mero Shiavas bhakti git).” 
Her frustration resonated with what I had heard from other female students; 
they are often interrupted when they are trying to make a serious point, more 
so than their fellow male students. But what is worse, according to Tanuja, is 
that no one notices when women are interrupted, and no one demands that 
their voices be heard. She said, “We have a choice, to either be pushy in 
stating our opinion when we know no one cares to listen, or we remain silent. 
Do you think we like being pushy? No. But there is no way for a woman to be 
                                                
173 Translation of an interview with an ANNISU (K) central committee member on 11.12.07. 
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graceful in politics, 174 we are either scrappy or non-existent.”175 It is a dilemma 
for women; they would rather have their opinions valued, but they recognize 
that when they are acknowledged it is often a concession, a gesture of 
inclusion. 
Jaya emphasized this when we met in the fall of 2009.  She had 
achieved the most coveted role for a female student leader.  She is the first 
female student to serve the position of president of a student organization.  
When I congratulated her on this feat one of the students in her entourage 
pointed out that she was not only the first female student president but also 
she was the first elected female student president.  Another student proudly 
pointed out that she is a janajati as well, but then he cowered when everyone 
averted their eyes because it was an obvious point to make.  Later, when Jaya 
and I were alone, I asked her about her experience as the first female student 
organization president. She said,  
You know, I had always thought that being 
politically active was a compulsion.  It was for us, 
especially during the movement.  But recently 
people have been saying that it is volunteer work. 
That is the response I hear when I try to give orders 
to make things happen. That is frustrating. I find it 
really hard.  I have no way to convince people to 
serve the organization except through conviction 
for our ideology and our aim to achieve justice.  
When people start defining their political duty as 
volunteer work, I don’t know how to direct 
them.176  
                                                
174 The direct translation of what Tanuja said was, “But there is no way for a woman to be 
womanlike in politics, we are either cunningly forceful or we don’t exist.” I had trouble 
translating this so I decided to rely on the quoted translation that my research assistant helped 
me translate based on my field note annotation. 
175 Transcription of a conversation with an NSU (K) central committee member on 2.11.07. 
176 Translation of an interaction with the ANFSU (Akhil) president on 10.6.09. 
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Jaya is too savvy to define her cadres’ resistance to obey her orders as an 
attempt to undermine her as a woman in a leadership role, but it fits a trend. 
Women are not overtly suppressed in politics; rather they are put in positions 
where they must act other than they were raised in order to be effective. They 
must either shout over interrupting voices, strictly administer orders, throw 
rocks at the police, or attend late-night meetings that may involve alcohol or 
other male indulgences—that is, if they are lucky enough to be invited, which 
they rarely are because it is not an appropriate atmosphere for a woman of 
character. It is in these ways that women experience obstacles in politics.  
Gendered Interactions: Women’s Place in Society through the Articulation 
of Their Place in Politics 
As I was walking with Uma to Min Bhawan campus to hear the Prime 
Minister’s speech at the ANNFSU (Akhil)’s 2009 Dashain commemoration, we 
ran into a very high-level CPN-UML leader. I knew his face, name, and 
history, but we had only met once in 2005 during a street protest where he had 
been arrested along with many other party leaders. Uma began introducing 
him. She told me that he was a former student activist, who has held the 
position of central committee member in the CPN-UML for a long time, and at 
the end of the Movement of Regression he was the minister of sports and 
education.  As she was introducing him, he was looking at her expectantly, 
waiting to insert himself. As she paused in her introduction he said, “Leader 
[neta], I am a CPN-UML party leader.  And this is my daughter.”177 He pointed 
affectionately to Uma. “I have known her for years. She is rising quickly in 
ANNFSU.” I said it was nice to meet him again; we had met many years ago 
on the streets.  He stared at me a bit blankly trying to recollect.  He then said, 
                                                
177 This CPN-UML leader and ANNFSU (Akhil) activist are not related; in fact, they are not 
even of the same caste or ethnic background.  
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“Is my daughter taking care of you? Uma, please make all of our guests feel 
welcome.” Uma nodded and mentioned she would come to his house before 
she left for her village for the Dasain holiday. As he drove off toward the 
speech program, Uma looked at me and said, “Guest? I think you know too 
much about us to be our guest.” 178 This minister’s response captured exactly 
what I have observed in the social dynamic of Nepali politics. Men designate 
themselves as leaders, and they incorporate politically active women into their 
circles by assigning diminutive kinship markers.  
I begin this section with this vignette because it demonstrates how 
women are placed in politics. When I asked student activists about the roles of 
minorities and women in politics, I noticed that people relied more on 
stereotypical descriptions of women’s traditional roles in order to describe 
their own or their female cadres’ experience. More often than not, women’s 
positions were depicted as relational; women’s identities were based on their 
relationships with their natal families, their husbands’ families, or their sons. 
A female minister who has been active in CPN-UML politics since her school 
days explained it in this way: 
For a woman to get ahead in politics, the family 
environment should be conducive. Her husband, 
son, brothers have to be supportive. In our society 
the socialization process for a son and a daughter is 
different. A son is taken as one who earns and 
performs the rituals after the parents die. On the 
other hand, a daughter is treated as someone who 
will go to someone’s home after marriage. A 
woman has to live within the control of her father 
before she gets married, her husband after she gets 
married and son after the demise of her husband. 
She is never free. Women don’t have their own 
self-identity. She is identified as someone’s 
                                                
178 Translation of a transaction with a CPN-UML central committee leader and an ANNFSU 
(Akhil) central committee member on 9.19.09.  
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daughter, someone’s wife, and someone’s 
mother.179 
This party leader told me that the reason she got into politics was to fight for 
women’s civil rights.  She believed that it was she who had the opportunity 
for education domestically and abroad, who needed to increase awareness in 
Nepali society and to enable women’s opportunities for more prominent, 
public roles in society.  She felt that the plight of women and the trials of the 
average Nepali person were similar but that women had a double layer of 
servitude.  She explained it in this way: at the time she entered into politics, 
the Nepali people were subject to the King but Nepali women were also 
subject to the men in their families.  For her, politics was a way to eliminate 
both levels of suppression.  In fighting for political freedom she could help 
Nepali people become equal citizens.  And by doing it as a woman, she hoped 
she could create space for other women so they could carve out identities 
other than being a daughter, sister, or mother.   
This woman’s experience is not typical.  Her family, which lived 
outside of Nepal, encouraged her not only to study but also to be politically 
active. Since so few women were educated, they of course would not have 
access to the political life that she did.  She went on to marry a founder of the 
Nepal Communist party, which, as she described it, “attached her to politics 
for life.”180 When I asked her what she felt she has done to uplift the state of 
women, her response indicated that she saw no difference between her 
personal political ambition and her fight for women’s political rights.  She said 
her mere presence in politics was a benefit to women because it affected the 
culture since men have to take her seriously in a leadership role.  She added 
                                                
179 Translation based on an interview with a CPN-UML central committee leader on 12.3.07. 
180 Ibid. 
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that the increase in women’s opportunity for education would automatically 
increase their participation in politics and this would lead to necessary societal 
change. 
Although this minister is exceptional in her position as party leader and 
state minister, her experience is not out of the ordinary for influential Nepali 
women. When I would mention this CPN-UML leader to others, the majority 
of people would first ask me if I knew who her husband was. This elucidates 
Wagner’s assertion that “…any recognition or bestowal of a name is always 
the fixing of a point of reference within a potentially infinite range of relations, 
a designation that is inherently relational” (1991: 164). She is influential 
because she is connected to men in political power, which secured her position 
of respect. As in other parts of South Asia, women who get ahead in politics 
are often attached to politically influential men, either their fathers, husbands, 
or sons.  The reality that women mainly establish a place in politics through 
the connection to a man not only illustrates the degree to which politics is 
network-based but also the reality that women’s public place is kin-based.  
This dynamic is both a benefit and a hindrance to women—a hindrance 
because without a male connection they may be completely invisible, but they 
may never be able to overcome their family connection either.  
 It is for this reason that according to one student, ninety-five percent of 
the women in politics are high-caste and the other five percent are of ethnic 
minorities. 181  Many more high-caste women can claim a male connection in 
the political system than ethnic minorities. How does this affect Nepali 
society, particularly for women in it?  One Madhesi student activist told me 
                                                
181 Translation of an interaction with an NSU (D) committee member on 11.28.07.  
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that a high-caste female leader whose father is the NC party president, no 
more represents his mother than her father does. He said, 
What difference does it make to the life of my 
mother if Sujata Koirala182 becomes a Minister? 
Please tell me; will there be any difference in her 
life? It does not matter whether Sujata is male or 
female. She is capable enough of course, because 
she has everything. Sujata does not need to be 
empowered. The very direction of the women in 
the name of the feminist movement is wrong in our 
country. Sujata does not fight to live or for 
recognition, but she fights to maintain her family’s 
wealth and influence, which was established on the 
premise of democratic right, that is her family 
business. Without it, her family is jeopardized, 
with it she is guaranteed to have a leadership role, 
even if it is a minister without portfolio.  How 
ridiculous is that?183 
This is the dilemma for women in Nepali politics. The most influential women 
are dismissed for the very same reason that they are able to get to the place of 
influence: they embody nepotism. They are a physical manifestation of an 
inherent aspect that fuels Nepali politics, networks. People spurn Sujata 
Koirala because she represents the reality that she, her family, Nepali 
Congress, and Nepali politics in general are run by an elite few. I ask people if 
Sujata is any different than other Nepali Congress male leaders. People’s 
typical response is that she is worse than them. Not different, but worse. It is 
because she is a reminder of what Strathern argued is the role of big men in 
Hagen culture. “In Hagen, the one man is likened to clan, is its homologue, 
showing in his transformed persons the way in which multitudinous and 
                                                
182 Sujata Koirala is the daughter of G.P. Koirala, the president of the Nepali Congress.  She is a 
contentious figure because to many she represents not only the nepotism of Nepali politics 
but she is harshly judged for being extremely corrupt.  
183 Translation of an interview with a Nepal Student Forum (Sambhavana) central committee 
member, 4.15.08.  
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diverse particular (kinship) relationships can be eclipsed in the pursuit of a 
single person” (1991: 212). For women of Sujata’s notoriety the reverse is also 
true, her pursuits are indeed eclipsed by her kinship connections and people 
cannot look past them to recognize her individual ambitions.  
Yet Sujata Koirala is different.  She is different because she is a woman 
who has access to the political core.  She is able to attend the key unofficial 
meetings that decide the political fate of Nepal. It is not a problem if she is 
around political alcohol bartering that may keep other women at bay because 
she is in the protected company of her father, uncle, and nephews. In public 
she is a woman who commands the respect of a man by other men. She is also 
different because she cultivates an entourage of female politicians and 
students. She creates an atmosphere where they can be near the center but not 
be compromised. In effect she is creating her own patronage network with 
women in key positions of power. 
Risha is one of her main disciples. And Risha has found success 
because she has embraced politics in this traditional way, through cultivating 
her own networks. Risha has also worked hard to extend her network both 
domestically and abroad in order to build her own political and social clout.  
She has been influenced by the donor rhetoric of empowering all women. The 
way Risha describes her own activities is extending support to women in 
every sector and geographic location to be active and influential in their local 
areas and in national politics. She is able to impressively articulate how she 
wants to promote and connect women both locally and para-locally in order to 
encourage them to reach across sectors to find support from one another. 
When I asked her what her ambitions are for the political sector, she said to 
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support established women leaders who promote her and her friends through 
the ranks.  
Despite her good intentions, Risha has a number of naysayers amongst 
the student political actors, in the larger political sphere, and in the general 
public. Prabal’s dismissal of her summarizes people’s attitude toward her. I 
was with him and a few other former NSU student leaders at a bar. We were a 
bit distracted by the television as the day’s news headlines were being 
reported. There was a segment announcing the most recent talks between the 
NC, CPN-UML, and CPN (Maoist) party leaders, who were trying to resolve 
the stalemate of the constituent assembly government.  The announcer was 
reporting that there was speculation that they were considering Baburam 
Bhattarai for the prime ministership but that G.P. Koirala would only agree to 
this if his daughter were declared deputy prime minister. As the announcer 
was reading this news there were images of people exiting the meeting. Sujata 
Koirala was filmed walking to her motorcade and Risha was behind her. 
Prabal pointed toward the screen at Risha, looked at me, and said, “Shadow 
goddess” (chāya devi).184 People view Risha’s influence as only based on her 
relations. Her attempt to get beyond the limits of male-dominated politics is 
what limits her ability to command respect. She has not been able to transcend 
her own personal connections in the minds’ of others. 
Another reason that women rise in politics through connection is that 
in order for women to get ahead in politics, they are expected to maintain the 
status quo or at the very least respect the party leadership.  If they have filial 
loyalties to those in power, then they can more seamlessly maintain the status 
quo because it is assumed they are invested in it. By challenging it, they are 
                                                
184 Translation of an interaction with former NSU (K) student leaders on 9.17.09. 
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not only challenging the political authority but also their families.  One 
student leader indicated this when he described the compromises women 
must make in order to be active in politics.  He said, 
I think, first of all, the women who get into politics 
have to agree to play the roles that have been given 
by the patriarchal society. Without so doing, she 
cannot make her space in this political male 
culture. On the one hand, they have to agree with 
the value attached to them by the society that they 
are weaker than males, and along with this, they 
have to raise their voice for something else, not 
themselves. For an instance, if women don’t 
challenge the positions of the party leaders but 
rather use their voices to raise the agendas of these 
leaders, then it is not difficult for them to obtain 
space in the parties. They have been getting such 
opportunities. I am really amazed seeing women 
distributing the batches in course of the programs 
held even by Maoists. At first glance it seems 
progressive.  But in reality the women should not 
raise their voices against patriarchal traditions. If 
they want to raise their voice at all, it must be on 
other issues.185 
This is how the experience of women and ethnic minority men differ despite 
the fact that people categorically collapse them together when speaking about 
exclusion.  As I established in section one, minority men can find partial 
success in politics if they are willing to act like high-caste men. Women, on the 
other hand, may have the advantage of caste and kin affiliations with the 
politically elite but they are limited in how they can act in politics. For them it 
is social suicide to act like one of the guys, hoisting up a glass of whiskey in 
order to seal a crucial deal with their fellow political cadres. It is in this way 
that women are limited; there is only so far they can access the inner circles of 
high-caste male politics. 
                                                
185 Translation of an interview with an ex-NSU (K) central committee member on 11.16.07. 
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As I argued in the first section, inclusion means to bring one in, and in 
order for this to happen one must be heard.  Women have their ways of being 
heard in politics.  Often it is by relying on what is effective, what resonates in 
Nepali politics, the maximization of the family as a political metaphor.  
Female party leaders often claim in their speeches at inauguration ceremonies 
and other political programs that they not only represent themselves but all 
mothers or sisters of Nepal.  Older women say that they give well-wishes to 
their sons as well as to their daughters in their pursuit of positions of 
leadership. Younger women often say that they are not only encouraged as 
younger sisters to gain positions of leadership so they can pave the way to a 
future for their daughters, but also to fulfill the aspirations of their mothers. In 
speeches and other forums, these young women ask all their brothers who are 
present “to assist them in fulfilling their own mothers’ aspirations, both for the 
sons and daughters of Nepal.”186 This may be a move that is inspired by 
national as well as international pressure for politics to be more inclusive. Yet 
the way they use the metaphor of family reveals that they are streamlining 
their agenda with traditional references to kinship and power.  
I asked one female student where the inspiration for these metaphors 
comes from. She admitted that the use of family as a metaphor is indeed a 
powerful tool to convince people of your cause. It is a tactic throughout Nepali 
politics that politically minded women have been adopting because it has 
been effective in other ways. As an example, she cited the terms that define the 
relationship between parties and student organizations, mother and sister 
organizations. From her perspective, this is a misnomer because women have 
                                                
186 This conclusion is based on political speeches given by female student and party leaders at 
the Dhading NSU (K) district convention 2.19.07, NSU (P) political program 3.7.07, and NSU 
(P) TriChandra campus convention, Kathmandu 3.21.07. 
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not played a central role. She claimed this is something that female activists 
intend to change; they will make themselves “more prominent in the political 
family structure.” 187 
As I have established, there are a number of obstacles that women face 
in politics, some of which cannot be discreetly addressed without expectation 
for substantial change. It is for this reason that a Maoist student told me the 
most important thing to alter is the state of mind of the politically elite.  He 
put it simply; they need to modify the way they do politics if they want to 
include women. Political practice must be made truly conducive for women’s 
participation. He said if women don’t feel safe doing politics in an 
environment where their image might be endangered, then they won’t 
participate.  That is why the Maoists have been experimenting with separate 
communes for men and women.188 They want to provide women a safe zone 
to fully focus on their politics. He continued by saying that they actively try to 
minimize the risk of women falling into traditional domestic roles at their co-
ed communes. They must all be vigilant in order to avoid “our natural social 
tendency,” as he described it. They hope that by avoiding such tendencies, 
their cadres will become used to interacting in a different dynamic. He said, 
“In our case, our wives are our competitors and enjoy equality in every aspect 
of life, just as we should know how to do every duty of life.”189  The main 
thing he emphasized was that in order to make politics conducive for women, 
men needed to start accommodating them and making sure they could 
participate in all political activities, official and unofficial.  
                                                
187 Observation and based on a conversation with an NSU (K) female student leader on 2.15.07. 
188 There may be sex-segregated Maoist communes but there are also co-ed communes, which 
I have visited. When I inquired about division of labor at the co-ed communes, they said they 
had assigned duties in order to ensure that no one falls into traditional gender roles. 
189 Translation of an interaction with an ANNISU (Krantikari) central committee member on 
11.12.07. 
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This student is correct in his analysis; male political actors need to 
change their ways of being in order to create equal space for women in 
politics. Creating a women’s zone can be empowering, but it too has its limits. 
An example of this is Padma Kenya Campus, the all-female campus. It is a 
very politically active campus with all of the student organizations 
represented in the Free Student Union.  Since the 1990s it has also had a 
prominent place in the student street movements. During the Movement 
Against Regression, the streets in front of Padma Kenya campus were ground 
zero for the rock fights between the security forces and the students. In 2005, 
during the height of the King’s rule, the students hung a sign declaring it a 
republic zone (ganatantra chetra). The police were never able to infiltrate that 
campus because all the student activists so heavily guarded it.  One would 
think this would produce some capable, prominent female student leaders. It 
did, but even though they made their name on the streets as activists 
(andolankāri), they still had to contend with the hierarchy of their student 
organizations’ central committees and their mother organizations.  And 
despite it all, even as Padma Kenya campus became known thoughout Nepal 
as a place to defy the state, it was still referred to as the “sāsurali” (father-in-
law’s house) by the male student activists.  It is where the male students saw 
their source for wives and relationships.  The male activists were happy to 
have the female students fight on the streets alongside them, but ultimately 
their view of what they would become never changed: the female students are 
their eventual wives.  
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Figure 19: An anti-king banner declaring Padma Kenya  
Campus a republic zone, Baag Bazaar, Kathmandu 2004 
My own experience of being placed within the social logic 
demonstrates the symbolic associations attached to gender in Nepali politics, 
even if I was designated as an outsider. Most of the student leaders would 
refer to me as “little sister” and the cadres would call me “big sister.” This is 
necessary etiquette. If a student did not use such a filial reference then it 
would say something about his intentions, that he has no interest in making 
me kin. I was fortunate not to experience such awkwardness very often. My 
established relationships with key student and party leaders protected me; 
their inferiors had to respect the fact that I was the “little sister” or “daughter” 
of their leaders. 
During my research, I spent a lot of time in male-only political 
situations, some official and many unofficial. I was often the only female 
present or, on rare occasion, a “sister-in-law,” the wife (or otherwise) of one of 
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the students, accompanied me. As I became more familiar with a group of 
students I started realizing that the kin terminology was not sticking. They 
wanted to acknowledge that I was not quite one of them. The reason may have 
been that it is not their habit to socialize with a woman who is not 
permanently or temporarily involved with one of them. They had to designate 
me as an outsider in order to normalize what was not normal. Therefore, my 
default name became latti kuirini (dumb white girl).   
That designator changed when these students realized that I was not 
just a dumb white girl. This happened during the 2007 NSU (K) national 
convention, three years after I forged a relationship with these students. It had 
become official that Akash was not going to contest the NSU (K) elections and 
his friends were very disappointed.  Some of them had come down to 
Chitwan just to campaign for him. That day I spent a number of hours trying 
to explain to his various supporters why it was not wise for him to contest.  
He did not have the support of the party, therefore he could never run NSU 
(K) as the public and the students would expect. I explained that he had 
already gained the political capital that one hopes to earn by being the 
president of a student organization through the notoriety he had earned 
during the Movement Against Regression. And that he felt his constituents 
were no longer the NSU (K) students but the larger public.  Most of them 
understood my points and admitted that my analysis would have been the 
inevitable fallout if he had won.  
That night I was explaining my perspective to Akash’s closest friends 
as they were drinking beer in the middle of the bridge, the coolest place in 
Narangad. Pawan said, “Yeah, I heard Ram say that today, but he did not 
seem convinced by his own argument; did you talk with him about this?” I 
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replied that I had but that my points were not new; I had been telling Akash 
this for awhile. Pawan looked at me and said, “You are not a latti kuirini 
(dumb white girl). You are a shyal bahuni (a foxlike (female) Brahmin).”190 
Everyone started laughing and from that point onward my nickname became 
shyal bahuni.   
In the eyes of these students I was elevated from a clueless, politically 
deficient female to a cunning high-caste female as soon as I demonstrated 
some political acumen. For me, to be called a shyal bahuni was no more 
offensive than being called a latti kuirini. I had relationships with these 
students; they treated me like a part of their inner circle. But when I tell other 
Nepali people this story I am informed that both terms are insults, I should 
not tolerate it or the students won’t show me respect. A female student who 
overheard this reference said to me, “I know you just take it as a joke, but you 
can’t let them think of you in that way. If you do, they will never take you 
seriously.”191 She may have been right because when a young Padma Kenya 
activist called me latti kuirini in front of Akash, he told her that I was her 
“older sister” and she should not think of me as anything else. Later he said to 
me, “We don’t want to give people the wrong idea about you.”192 Answering 
to a name that put me outside the purview of the filial network did indeed 
send the wrong idea about me. Even my own gendered interactions were 
limited by the confines of the Nepali social system.  
State of Elites: A New Era of Secularism  
I have established that Nepali elites are adept at employing nationalist 
ideology to fit their own ambitions or, more specifically, at framing nationalist 
                                                
190 Translation of an interaction with NSU (K) student activists on 5.20.07.  
191 Translation of an interaction with an NSU (K) student on 8.12.07. 
192 Translation of an interaction with an NSU (K) student leader on 10.2.07. 
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ideology so that their ambitions are the basis of the national pursuit. There is 
circularity to this endeavor. The political actors reference nationalist ideology 
to promote democratic rule that ensures their place as leaders. The usage of 
this ideology and its resonating ability substantiates their historical position as 
the ruling elite. Yet now they want to move away from the Hindu social order, 
which defined the ruling structure of the Nepali nation-state in the form of a 
Hindu Kingdom until 2008. I conclude this chapter with a focus on a key 
political demand that came out of the Maoists People’s War and the Second 
People’s movement, secular republic. Establishing a secular republic is an 
attempt to decouple the state and the King, to reframe the Hindu kingdom as 
a sovereign nation-state both in law and practice. Here I demonstrate the 
challenges for political actors to move beyond a Hindu sensibility in their 
political practice because they have benefited from it as a form of cultural 
authority, an authority in which they have found meaning as leaders who 
have committed themselves to the public service of politics. 
Talal Asad argued that secularism takes a particular form in modern 
liberal governance because it is an established system in which “neither 
compulsion (force) nor negotiation (consent) but the statecraft that uses ‘self-
discipline’ and ‘participation,’ ‘law’ and ‘economy’ as the elements of a 
political strategy” (2003: 3). Nepal is in the process of trying to establish those 
elements of modern liberal statecraft but the inability thus far to institute 
secular practice of politics is an indicator that the state is not monolithic, but 
made of actors who maintain inconsistent views.  
Even though a secular republic has been instituted in name, it has yet to 
change the system in practice. Rather, the President and Prime Minister have 
replaced the King in religious state ceremonies that are designed to maintain 
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the supreme leader’s position as the head of state in the order of the Hindu 
cosmos. Furthermore, Hindu metaphors have maintained their prominence 
throughout the parties in political speeches, as an anchor of social interaction, 
and in the ceremonial procedures of political programs like the adorning of 
garlands and blessing of red rice paste (tika).  Even the translation of the word 
secularism represents the vagueness that official language encapsulates.  I 
have heard two terms used for secularism; one is dharmanirpeksha, which 
means without religion, the other is darmanispaksha, which means non-
biasness of religion.  The subtleties of the two may seem inconsequential to 
most, which is obvious since they are interchangeable within conversation. Yet 
in the lack of distinction between the two terms reveals an opaque layer of 
intention with no action to follow it through. The linguistic inconsistencies, 
entrenched religious traditions, and metaphors in political programs and 
interactions are obstacles to addressing the issue of secularism and how it 
should be implemented.  
Figure 20: Newly elected Padma Kenya campus leaders during  
an NSU (K) victory rally, Baag Bazaar, Kathmandu 2004 
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The public even resists attempts to address necessary change in practice 
in order to institute a secular republic. I first started understanding how 
entrenched the Hindu tradition is in politics in 2006 when I observed the 
resistance that an ex-student leader, Akash, faced when he tried to propose 
what a secular republic can look like in Nepal. He is known for being 
contentious, so I was surprised when I heard how he broached the topic of 
political practice within “new Nepal” in a few of his speeches at different 
district conventions. He was speaking in an indirect manner that counters his 
typical style. He was asking what “new Nepal” was and if it included the 
practices of wearing topis193 and giving blessings (tika), or if it included 
sponsoring the King to go to the Pashupathi temple. He asked if these acts 
should be a part of politics or did they reinforce a different project that went 
against the sentiment of the people.  What surprised me was that he is a 
firebrand194 not usually known to delicately tread an issue. Later I asked him 
about his atypical diplomacy. I added, “You usually get people fired up so 
they support your radical suggestions.”  He acknowledged my observation 
and admitted that he had been struggling with this. He admitted that 
emphasizing secularism has been a lot more challenging and complicated than 
his original call for a Nepali republic.   
According to Akash’s account, initially he did directly address that the 
political traditions, even through the democratic period, were those based on 
the superiority of the Hindu monarch. He stressed that it has benefited the 
monarch that the political culture of the Hindu state has continued. He felt 
                                                
193 Topis are traditional hats worn by high-caste men on a regular basis, but were mainly meant 
to be worn by Hindu males during religious rituals. Topis were part of the State uniform for 
bureaucrats and politicians alike. 
194 It was his campaign for a republic that was an alternative to the Maoist demand for 
republic and the resulting sedition charges that were brought against him that radicalized the 
rhetoric of the Movement against Regression in 2003.  
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that if they wanted to achieve a truly secular republic, which would not be at 
risk of being recaptured by the monarchy, then they must remove these 
practices and traditions not only from their government but from their 
political parties as well. He recounted a recent speech of his that the crowd 
reacted against. He had given the example that within that particular VDC 
(Village Development Committee) there was a walkathon for tuberculosis and 
about thirty people participated and raised ten thousand rupees. Then the 
next week the Pashupati temple trust had a rally and over one thousand 
participated and they raised over three hundred thousand rupees. He asked 
the audience for whose benefit was this money raised, for Pashupathinath, the 
God that gives our King his mandate to rule us?  He lamented that after giving 
this speech, people approached him and asked why he was anti-Hindu.  This 
shocked him and made him understand the gravity of people’s resistance. 
Since then he has skirted the issue, trying to challenge the traditional political 
practices in order to gingerly broach how they might remove the King from 
their politics. He shook his head, saying that he was struggling to address this 
without offending people or their religion.  
When people heard the word secularism they felt it was a threat to their 
traditions. Their response was similar to what Sindre Bangstad refers to as the 
conceptual binary regarding secularism in western social science, that it is a 
complete erasing of religion.  She argues that it is not accurate to think of the 
issue of secularism as an either or thing. Rather, “the secular is an analogue, 
rather than a digital concept: societies – and individuals for that matter – may 
be more or less secular, but cannot be either ‘secular’ or ‘religious’” (2009:201). 
The conundrum that this student politician faced was that his calls for secular 
political practice were an attempt to integrate the Nepali people into a 
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different type of unity, a national citizenry.  Yet those who resisted did not 
recognize their personal place in that unity, rather they saw it as a threat to 
their identity, the identity they are used to having vis-à-vis the state. 
After his explanation I asked him what was the solution to his impasse. 
He admitted that he had been reading more Hindu texts to gather quotes and 
teachings to communicate the Hindu belief that god is in all creatures, in all of 
us.  He was trying to figure out a way to convey that he did not want to make 
people choose between Hinduism and no Hinduism but rather trying to 
promote that Hinduism is about worshipping the god in all people and should 
be used to promote communalism and inclusiveness in a way that people will 
be receptive to. He admitted that people have a hard time separating the 
politics and government from their everyday life experience, which for many, 
Hinduism is their dominant orientation. He felt that he was at an impasse, that 
the only effective way he saw to convince people to enact inclusion was 
through their Hindu faith, the same sentiment the King had exploited to 
maintain his mandate. He queried, “How do I break the cycle and try to 
institute political practice of equality that does not use the King’s tactics?”195  
This politician’s struggle resonates with an observation that Michael 
Rowlands made regarding his study of elite political dominance in Mali and 
the Cameroon when he wrote, 
The study of elite cultures illustrates the 
inadequacy of making a split between civil society 
and tradition—a between subject and citizen—as a 
characteristic of the postcolonial state in Africa. 
The two are not so clearly separated and the 
continuing importance of the “traditional” in the 
links between rural and urban, between civil 
society and custom means that everyone 
                                                
195 Based on an interaction with an ex-NSU (K) student leader, 11.30.06.  
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participates in both as a crucial part of their 
identification (2002: 156). 
It is not merely an academic inadequacy to separate these two, but 
practitioners also find themselves at an impasse when they want to 
disassociate certain modes of identity from certain realms of practice. This 
politician is unable to break the political identification with Hinducentric 
origins that have shaped Nepali political culture and the nation-state of Nepal. 
In other words, in Nepali politics the “dialectics of belonging” involve a 
Hindu social order that is tenaciously present for many (van der Veer 1994). 
They may agree with the sentiment of broader inclusion in the political and 
bureaucratic spheres but they are not open to changing it to the degree that 
they cannot relate to what has been the central identifying referent, a Hindu 
social system. 
At the end of my discussion with this ex-student leader in 2007, he said 
perhaps if the Maoists win the constituent assembly elections then we will see 
some changes in this regard.  He reasoned that it was the Maoists that most 
advocated for the secular aspect of the secular republic state.  Plus many of the 
Maoist party put politics over and above religion and culture. He wondered if 
they might be more successful in instituting secular practices that resonate 
with the larger public. At the time I responded, perhaps we will have to see, 
while visions of Maoists wearing tika, garlands (mala) and the topi came into 
my head.  Two years later, I was eager to return to Nepal to see if the Maoist-
led government had been able to make any substantial progress on the secular 
front. Returning in September 2009, I quickly realized that Dasain in the 
secular republic looks very similar to the Dasain during the King’s rule. The 
major difference is that the elected government leaders have replaced the King 
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in all of the Dasain rituals; the President and Deputy Prime Minister196 
received the flower from the Nepal Army general at the Army-sponsored 
Phulpati festival197 on the fourth day of Dasain.  
There was a torrential downpour the afternoon of the Phulpati 
ceremony.  I had managed to convince a cab driver to let me sit in his vehicle 
along the army grounds so that I could observe the ceremony without getting 
completely drenched. As the ceremony was occurring he asked me what I 
thought of it. I replied that the secular republic of Nepal looks very similar to 
the King’s rule during Dasain. He explained that Dasain was the biggest 
festival in Nepal and that people feel more connected to their government if 
the officials are part of the celebration.198 As I sat in his cab, I thought of the 
Nepali rupee bill.  After the Nepali Army and state were stripped of the royal 
designator in 2006, they removed the King’s image from the Nepali currency 
                                                
196 I was told that the Prime Minister would have attended but he was abroad at the United 
Nations’ Council meeting in New York so the Deputy Prime Minister stood in for him.  
197 The Phulpati Ritual is the royal ritual that symbolically reenacts Prithi Narayan Shah’s 
journey from his homeland of Gorkha to his appointed nation-state capital, Kathmandu. What 
I observed in 2009 was that the interim government leaders replaced the King and the Nepal 
Army served the same function as the Royal Nepal Army had during the monarchy.  In 2008, 
the Army served the similar function, the Nepali Congress President was present but the 
Maoist-appointed Prime Minister did not attend. This is a description of the Phulpati Festival: 
“The navapatriva (the nine plants--banana, dadim, dhanko bala, haledo, manabriksha, 
kachuki, belpatra, ashok, and jayanti--are collectively called navapatrika) for phulpati are 
carried by the helpers from the royal Dashain Ghar of Gorkha via the ancient route up to 
Jeevanpur in Dhading district. The person carrying the phulpati dives in the raging Budhi 
Gandaki River instead of walking on the bridge above it or taking a boat to cross the mighty 
river. The person believes that he has the blessing of Goddess Shakti and no harm will come 
his way. A group of assistant priests from the royal Dashain Ghar of Basantapur place of 
Kathmandu will be waiting for this person in Dhading to carry the phulpati to Kathmandu. 
They bring it to Jamal and from there the phulpati receives elaborate and royal treatment. It is 
placed in a palanquin under a gold-tipped ornate umbrella. Here, the phulpati is welcomed 
by the Royal Nepalese Army, Nepal police, and government dignitaries. After this an army 
platoon of the royal priest leads the phulpato parade to Hanumandhola Place. !While the 
procession is on its way to Hanumandhoka, the King witnesses the ceremonies taking place in 
Tundikhel, the army parade grounds. Guns and cannons are fired to honor the phulpati. By 
the time the functions of phulpati, also known as phulpati badai, are over, the phulpati 
procession will reach Hanumandhoka Palace. The King also proceeds to the courtyard of this 
palace and pays homage to Nava Durga, the nine shakti goddesses. With this ends the 
phulpati ceremonies.” www.internationalfriendsofNepal.nl/phulpati-dashain-nepal.html 
198 Translation based on an interaction with a cab driver in Kathmandu on 9.25.09. 
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and replaced it with an image of Mt. Everest or a rhododendron on the 
different rupee notes.  But if you hold the money up to the light, you can still 
see the watermark of the King with his crown of peacock feathers.  The image 
may have changed but the underlying stamp is still the same. The bastions of 
the monarchy remain even if it is not apparent at first glance. 
The referential power of Hindu tradition is not merely masked by 
secular images; it is also embraced as a means toward restructuring the nation. 
During my 2009 visit I also attended a program organized by joint youth 
organizations in their campaign to put pressure on the government to make 
progress on the constituent assembly process. An ex-student activist, Rajeev, 
explained to me that it was mainly civil youth organizations that participated. 
They had originally hoped that the student organizations would take 
leadership in running the campaign, but all the student organizations were 
hesitant to protest their mother parties as a united front.  After the organizers 
realized their ambivalence, they decided it would be more effective if it was a 
non-political movement. They hoped this would make it a more legitimate 
endeavor in the eyes of the public. He admitted that after student 
organizations realized the potential benefits of this movement, they were 
eager to participate.  He reassured me that they did not allow them to display 
their flags because they did not want the student organizations to usurp the 
spirit of the movement, which they have organized to be “pan-yuba,” across 
youth lines. He explained to me that they had organized some symbolic 
protests to get their message across at this program. He thought they would 
be very effective and would like my input. 
The symbolic program was in the form of a skit, which enacted the 
Dasain blessing whereby the eldest family member gives the juniors a blessing 
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and a gift. It is implied that the one receiving the blessing gives respect to the 
elder’s authority and commits to ensuring their future well-being. The 
dramatization comprised of a mother giving her son the Dasain blessing (tika) 
and then trying to give the boy a gift.  The boy refused to take the gift and 
retorted, “All I want as a Dasain gift is a constitution. How do you expect me 
to insure the prosperity of our family and country in the future without a 
constitution?” Then the same skit occurred again with a father giving his 
daughter a blessing and her requesting a constitution.  Then everyone came 
on stage and sang a song that stated as the citizens of Nepal we should not 
only ask our leaders for their blessings but for a constitution so we have a 
guideline to invest in them and the state of Nepal.   
Rajeev was very excited that the media had come. He explained to the 
television media that they should broadcast the skit instead of the speeches.  
He asserted that if it was broadcast into the living rooms across Nepal, 
perhaps it would get people thinking about what their priorities should be. He 
then asked me what I thought, did I think it was effective. I wondered allowed 
if people would perceive a logical disjuncture in having the newly 
restructured state symbolically assert itself as the Hindu patriarch.  He 
retorted that it was not a big deal.  He reasoned that everyone celebrates 
Dasain so they will identify with their sentiment. He paused and asserted, 
“We need to make a statement in a way that everyone understands.” Then he 
paused and added, “People understand this, even you understand it. In that 
way it is effective.”199  
                                                
199 Based on an interaction with an ex-NSU (K) student activist at a political program on 
September 19, 2009. 
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Rajeev’s approach differs from that of Akash, who has struggled to get 
beyond the impasse of an entrenched Hindu orientation. They both come from 
the same party, but Rajeev embraces the “dialectics of belonging” in order to 
achieve his ends, youth pressure to effect progress of the constituent assembly. 
He is not critical of the means used towards this end, even if it involves 
referencing traditional forms that some view as obstructing the construction of 
“new Nepal.”  He perceives a new constitution and traditional forms that 
resonate with the public as mutually reinforcing; they both can mobilize 
people toward progress.  Rajeev’s reasoning was that it is better to reference 
what is understandable, but this sort of approach passively reinforces politics 
to be a particular way of life, one that further entrenches the elite political 
culture that has historically thrived as the main stakeholders within the state.   
Conclusion: Erasing Identities 
Raymond Smith argued that what we as researchers see as the problem 
may not be what matters to the actors themselves, when he asserted that a 
“worker’s most common claim is not that he is exploited, but that he is ‘not 
recognized’ and not ‘helped’ by those in power” (1984: 511). Nepali politics is 
about recognition. What I have demonstrated in this chapter is that in order to 
be recognized the citizens must speak, shout, protest, or acquiesce in a way 
that registers. Only then can they be helped or influential in the spheres of 
power.  This chapter analyzes the nature of this dynamic in order to 
understand how high-caste elite politics is continually reinforced even as the 
Nepali political actors attempt to institute an inclusive state. And these 
political actors have sold the citizenry on the democratic principle of voting as 
the basis for their political freedom and expression.  But voting does not 
guarantee equality, what it guarantees is a system; a system is vulnerable to 
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political savvy as much as any other. Nepali history has shown that when this 
system does not suit the elite, then they take to the streets to enforce an active 
democracy. This trend is meant to ensure their role as state brokers while 
obfuscating that they are the police order that dictates the predominant 
political logic. Rather they have the reigns of control on both stages, of 
democracy (during the contentious politics of the āndolan) and post-
democracy (during the restructuring of the state). I now conclude with a 
vignette, which highlights that even though voting often substantiates issues 
of inclusion and political freedom; the action of voting cannot encompass the 
complexities of social inclusion. 
The day had finally come.  There was a ten-year civil war, five years of 
political opposition on the street, and finally the People’s Movement Part Two, 
which united all the stakeholders in agreement for a constituent assembly as 
the way out of the political impasse. For over a year and a half, mass 
movements like the Madheshi movement and small terrorist cells were trying 
to assert their voice so they could either participate or affect the parameters of 
the constituent assembly campaign process. And now in April of 2008 the 
elections were happening.  The sacrifices of every sector culminated in each 
citizen’s one vote to determine the fate of the country.  People were nervous 
that there would be political clashes, sectarian violence, or terrorist 
suppression. No one knew what the results would be or if the multiple 
international monitors would consider it a free and fair election.   
I decided to stay in Kathmandu to observe the elections at the political 
center of Nepal.  I thought it best to start out on foot.  I began my day with my 
regular jog up to Pashupati temple, but that day I stopped at all the polling 
stations along the way.  There were eight between my house and the top of 
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Pashupati temple.  I was going through a few neighborhoods, which would 
allow me to get a sense of how the day might turn out. Will people come to 
the polls early, will they wait to see if it is safe, or will they boycott the polls 
altogether? All of these questions were at the forefront of my mind.  I 
reasoned that I could assess the mood on my run and plan my day 
accordingly. People had indeed come to the polls early, eagerly anticipating 
long lines.  One gentleman said to me, “It is a holiday. Our only obligation is 
to vote, so if we get it done early, we can play cards for the rest of the day.”  
As I was jogging back through Hadigaon, I practically ran into a very 
disgruntled older Newar man who was ranting as he weaved through the 
street.  I asked him what was wrong and he shot back, “This is what they call 
democracy?  This is what the fight has been for?” I looked at him blankly, 
waiting for an explanation.  He said if he was not such a simple person, he 
would suspect a conspiracy, he did not know what to do.  I asked what he was 
talking about, whether someone had barred him from the polls.  He shook his 
head in dismay, explaining that he was not allowed into the polling station 
because he was not on the voter list.  He showed the sector volunteers his 
residency card after they asked him if he was at the right constituency.  He 
was at the correct one.  Then he said they looked at another list and said, 
“According to our census data you died two years ago.” He paused, breathing 
deeply, and then as he shook his residency card at me, he said, “They told me 
I can’t vote because I am dead, but I am alive. Can’t you see, I am alive. There 
have been many times that I was ignored by authority, they had lots of 
excuses but never because I was dead. What is the point of this so-called 
political freedom, can a vote even matter?”  I was so stunned that at first I 
could not respond. I asked him if his family could go and vouch for him or did 
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he know any of the political cadres of his constituency.  He replied, “I am old, 
I have no influence, no political connections. They told me it does not matter 
what my family says, I was on the deceased list, I don’t even have a number.” 
He paused and began kicking the disintegrating curb, then looked up at me 
and said, “If they declare this election free and fair, remember this.  Things are 
never what they appear to be, especially in politics in this country.”200 
The elections were declared free and fair. This man’s experience was 
extreme. Most political activists and media personnel with whom I spoke said 
that this situation was an anomaly; rather, proxy voting was a more regular 
occurrence. In fact it was common knowledge that the political parties, 
particularly the Maoists, were clever enough to figure out who was absent 
from their constituents so that they could arrange people to vote in their place.  
I recall one Maoist student saying to me, “A lot of the young men are in the 
Gulf, being exploited because they have no other choice. We know that they 
support us in sentiment.  And we wanted to make sure that sentiment was 
realized.”201  I conveyed this thought to a Nepali political analyst and 
wondered if it was an admission of proxy voting.  He replied, “All the parties 
did it; the fact that the Maoists did it so systematically and effectively can be 
attributed to their organizational abilities.”202  
 Even though this gentleman’s experience was irregular, it still sheds 
light on the fact that voting is a limited form of political expression, yet it has 
been synonymous with freedom during the years of political struggle in 
Nepal. It is an example of the “radical form of forgetting all about it” that 
                                                
200 Translation of an interaction with a supposedly deceased citizen of Hadigaon, constituent 
number five, 4.10.08. 
201 Translation of an interaction with a Maoist campus leader at Padma Kenya Campus during 
my going-away tea party, 4.16.08. 
202 Interaction with a political analyst who monitored the constituent assembly elections for 
the National Democratic Institute, 4.17.08. 
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Rancière argues occurs when equality is manufactured as the basis that binds 
sovereign people.  
The equality of anyone and everyone becomes the 
immediate effectiveness of a sovereign people, 
itself identical to scientific modeling and 
forecasting operating on an empirical population 
carved up exactly into its parts. The equality of 
anyone and everyone becomes identical to the total 
distribution of the people into its parts and 
subparts. (1999: 105)  
The only thing that is not equal is being dead. Otherwise, the lists are carved 
up and the parties machinated to take advantage of every empirical loophole 
that was possible, and the elections of 2008 were declared free and fair by the 
international world.  
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CHAPTER 6  
THE AESTHETICS OF ORGANIZATION: ORGANIZATIONAL 
PRACTICE, IDEOLOGY, AND IDENTITY 
In order to understand other people’s politics, I think it is not only 
important to analyze people’s ideological categories, but also their practical 
categories like organization. In this regard I take a cue from the political 
anthropology tradition that demonstrated how the structural aspects of 
people’s practice provide a lens into their worldview (Evans-Prichard 1940, 
Leach 1970 [1954]). Focusing on Nepali political actors’ instrumental 
categories allow me to understand their larger shared sense of the political. An 
example of this is the ANNISU (R)’s use of the term “scientific organization,” 
which they referred to in order to convey their sense of what their 
organization entails. As I began to unravel what they meant by this, I realized 
that it represented a larger aesthetic of organization that many of my 
interlocutors focused on. The phrase is a referential composite of a 
complicated number of interrelated factors that they use to define their 
political organization and frame their political identity. The aspects that 
comprise organization weave together the students’ organizational structures 
and day-to-day practices, through which their identity as a political 
organization is articulated. 
In this chapter I analyze the aesthetics of organization in order to 
understand the perpetuation of political party mythos and how they fuel 
Nepali political imaginary. I frame this analysis to address Jan Harris’s 
question regarding the Latourian perspective of organization: “Organizations 
(noun) are sustained by organization (verb). But what are these modes of 
ordering, how are these immanent acts of organization that yield institutions, 
facts, and artifacts to be described?” (2005: 165). I argue that people are 
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invested in a link between ideology and organizational form, as well as 
working styles and lifestyles, which highlight the contradictory nature of the 
larger political mythos that their parties thrive off of.  They attribute these 
connections to institutional culture, which not only provides them an identity 
but also allows them to attribute an identity to others. I have chosen to focus 
on the aesthetics of organization, 203 to reveal their sense of identity by 
specifically focusing on how they frame their organization to me in our 
interactions, because it was a common theme amongst my interlocutors. I 
sensed that their focus on it reflected an anxious gap between how people 
expect things to be and how they actually are. Their obsession with 
organization was their way of reconciling this reality.  
This analysis is meant to inform how shared collective mentalities are 
developed and become a force for political change or establishment of norms 
within and between political generations (Braungert 1986: 219). I draw on 
Tilly’s concept of repertoire, which is meant to explain what political activists 
conceive of as viable options from which to choose their strategies and 
organization-making abilities. Tilly argues that “existing repertoires 
incorporate collectively learned, shared understandings concerning what 
forms of claim making are possible…as well as what consequences different 
possible forms of claim making are likely to produce. They greatly constrain 
the contentious claims political actors make on each other and on agents of the 
                                                
203 It is not my intention to be redundant in my analysis of people’s Marxist or otherwise 
revolutionary theoretical orientation by using a Marxist theoretical perspective as my analytic 
base. Rather, I will analyze the aesthetics of political actors’ theoretical sensibilities and how it 
impacts their sense of who they are and their political orientation in the local context of Nepali 
politics. Put in a different light, I will look at the preferred symbolic associations that influence 
political actors’ organizational forms—what counts as scientific organization and how they 
rationalize it through their everyday practices (Lounsbury and Ventresca 2003, Polletta 2005). 
It is for this reason that I will focus on students’ internal institutional culture. I will analyze 
how the notions of organization impact the internal institutional culture of the student 
organizations and its relationship with its mother organizations. 
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state” (1999: 419). Braungert highlights that repertoires are not stagnant but, at 
the very least, generational or jointly experiential. I consider this from the 
perspective that student activists are in a particularly transitory position, 
learning the repertoires of their superiors and attempting to imbue them with 
contemporary values and social change that they consider necessary. This 
chapter is meant to elucidate the process of changing political values by 
analyzing the generational repertoires that inform them. 
I begin this chapter with an analysis of internal culture. I will define 
what political institutional culture means to student activists before I begin the 
larger analysis of organizational form because the other aspects of 
organizational form are what my interlocutors have identified as the 
components that comprise internal culture. In the second section I will look at 
the components that comprise the internal structures of their organization. 
Political science engages internal processes and organizational structures as 
analytics in order to understand how political institutions go about achieving 
their agendas (Gunther and Diamond 2003; Hachhethu 2002; Katz 1994; 
Lawson 1994; Monroe 2001). Yet it must be acknowledged that the basis for all 
political agendas is political ideology (Panebianco 1988; Prasad 1980; Puri 
1980). Ideology informs the end point. Internal processes and organizational 
structures reveal the means toward that end. But to what degree does the 
ideology inform the processes of everyday political action?  In other words, 
how closely linked are theory and practice? In this section I will unpack the 
place of political ideology, how it informs notions of organization, and how 
the students orient themselves to it as a political and pragmatic concept within 
their institutions. I will also demonstrate how the transition from 
revolutionary group (cadre-based party) to political organization (mass-based 
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party) can stymie a political group. Once in the position of political 
organization, a group must condone tactics of political survival that serve as a 
recursive obstacle to its larger political ends. 
In section three, I analyze why the students emphasize the necessity of 
consistency in their organizational practices. They maintain Nepali political 
organizations have become weakened because of the discrepancy between the 
parties’ political ideological aspirations and their internal practices (working 
styles). Organization ultimately comes down to the age-old struggle between 
theory and practice (Djilas 1957; Doolin and Goolas 1964; Lenin 1920). Within 
the notion of organization there is an insinuation that internal culture and 
ideology should be recursive (Brienes 1989).204 Yet in reviewing Karl Weick’s 
contributions to organizational theory, Barbara Czarniawska connects Weick’s 
establishment of notions like “autopoietic” (self-regulating and self-
reproducing systems) to the realization that “the result of organizing is 
interlocked cycles which can be represented as causal loops rather than a 
linear change of cause and effects” (2005: 269). Section three explores the 
degree to which the discrepancies between ideology and internal practice may 
unintentionally serves as feedback loops that create unanticipated downfalls 
that are perceived by others as negative political culture.  This analysis will 
also include an overview of their hierarchal structures and the degree to 
which hierarchy informs the place of cadre and leader not only in the student 
organizations but also in their institutional relationship with their mother 
party. The last section serves as a case study to demonstrate the potent anxiety 
amongst the students that their political parties have lost touch with the 
                                                
204 In the Nepali context, the more left a party is, the more its practices, agendas, and internal 
procedures will be informed by a theoretical political ideology (Baral 1995; Borre et al 1991; 
Hachhethu 2002; Hoftun et al 2002; Rana 1995; Shrestha 1996). 
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“master frames” that are supposed to anchor their agenda and tactics in order 
to present organizational cohesion (Snow and Benford 1992: 146).  
Differentiating: The Parameters of Political Culture205  
People are invested in the idea of internal culture because it allows 
them to orient themselves to others in different groups.  In politics it is 
inevitable that all the participants must interact, therefore conceptions of 
organizational culture provide a compass that allows the participants to 
navigate the political terrain.  As I will demonstrate, the concept of 
organization is as much about how individuals conduct themselves in their 
institutions, which is their politics, than how the group conducts itself. I will 
be foregrounding this as a link to the coming chapter on governance and 
internal political process. 
Organizational culture is just one example of a social guide that serves 
to identify others. It also provides the parameters from which the participants 
can create their own identity, which is influenced by what they understand 
their organizational culture to be and how they understand others to identify 
it. In other words, institutional culture allows political actors a way to identify 
their place and the place of their group in the larger politics. In a sense it 
                                                
205 It is important to note that I asked various student activists, as well as party cadres and 
political leaders, a series of questions in order to understand the different notions of 
organization. I began my questions by asking people about the notion of organization and the 
role it plays in their student unions and mother organizations, which lead into a question 
about the role of ideology and how ideology impacts the character of the organization. Then I 
inquired about their organization’s internal working styles and what impacts it, then asked 
them to consider the lifestyles of their members. Then I would link all of these questions, 
asking them to consider them in a comparison of their own political organization to others. 
The final question I asked was about internal culture of their organization, specifically what 
informs it and how it plays a role in the identity of their organization. I took the advice of 
some key informants who had suggested I not use the word culture until the end of my series 
of questions in order to avoid leading people. The analysis I make in this chapter is based on 
how my subjects invoked the notion of culture when talking about working styles, lifestyles, 
group dynamics, and organizational character.  Their responses confirmed that the notion of 
internal culture was a useful conceptual tool that encapsulates ideology, working style and 
lifestyle, which manifests through the organizational character.  
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serves as an inner circle the way Bista described in Fatalism and Development, it 
allows people to differentiate between “us and them.” Chantal Mouffe argues 
that this is an essential part of democratic logic, who is a part of the demos 
and who is outside it must be established in order to constitute collective 
political identities (2000: 4, 12). Furthermore, the notion of distinguishing 
between “us and them” is a traditional anthropological theme. As both 
Marilyn Strathern (1988) and Roy Wagner (1975, 1977) have established, 
differentiation is an inevitable result of social interaction, “for such 
differentiation is the very core of their social self-invention” (Wagner 1975: 
121). Another useful way to conceptualize organizational culture is as a 
political niche. The concept of niche has been used to describe the factors that 
shape and maintain boundaries between organizational forms; this is a 
dynamic process of segregating and blending until a unique organizational 
identity is ultimately formed (Hannan and Freeman 1996).  
Furthermore, the larger political culture is informed by the interaction 
of these specific institutional cultures as well as more general cultural 
sensibilities and political history. This point resonates with Janet Borgenson’s 
argument in her essay on Judith Butler’s theoretical approach to organizing 
subjectivities.  In this essay she postulates that within Butler’s theoretical 
frame, “organizational environments serve as contexts for iteration of 
whatever is demanded with such a space, creating and controlling 
subjectivities and relations among these” (2005: 71). It is the organizational 
environments that allow the possibility of mutual recognition.  The aesthetic 
of internal culture that Nepali political actors use to guide themselves through 
the political terrain is similar to what Butler has called the tableaux of 
subjectivity: “Repeated representations, imposed codes of behavior, or 
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organizational cultures endlessly recreate normative values and identities 
which are made available to, constitute, and exist in tandem with the subject 
in contemporary culture.” (2005:71). Or as Rancière has argued about politics, 
“[I]t places it in the regime of the One distributed as parts and roles” (1999: 
64). 
Mutual recognition between actors of political institutions is a 
necessary part of national politics in any representative democracy. Yet it is 
also important to highlight that within the Nepali political institutions 
themselves, the ideal notion of organization is the collapsing of individual 
identities into one unit that serves the ultimate political aim. As I will show in 
this chapter, those who pride themselves on establishing a political institution 
that mirrors their political ideals are most likely to enact an organizational 
sensibility that prioritizes political ideology and aim over individual need.  
Renè ten Bos captures this sentiment in his essay on Agamben’s contributions 
to contemporary organizational theory when he argues, 
Something that Nancy has referred to as 
“immanentism” that is, a political craving for a 
social identity that functions as an absolute horizon 
for those who are going to bear it and that can only 
be achieved by means of myth and sacrifice (Nancy 
1991: 12; 56-7; Nancy 2002: 74) and if the bourgeois 
accepts his or her “proper being-thus” not as 
belonging to an identity but as a “singularity 
without identity,” then and only then might there 
be a chance that this bourgeois will “enter into a 
community without presuppositions and without 
subjects” ([Agamben] 1993a: 65). (205: 22) 
Therefore, the role that culture plays in organizational theory may seem like a 
contradictory role if one considers all that it incorporates: differentiation 
within the process of mutual recognition that occurs between institutions, that 
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on an internal level is meant to be collapsed in order to strengthen the external 
image and agenda of each institution. This contradiction indicates that the 
way in which actors understand culture as it applies to political organizations 
is simultaneously based on the insertion of oneself into an organization as well 
as the collective action of insertion into Nepali politics. 
It is important to establish that culture in the context of Nepali politics 
is differently categorized than culture amongst ethnic groups or religious 
groups. Institutional political culture is a manifestation of identifiable factors 
like ideology, working style, individual characteristics, hierarchy, and a 
particular history that is shared by the group. People may consider these 
factors as aspects of other types of culture, yet they would not identify them in 
a deconstructive, critical manner; rather, they treat their own culture and, at 
least conceptually, other’s culture with reverence for it as reified tradition. 
Within politics, there is more awareness that political culture is constructed 
within a history and is continually changing or open to change. When they 
identify the aspects of culture or, in Nepali, sanskriti, they regard those aspects 
as the essence of tradition, not something that can be extracted or 
manipulated. The aspects of political culture, on the other hand, are identified 
in order to be judged and restructured for the benefit of the institution—in 
other words, to serve a political end.  
When I asked people about institutional culture, I used the Nepali 
word, sanskriti, yet more often than not people would respond using the 
English word “culture.”  They would tack back and forth using the word 
sanskriti to describe religious and ethnic traditional ways of life, while using 
the English word “culture” to describe internal institutional culture.  This 
tendency did not surprise me because many of the student politicians are 
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sociology or political science majors.  They have a social scientific 
understanding of culture that they associate with the English word that differs 
from sanskriti. The social scientific explanations that they came to learn in the 
classroom are based on culture as a constructed concept, something that is 
objective, which can be studied and identified. The students’ analyses of their 
own and other parties’ institutional cultures were, in this sense, academic. 
Another thing that marks the difference between sanskriti and 
institutional culture is that my interlocutors demonstrated a capacity to be 
critical of political culture without being fundamentally critical of those who 
engage it. They are able to objectify it and disassociate it from the actors in 
order to analyze it, whereas being critical of others’ sanskriti is to be critical of 
not only the people of that culture but their lineage as well. Political actors 
engage in this type of assessment for both their own institutional practices and 
others.  For instance, a leader from a smaller left student organization told me, 
While our culture is exposed to the society or to 
other organizations, we have to assess whether 
others like or dislike our culture [English]. What I 
mean by culture is the accumulative form of our 
working style and interaction with each other and 
society. If the people outside don’t like our styles 
we need to change them. For instance, imagine that 
we are presenting our culture as revolutionaries. 
But if the people do not like it, naturally we needed 
to bring changes in our styles.206 
As this quote demonstrates, political actors can engage in detached reflection 
of their organization in ways that are rarely done when considering their own 
or others’ ethnic or religious identities in this way. The constructedness of the 
organization is an obvious attribute; their very survival as an organization is 
                                                
206 Excerpt from interview with ANNFSU (Ekikrit) student leader, 11.10.07.   
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impacted by how they present themselves and how they are perceived. It is a 
reflexive endeavor that is constantly negotiating meaning and struggling over 
agenda or direction, a continual act of disagreement. 
In this sense, Nepali political actors have a bifurcated view of culture 
similar to Roy Wagner’s critique of anthropologists in The Invention of Culture 
when he wrote, “And in analyzing the phenomenon of intention from the 
viewpoint of the actor, it has been necessary to regard the conventions of his 
culture—what is understood to be ‘innate’ as opposed to what is seen as the 
‘artificial’ realm of human manipulation—as relatively static” (1975: 103). To 
people of other sectors, political actors may not appear to be too discerning 
between invention and convention, but as they have demonstrated in their 
responses to me, there is an awareness. It is through inter-organization 
interaction that they are continually contesting and negotiating the meanings 
and assumptions about how they are perceived. In speaking about this, people 
are not fatalistic about organizational culture. They do not believe they are 
destined to be a part of a particular organization, and people recognize their 
free will in being participants, despite the fact that their political associations 
very often reflect their more general social network. In this regard, there is a 
paradox in the way they objectify institutional culture and how they fit into it, 
creating their social connections and identities to be based upon their 
organization. 
Even though institutional culture is regarded differently than sanskriti, 
it is still informative of how people build society, make social connections, and 
interact with one another. In describing political culture to me, a political 
analyst said the following: 
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First of all, political culture encompasses a lot of 
things. It has an impact on everything. Our 
institutional culture plays the most significant role 
in our varying ideologies and perspectives in the 
political realm. What I do largely depends on the 
society in which I grew up. It depends upon the 
norms and culture of my society. In the context of 
politics, my own culture evolves depending on 
how, where, and with whom I become adjoined. It 
is similar to the more general concept of culture, it 
is accumulative in the long process of living, and it 
finally carves the character of a person. Our diverse 
views have to be acknowledged and respected in 
the realm of politics... If people approach politics 
with this in mind, then they can understand that 
accommodations should occur; give and take must 
be done. 207 
Some would argue that his explanation of culture pretty classically captures 
the Nepali understanding of sanskriti within Nepali society.  Since the creation 
of the modern Nepali nation-state, there has been an acknowledgement of the 
different cultures and identities that exists within its borders. It is an 
unavoidable tradition to identify difference and then figure out how to relate 
with one another despite hierarchy and conflicting views. It makes logical 
sense that people would apply the same reasoning to the diverse landscape of 
politics and define justice as everyone compromising for inclusion that 
represents the diversity within Nepali society. After all, politics is the venue in 
which societal justice is negotiated. 
As I have previously mentioned, the politically active students link 
ideology, working style, and lifestyle as integral to their institutional culture, 
although it is important to note that ideological orientation impacts how 
students prioritize these different aspects in the composition of their own 
culture and how they understand the ratio in other political institutions. For 
                                                
207 Excerpt from interview with independent political analyst who was serving as a Maoist- 
appointed minister, 11.19.07.  
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instance, the leftist students with whom I spoke focus more on working style 
and political agenda being the most crucial aspect that shapes institutional 
culture, particularly when it came to their own internal culture. A Maoist 
student explained to me, “style and culture are more or less sides of the same 
coin.”208 For them working style is the manifestation of the two symbiotic 
tenets of their institution: their ideology and their political agenda.  It is for 
this reason that their culture is defined by their working style. On the opposite 
end of the spectrum, NSU does not hold their working style in high priority 
because they do not have a unified style; what binds them is their history of 
fighting for democracy, a fight that is even an internal struggle.  
Yet it is important to highlight that regardless of how working style is 
prioritized as an aspect of institutional culture, it is not the first thing they 
consider when defining other student organizations’ culture.  Rather, students 
often cite the characteristics of the cadres as what impacts other organizations’ 
culture. As one female ANNFSU student put it, “The internal styles and the 
culture are reflected in the character of its leaders and the cadres.”209 The NSU 
students are the most likely to recognize that the character of their students 
and how they interact with one another as what affects their culture.  After all, 
if your organization is dictated by personal fiefdoms, then charisma and 
personality are determining factors in how individuals rank in the nepotistic 
hierarchy.  One student critically told me, 
The way the cadres of an organization act 
determines the overall culture of the organization. 
We have developed such a culture that one must 
hold a position, serve one’s interest, and create 
disputes in order to achieve all this. While doing 
this, the activities of the organization cannot go 
                                                
208 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, 11.12.07.  
209 Translated excerpt of an ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee member’s interview, 11.25.07.  
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ahead smoothly. Our culture undermines us. For 
instance, if we passed through the Central 
Committee an edict that we would stop drinking 
alcohol or smoking, there would be a ninety 
percent chance we would fail in implementing 
what we have decided. If we decided that we 
would start wearing simple dress there is ninety 
five percent chance that we would fail to 
implement it. The main reason behind this is the 
individualistic attitude that has developed 
amongst us. Not implementing such measures 
indicates the tolerance for individual freedom in 
our organization. That defines us. It helps to attract 
many students to our organization. But the 
negative aspect is that since individuality is 
prioritized we cannot reach the students or people 
in a unified way. Our strength has disintegrated.210 
This student’s critique demonstrates the difficulty in balancing discipline and 
individual freedom. This begs the question, do these students smoke, drink, or 
prioritize fashion to exercise individual freedom or to be a part of the group?  
From the outside, it is aspects like these that come to characterize NSU culture 
as a group. 
When I asked a leftist student leader from a smaller organization about 
the relationship between an organization’s working style and its overall 
agenda and ideology, he responded in a way that encapsulated a lot of what 
people cite as the two differing values that are held by student organizations, 
discipline and freedom. He made this point not when I had asked about 
culture, but when I asked him to address working style, agenda, and ideology.  
But he immediately put it in the context of culture.  He said, 
Of course, it differs on the basis of the culture 
[English] that a cadre has come from and what has 
been taught to him...You might have seen that the 
style of the student organization affiliated to the 
Maoist is different than other organizations. They 
                                                
210 Translated excerpt of an NSU (D) central committee president’s interview, 11.28.07. 
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are militant. Their background is that they have 
taken up the arms in the past. The respective 
culture might have an impact in other student 
organizations as well. If the leaders in the high 
positions of the party abuse others, are not 
disciplined in what they consume, and inspire 
gangsterism, obviously it will have an impact on 
the lower level of the organization. These are some 
of the differences in the working styles of the 
organizations. The ideology is on one factor, but 
the behavior changes the ideology. An 
organization could not be effective if its ideology 
and practice don’t match each other.211 
The Maoists would not be insulted by the description that they are militants.  
In fact, they pride themselves on it.  Their militarism is something that marks 
them and their dedication to class struggle.  They see it as living according to 
their ideology as well as creating internal solidarity. They cherish their own 
consistency as a strength they have over other parties. 
On the other hand, students of other organizations are very suspicious 
of what they call the lack of freedom that the Maoists propound. They dismiss 
them as militants212 who have opted for violence rather than more socially 
acceptable ways to oppose the system—ways that are not only fighting for 
political justice but that allow existence of all political views.  One charismatic 
NSU student leader had a powerful line in his speech during the constituent 
assembly election campaign that always drew enthusiasm from the crowd.  
He would say, “I do not agree with Prachanda’s politics, but I will fight to the 
                                                
211 Translated excerpt of an ANNFSU (Ekikrit) student leader’s interview, 11.10.07.   
212 They do not describe them as revolutionaries because all student activists consider 
themselves revolutionaries since they all have struggled for their political existence.  As I 
demonstrated in Chapter three, this claim is rhetorically mobilized in political speeches by all 
political stripes because it gives people a sense of pride that they have a history to stand up 
and fight against the system.  It blurs the boundaries of what is considered politically left and 
politically right in a poor country where people tend to be attracted to radical political 
philosophy.  
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death for his right to do politics that I don’t agree with.”213 This student’s 
statement highlights the Nepali Congress’s commitment to political freedom 
within the political mainstream. Yet the Nepali Congress is wary that the 
Maoist sense of discipline and militarism jeopardizes their claimed core value, 
political freedom. They were willing to let allow the Maoists into the political 
mainstream but they worry about the Maoists’ potential to undermine 
democracy.  
But ultimately this sense of freedom has stymied Nepali Congress. As 
the results of the constituent assembly elections have indicated, their freedom 
has become so endemic that they cannot even organize their party enough to 
be competitive against the Maoists in a democratic election. The general public 
recognizes that democracy and individual freedom are rhetoric for the 
democratically oriented parties.  They thrive on the ethos of political freedom 
because that is what they see as their ability to survive. Yet the democracy that 
they have struggled for has never been internally instituted.  An ANNFSU 
(Akhil) student leader predicted another party’s downfall because they were 
not able to create an internal culture that realized their political rhetoric. She 
said,  
The most important thing for us to know is how 
democratic a person’s practice is despite the fact 
that he advocates in favor of democracy. For 
instance, if I talk loudly about democratic practice 
but I am despotic in the internal practices within 
the organization, how can that organization be 
democratic? Therefore, what agendas one 
advocates in different forums should be an integral 
part of his organizational and political life. For 
instance, in an organization like ours as well, the 
President assumes more power. But if the 
                                                
213 Translated excerpt from constituent assembly speech given by an ex-NSU (K) student 
leader and current constituent assembly member, 2.23.08. 
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President cannot be democratic and cannot accept 
others’ existence, the organization can’t be 
considered democratic. An organization will 
obviously be good if its leaders practice a 
democratic exercise, listen to the views of the other 
members, and develop common understanding 
among them. It will make the organization run 
within a system. In comparison to other student 
organizations, our student organization is 
systematic and practices a collective decision-
making process. This is our claim and this is the 
truth.214  
Her student organization and the respective political party, the CPN-UML, are 
considered to be the ideological middle ground between the Maoists and 
Nepali Congress. They are a communist organization that has accepted and 
engaged in multi-party democratic politics since 1990.  They are able to make 
critiques like this because they have the historical precedent of embracing 
democracy over the Maoists and are also less guilty of the democratic double 
speak than the Nepali Congress (although they are not as internally 
democratic as they claim). Regardless, her point is that a group’s action must 
be consistent with the ideological claims they make in order to be regarded as 
valid by the public.215  If they are not, it will ultimately weaken them in the 
democratic process that many national and international actors regard as the 
appropriate means to rebuild the state.  
                                                
214 Translated excerpt of an ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee member’s interview, 11.26.07.  
215 Translated excerpt of an ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee member’s interview, 11.25.07: 
“If we did not follow the internal working style of our organization, we could no longer exist 
in that organization. If our organization is strong and we behave maintaining secrecy of the 
organization, the same type of culture will develop. The school and campus level students can 
obtain a lot of advantages. If the [student] organization has good style and culture the 
students in the schools and the colleges will follow it. The internal styles and the culture are 
reflected in the character of its leaders and the cadres. If the [student] organization has a good 
working style and internal culture, it helps the cadres and leaders win the election and vice 
versa. For instance, if groups were formed in the center, the same would happen from top to 
bottom and groups would arise even in the Preliminary Committee. If the center is disciplined 
and it can maintain secrecy, the same character will be reflected in the lower levels.”    
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Finally, one thing that should be noted is that institutional culture is not 
devoid of other cultural influences. An institution is made up of like-minded 
individuals who have decided that the group form is a better means to 
accomplish their ends than an individual approach.216 As the political analyst 
whom I previously cited argued, culture is the materialization of the norms 
and value of the society one has grown up within.  For some the norms and 
values are predominantly ideological; for others it represents networks and 
maintaining or maximizing their place in a traditional caste-based society. 
Indeed, people are most often drawn to political organizations that suit their 
character and values.  This becomes blurred because of the very existence of 
things like student organizations or political indoctrination of youth; if one 
develops into an individual within a political organization, there is a higher 
likelihood that their character will match that of the organization.  One female 
ANNFSU (Akhil) student’s explanation of why she chose ANNFSU (Akhil) 
with resonates this point: 
Its activities are seen as different than the others’ 
activities. In the school level, one can distinguish 
the different characteristics among students who 
belong to different organizations. One group has 
the honest and studious students, whereas the 
other group had the students with the reverse 
characteristics. This distinction lied in the thinking 
pattern, getting together with friends, and simple 
living versus the students who have a pompous 
lifestyle. I was raised to oppose such a lifestyle. 
Also, the training that I obtained from student 
                                                
216 This point may seem to undermine my earlier point when I distinguished between sanskriti 
and culture. I argued that people were less fatalistic about institutional culture despite the fact 
that they often end up surrounded by political cadres that are of the same class and caste 
background as them.  Herein lies a paradox: since politics is not a prescribed birthright for 
most, it is not treated fatalistically even though for many they don’t stray too far from the 
political lineage of their forefathers.  
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leaders and my family background also helped me 
to choose ANNFSU (Akhil).217  
It is for this reason that I highlight the larger connections to Nepali cultural 
trends and dynamics when I am analyzing the structural dimensions of 
institutional culture and organization form. The elements of Nepali culture 
that get translated into political culture end up re-entrenching the place of 
politics in the dominant Nepali culture, in which political culture represents a 
very narrow yet influential slice of the dominant cultural landscape. This 
dynamic is indicative of why certain aspects of political culture become part of 
the norm and others are left out, which is particularly important to consider at 
the crossroads of restructuring the Nepali state to be more inclusive. 
 
Figure 21: Primary School Children at a Maoist Rally,  
Tundikhel, Kathmandu 2006 
                                                
217Translated excerpt of an ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee member, 11.25.07. 
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Institutional Culture: The Role of Theory in Practice  
We have the organizational life but we have very little personal life.218 
-Maoist student activist 
There is a distinct narrative concerning the role of organization in the 
Nepali political culture that at times seems contradictory, but when it is 
considered in the larger political context and the different informing factors 
are deconstructed, it can be understood as an interesting combination of 
political expectation and idealism that is used to place oneself and level others 
in the political playing field. Political ideology and the role of individual 
personalities are the two things that impact internal institutional culture in 
varying degrees in all political parties (Harmal and Janda 1995; Khanal 1995; 
Putnam 1976; Randall 1988).  In the Nepali context, it is well understood that 
the degree to which parties are informed by these two elements correlates 
with their political orientation. The more left a party is, the more their 
practices, agendas, and internal procedures will be informed by a theoretical 
political ideology (Baral 1995; Borre et. al 1991; Hachhethu 2002; Hoftun et. al 
2002; Rana 1995; Shrestha 1996).  The more mass-based a party is, the more 
their practices, agendas, and internal procedures are informed by particular 
personalities as well as personal network dynamics. Nonetheless, these two 
aspects exist in all the parties, that play into the larger arena of inter- and 
intra-party competition (Hachhethu 2000; Paramanand 1982).  
Party activists, students, and general citizens take both of these aspects, 
ideology and personal network dynamics, into consideration when they 
choose, claim, or reject political affiliation (Sharma & Sen 1999). In this section, 
I will provide a detailed description of how people talk about these two 
                                                
218 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member, 11.12.07.  
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different aspects of organization and how they inform each other within the 
student organizations’ internal structures. Furthermore, I will demonstrate 
how the different concepts of organization are mobilized in order to exert 
political pressure, which leaves actors vulnerable to political anxiety based on 
idealistic expectations of how these two aspects should be balanced in a 
healthy party structure.  
It is important to begin by highlighting that the aesthetic basis of 
organization has as much to do with clarity and consistency, as it has to do 
with behavioral or theoretical discipline. In her article on Karl Weick’s 
theoretical approach to organizational studies, Barbara Czarniawska points 
out that in traditional organizational studies, the “notion of ‘uncertainty’ [is] 
understood as a negative state that must be eradicated for organizing to take 
place” (2005: 269). Weick’s work, she argues, has amply proven that 
“[W]hereas, organizing is an effort to deal with ambiguity, it never completely 
succeeds. Furthermore, the ordering it involves is a complex and inherently 
ambiguous process of sense-making rather than that of imposing the rules of 
rationality on a disorderly world” (269-270). For Nepali political actors this 
sense-making involves creating party identities that are consistent with the 
party philosophy with which people can recognize and associate.  A CPN-
UML219 leader described it to me in this way:  
                                                
219 The Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) is the largest mass- 
based communist party in Nepal.  It is the only communist party to have gained the prime 
ministership during the years of multi-party democracy 1990-2001.  It is considered right of 
the CPN (Maoists), supporting multi-party democracy with a socialist structure without the 
use of violence against the state.  During the late nineties, the Maoists gained a lot of support 
from people who were previously loyal to the CPN-UML. They had become disillusioned 
with the CPN-UML after their government rule because they failed to impact a state structure 
along radical ideological lines. The Maoists offered a more radical approach for these people 
to adopt that CPN-UML had seemed to abandon in order to do party politics (Hachhethu 
2009).  
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The ideological base of the party has to be 
predictable. Even one who is not involved in the 
party should be able to know what the party’s 
ideological base is and understand the party’s 
destination. Thus, the party should be committed 
to a defined ideological base. On the one hand, 
there should be the cultural base that is determined 
by that ideological base. On the other hand, it is 
said that this is the party of the proletariat class but 
the entire lifestyle [of the party leaders and 
cadres]–clothing, foods, and other behavior–is 
more similar to the capitalist class! How can these 
contradictions exist together?...We are trying to 
develop the party away from this direction. Thus it 
[the party] should have a defined ideological base, 
an ideological basis that other people can 
recognize, with a cultural identity that suits that 
ideology. They should be consistent with one 
another.220 
A Maoist student leader articulated a similar view when he said this of the 
Prachanda Path:221 “It is not just a slogan or a movement that we do 
theoretically. We live it both as an organization and as a lifestyle.”222 People 
connect having a lifestyle that is consistent with the party ideology with party 
image. Image does not merely imply how the party distinguishes itself nor 
how it is recognized, but how the party members project their own degree of 
commitment to their perceived political cause. This is not only influenced by 
leftist sensibilities of discipline but also based in a South Asian political 
sensibility of piety in all action, one closely linked to the ascetic sense that I 
analyzed in chapter two. Since politics is a public process, those who engage it 
live their lives under public scrutiny. People do not assess a party merely by 
                                                
220 Translated excerpt of a CPN-UML central committee member’s interview, taken on 1.14.07. 
221 Prachanda is the chairman of the Maoist party.  He came out with a declaration in 1998 
called the Prachanda Path, which he claims to be the Maoist trajectory in Nepal. It is an 
extension of Mao’s political philosophies and teachings that he has appropriated for the 
cultural, social, and economic conditions of Nepal.  
222 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, taken on 
1.8.07. 
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its party line but by the action, lifestyle, and consumption levels of its 
members.223  
When I was speaking to some Maoist students about the differences 
between the ANNISU (R) students and students from the other student 
organizations, the first thing they identified was the strict discipline of their 
organization.  One student said it was like “eating iron churaa (beaten rice).”224 
She admitted this was not merely for the betterment of the organization but 
also to maintain the image of their organization. Her partner expanded by 
saying, “If you are truly dedicated to your organization, then its image and 
agenda means more than your own success—this is where sacrifice comes 
from.  We do it not merely for the organization but because we believe that it 
is through ANNISU (R) that we can best fulfill the needs of the country.”225 
After their explanations, I was reminded of people’s reaction to how the havoc 
at the two NSU’s.226  People looked at their inability to carry out a smooth 
convention as indicative of the weaknesses of the political party system. This 
perceived anxiety has been documented in sociological studies that focus on 
political action groups that are classified as “organized anarchies.” Such 
organizations calculate their solutions and choices upon what is readily 
available to them within a given situation rather than long-term systematic 
analysis (Minkoff and McCarthy 2005: 300). This does not bode well for 
political organizations that must maintain a base and are expected to work for 
that base. In Nepal, the unease with this type of organizational anarchy is 
                                                
223 This is something I explore in further detail in chapter two in my analysis of politics as 
social service. 
224 Translated excerpt of a ANNISU (R) female campus leader’s interview, taken on 6.28.07. 
225 ANNISU (R) Padma Kenya campus leader’s interview, taken on 7.7.07. 
226 NSU (Nepal Student Union) is affiliated with the largest mainstream democratic 
organization, the Nepali Congress.  From 2001 to 2007 there was a split in Nepali Congress 
due to personal strife.  In October 2007, this split was reconciled and the party re-emerged in 
order to increase its competitiveness in the Constituent Assembly Elections.  
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articulated not only in people’s frustrations with the lack of clear-cut agendas 
but also the damage control measures taken by the political parties.  
Even though the parties vary in terms of their agendas, they are all very 
clear about their party platform: to represent the people. How they do so may 
differ, the democratic parties claim to struggle for the people’s democratic 
freedom whereas the leftist parties are more encompassing, but nonetheless 
their agendas are based on serving the people. For instance, the Prachanda 
Path is not understood as one man’s manifesto but as a just manifesto based 
on the needs of the Nepali people and their situation. A Maoist student 
explained it to me in this way when he was trying to convince me why the 
Maoists would be victorious in the constituent assembly elections:  
The ideology of our party is the one that is most 
closely related to the people. The ideological and 
organizational subject matters that the party has 
raised are of the people. Because of all this, the 
relationship with the party and people is like that 
of a nail and the flesh. The party takes the 
initiatives in an organizational form to solve the 
people’s problems. Without the people, the party 
would not be formed and the people’s problems 
will not be solved without the party. Therefore, 
they have a very close relationship. They are 
complementary to each other. That is why there 
exists no contradiction between the beauty of 
elevating justice and revolt and revolution; there is 
a deep and continuous relationship between them, 
just like the relationship between the party and 
people [author’s emphasis].227  
For the Maoists, political action is justified as a dialectic based on the people’s 
needs.  Yet that is not enough: one must be explicit, consistent, and organized 
on the theoretical level, but also it must unambiguously translate on the 
practical level. In their political motivation, they must show that they are 
                                                
227 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, 1.8.07. 
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organized for the people. A Maoist student described how scientific 
revolution is different in this way: “We don't need to pray to God, rather we 
believe in ourselves and have the faith that we have the support of the people 
because all we do is based on their needs.”228  In people’s articulations there is 
a fine balance between being scientifically organized in their political ideology 
and recognizing the inspiration for those theories in the first place, the people.  
Rancière has argued, “Ideology is a name for the endlessly decried gap 
between words and things, the conceptual connector that organizes the 
junctions and disjunctions between the components of the modern political 
apparatus” (1999: 85-86). The Maoists call this class struggle, yet Rancière has 
shown that the united ideological form of class struggle glosses over the 
nuances of the exploitation that inspired it in order to sustain the common 
agenda (ibid). In other words, even though the Maoists aim for a 
revolutionary politics that is in line with Rancière’s definition of 
politics⎯politics that question the order of things through their endeavor to 
unearth exploitation and inequality via class struggle and raising class 
consciousness⎯their sensibility of scientific organization suppresses internal 
politics and their ideological militancy glosses over the differences within 
their organization. 
Before continuing, it is important that I elaborate on this point. Through 
my conversations with people, it became apparent to me that the general 
understanding of organization in Nepali political culture is ideology and how 
one balances ideology with practice, lifestyle, group dynamics, and hierarchy.  
One student said it quite simply: “Thoughts and theory guide people. Those 
who are devoid of thoughts and theory are worthless. Man is a social animal 
                                                
228 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, 10.12.07. 
   248 
and he is associated with one or another philosophy; it is how we interact in 
the world and with other people.”229  Here I will compare two students’ 
thoughts on this matter in order to show how the role of ideology in 
organizational form translates into different notions of organization and 
people’s own understanding of their own organization.  The first thought I 
will consider is the Maoist student president’s response when I asked him 
about the concept of organization in a political institution. He responded, 
While talking about the concept of organization in 
a political party, we have to understand the 
interrelationship between ideology and practice. 
When ideology remains just as an ideology, 
without practice, it becomes raw, ideal, and 
hollow. If it (the ideology) is utilized as a way of 
life then it becomes real… On effectiveness, first of 
all one has to individually become competent in 
thinking, be creative and have discussions. Then 
they have to be able to progress from debate based 
on shared organizational commitment. Then there 
should be the representation of youths’ sentiments 
and the representation of their way of thinking and 
their creative-pan (in English) way of thinking. If 
this could happen in an institution then it will be 
an institution in its real sense and it would drive 
the political power in an organized way.230 
It is generally acknowledged that the Nepali Congress does not have such a 
clear ideological basis for their organization, which is why they do not have 
such a tight organizational structure but rather resemble an umbrella group 
for many factions.  An NSU student put this into context for me when he 
explained, 
Our party [NC] was established in order to obtain 
a mission – to overthrow the Ranas. An ideology 
was adopted to obtain this mission. People got 
                                                
229 Translated excerpt of an ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee member’s interview, 11.25.07. 
230 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee leader’s interview, 10.12.07.  
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indoctrinated and invested in that ideology; it 
involved democratic, political freedom. But in the 
latter days, I don’t think a person who comes to 
join our organization understands our organization 
in that sense. We don’t really tell our new member 
of our mission and ideology while taking him in. 
We focus on the specific interests of a student 
while distributing our membership. For an 
instance, while giving membership to a new 
member in Tri- Chandra college we try to 
understand the issues, concerns, and interests of 
the students. It means we focus on local issues. The 
same thing happens in the case of a constituency 
area. The people in a particular constituency 
calculate their benefits and losses and leaders try to 
convince the people that they would be more 
secure if he was their patron. We don’t extend our 
organization by giving members full introduction 
to the party with its principles and mission. The 
continued distortion of our mission for individual 
purpose has made it seem as if “this is the true 
form of the organization.” Now we have forgotten 
why we needed to establish as a party. Slowly, it so 
happened and that is what we have become.231  
The contrast between these two statements shows that different senses of 
organization come down to degrees of deliberation.  The Maoists and leftist 
parties are more deliberative in how they organize because they have a clear-
cut ideology that they believe they must base their organizational style upon.  
There is a historical lineage that sets the precedent for this basis: Leninism, 
Stalinism, and Maoism. There are mistakes that have already been made that 
they can learn from like that of the Sendero Luminoso or the Khmer Rouge, 
which the Prachanda Path claims to have taken into consideration. Rather, 
when an ideological basis, like that of Nepali Congress, sets political freedom 
as its aim, then the organization is bound to become diluted. If one defines 
organization on the basis of a Maoist student’s definition—“Organization is a 
                                                
231 Translated excerpt of an NSU (K) ex-central committee leader’s interview, 11.16.07.  
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means of unifying individuals for a common goal…with a sense of sacrifice 
and devotion to solve the issues the members are facing”232 —then the Nepali 
Congress is not an organization. Yet internally they do politics, as Rancière 
has established: “For politics, the fact that the people are internally divided is 
not, actually, a scandal to be deplored. It is the primary condition of the 
exercise of politics. There is politics from the moment there exists the sphere of 
appearance of a subject, the people, whose particular attribute is to be 
different from itself, internally divided” (1998:87). People say the basis of the 
Nepali Congress as an organization is political freedom, but over the years it 
has become an alternative power structure in which people could further their 
own ends, and that individual pursuit has been respected on the basis of 
individual freedom. This freedom is a core value of the Nepali Congress that 
keeps them at the same time united yet internally divided.  They are quick to 
contrast themselves with the leftists, saying, “In the Communist student 
organization the students follow the limitation outlined by the party. Thus, 
their human rights are violated and their freedom of expression is curtailed. In 
NSU, one can enjoy the freedom of expression. NSU regards freedom and 
every individual’s existence.”233  
If an organization is the cumulative form of the individual characters 
involved in it, then this is how the political organizations differ.  The members 
understand their respective organization based on the organizational mission, 
how clear-cut it is and the degree to which it dictates the member’s own life. 
This boils down to the difference between a commonality of shared values and 
the commonality of a shared agenda.  The Maoists have proven that a shared 
                                                
232 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, 11.12.07.  
233 Translated excerpt of an NSU (D) central committee student leader’s interview, 11.28.07.  
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agenda or mission will define an organization more directly than shared 
values.  
As I have demonstrated, people value sound ideology as the organizing 
principle of their party, and the lack there of is often cited as the explanation 
of why parties weaken. There is a belief that more radically leftist parties like 
the Maoists prioritize party agenda and that ideology is the glue that unites 
and sustains the party despite the different class, caste, gender, and 
generational perspectives that the members are coming from. Their ideology is 
also what erases the difference amongst them; it keeps internal politics at bay 
because it does not allow for disagreement. A Maoist party leader explained it 
to me in this way: 
The UML is also heading towards disintegration. 
The main reason behind this is the lack of 
ideological development. The Communist Party 
has to run on the basis of ideology, the lack of 
which the party gets divided. Once the party 
becomes unable to develop its ideology, it will run 
according to an individual, and his prestige comes 
to the forefront rather than cadres giving priority 
to the organization and ideology. The individual 
interests go ahead in a non-restricted way. This is 
why splits take place. Political agendas get made 
according to personal agendas rather than 
according to ideology that is formed according to 
the needs of the people. We have seen that this is 
where some of the biggest social contradictions 
have been born.234  
Most parties disparage and dismiss the solidarity of other parties based on 
this idea that personality often ends up dictating party agenda, which results 
in disputes over how loyal parties stay to their party line. In Nepali political 
history, vying personal agendas have created dissent that has repeatedly 
                                                
234 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, taken on 
11.4.07. 
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factionalized parties. Many of my informants claim the role of ideology is to 
keep the party unified and on track, to break traditional social roles in order to 
unite with the masses in a common class struggle (Neupane 2005). In times 
when personal ambition trumped ideology, there is both factionalization but 
also the unraveling of a unified, clear-cut political agenda.  
It is commonly admitted that the Maoists have been able to overcome 
personal agendas more so than other parties because of their party structure.  
They are not a mass-based democratic party but have been a revolutionary 
party that is cadre-based.  Their appeal is their ideology. Their approach is not 
to convince people that their ideology is the best one available to suit the 
needs of the individual voters, but rather a truth, which is realized through 
raising the consciousness of the masses. Similar to the CPN-M, the CPN-UML 
used to be a cadre-based party, but since 1990, they too became mass-based. 
This transition occurred during the exercise of parliamentary democracy.  The 
CPN-UML had to win votes.  What the Maoist leader diagnosed as the CPN-
UML straying from their ideological roots, democrats see as them having to 
appeal to the public on a broader scope. The CPN-UML serves as an 
interesting case study that elucidates the points I raise here. Since the CPN-
UML has become a mass- based party, it has suffered from factional splits that 
were largely attributed to personal disputes, and their political agendas have 
become less clear, seeming to stray from the political ideology they claim, 
which has led to the fraying of their constituent base. 
The correlation between mass-based parties and the prevalence of 
leadership personality cults and factional networks or cadres-based parties’ 
connection to ideology, is based on how leadership receives its mandate and 
rises through the ranks in a party.  In the CPN-Maoist and ANNISU (R) one is 
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promoted through proven dedication to party political ideology, not voting. 
The cadres don’t question their leaders’ ability or mandate because they trust 
they have progressed according to their theoretical acumen and ideological 
dedication. The president of the ANNISU (R) highlighted it as a difference in 
priority, whether an organization focuses first on leadership formation or on 
political discussion. The Maoist students claim to build their road map 
through deliberation. They know that they understand politics in a similar 
way when they are unanimous in how to proceed with their agenda. Other 
student organizations focus more on leadership formation, and the leaders are 
the ones who decide which agendas and how to push them forward. The 
ANNISU (R) president cited the student organizations’ national conventions 
as an example of this. He said other student organizations took three to eight 
days to campaign and less than a half a day to discuss their political agenda 
and proposals.  The ANNISU (R), on the other hand, spent four days on 
political discussion and less than half a day on choosing leadership.  He 
claimed that this is why the Maoist students more thoroughly understand 
ANNISU (R)’s agendas and the proper implementation compared to other 
student activists. ANNISU (R) students participate in the in-depth discussion 
on how to craft their agenda; it is through this process that they learn party 
ideology and cultivate ideological dedication. These discussions do not end 
until there is understanding amongst everyone that their program is according 
to the true spirit of their political ideology.  
In the mass-based parties, people progress by receiving endorsement 
from political networks and gaining popularity with their constituents. But in 
the same fashion they can also lose this popular mandate or challenge others 
in order to maintain it, so there is more intense competition and a lot less 
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stability in how one progresses in the political party structure of a mass-based 
organization. Nepali political actors sense the correlation between sustainable 
party structures and organization. An ANNISU (R) student said to me, “An 
election that does not establish clear ideology and an agenda, cannot lead the 
movement in its real sense. Our movement is not merely concerned with 
shouting slogans but action; we don’t only do movements but also foresee 
where they must end and give conclusions for how to address problems.”235 In 
other words, if a political institution’s ultimate purpose is to serve the people, 
then lack of institutional organization and a clear agenda atrophies its ability 
to be effective.  
As I observed all the student organizations’ national conventions, a 
recurring theme was the frustration due to the lack of organization on the part 
of the leaders but there was also a latent anxiety about the political uncertainty 
and how it impacted people’s and their institution’s ability to be organized at 
such a definitive political moment. Student activists’ anxiety came from the 
realization that if their disorganization stymies them, then the organization 
that the Maoist student organization is known to possess will result in 
successful implementation of their political agenda and the future of “new 
Nepal” will be determined by Maoist political ideology.  A Maoist student 
smugly claimed, “In the absence of ideology and the proper mechanism to 
implement that ideology into plans of action, the big organizations cannot 
transform society and will continue disintegrating.”236   
This section demonstrates that both scientific organization and 
anarchical organization serve as recursive obstacles to political parties’ and 
                                                
235 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) district committee member’s interview, 1.9.07. 
236 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, taken on 
10.12.07. 
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student unions’ larger agendas. On the one hand, the Maoists’ scientific 
organizational approach suppresses the radical politics on an internal 
organizational level that they are trying to achieve through societal class 
struggle. And on the other hand, the internal political divisions that exist due 
to the value of personal freedom within the NC reveal the actual inequalities 
that ultimately undermine their ambition of personal and political freedom on 
the societal level.  Furthermore, the CPN-UML’s transition from a cadre-based 
to a mass-based party demonstrates that the center, between these poles, is no 
less riddled with inconsistencies.  This suggests that tactics of political 
survival ultimately undermine larger political ends and ideals. 
Working Style: The Pragmatics of Organizational Ritual  
In our context, what communist means may be 
difficult to understand. It is the manpower that has 
been critical of social injustice and feudalism … it 
is a force that gives expression to that kind of 
sentiment. If you try to see the class-based 
communism strictly in Marxian perspective, you 
may not see any true Communist party in Nepal. 
You may find it only on an individual basis. That is 
because there are no Communist parties in 
organizational form, one strictly governed by 
Communist philosophy. Even the Maoists 
represent the middle class.  
-CPN-UML Central Committee Member 1.14.07 
What my analysis thus far demonstrates is that the issue of 
organization ultimately comes down to the age-old struggle between theory 
and practice. John Law argued in Organizing Modernity that organizational 
narratives are “recursively told, embodied, and performed in a series of 
different materials” (Law, 1994:259). As he outlined, the recursive nature is by 
no means an indication of stability or predictability but rather haphazard 
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ordering processes that can ultimately justify unforeseen outcomes.237 There is 
indeed a sensibility amongst Nepali political actors that internal culture 
should be recursive of the larger political goals and vice versa; they are 
expected to serve as feedback loops that reinforce one another. Yet, as I have 
demonstrated, internal culture often serves as a recursive obstacle that keeps 
parties from achieving their larger political goals and undermines their sense 
of purpose. This sense of purpose is the base for their identity. Rather, as Law 
has shown, one’s identity is cultivated in a dynamic equilibrium of interaction 
within the larger political world. 
In order to convey how this dynamic operates in the student 
organizations, it is important to understand the organizational setup and 
hierarchal system within the unions. This analysis will also demonstrate the 
student organizations’ role in the larger political movements, including their 
relationship with their mother organization, and the degree of autonomy they 
have to carry out their agendas. The ANNISU (R) organizational sensibilities 
indicate that the students must put their political ideals into practice. For 
them, this is the definition of being organized and politically active: it allows 
them to proceed in a well-defined manner and to feel ownership over the 
political process. In this regard, the common cadres pride themselves on 
knowing that their political ideals are what inform the institutional culture. 
One ANNISU (R) leader explained, “We make the student cadres understand 
scientific organization and then they support our directives.”238 Yet the 
practice of instituting political ideals is valued by all the students. Students 
from less organized unions value it by omission. A number of political 
                                                
237 In chapter two and four I demonstrate the students’ ability to use unexpected outcomes to 
their advantage. 
238 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, 12.4.07. 
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analysts have said that it is due to this disconnect that the students become 
cynical or lost. In some organizations students see no forum for personal 
expression of political ideals, and in others there is no opportunity to realize 
their political ideals. In many student organizations, political ideology comes 
in the performative form of sound bites from speeches or when they shout 
slogans, but ends there.  Except during street protests, many students don’t 
feel their actions serve the political end that they support.  
The concept of hierarchy is connected to the balance of student 
autonomy and obedience within their organizations. The ANNISU (R) 
secretary best expressed this when he asked me if I saw the knives at the NSU 
conventions.  He said, “This is the NSU culture.  You would never see this in 
our culture because we understand the balance between freedom and control.  
ANNISU (R) simultaneously practices the policy of freedom and control. 
There must be limitations on freedom in the organization, otherwise the 
organization will turn into a chaotic mass.”239 He repeated this sentiment 
when I asked him if he would allow me to interview him.  He did not refuse 
but rather indicated there were proper channels by which to gain access to the 
information I was seeking. In this case, it was obvious that the freedom to 
expose the organization was curtailed.  
The NSU students also believe that working style forms institutional 
culture but NSU’s notion of working style is different than the leftists’ notion 
because it is not based on political ideology.  Rather, it is a very traditional 
way for those in leadership positions to conduct themselves in Nepali high-
caste society. An NSU student emphasized this to me in the following 
statement: 
                                                
239 Interaction with ANNISU (R) activists at their main office on 7.14.07. 
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Our working style created hierarchy in our party 
and student organization. This type of hierarchy 
was created since we don’t require our cadres to 
participate in the decision-making process, rather 
we tell our decision to them. The working style in 
the party “that I am superior to you” has created 
hierarchy and finally it became a part of our 
culture. Again, this culture strengthened to the 
culture of inferiority and superiority… Our 
president has never followed the constitution in 
the decisions he has taken so far. But he will blame 
G.P. Koirala for not following the party 
constitution. This is happening is because it has 
become our culture. I will do the same. I remember 
that I used to do the same when I was in 
leadership. I used to announce to the media that 
we would start the movement against the 
petroleum price hike then endorse it at our 
meeting. That was not the correct process, was it? 
Thus, our working style is slowly shaping our 
culture. Within us, those who obtain bigger 
responsibility think that we are superior to others. 
There is a split in our party—the split of big people 
and small and this has ultimately contributed to 
our culture.240 
This student is describing a hierarchal approach that defies the democratic 
process laid out by the party and organization’s constitution. Indeed it is this 
type of working style that lead others outside of the organization to view the 
Nepali Congress members as having a domineering, entitled character, which 
is seen to inform their organizational culture.  
On the other side of the political spectrum, in the ANNISU (R) union, 
leadership is as well hierarchical.  But that hierarchy is incorporated into their 
notion of scientific organization and political discipline. That is why everyone 
in the ANNISU (R) knows how to pursue promotion and everyone respects 
leadership because there is a protocol for ascension through the ranks.  There 
is no doubt that the leaders are capable of achieving the overall agenda in the 
                                                
240 Translated excerpt of an NSU (K) ex-central committee leader’s interview, 11.16.07.  
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positions they fill.  I had this progression described to me as a pyramid 
system.  The central committee is at the top, below them are the regional 
committees, then the district committee, and finally the area or unit 
committees. When I asked a student leader if people are able to bypass a level 
or whether it similar to the Cuban style, where they are required to move up 
the ranks, he responded, 
…There is always a system for everything. For example, 
some sorts of incompetence surface when a person who 
had worked in the organization in 2052 BS (1996) jumps 
into the organization again in 2058 (2002) at a higher level. 
It happens so because he would not know what happened 
in the course of the student movement in the consecutive 
years that followed his departure. If he lacked this 
experience, he would find it really difficult to motivate 
the people in the movement in the latter stages. Therefore, 
only those who have passed through all the levels 
accumulating the knowledge obtained in the course of the 
successive student movements can be effective student 
leaders. With this calculation in mind, our friends rise 
passing through the pyramid structure of the 
organization.241  
Not only is it expected that one rises systematically through the ranks in order 
to acquire proper knowledge, but also one must do so to prove one’s political 
dedication to superiors and inferiors in order to gain their confidence.  
Furthermore, one’s own experience is considered within the larger realm of 
historical materialism.  When I pushed this student leader on his point he said, 
That is what we mean by scientific revolution: it is 
not only about looking at the past as lessons in 
which to base our current policy in order to 
achieve our goals for the future, but it means being 
an active participant in the process.  One’s personal 
experience must be within the context of the 
unfolding revolution.  It is only then that they can 
claim to have a substantial basis in which to know 
                                                
241 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, 1.8.07. 
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how to go forward. You must realize the personal 
and the public are one and the same, you must take 
personal responsibility and personally orient 
yourself to the revolution at every level, most 
importantly, making the public your first personal 
priority.242  
Therefore, gaining experience in the process places people’s personal 
experience within the revolution and allows them the ability to appropriately 
explain the party line to their juniors in order to direct them on how they 
should proceed.  Only when one thoroughly understands the basis of party 
ideology is one able to make decisions to further the party toward its proper 
political end.  
Not every single person that has been promoted in ANNISU (R) has 
progressed in the orthodox way of the pyramid structure, but when they are 
not, it is set in a context of what is needed for the progression of the overall 
revolution.  In other words, people can justify the swift appointment of 
individuals if the leaders deem it necessary because they have faith that the 
leaders know what is needed and can judge people’s capabilities.  
Furthermore, the development of the ANNISU (R) as an organization 
happened during a war.  During war, one does not question one’s superiors.  
The ANNISU (R) students pride themselves on what they describe as 
“militant commitment”243 to their ideology and their party. War is just one 
part of revolutionary class struggle. For that reason, even after the war is over 
they can justify irregularities as being necessary to further the revolution.   
One ANNISU (R) student leader explained to me, “My organization 
believes that unity is possible through struggle. Unity achieved through 
                                                
242 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, 1.8.07. 
243 This term was used by an ANNISU (R) central committee member in an interview taken on 
12.4.07. 
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struggle is durable. I am willing to compromise the superficial but won’t 
compromise my devotion to class struggle. This is what is real to us.” 244 This 
student went on to explain to me the Maoist understanding of power.  He said 
power is such that it will always enforce a dictatorship on others who are not 
in power. He claimed people are deluded if they deny that every form of state 
power enforces a dictatorship on the other classes.  Therefore power must be 
just.  The whole point of their class struggle is to negate the capitalists and 
establish a dictatorship of the proletariat.  If people believe that all power 
takes a dictatorial form, then they are willing to suspend their own personal 
freedom for the form of power they would like to see installed. Therefore 
organizational structure for the ANNISU (R) is not about compromise or 
appeasing all participants through democratic contention, but rather it is 
about properly indoctrinating cadres with the right sense of discipline and 
dedication so they follow the orders of their superiors, who they see as the 
most capable of furthering the ultimate agenda of their shared struggle.  
This is not to say that there is only one political line that people must 
accept.  When discussing this issue, a number of ANNISU (R) students 
highlighted the discursive space within their organization.  One student told 
me that space is given to various opinions and they are encouraged to debate 
and compete with one another in this capacity.  He cited Mao’s saying “Let 
many flowers bloom” as the basis for which opinion is disseminated.  But he 
was quick to make a distinction between revolutionary and opportunist 
opinion. He explained,  “…if the opinion has emerged from an opportunist 
line, we have to negate it. But if it has come from the revolutionary line, we 
                                                
244 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, 12.4.07. 
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have to accept it and institutionalize it in a new way.”245 The limitations within 
the discursive space are not about the opinions themselves, but about the 
orientation of those opinions.  If the students are coming from a revolutionary 
line, then they are encouraged to express their views in an unlimited way.  In 
other words, they have freedom only within discipline. Where the students 
lack freedom is outside these revolutionary parameters. If they cannot agree 
with the basis of the Maoist doctrine, then there is no place for them.  Other 
student organizations make more room for flexibility in this way so they are 
perceived to be organizationally more autonomous. Yet for the ANNISU (R) 
students, this sort of freedom of opinion runs completely counter to what they 
believe an organization stands for. For them the organization is a shared basis 
through which they will realize their ultimate political end.    
When I have spoken to the Maoist students and leaders about authority 
within their structure, what they try to highlight is that although there may be 
power inherent within the hierarchal structure of the organization, they try to 
limit the power by making sure that everyone is equal in most contexts. I was 
told that division of labor is necessary in order to progress in a scientific 
manner.  Therefore they must all be pragmatic in accepting how their 
hierarchal structure works.  Everyone fulfills a role but they also understand 
how their role fits into the overall system of the organization’s action plan. 
They claim that there is no added privilege for a higher role because this 
would create schisms that would lead people to disassociate from the larger 
agenda.246 In order to avoid political alienation, there is an emphasis that all 
                                                
245 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, 11.12.07. 
246 I should note that Maoist cadres have criticized their leadership for quickly embracing 
lifestyles that resemble that of the other mainstream political leaders.  At a campaign rally 
entitled “Let us study and survive”—an ANNISU (R)-sponsored campaign that demanded 
equal compensation to orphaned children of PLA (People’s Liberation Army) soldiers as 
orphaned children of soldiers of Nepal Army and national security forces have received—one 
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cadres must feel ownership over the larger process in their everyday activities. 
They do this through a cultural emphasis on equality and uniformity of 
lifestyle; this is just one example of how they live their politics.   
Every ANNISU (R) student I asked said the lifestyle of leaders and the 
cadres is not much different beyond their political and military duties.  They 
live together in communes, eat the same food, dress the same, and rotate 
duties to maintain the domestic sphere. One student leader told me that he 
would be criticized if he took a taxi when his comrades took the bus, or if he 
ate more expensive food or wore more expensive clothes than others.   “I have 
to refine my thoughts and deeds in order to be a good person; a feeling of 
collective living should prevail in me rather than an individual one,”247 he 
reported.  He claimed that this is what has caused splits and weaknesses in 
other parties. Nobody struggles for anything but power, and once they have 
it, they use it to amass wealth and personal prestige. This has led to 
resentment and cynicism.  He said such a political culture is based on a very 
different lifestyle, a bourgeoisie lifestyle that is premised on one’s individual, 
private orientation.  He pointed out that other student leaders are able to leave 
their offices to go to the private comfort of their homes and families.  The 
discrepancy between their lifestyle and that of their cadres does not bother 
them.  Furthermore, in the eyes of ANNISU (R) members, other student 
activists have competing loyalties.  Their families and status usually come first 
and their politics is a means to ensure wealth and security and to further their 
filial influence. The Maoists, on the other hand, work and live together 
                                                                                                                                       
orphaned cadre gave a speech with CPN (M) Chairman Prachanda sitting in the front row, in 
which she railed against the “mobile and motor culture” that the Maoist leadership was 
embracing.  She argued that her parents did not fight and die for their leadership to be 
indistinguishable from the other political parties (June 13, 2007).  
247 Translated excerpt of an ANNISU (R) central committee member’s interview, 12.4.07. 
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communally; the party is what comes first.  The party is the reason for the 
students’ involvement; it is what they “struggle and live for.”248 The way this 
student describes the collapsing of prescribed bourgeoisie boundaries or 
categories of the personal and professional, or family and party, is similar to 
the way ten Bos summarizes Agamben’s theory of organization as threshold 
(2005: 20). Agamben describes organization as a zone of indifference between 
work and non-work or culture and nature that is set up in order to skew 
categories. In this sense, the categories are framed in order to imbue every 
aspect of life with the import of the revolutionary cause. The skewing of 
categories is, in a sense, freedom within discipline. 
Contrarily, Nepali Congress had a mission to struggle and live for in 
their beginning, overthrowing the Rana regime. They accomplished it.  After 
they accomplished their mission the organization abstracted their mission to 
be an ethos, democratic freedom.  They maintained this ethos while they were 
in power, but their power has diminished because of their lack of an agenda.  
It is at this point that the ethos again materializes, in times when they are 
struggling for their survival (during the Panchayat period and the Movement 
Against Regression).  During those times they again had a mission that 
defined them, whereas the communist organizations have a larger mission 
that has not been accomplished, societal equality.  This is why many Nepali 
politicians and activists are suspended in the unfinished that the political 
movements embody, as I established in chapter three. This position makes 
their political agendas more palpable. They focus on their political movements 
continuing, continual struggle, because they don’t know how to reorient 
themselves as an organization when they are not struggling to attain a 
                                                
248 Excerpt based on notes from an interaction with an ANNISU (R) student on 7.9.07. 
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mission. In the process they collapse their political and private lives into one 
zone of indifference that incorporates all action and sentiment into the 
category of class struggle or democratic freedom.  
Conventions as Recursive Rituals: 
In this section I will specifically focus on student conventions as the 
ritualistic encapsulation of the political notion of organization. The student 
conventions are not only treated as a manifestation of organizational ability, 
but they also demonstrate my argument that organizational practices often 
serve as recursive obstacles to the ultimate political aim. Here I will rely on 
Alexi Yurchak’s analysis of political acts in Perestroika Russia. He argues that 
while ritualized acts were meant to enforce authoritative discourse, they were 
ripe with possibility because they were comprised of both fixed performative 
and shifting constative dimensions (2006: 24-5). In the Nepali context, one 
cannot assume that these possibilities are always empowering to those within 
the organization. More often than not, the authoritative nature of the 
conventions creates constative meaning other than what was intended. Indeed 
these outcomes undermine the organization even while they are meant to 
reinforce the collective ideals of organization. Nonetheless, Yurchak’s 
paradigm is conceptually useful in understanding unexpected ritual effects. 
Yurchak relies on Judith Butler to analyze ideological rituals and the effects 
they produce when he states, 
It is precisely because the two elements of the 
performative force⎯sociological and 
semiotic⎯operate simultaneously that speech acts 
even in strictly controlled institutionalized contexts 
can take on meanings and produce effects for 
which they were not intended. This possibility of 
an unanticipated outcome constitutes, Judith Butler 
argues, “the political promise of the performative, 
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one that positions that performative at the center of 
a political hegemony.” (Butler 1997: 161 in Yurchak 
2006: 21) 
For Nepali student politics it is not merely speech acts that have unintended 
consequences but the conventions, as ideological rituals, themselves can 
produce effects that undermine the student unions and their mother parties as 
much as provide unexpected possibilities for autonomy and a place in the 
political spectrum.  
Political culture, much like other cultural traditions, is galvanized by 
ritual; without it the tradition itself does not exist. The student organizations’ 
conventions are the ultimate ritual that fuels the tradition of student politics. 
Through the choosing of leadership and political agendas, the convention is 
the process that shapes the organization, as well as being the act that 
substantiates the group as a political entity. A speech given by a campus 
leader during the inauguration at a campus convention captured a common 
cynical analysis regarding why people invest in conventions. He said, 
Why is it people's compulsion to give all NSU 
conventions well wishes?  Because it moves each 
one’s own political position forward, not only 
through exposure, but it becomes a changing of the 
guard and that involves people moving up to 
higher positions in the political chain. The 
convention process is one of the engines that push 
us all forward.  But what about making real 
changes?  The sentiment expressed is that we can 
come together and actually make a stance on how 
we perceive and can implement “new Nepal,” but 
does this really happen? Will it?  Is it within our 
control?  [There was enthusiastic applause for this 
statement.]249  
                                                
249 Translated excerpt from NSU (D) campus leader’s campus convention speech at Trichandra 
college, 3.22.07. 
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This is one aspect of the student organizations’ conventions but they also 
serve a number of other purposes that are strategic and practical. They are 
foremost a ritual that ensures “reproduction of the institution itself and of 
one’s position as its member” (Yurchak 2006: 23). As this student describes, it 
is also a ritual of exposure: they not only serve as an exposure of individuals 
to others in the organization, but they are the venue where alliances, agendas, 
and political mandate are established or reinforced and broadcast to the larger 
public.  For this reason, they are often described as dramas (natak).  There is a 
lot at stake in the conventions so people engage them as if they are hyper-real 
moments that define their organization. For this reason, appearance accounts 
for much of the student organizations’ motivation to pursue the ritual of 
institutional processes.  
The conventions allowed the organizations (and by proxy their parties) 
to regroup and entrench their organizational solidarity, even if they were not 
interested in exhibiting their internal democratic dexterity. All the student 
organizations used their conventions as an opportunity to gather and create a 
common agenda and party platform, which they mobilized during the 
constituent assembly election campaigns. Not only did it allow them to 
establish a unified, consistent voice but also by completing their student 
conventions, they prove their ability to be organized. I have often heard the 
sentiment that the power of appearing organized is just as strong as appearing 
democratic.  
Indeed, the two NSU conventions demonstrated this. Both 
organizations were pressuring their parties to allow them to have their 
convention to prove to the public that they are institutionally capable. Yet their 
inability to oversee local conventions reinforced their ineffectiveness in the 
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eyes of the public. The public reasoned that if they could not maintain their 
internal process because of external pressures,250 how would their mother 
party maintain and run the state apparatus? The manner in which the events 
unfolded revealed the opposite reality than the one they intended. Rather than 
the conventions exhibiting their political aptitude, it revealed their political 
ineptitude and how much is beyond their control.  They had to contend with 
the fact that the appearance for which they aspired was as much a risk as it 
was a benefit. 
It could be reasoned that the manner in which the student 
organizations carry out their conventions actualizes what the members 
envision the convention to embody, which ultimately reinforces their sense of 
organization and the internal character of their group.  Just as a ritual is 
carried out in a prescribed order to produce the desired outcome, the 
convention process is defined by each student organization’s constitution. Yet 
the process can also perpetuate the problems that are endemic to their 
organization, serving as an obstacle to the organization’s ultimate end.  For 
example, the very procedure of having the district conventions before the 
national convention reinforces the top-down and bottom-up bargaining 
process that has cultivated factionalism in NSU (K). The ANNFSU (Akhil), on 
the other hand, runs their conventions in reverse, beginning with the national 
convention then running the district conventions.  This reinforces their 
noncompetitive attempts at democracy, which some say has lead to ineffectual 
leadership.    
                                                
250 Both factions of NSU had a difficult time organizing certain district and campus 
conventions because of political instability in the south, which was in part due to street 
activism of the Madheshi movement and also guerilla activity of rogue Maoist offshoot 
organizations. 
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In NSU (K), those who serve or may be campaigning for central 
committee positions have a huge stake in how the district and campus 
elections turn out because the local conventions determine the constituents 
that will vote in the national convention. The district and campus conventions 
serve as the context in which deals are made between the two levels. Aspiring 
district candidates seek out the support of central committee members or 
candidates in order to secure a victory, and in return the local candidate will 
guarantee his or her domain’s support for the central committee candidate (or 
the candidate that the central committee leader is supporting) during the 
national convention elections.  This creates a bartering process, which 
perpetuates the patronage culture where domains of influence and social debt 
are cultivated norms in the Nepali Congress (K). 
The ANNFSU (Akhil) administers their district and campus conventions 
after their national conventions and they don’t set a deadline that requires the 
local-level conventions to be completed. Rather, they do it when it is 
appropriate for the district and campus in consultation with the newly elected 
ANNFSU central committee. In this respect it is a lot more relaxed an event 
with less emphasis on the competition and more on the process of cultivating 
members. The current ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee president and one 
of their vice-presidents explained to me that they conduct it in this manner 
because it decreases the threat of internal competition and is not presented as 
such a high-stake procedure. They explicitly referenced the NSU’s style of 
holding elections as faulty because its competitive nature breeds internal 
factionalism; this is something ANNFSU (Akhil) has always tried to avoid. 
Furthermore, they reasoned that by the time they have their next national 
convention, there is no mystery as to who the delegates will be, as they had 
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been chosen within the year and a half before. This is meant to make the 
whole process more transparent. They claim this process provides a distinct 
advantage because the delegates come with the experience of serving their 
own campuses and districts for some time before the national convention. The 
delegates and local leaders are much more intimately involved with the day-
to-day processes and know the problems that should be addressed at the 
national conventions.  This order insures that the delegates have some 
maturity and experience to effectively represent their sectors at the national 
convention.251  
This procedural style impacts the tenor of how the ANNFSU (Akhil) 
students conduct themselves and pursue their aspirations.  Their progression 
through the hierarchy is a lot more rank-and-file, with less bargaining and 
intrigue.  It is actually considered inappropriate to be hyper-competitive 
during the convention process. As a result, a lot more irregularities get 
covered up and people are discouraged from publicizing them.  Some slighted 
ANNFSU (Akhil) leaders have told me that the UML’s priority to avoid 
factionalization at any measure within ANNFSU (Akhil) not only undermines 
transparency and the students’ desires for a democratic practice, but it also 
stifles innovation, which makes them less competitive amongst the student 
unions in the Free Student Union system.252 Another downfall of this system is 
that they get less exposure in the media. Since they do not attract a sense of 
election countdown sensationalism that the NSU’s process does, their leaders 
and contestants do not become media darlings, as tomorrow’s leaders.   
                                                
251 Based on interviews with ANNFUS (Akhil) central committee members, 1.17.07 and 1.28.07. 
252 Based on interviews with ANNFSU (Akhil) contestants and UML leaders, 10.18.06, 11.2.06, 
and 11.9.06. 
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I have discussed the different styles of running the conventions with a 
number of students in order to understand the reasoning for why they do it 
and the various entrenched dynamics that result from the procedures. A few 
conversations I had underscored this issue. One was with an NSU (K) ex-
student leader who was lamenting that the Kathmandu convention election 
(the first time an election had occurred in fourteen years) was merely a drama. 
His response was that ANNFSU (Akhil) is much more democratic than NSU 
and cited the difference in how they run their conventions.  He said they think 
hard about ways to run their organizational processes to avoid making the 
stakes so high.  To his mind, this leaves them less vulnerable to inviting party 
interference in order to keep the student leaders and candidates from “ripping 
out each other’s throats. Our procedure fosters this and our leaders prefer it 
because it justifies their interference.”253 
It may be true that the ANNFSU (Akhil)’s process of doing things does 
not encourage people to “rip each other’s throats out.” Rather, their process 
reinforces unification between the lower levels and upper levels that is forged 
through the cooperative creation of the lower levels with the authorization of 
the running central committee. This allows them to administer things more 
effectively because there is cohesion between all the levels. Furthermore, it 
removes the uncertainty of who will be in power, which in NSU leads to 
political posturing that forces people to hedge their bets. Nonetheless, it is a 
top-down process; one must gain the endorsement of the current running 
central committee to guarantee victory.  The district and campus conventions 
are almost the process of hand-picking the lower leadership in order to 
guarantee cooperation from the lower levels to institutionalize the central 
                                                
253 Translated excerpt of an NSU (K) ex-central committee leader’s interview, 2.18.07. 
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committee’s policies and agenda. This can be a point of frustration because it 
rules out the dynamism of democratic competition and causes the 
organization to stagnate. As a principle, ANNFSU (Akhil) has a cohesive 
process of entrenching leadership promotion that people frustratingly abide 
by in order to squelch unhealthy internal competition that is common in NSU.  
I have interpreted this data to demonstrate the subtleties of how 
organizational process either promotes or undermines the organizations. 
Process not only affects organizational outcomes but also reinforces 
institutional character. In its ritual form, it substantiates the students’ 
endeavors; it is what provides political opportunity and reinforces their 
attachment to the social connections of politics. Yet political process can just as 
easily undermine political ideals as it can justify their investment. 
Furthermore, political process does not necessarily need to be inconsistent to 
be an obstacle to the larger political aim. What I have shown here is that the 
performative dimension of political process can cause unintended effects that 
are not easily identified. Ultimately, it is the unintended consequences that are 
the basis for the political anxiety that manifests as a fixation on organizational 
form and its relation to political ideology. 
Conclusion: The Sustainability of Political Ideals 
What I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter is that Nepali political 
actors have a heightened sense of what makes an effective organization.  It is a 
combination of discipline and consistency that elides with party ideology. Yet 
in order to survive in the political mainstream the parties must also be flexible 
enough to deal with the complexities of mass-based democratic politics. The 
Maoists are now experiencing the difficulties that moving into mainstream 
politics entails, they have been forced down to a level of imperfect politics 
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with which the rest of the parties have had to contend. The issue all the parties 
grapple with is to what degree is flexibility within the mainstream system 
going to serve as a revisionist impediment to their ultimate end of resolving 
class struggle or instituting democratic justice?  
In this respect the student organizations can guide their mother 
organizations’ transition into the mainstream political process. Polletta argues 
that in the context of the dynamic nature of repertoires, “people can transpose 
modes of interaction from one setting to another, indeed from one 
institutional sphere to another, modifying those interactional modes in the 
process” (2005: 274). The student organizations’ position as sister 
organizations made up of tomorrow’s generation of leaders may be the venue 
that provides them a new horizon during a time when people are 
transitioning from 20th century politics to the politics of “new Nepal.” They 
can ensure their parties survival by doing exactly what they do, they suspend 
their agenda so that they can continually progress at the front and center in 
the political arena, as I have established in chapter two and four, they do this 
through their ability project their voice over time and space and adapt to the 
unexpected and frame it as possibility. 
   274 
CHAPTER 7  
“PURE DEMOCRACY”: CONCEPTIONS, PRACTICES, AND ANXIETIES 
 
 
Figure 22: Kathmandu Post Cartoon 9.22.07 
Since the 1940s, Nepali politics has been defined by its democratic 
struggle. After an unsuccessful democratic period in the 1960s, the multi-party 
democratic activists were pushed underground. They finally reestablished 
democracy in 1990, but by 1996, it became apparent that democracy had not 
fulfilled the expectations and aspirations of all Nepalese citizens. During the 
Maoists’ People’s War, from 1996 to 2006, political strife over what type of 
political system is appropriate for Nepal led to bloodshed. From 2003 through 
2008 there has been a collaboration of people from all different political 
ideologies coming together to demand democracy in reaction to the King’s 
dictatorial attempts.  In 2006, democracy was once again established after the 
People’s Movement II ousted the King from power. After the Constituent 
Assembly elections of 2008, Nepal was officially declared a republic. This 
period is popularly referred to as “new Nepal.” Yet, in reality, Nepali people 
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have differing conceptions of democracy, which are informed by different 
ideological orientations, organizational processes, external influences, and 
activist histories. By the time the Nepali democratic republic was realized as 
the state political system, the different political parties had established their 
own political rhetoric, practices, processes, and traditions that are not 
necessarily informed by liberal democratic values (Krämer 2002; Joshi and 
Rose 2004; Lawoti 2005 Panday 2000; Shah 2004; Upadhya 2002). Therefore, it 
must be acknowledged that the various forms that democratic principles take 
in Nepal have been rhetorically cultivated in conversation with other forms of 
power in a specific historical and cultural context.  
It is from this vantage that I will explore different Nepali conceptions of 
democracy. In this chapter I will examine ethnographic case studies of Nepali 
student organizations’ internal political processes, specifically during their 
campus, district, and national conventions, in order to understand the 
different political attitudes toward electoral processes in Nepal. I will 
concentrate on the performative dimensions of elections in order to 
demonstrate how the students and party leaders’ self-conscious actions 
attempt to control the agonistic nature of electoral politics. In the first section I 
analyze different actors perspective on deliberation and its place in political 
practice.  I then outline the different forms that elections have historically 
taken in Nepali politics in order to highlight the issues that people confront 
when they pursue electoral politics. In the third and fourth section I analyze 
consensus as a traditionally desired approach in the electoral process. I 
provide ethnographic examples of the way consensus unfolds in order to 
demonstrate why it is desired and the anxiety around achieving anything less 
than “pure consensus.” In the last section I consider the benefits and risks to 
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direct elections by highlighting what people contend with while staging 
democratic elections.  My analysis reveals how people’s anxieties regarding 
electoral processes open up an interpretive space that Spencer calls a 
carnivelesque space that is full of possibility and license, “license to argue, and 
license to joke, and license to experiment with challenges to the order of 
things” (ibid: 94).  
Deliberation: The Basis for Liberal Democracy?  
I begin this chapter by analyzing different Nepali conceptions of the 
democratic practice by focusing on the topic of deliberation because it 
elucidates the main contentions that comprise Nepali politics: inclusion, 
organizational unity, forms of competition, democratic claims, and dictatorial 
processes.  
The academic debate surrounding deliberation reveals the inherent 
stakes that are present for political actors themselves. Political theory 
considers deliberation to be one of the central components of the liberal 
democratic political process as well as a main aspect of any form of societal 
maintenance that is not dictatorial in form. Political philosophers and social 
scientists often define deliberation according to the Kantian argument, 
claiming that reason,254 inclusion, and justice are the underpinning 
components of deliberation (Bohman 1996; Gutmann and Tompson 1996, 2004; 
Little 2007; Mouffe 2000; Schneiderhan and Khan 2008; Steiner et al. 2004; 
                                                
254 Cass Sunstein argues that the key to healthy deliberation and dissent is reason. He asserts 
that much dissent is harmful nonsense and productive deliberation is predicated on the liberal 
sensibility of reasonableness (2003: 91).  To which Adrian Little counters, “why should I act 
‘reasonably’ in a society that excludes me or where the established procedures run contrary to 
my moral principles? What form of political action aside from the transgressive can I use if the 
political system in which I reside does not recognize me as legitimate?” (2007: 147). Little 
highlights the need to acknowledge “disagreement” (Rancière) in order to embrace “agonistic 
pluralism” (Mouffe), which moves beyond reasonable deliberation and consensus to a radical 
democratic theory that is comfortable with the tensions of social contingency and uncertainty.   
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Sustein 2003). Deliberation is enacted through the process of reasoned 
argument, or what Jürgen Habermas calls “communicative action” (1984 and 
1990), which ideally includes the voices and perspectives off all those who are 
participating in the process. For this reason, deliberation is cited as central to 
democratic legitimacy. The assumption in a democratic state is that all citizens 
have a right to be included in the democratic process and, therefore, have 
access to deliberation.255   
Jürgen Habermas’s work on deliberation has been the most influential 
in the academic debate. He described deliberation as an organic phenomenon 
that unfolds within the specific social process or context (1990: 66). Yet what E. 
Schneiderhan and S. Khan have discovered in their study that imposed 
exogenous controls on the process of deliberation, is that the more inclusive 
the deliberation process is, the more robustly engaged the group is in 
deliberation (2008: 2 and 9). Their conclusion may be accurate from the 
presumed premise of an inclusive group dynamic but I would not extrapolate 
beyond that, because what I have observed is that political participation 
comprises either partial inclusion or a semblance of inclusion. But their study 
provides another useful conclusion about the nature of deliberation. It 
demonstrates that there are ways to affect the pace of deliberation; it is not an 
organic phenomenon. In this regard, Davies et al. have casted doubt that 
deliberation has inherent value, premised on reason, inclusion and justice, by 
questioning the underlying assumption that deliberation naturally unfolds.  
They argue that there are “recursive loops in which some form of deliberation 
                                                
255 Genevieve Lakier borrows the phrase “illiberal democracy” from Zakari (1997) in her 
analysis of the role of public protest in Nepal in the democratic years of the 1990s (2007). She 
argues that without access to liberal, legal forms of representations and deliberation, groups 
use public protest to assert their rights or as I have shown, in the case of the political elites, to 
enforce their political views by usurping public space (2005 and 2007). 
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is needed before determining how deliberation should proceed; but the 
question of how the earlier round of deliberations can commence without 
confronting the same selection problem is left unanswered” (2005: 605).256 
Pellizzoni (2003) further warns that we must consider the role of power 
relations in discursive interactions because discourse and social prestige can 
be deployed in order to marginalize alternative viewpoints. Therefore one 
must consider the specific social dynamic in order to understand the 
parameters of deliberation before the value of deliberation can be understood. 
For similar reasons Rancière critiques Habermas’s attempt to 
distinguish the creation of community upon rational argument as a discrete 
political interaction that differs from group collaboration based on converging 
interests. Rancière reminds us that not everyone may be present in the 
discursive process, and if they are present, they may not be able to articulate 
their desires and needs to the full extent because they must use the 
predominant discourse in order to be understood, hence becoming eclipsed by 
the dominant social logic, or what he calls police logic. He argues that 
Habermas underestimates the impact of the “multiplication of persons 
associated with the multiplication of the political logos” and that the third 
person (or external community) is as much a factor in the social dynamic of 
deliberation than the two who are deliberating. The third or external that 
Rancière refers to in his analysis is the basis for a theoretical critique of 
                                                
256 Fearon may argue that what Davies et al. are referring to as the earlier round of 
deliberations is merely discussion: “Although ‘mere communication’ may not be deliberative, 
discussion is a necessary prerequisite of the deliberative process because, without discussion, 
there can be no deliberation” (1998: 404). Whether it is referred to as deliberation or 
discussion, or it allows discussion to be a proxy for deliberation, it is true that the parameters 
for which the group deliberates within are often decided by a core group of elites, or leaders 
who are limited by particular political or social principles, none of which is inclusive of the 
larger group and or society. 
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Habermas’s democratic theory known as triple contingency.  Piet Strydom 
clarifies the complexity of triple contingency in the following way: 
This ability [to communicate] implies that, in 
addition to the perspectives of speaker and hearer, 
another perspective comes into play in the 
development beyond the double contingency 
relation. This is the perspective of the observer. 
When this perspective enters social interaction, ego 
is able to take an attitude that allows him or her to 
divide alter’s communicative role in two, the role 
of alter ego in the sense of a participating 
counterpart and the role of a neutral or 
nonparticipating onlooker or observer belonging to 
the group forming part of the social situation. As a 
consequence of this structural differentiation made 
possible by the adoption of an objectifying attitude 
in addition to as per formative attitude, the 
perspectives of speaker and hearer are relativized 
vis-à-vis a third perspective. The first person who 
is speaking and the second person who is 
addressed and responds show up against the 
background of the uninvolved third person. The 
emergence of this basic triad marks the structure of 
communication that takes place in a social group 
within a situation in the real world.  (2001: 174) 
Strydom argues that since the public (or the observing third) is a contingent 
factor in the way socio-cultural conditions dictate epistemic structures, then 
the broader public must participate in any political debate or restructuring 
(Strydom 2001: 178). Yet Habermas’s theoretic frame does not consider 
democracy on this level of abstraction. 
Triple contingency reveals the limits of Habermas’s analysis of 
deliberation as rational argument, and underscores what Rancière observes as 
the paradox of democracy: “The demonstration of right or manifestation of 
what is just is a reconfiguring of the partition of the perceptible or 
Habermasian communicational intervention” (1999: 55). This unveiling occurs 
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during disagreement (or radical revolutions), not in a public sphere of 
consensus or deliberation.  Consensus democracy presumes that the parties 
have already been identified and established, and through the “regime of the 
perceptible”257 consensus masks the boundaries between parties. As I 
established in the introduction, Rancière considers this post-democracy. For 
him, democracy is the political movement that reveals suppression and 
exploitation, makes the unheard voices heard, whereas post-democracy’s 
ultimate end is to obscure the different voices by claiming they are all equal 
citizens. Post-democracy “is the identifying mode, among institutional 
mechanisms and the allocation of the society’s appropriate parts and shares, 
for making the subject and democracy’s own specific action disappear” (1999: 
102). The theoretical limits of deliberation and consensus democracy that I lay 
out here allude to some of the problems that Nepal is facing in its constituent 
assembly, wherein the express goal is to restructure a more inclusive state 
through a consensus democracy that assumes all are participating as citizens 
and specific communities’ concerns are often dismissed in order to make “new 
Nepal.”258  
Indeed, establishing inclusion has been an ongoing political debate in 
Nepal. It fueled the civil war and dominated the peace talks and state 
restructuring procedures. Many are asserting that, in order for Nepal to 
become “new Nepal,” broad sweeping inclusive policies are necessary. The 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN [M]) demonstrated the political 
capital that the act of inclusion carries through their attempts to bring more 
                                                
257 Rancière defines the regime of the perceptible as “the regime in which the parties are 
presupposed as already given, their community established and the count of their speech 
identical to their linguistic performance” (1999: 102). 
258 Chantal Mouffe argues that consensus “exists as a temporary result of a provisional 
hegemony, as a stabilization of power, and that it always entails some form of exclusion” 
(2000: 104).  
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diverse voices into the political fold. In this sense, their accomplishments 
during the decade of civil war is what Rancière would describe as democracy, 
because it made the entire society confront the “policing logics” of the Nepali 
state, the way things are structurally distributed among social, ethnic, and 
gender groups (Rancière 2003: 201).  The People’s War was an act of politics 
because it threw these distributions into question. It was this strategy that won 
them the majority of both the first past the post and proportional votes in the 
2008 constituent assembly elections. 
Yet as I demonstrated in chapter five, inclusion of diverse groups in the 
party does not necessarily ensure that internal policies promote active 
inclusion of various voices. When I asked ANNISU (R) students about this, 
they explained to me that the Maoists’ main attempt at inclusion on an 
internal level is through deliberation. This is a curious claim because the 
Maoists are not considered to be a democratic party; in fact many people 
mistrust their democratic intentions. The Maoist leadership itself has justified 
coming into the political mainstream since 2006⎯making a coalition 
government with the democratic parties and contesting in the Constituent 
Assembly elections⎯as the necessary step that the revolution must take to 
reach its ultimate end, a Maoist People’s Republic. They argue that they must 
become a central part of the system in order to restructure the system.  
Nonetheless, ANNISU (R) leaders cited deliberation as a key 
component to their internal election process. While discussing their campus, 
district, and national convention processes with ANNISU (R) students, I 
inquired as to how they choose their leaders in order to understand the degree 
to which they value democratic processes. What I found is that deliberation 
was more highly prioritized than casting ballots, campaigning, or 
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representational voting. A central committee leader explained it to me in this 
way:  
During our convention we elected our leaders. But 
our method of election is different. What the 
bourgeoisie do is, they use the ballot paper and 
cast their votes; they spend a lot of money to buy 
the votes and use knives, swords, and sticks to 
assault the opposition that is within their 
organization. You might have seen the Nepal 
Student Union conferences in Chitwan and 
Nepaljung. They call it democratic norms. We are 
against that. Rather we hold discussions until we 
reach a consensus. Therefore, the election 
procedure adopted by bourgeoisie is for mere 
show, a performance for the outsiders that 
elections took place. We don’t agree with this 
process since it is full of conspiracies and tricks… 
We prioritize internal discussion on our political 
agenda and road map. Only once we have 
established our political agenda do we engage in 
elections. Choosing our leadership is secondary to 
jointly organizing our group. We feel that if an 
election is held without becoming clear on the 
organization’s ideology and programs then the 
organization cannot lead the political movement in 
any real sense. These are our norms and values. 
Here lies the difference between other 
organizations and ours.259  
It may seem odd that a proclaimed Maoist student leader is embracing a 
political form that assumes the liberal morals of individual rights and freedom 
of speech as its basis, values that seem counter to radical socialist views.260 Yet 
it is important to take note of what he sets up as its juxtaposition, casting 
                                                
259 Translation of an interview with an ANNISU (R) central committee member on 11.12.06. 
260 C.K. Lal, a prominent Nepali journalist and political analyst, claimed in a public forum after 
the Constituent Assembly elections that the “Maoists were not real Maoists.” He cited their 
willingness to participate in the Constituent Assembly elections, their willingness to embrace 
private market economic policies as a transition into their own economic policies, and 
burgeoning diplomatic ties with conservative foreign powers as proof of their lack of political 
authenticity within the Maoist ideological orthodoxy (at Martin Chautari, Kathmandu, Nepal, 
4.16.08). 
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ballots. He argues that casting ballots is a bourgeoisie political form that 
promotes the thumbprint of each individual, but beyond that it is useless.  
 
Figure 23: Police keeping NSU (K) cadres at bay as they look at 
 the national convention voter list, Bharatpur, Chitwan 2007 
In Nepal’s history, the individuating process of casting ballots has often 
been manipulated or usurped in order to safeguard traditional, elite political 
rule. Deliberation, on the other hand, allows people a voice and an active 
social role in the process. For the Maoists, individual right is not the primary 
focus of deliberation, but a means to an end. Rather, deliberation is a 
communal process of consensus. For them, deliberation promotes sociality.  
Yet their progression from revolution to post-democratic approaches like 
deliberation highlights the potential for political erasure of what they wanted 
to convey during their civil war. The action of revolution is contrasted with 
   284 
the Maoists’ final aspiration for consensus.261 This is one example of how the  
historical political drama unfolds in Nepal: it is the oscillation between street 
politics and parliamentary politics or Rancière’s disagreement (democracy) 
and consensus (post-democracy).  
The distinction between casting ballots and deliberation that the Maoist 
student leader makes is what A. Fung and E.O. Wright describe as the 
difference between real-world deliberation and genuine deliberation (2002:17). 
They claim that the real world involves heated conflict where there are 
winners and losers. Whereas genuine deliberation is not necessarily about 
being fully convinced of the collective agreement, but through reasoned 
argument all participants are persuaded to endorse it because it is what is 
most advantageous for the group. If we were to extrapolate this ANNISU (R) 
student leader’s logic to apply to Fung and Wright’s paradigm, then casting 
ballots would be real-world deliberation, and the Maoist internal consensus 
would be genuine deliberation. But in order to further parse this out, there is 
another aspect that must be considered, one that Fung and Wright do not 
address in their analysis, which is the emphasis on solidarity in the 
deliberative process (2002). Not everyone has her or his own agenda; 
therefore, it may be enough to provide people with a sense of ownership in 
the process in order to get them to agree with the party in a consensual way. 
The degree to which one values the group’s agenda over one’s personal 
agenda reflects one’s willingness to oblige genuine deliberation over a real-
world deliberation situation. This is particularly true within the ANNISU (R), 
where students are ideologically well-trained and disciplined in their shared 
                                                
261 Rancière warns that, “The uncounted could make themselves count by showing up the 
process of division and breaking in on others’ equality and appropriating it for themselves. 
The “exclusion” referred to today is, on the contrary, the very absence of a representable 
barrier. And so it is strictly identical to the law of consensus” (1999: 116). 
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political agenda, as I establish in chapter six. Their training is meant to put the 
students on the same ideological footing in the communicative process of 
deliberation.   
The shared conviction to prioritize the group over the individual allows 
the ANNISU (R)’s convention to have a focus other than the electoral process. 
Rather than encouraging people to exert their own opinions it is about 
encouraging them to abide by the agenda that is best for their group. This not 
only allows them to become a part of the group, but it also reconfirms the 
social reality of the group. It is not group formation by popular mandate, but 
group formation through the social process of “genuine consensus.” In his 
ethnography on the last Soviet generation, Alexei Yurchak (2006: 117-19) 
describes this priority within the cultural value of svoi or a sociality that 
produces a public. He documents the distracted, haphazard process by which 
Komsomol cadres vote for motions. These university students understand that 
it does not matter what the motions are that they raise their hands in favor of, 
but rather what matters is the act of supporting the motion. The multiplicity of 
raised hands confirms the sociality of the event, one that reconfirms the 
identity of their organization in a public forum. Similarly, the ANNISU (R) 
students do not proceed with elections until they are organized as a group, 
creating a shared political agenda is what creates social cohesion for them, 
only then they are able to choose a leader.  
A Maoist central committee leader gave me an interesting explanation 
for the Maoists’ resistance to the parliamentary system, which broadens the 
distinction between different forms of political participation. His explanation 
informs the difference between real-world and genuine deliberation. He said 
that, at one time, the parliamentary system was progressive, but that the 
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Maoists no longer support it because it has become a reactionary system, 
which has served as a guise to support the monarch while providing a façade 
of democracy. He said, “We believe in multi-party democracy if it implies 
creating consensus among the political parties in order to make Nepal a 
prosperous and developed country for the betterment and equality of its 
citizens.”262 Ultimately, both systems claim to have the same end, yet he 
invoked Lenin to assert that the process of consensus insured equality and 
class struggle in a way that the parliamentary system precluded. He also 
added that consensus combats unhealthy competition. He felt competition 
stifled the system since it kept people from dedicating themselves to the larger 
aims of justice by prioritizing their own victory. In other words, competition 
distracts people with the mere struggle to maintain their presence and to 
progress within the political system.   
This tension between voting and consensus ultimately comes down to 
what people believe is the best way to balance the liberal individual right of 
representation or a socialist approach that prioritizes the betterment of the 
group. In Nepal, this tension is informed by the historically proven suspicion 
that democratic governments are manipulated for spurious ends. Voting and 
the parliamentary system can encourage unhealthy competition that 
factionalizes the larger governmental institution in overt ways, whereas 
consensus, in its ideal form, may reaffirm the solidarity of the group (or state). 
Yet those in favor of the democratic process claim that dictatorial attempts are 
made in the name of consensus, which ultimately undermines the solidarity of 
the organization. This too is a reasonable worry considering Nepal’s political 
history. Furthermore, some Nepali politicians have warily contended that 
                                                
262 Translation of an interview with a CPN (Maoist) central committee member on 1.18.07. 
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consensus is not democratic because, in Nepali political history, the claims of 
consensus-building deliberation have been predicated upon the exclusion of at 
least one other political faction. 263   
 
Figure 24: NSU (D) cadres protesting the postponement of the  
election at their national convention as party leaders tried to 
broker consensus amongst candidates, Nepalganj, Banke 2007 
In many ways, the preference for “real-world deliberation” or “genuine 
deliberation” seems to fall along party fault lines in Nepal. On the internal 
level, the predilection for consensus is influenced by the degree to which 
organizations prioritize their organizational stability, solidarity, and unity, 
whereas intra-party interaction is more straightforward regarding “real-world 
                                                
263 “But for parties to opt for discussion rather than a fight, they must first exist as parties who 
then have to choose between two ways of obtaining their share. Before becoming a preference 
for peace over war, consensus is a certain regime of the perceptible…consensus thus 
presupposes is the disappearance of any gap between a party to a dispute and a part of 
society. It is the disappearance of the mechanisms of appearance, of the miscount and the 
dispute opened up by the name ‘people’ and the vacuum of their freedom. It is: the 
disappearance of politics.” (Rancière 1999: 102) 
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deliberation.” The other factor that informs this preference is rank. Those who 
are in positions of power who are able to affect what the consensus will be 
(mainly the party and student leaders) endorse consensus, while those who 
have more to risk and are more dependent upon possibility are willing to 
support democracy as an electoral form. This raises the issue of autonomy that 
I will address throughout this chapter. I will now turn my focus to the types of 
elections that different student organizations strive for. Through case studies 
of these various types of elections, I will assess what the students perceive as 
the appropriate balance between competition, consensus, and mother-party 
interference in order to maintain a healthy political order.  
Types of Elections  
When I asked a seasoned Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist 
Leninist) (CPN [UML]) party activist about the differences between voting 
and consensus, his explanation was very insightful. It outlined how leadership 
has been traditionally chosen in Nepal’s political organizations. He said,  
In Nepali political history there were three types of 
election systems. One was consensus-based 
election system; the other was the election system 
based on patron-client relationship; and the last 
one was the direct election system. The middle one, 
that is, patron-client relationship, is a defective one. 
The consensus-based system is fine since there is 
no need to go to the election if a consensus can be 
reached as to whom is the most qualified. 
Moreover, it is natural that the voices are raised 
against the person who is not popular and 
dynamic. For this reason, if consensus cannot be 
reached then a direct election system should be the 
alternative and there should not be influence from 
outside. This is the only way to declare a victor; he 
proves to be the most qualified, popular and 
possess the qualities that the voters desire. Our 
protest and critique is directed at the system that, 
in the name of consensus, comes from the basis of 
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patron-client relationship… We are trying to 
abolish the system of the patron inserting his 
client.264  
During the process of the student organizations’ conventions, I have seen all 
these types of elections, but the process of consensus and the one of patron-
client are the most common. As far as I have observed, all the student 
organizations, despite their claims to being operatively democratic, would 
prefer the scenario of clear-cut consensus. As I will demonstrate, consensus 
and the electoral process are not considered mutually exclusive in how 
democratic Nepali political processes are, particularly in organizationally 
internal processes. Consensus provides a sense of communalism that people 
regard as more cohesive than the voting process because it avoids dispute, 
competition, and the risk of breaking organizational harmony. Yet, as I will 
show, the desire for consensus allows the term to be rhetorically manipulated 
in order to mask processes that are seemingly less democratic and ultimately 
undermine the solidarity of the organization.   
The historical precedent of factionalism within Nepali politics 
underscores why people emphasize maintaining group harmony with such 
anxious vigor.  The splintering trend is classified into two categories, 
ideological and personal splits.  The more leftist the political organizations, 
the more likely their split will be an ideological one.  A Maoist student 
defended the communist splits, comparing them to the ideological refinement 
process. He described it to me as a dialectical process that flushes out the 
negative and positive issues. He explained the challenge for the left’s 
evolution has been their ability to discern between truly revolutionary 
assertions, even if they go against the party line, and opportunists’ revisionist 
                                                
264 Translation of an interview with a CPN (UML) central committee member on 1.14.07. 
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assertions. He admitted that there would have been less splits if the party 
leadership were able to accept different opinions.265 This student’s explanation 
of the history of splits and mergers is a historical materialist view, the 
unfolding of a materialist dialect toward the realization of truth that his 
political ideology has taught him.  Nonetheless he was sensitive about the 
predominance of splits in the Nepali communist history, which was apparent 
in his defensive tone. Most leftist students are. I realized this when I asked an 
ANNISU (R) leader a question about the Maoist students’ lifestyle, the tone of 
his response echoed that of the student’s justification that splits were an aspect 
of the dialectical process. He said, 
There are a lot of questions within this single 
question. I think your question is based on reality 
since the Nepali Communist Movement went 
through various merges and splits. But there is a 
basis for this. The negative history of the Nepalese 
Communist Movement was its inability to 
transform its ideology into a lifestyle or political 
program. The Maoists have closely studied this 
because it is our history and it is from there that we 
have cultivated out lifestyle, one that merges our 
ideologies, political programs, and personal 
lives.266  
As I established in the previous chapter, the Maoists do not see the difference 
between their personal and political lives. They have melded their aesthetic 
sense of organization through theory and practice, which is articulated in their 
internal political culture. For this reason, it is useful to contextualize the Left’s 
history of splits and mergers through an ideological lens.  
The Leftists may justify their history of splits as being a process of 
ideological refinement, but the parties who are more centrist or conservative 
                                                
265 Translation of an interview with an ANNISU (R) central committee member on 11.12.06. 
266 Translation of an interview with an ANNISU (R) central committee leader 10.12.07.  
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in their political views see the issue of splits and mergers very differently.  It is 
a more pragmatic approach that elucidates the reality of political survival. 
One ex-student leader broke it down into this nuanced cycle: 
Any cadre working in the student organization, 
whether he belongs to NSU or the ANNFSU, 
knows very well that the party is nothing more 
than the combination of different factions. 
Therefore, they want to ascertain their political 
future by affiliating themselves in one or another 
faction of their respective party.  
What I mean by this is opposition politics, the 
condition of the parties in course of retaliatory 
politics... During this period they serve in a united 
way…It is in this type of situation that the parties 
become a family of sorts and the interests of the 
individuals don’t take priority… But as soon as the 
parties enter the stage of power politics, a new type 
of political culture develops and each party does 
not remain a party. According to my experience, 
the party remains in face a group but in reality it is 
various constituent factions. One who possesses 
the ability to manage the diverse groups becomes 
the leader of the so-called party. Otherwise, the 
party activity is limited in the power sharing and 
power management of different groups within the 
party. This is how the liveliness within the party 
gradually disappears and issues-based discussion 
cease to exist. The reason behind this is that there 
will be some two or three [dominant] factions in 
the party and one has to be the member of either of 
the groups. Politics in this case goes ahead in 
accordance to the consensus and disagreements 
that appear among or between the groups. 
What people come to understand from this system 
is that we can contribute positively only when “I” 
or “my party” remains in power and the society 
will deteriorate if he or his party comes to power. 
This is the understanding of the leadership and it 
circulates the same message down to the bottom of 
the organization. This is what happens when 
parties engage in power politics. 
   292 
On the other hand, when we are in the stage of 
politics of retaliation, the distance between the 
parties is very thin; it seems as if they are not two 
parties but one and they share a history on the 
streets and they don’t differ in their ideology. But 
once they reach to the power politics, they are no 
longer united, and don’t even accept the 
fundamental norms and values of multi-party 
democracy.267 
This student’s description of retaliatory politics versus power politics 
references the livelihood of the party and the political system in which it 
thrives. An example of this was the reunification of the Nepali Congress in 
2007. With the impending constituent assembly election, when Nepali 
Congress was up against the odds of a possible Leftist coalition, they once 
again reunited as a party. This was necessary retaliatory politics that resulted 
from power politics, which had split them in the first place.  Similarly, NC was 
able to maintain unity throughout the Panchayat era despite horrible inter-
party battles because they were not in power, so their survival as an entity 
was contingent upon their unity. The King’s rule in 2001 and 2005 is another 
example of retaliatory politics. This experience of suppression caused the 
parties to identify with one another, which allowed them to maintain street 
coalitions that could not endure once they were in power in parliament.  
This paradigm of retaliatory and power politics can be mapped onto 
Rancière’s distinction between democracy and post-democracy. During the 
times that NC had to fight for its voice on the streets, it was in a place of 
retaliatory democracy where unity in numbers mattered, yet as soon as the 
NC’s position of power was properly reinstituted and it could dictate the 
police logic through post-democratic consensus, it then fell into power 
                                                
267 Translation of an interview with an NSU (K) ex-central committee leader, 11.16.07.  
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politics. I have heard other students say that it was during major party splits 
that the King was able to seize the opportunity for power.  For that reason 
they describe the split within the party as dangerous because they not only 
undermine the party, but history has shown that splits threaten the whole 
multi-party democratic system.268 
 
Figure 25: Joint eight-student union protest declaring a common 
minimum program, Baag Bazaar, Kathmandu, 2004 
Another NC-affiliated student addressed the uncertainty of people’s 
positions within the power structure as a reason for splits.  He explained, 
                                                
268 Translation of an interview with an ANNFSU (Akhil) central member, 11.24.07: “The causes 
behind the splits and the merges are the conspiracies played on the part of the palace, 
deviation in ideological line, and the play of the imperialism. Politics is mainly responsible for 
the making of the state, society, district, etc. The splits that occur in the political parties create 
political instability in the country.” 
Translation of an interview with an NSU (D) ex-central committee leader, 11.28.07 : “The past 
evidence shows that the King imposed his despotic rule at the time when NC got split.… 
Therefore, my opinion is that the parties should not get split. If the parties could go in a 
unified way, the ways of restoring to violence and imposing despotism would come to an 
end. Then the politics of Nepal would follow the path of peace and prosperity.” 
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Splits occur when a leader can no longer accept the 
other as a leader. There is a tendency to cut the 
throat of the nearest rival in the party to ensure 
one’s success for the future. In other words, in the 
absence of realization of political security and 
political justice, the parties have to split. It has had 
a negative impact in Nepalese political culture. If 
the parties had not split, I think that there would 
have been just two parties in Nepal, Nepali 
Congress and Nepal Communist Party. Had there 
been just two parties in existence, it would have 
been far easier to reach consensus and it would 
have reduced violent conflict.269 
Many of the students agree with this student that the splits are 
counterproductive not only to the parties but to the overall system of politics. 
They cite the history of factionalism as the reason that citizens became 
disenfranchised, which led to a decade of violence and extremism on both 
sides.  
The data I have gathered on factionalization informs people’s sense of 
their organization as well as the necessity for coalitions. In a place as diverse 
as Nepal, people need to rely on coalitions in order to survive and have an 
effect.  Yet coalitions dilute the unique identity and stance of all involved. For 
this reason, coalitions exist with common minimum programs. It is important 
to understand this not only on the macro-level of intra-party coalitions but 
also on the level of inter-party coalitions. As these quotes indicate, parties are 
not unified entities but are a group of factions. This explains why Nepali 
political actors prefer consensus as a decision-making process rather than 
vote-casting or real world deliberation.  It not only allows flexibility to push 
power agendas behind the façade of democratic process, but it is necessary in 
order to maintain the integrity of very fragile group structures. This 
                                                
269 Translation of an interview with an NSU (D) ex-central committee leader, 11.28.07. 
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perspective informs the larger theoretical implications of societal makeup, the 
way in which a group becomes a uniquely identifiable group and the role of 
difference interaction. Coalition building is situational, opportunistic, and 
relative. As I established in chapter six in the section on political culture, 
political groups are accepted as being constructed and continually dynamic. I 
will now analyze examples of the different types of elections in order to 
demonstrate the fragility of group cohesion within the electoral process.   
The Gap between “Arranging Things” and “Full Consensus”  
The first district convention that I observed was a prime example of 
what the CPN-UML  leader that I previously quoted would call a patron-client 
election process, but in the name of consensus. It was at this time that I 
realized the transition in people’s verbal patterns and dialogue in order to 
accommodate the proper political process. During the convention people 
would say things “were being arranged” and, once a final decision was made, 
they would say there was a “full consensus.”  The following ethnographic 
analysis demonstrates the flexibility of the term consensus, and how it allows 
political actors to maintain the integrity of the democratic process. 
I had arrived the day before the district convention elections with a 
female NSU (K) vice-president, Risha. Since Risha was running for president 
in the national convention, she was keen to attend district conventions, 
especially districts where she had established relations. This was obviously 
one of them. This district was the district of a female NSU (K) central 
committee member, Tanuja, who Risha was openly promoting. As we arrived, 
we went directly to the NC party office. I was introduced to everyone and we 
had tea. Soon after receiving tea, the students and NC district leaders made us 
aware that they had not yet been able to “arrange things” for the convention 
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the next day. The NC-appointed election committee excused themselves, to 
have another meeting with all the possible candidates so they could agree 
upon a solution. They asked if Risha would like to attend. She declined, 
saying it was not her intention to interfere; she had come to be supportive of 
everyone. Tanuja excused herself, saying she should probably participate to 
see if she could help broker an amicable agreement. As we departed Tanuja 
whispered to Risha, “I’ll represent us.”   
At about ten p.m. that evening, Tanuja arrived at our hotel room very 
stressed. She said that they still had not reached an agreement and that NC 
district leaders were at an impasse with some of the younger students because 
the leaders felt these students did not have the experience to take such key 
leadership positions. The NC leadership preferred to endorse the current 
running president; with the impending constituent assembly election they felt 
that needed to establish reliable leadership. She expressed disgust with the 
NC leaders’ heavy-handedness in this matter and their sense of impunity. She 
felt they were using the election-committee responsibility to ensure that the 
process ran smoothly, as an excuse to interfere. She had sympathy for some of 
the students who had aspirations to compete in the elections. She said,  
They fought so hard for the party during the 
People’s Movement II and have been active all 
through the Movement Against Regression. They 
spent time in jail and in the hospital. They feel 
empowered to serve central roles in this party after 
all they have contributed. This is how they are 
compensated, with doubt over their leadership 
abilities?270  
                                                
270 Transcription of a conversation with an NSU (K) central committee member on 2.9.07.  
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Both of these women felt frustrated by the interference, even though they 
were serving in positions appointed by the NC central leadership. Their 
frustration and the position they held revealed how little autonomy their 
organization has and the extent to which they are beholden to NC party 
leaders.   
The next morning, the meeting began early in order to reach an 
agreement before the delegates came. The convention was supposed to begin 
at nine; by eleven the meeting with the election commission was still 
occurring. Delegates had come from all over the district, some travelling over 
five hours to reach there by nine. At the time when everyone was getting 
hungry, Risha barged into the office and started lecturing the NC leaders. She 
said that if nobody was willing to back down and an agreement could not be 
reached, then they should hold elections and let the students decide. She 
berated them, saying that their behavior showed they had little faith in the 
students of their organization. Within fifteen minutes all the students were 
called into the convention hall to begin the inauguration. At the last minute it 
was announced that they would serve lunch first and then begin. This bought 
the party leaders another hour to push their agenda. By the time the 
inauguration ceremony began, the NC leaders were relieved and the 
candidates were distressed. An agreement had been enforced.   
During her speech, Risha told the students what had been going on. 
She emphasized her point, saying, “You have been called here to participate in 
this democratic process, just as you had been called on to fight to protect our 
democracy. Now you sit here and wait, wait for the leaders to decide for you. 
Is this how we should be democratically running things?”271 When the NC 
                                                
271 Translation of a speech given by an NSU (K) central committee member on 2.10.07. 
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district vice president,272 who was serving as the election committee chair, 
came up to give his speech he acknowledged Risha’s critique but claimed that 
they had reached “full consensus” among all the candidates for the good of 
the NSU (K)’s district committee. He said,  
You have a big responsibility to campaign for the 
constituent assembly elections. This is as important 
as the roles you have served in the past in your 
fight for democracy. You need strong leadership 
right now that has experience. All the candidates 
will get the opportunity to gain that experience 
during this administration.273  
As we were leaving the party office, there was an air of discontent. A tussle 
broke out between some of the students who were supporting a candidate 
who had been sidelined and students who supported the two-term victor. The 
party leaders rushed to break it up. I asked Risha why they had not let the 
matter go to a vote. She called the NC district vice president over and said, 
“Amanda asked why the students were not allowed to vote, please explain it 
to her, sir [older brother].” He responded, “Many of these students are from 
plus-two colleges and are very immature. If we had an election, it could have 
gotten ugly. See, that tussle that we just suppressed is a good example of the 
risks that would be involved in an election process.” After that we talked for a 
while, and the conversation was relatively good-natured because all the 
frustrations had been voiced.  While I was waiting to get a copy of the district 
proposals and report, I was surprised to overhear Risha as she turned to the 
very same NC vice president and say,  
Sir, you know we need thirty three percent female 
representation not only at the country level but 
                                                
272 The NC district vice president is Tanuja’s father. 
273 Translation of a speech given by the NC (K) district vice president on 2.10.07. 
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also in the party and NSU (K). I expect at least fifty 
percent of the delegates you send to the national 
convention from here to be female. It is in your 
power; oversee this to make sure it gets done.274  
He agreed to do so. I was surprised that Risha had spurned him and the 
party’s interference in the convention, but was willing to rely on it when it 
was to her advantage.   
As we were having our last cup of tea with the party leaders at the 
hotel before leaving, the NC vice president seemed exhausted and a bit 
disheartened that things had not gone smoothly. He explained that things 
were not completely worked out and he would need to do some damage 
control in order to ensure that all the aspiring candidates would cooperate 
with the committee president. Throughout the next couple of days on our trip 
to other district conventions, I overheard Risha and Tanuja provide different 
versions of what happened depending on the listener: sometimes they said it 
went well and there was “full consensus,” at others they went into a tirade 
about the district committee’s interference.   
Another example of this sort of manipulation of the term “consensus” 
was right after the 2005 NSU (K) national convention, known as the Pokhara 
scandal that disintegrated into chaos and vandalism. 275 The Nepali Congress 
constituted a selection committee to form an ad hoc NSU central committee to 
                                                
274 Conversation with NSU (K) central committee member and NC (K) district vice president 
on 2.10.07. 
275 During the NSU national conference in 2005, the NSU students clashed after some 
irregularities. The then-appointed president, who was a candidate, was blamed for 
manipulating the list of voting representatives with the support of NC leaders. The clashes 
resulted in serious injuries, vandalism of public property, and the torching of the convention 
hall, causing damages costing over eight million Nepali rupees. The Nepali Congress had to 
cancel the national convention and appoint a new NSU panel, again postponing the national 
convention that had been overdue since 2004. During the 2006 Free Student Union elections, a 
nationwide campus competition that takes place among all the student organizations, NSU 
lost many of its campus strongholds due to the fact that the central committee was ineffective 
and did not represent the sentiment of the NSU students. 
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fill in before they could have the next national convention. This selection 
committee’s responsibility was to work with all the student leaders and ex-
student leaders who had recently been active in order to form a NSU (K) 
central committee. Although everyone refers to the positions as appointed, 
NC made all the current and previous student leaders sign a document 
agreeing that the list of appointments were in the best interest of NSU (K). 
After receiving the signatures of all the key players, NC was able to claim that 
the NSU (K) central committee was consensually formed and play down their 
interference. I confirmed this with Akash, the key ex-student leader, whose 
experience of being sidelined by the party at this convention had sparked the 
riots and vandalism. He explained that this was NC’s regular tactic when they 
dissolve and appoint NSU administrations. They must manufacture a 
consensus among the students since their constitution explicitly states that NC 
will not appoint student leaders. The signed consensus is their loophole. He 
chuckled, saying, “Yeah, I have signed two of those consensus agreements for 
their appointed leaderships, once when they dissolved my committee during 
my general secretary tenure and the second time after I tried to run for 
president.”276 
The discrepancy in the students’ language and the party’s actions 
indicates how they rhetorically manipulate their claims to provide a 
democratic façade. I do not want to assert that this is a cynical practice; rather, 
it is a reaction to a political reality beyond their control. The paternalistic 
anxieties of the NC leaders reveal that they do not feel the students are ready 
to govern themselves. In response, the students have adopted cues that 
indicate democratic aspirations while masking their lack of autonomy. 
                                                
276 Interaction with an ex-NSU (K) central committee member on 3.5.07.  
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Nonetheless, this does impact the students’ political behavior, and how they 
will serve as politicians. They may not only transfer their leaders’ wariness of 
their capabilities onto the generation below them, they are also developing 
sophisticated patterns of rhetoric that blur the boundary between 
intentionality and actuality.  
The Desired “Safe Landing”: “Pure Consensus”  
In order to better understand why people manipulate the word 
“consensus” as an attempt to tag irregular political processes as 
democratically normative, it is important to highlight the anxiety around 
maintaining the image of a clean, healthy democratic process. It is this anxiety 
that compels people to be invested in a “full consensus” outcome. The 
example of what my informants refer to as “pure consensus” demonstrates the 
ability of consensus to strengthen organizational unity.   
A particularly central fixation of the district conventions of the two 
Nepali Student Unions’ ⎯NSU (K) and NSU (D) ⎯was the concept of “safe 
landing.” The NSU (K)’s last national convention is typically referred to as a 
scandal that was not only a black mark for NSU (K) and NC (K), but for the 
institution of student politics⎯a general example of how politics is a “dirty 
game.” Therefore, it was necessary that all the 2007 conventions run smoothly. 
An urgent text I received from a Nepali friend during the NSU (K)’s national 
convention in Chitwan revealed how much was at stake in holding these 
conventions. He texted the morning after an extremely tense day to inquire if I 
was safe because he had just seen footage of the previous day’s scuffle 
between the students and the police.  The students had tried to storm the 
convention office after a rumor spread that the central committee was fixing 
the voter list. He lamented how bad the news coverage was.  He texted, 
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“Don’t they realize that the whole country’s eyes are on Chitwan right now?  
Do they realize how bad this makes them look, let alone the enterprise of 
democratic politics?”277 His worried message signals what all sides can agree 
upon, that the student conventions should not disintegrate into chaos, 
everyone must do whatever is in her or his power to ensure a “safe landing.” 
It is for this reason that there was so much oversight of these conventions by 
the student organizations’ central committee leadership as well as by the 
political parties’ district and central leadership.  
A good example of a “safe landing” was the smooth consensus process 
that I observed at Padma Kenya, the all-female college in Kathmandu.278 I was 
able to sit through the entire convention, including the closed session. 
Throughout the convention, things were pretty chaotic. The female central 
committee member, Risha, who was meant to observe the convention, actually 
oversaw many of the processes that should have been the campus leaders’ 
independent responsibility, including writing the proposals for the convention 
report. What seemed like interference to me was not only tolerated, but also 
appeared normal. In fact, nothing to me seemed to run in an official fashion. 
The whole process resembled family pujas (religious offering ceremonies) that 
I have observed wherein participants have their own ideas of how things 
should be conducted and simultaneously contribute their input, often 
bickering about it. The puja procedure is ultimately a combination of 
everyone’s input, which the most experienced or respected of the family 
decides to incorporate as he or she sees fit. Risha, who is no longer a student at 
                                                
277 Translation of a text interaction on 5.24.07. 
278 The girls from this campus are known to be some of the most active members of all the 
student political processes, particularly during the political agitation of the last few years. This 
campus was one of the main protest zones during the political movement from 2003 to 2006. 
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this campus, seemed to fill this role, coordinating with the most senior of the 
campus leaders who was serving as the moderator.   
When it finally came to nominating the candidates, two were 
nominated. After they registered and someone paid their dues for running, 
the moderator called a break in order to have a discussion with the two 
candidates.279 This discussion happened outside the hall among the 
moderator, the candidates, the soon to be ex-president, and Risha. During the 
discussion, the female delegates were chanting the name of one of the 
candidates in unison. After about ten minutes, the team returned and declared 
consensus: the female candidate who seemed to have obvious support from 
the hall of chanting delegates had won, because the other candidate had 
withdrawn. The crowd enthusiastically cheered, and then the convention was 
over. Different students came up to the victor to congratulate her and thanked 
the other candidate for her respectable withdrawal.  
The moderator told me that the discussion that was held among the 
student leaders and candidates was a bargaining process to establish the new 
campus administration. The candidate who had withdrawn would be 
appointed general secretary by the new president, since it is the president’s 
prerogative to appoint her own cabinet. It would not be surprising if the 
female student who withdrew would be next in line for the presidency, just as 
the student who had won was in line for it from the previous election.  
The campus convention culminated in all of us—delegates, former 
leaders, newly consented leaders, central committee members, and me—
                                                
279 As far as I have observed at the closed sessions that I have attended, all the candidates were 
sponsored. Their supporters contributed a fixed amount to that wing of the organization 
(district or campus). Often, the central committee members (who technically are only there as 
external representatives) solely contributed the money for a specific candidate; which to me 
exhibited a conflict of interest. 
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eating lunch together. The whole process, which was seemingly undemocratic, 
was embraced by all involved as full consensus. Everyone was happy with the 
procedure and the outcome.  Yet this time Risha did not describe it to external 
party leaders as “full consensus.” Rather, I overheard her on the phone 
reporting the election was a “pure consensus,” which she said in English. In a 
sphere that is considered a “dirty game,” using the word “pure” to describe 
something serves as a strong indicator as to how coded political processes are. 
In this context, pure consensus represents a civilized process in which 
everyone is in agreement. It is for this reason that “pure consensus” produces 
such a sense of organizational harmony: it occurs from a united front, 
whereby there are no vying interests and all participants become one in their 
aim of organizational betterment. They are a socially constructed singular 
with no surplus identities (Rancière 1999:124). 
A conversation I had with a few NSU (D) central committee members 
shed light on this procedure of consensus and how people favor it as part of 
their democratic exercise. We were returning from the Nuwakot district 
convention. We had attended the inauguration but decided not to stay for the 
closed session. On the road back, one of the student leaders was receiving 
updates on the convention’s progress by phone. I asked him how many 
candidates had been nominated; he said at the moment it was five or six, the 
nomination process was still occurring. I articulated my surprise that there 
would be so many candidates, as I had heard that there would be no election. 
Another central committee member explained, “The students come forward as 
candidates and state their intentions and then they talk it through. If they have 
the ambition to be president then they will probably be willing to serve 
another position if the delegates don't support them as president.” I 
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commented that as far as I had observed, during and before the closed 
sessions, this scenario is referred to as “arranging things,” and after it was 
arranged, it is referred to as “full consensus.” He responded, “Well, what do 
you expect, us to compete with guns or throw rocks at one another?280 We 
want to create leadership and teams for the betterment of our organization 
that all our delegates will support.”281 His response maintains that 
organizational cohesion should not be jeopardized by democratic competition. 
As I have shown, choosing leadership is an anxiety-ridden process for all 
student organizations during which they cite each other’s blunders and 
failures to justify their own approach to establishing political leadership.   
Direct Elections  
The other option for choosing new leadership is direct elections. This 
procedure is the one that all Nepali political organizations who have 
supported multi-party democracy must contend with as the acceptable form 
of choosing leadership in the liberal democratic model (Dahl 1989). Although 
they recognize it as such, it is not the historically preferred method in Nepali 
political history (Hachhethu 2002). Direct elections occur when an 
organization feels it must demonstrate it is capable of the performance of 
internal elections. It is at those times that liberal democratic values are most 
audible as political claims. In this section, I will analyze the ANNFSU (Akhil)’s 
switch to a direct election style in order to highlight people’s attitudes and 
anxieties concerning political participation.   
For the first time in its forty-one year history, ANNFSU (Akhil) 
instituted a direct election process at its 2006 national convention. In the past, 
                                                
280 He was insinuating that as an organization, NSU (D) is not violent like the Maoists or as 
cutthroat as NSU (K). 
281 Conversation with an NSU (D) central committee member on 3.18.07. 
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the student representatives voted for the national council, which would 
constitute the election commission. This commission, through the process of 
consensus, would choose the top leadership, the president, and members of 
the secretariat. In 2006, all the student representatives directly voted for each 
position, thereby each person gained her or his position through an electoral 
mandate. This is commonly described as a direct election that was carried out 
“from the hall,” which people contrast with the “decision handed down from 
the party.” The institutionalization of this process allowed me to parse out the 
strengths and weaknesses of different forms of political representation.282 
Since 1983, there has been a consistent rift over choosing leadership 
through the election commission. The ANNFSU (Akhil) student leadership 
demanded that they have direct elections and that their mother organization, 
CPN-ML,283 should expand its platform beyond fighting against the despotism 
of the monarchy (for a democratic republic) to include direct democratic 
practices. The student leaders argued that CPN-ML should begin by allowing 
its sister organization the freedom of direct elections. The entire leadership of 
that ANNFSU panel was dismissed because CPN-ML disagreed and 
questioned the students’ abilities, since they had strayed from the party 
                                                
282 Another benefit to the changing of this system is that it provided me a context to 
understand the extent to which (CPN-UML) interferes with and controls its sister 
organization, ANNFSU (Akhil). In my research from 2003-2005, I had tried many different 
ways to indirectly raise this topic without seeming accusatory or cynical of students’ or party 
activists’ political intentions, but it was difficult to collect anything substantial. With this 
institutional change people became more open with me, because direct party interference had 
become the contextual background, the conceptual piece of history that points to how 
ANNFSU (Akhil), and by default, the CPN-UML, have progressed as a democratic entity. I 
received across-the-board quotes, followed by in-depth detail, stating that in the past CPN-
UML decided on the ANNFSU (Akhil) leadership under the pretext of an election commission, 
which was meant to decide the leadership on a consensual basis. 
283 When this issue was raised in 1983, the party was called CPN (ML) and their student 
organization ANNFSU, but it has since split into CPN (ML) and CPN (UML), and ANNFSU 
(ML) and ANNFSU (Akhil) respectively, though both parties trace their history back to the 
original CPN (ML). 
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ideology. This party ideology has survived through the People’s Movement I 
(1990), in which the CPN-ML collaborated with the other parties to fight for 
multiparty democracy. It lasted through the first ten years of active 
democracy. In other words, even though the party that became the CPN-UML  
was contesting in a multiparty, democratic system, it was running the party, 
and by extension its sister organizations, internally by consensus. Consensus 
is the official phrase, but, as I hear, consensus has meant agreeing with the 
leadership’s decisions.284   
Why has this changed? People say that political change can only occur 
incrementally, and this is an example. In 2002, along with every other party, 
CPN-UML had its power torn from it by the King, only to discover a passive 
public that they had disenfranchised. For the next four years, CPN-UML 
fought along with other parties for the reinstatement democracy. It was not 
until the upsurge of public participation during the People’s Movement II that 
the parties actually had the power to change things. In the months after the 
People’s Movement II, the publicly held sentiment was that people’s mandate 
ensured the removal of the King and the reinstatement of democracy. This 
claim was based on the participation of the common masses in the People’s 
Movement II. All the parties had to be sidelined in order to realize that their 
power comes from the people. Therefore, the parties made overtures toward 
                                                
284 It is commonly known that the other large mainstream party, NC, is run by appointment. It 
has elections, but a large percentage of its seats are officially appointed. Furthermore, if the 
election results do not suit the party president, then he puts pressure beforehand to impact the 
results, and if that does not work, he is known for dissolving the entire panel and appointing 
everyone himself (Hachhethu 1992). Since the 1990 democracy, eight of the nine NSU panels 
have been appointed by their mother organization (NC). Not surprisingly, CPN-UML has 
always argued that it is more democratic than NC because it operates on a consensus basis, 
which they feel is democratic at the grassroots. 
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restructuring the political system to be a “pure democracy” or “complete 
democracy” (purna prajatantra).285  
CPN-UML has taken these events seriously and, as a result, it has 
chosen to internally reform itself. One CPN-UML central committee member 
and former student president described it in this way:  
We were struggling for the democratic process. On 
the national level people are considered sovereign, 
and the party members must also be sovereign. 
And they must also have the right to decide. 
Statewide who decides on the president or prime 
ministers? It is the citizens. And in the parties and 
sister organizations, who decides on the 
leadership? It should be the members. This is how 
the democratic process and organizations should 
proceed… Not only at the state level but also at the 
party level things need to be restructured. How do 
we restructure? By guaranteeing all the rights of 
the party members and cadres. This election 
guaranteed all the rights of the student members 
(ANNFSU ((Akhil)). This is the beginning of the 
practice of the democratic process.286  
By making these changes, CPN-UML was not only the first party to show that 
it was internally restructuring itself, but it was also distinguishing itself from 
its political counterpart, the Maoists. In 1983, when CPN (ML) had dissolved 
the ANNFSU leadership for demanding the political agenda of direct 
democracy, the Maoists were a part of the party.287 At that time, they all 
agreed on democratic republic. Yet, today, what the Maoists and CPN-UML 
mean by democratic republic is different. CPN-UML has shown its support for 
representative democracy and a Westminster parliamentary system by 
                                                
285 Although purna prajatantra more accurately translates to “complete democracy,” Nepali 
people would use the English phrase “pure democracy” in their speech. 
286 Translation of an interview with a CPN (UML) central committee member on 10.12.06. 
287 The communist parties of Nepal have one of the most complicated histories of splits and 
mergers (see Thapa and Sijapati 2005). 
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participating in it since its establishment in 1990. During the Maoist People’s 
War, CPN-UML denounced the Maoists’ use of excessive force against the 
state in order to establish a democratic republic. Yet, after the successful peace 
talks of 2007, the rejection of violence no longer served as the distinguishing 
feature between these two parties. CPN-UML has attempted to show this 
difference in its internal political reforms, and through these reforms it claims 
that it is acknowledging the democratic aspirations of the people. Yet it is not 
as simple as it seems. The CPN-UML and, by default, the ANNFSU (Akhil)’s 
embrace of direct democracy and party members’ response to it, hits at the 
base of the internal contradiction that democracy entails, the negotiation of 
interpretation, which is shadowed by the power of influence.   
Both CPN-UML and ANNFSU (Akhil) are keen to claim that their 
ability to restructure is a move from talking (bhanai) about “pure democracy” 
to doing (garai) “pure democracy,” but they also want to avoid what seems 
inevitable to Nepali politicians: if you allow things to go to a vote, then you 
are vulnerable to a complete breakdown of the process through factional 
clashes. As I have demonstrated, people are very sensitive about this 
possibility. The embarrassment of the NSU (K) Pokhara scandal is still fresh in 
people’s minds. The NSU (K)’s actions have shown how deep factionalism can 
weaken the relevance of a party or group. In order to avoid such shame, CPN-
UML and ANNFSU (Akhil) forewent particular procedures that are considered 
key to a direct democratic process during the 2006 ANNFSU (Akhil) 
convention. For instance, the student candidates were not allowed to debate, 
nor were they given an opportunity to express their views or their proposed 
agenda to the crowd of student delegates. I was told that this approach would 
create an unhealthy, competitive spirit. Yet some candidates, who already 
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held high positions in the outgoing central committee, were responsible for 
presenting the various proposed amendments that the student representatives 
supported or rejected through applause in the convention hall. Through this 
procedure particular candidates were granted exposure; this also allowed 
them to position their intentions within their amendment proposals. This 
scenario unwittingly revealed the reality that most student leaders progress 
through the rank and file.   
Since there was not open debate, how did the student delegates choose 
their leadership if they did not know all the candidates’ platforms? I was 
provided with two explanations. The first was media exposure that focused on 
candidates’ actions of political protest during the last five years of political 
agitation. This did not necessarily illuminate their particular political views or 
a proposed agenda for ANNFSU (Akhil), but highlighted their dedication to 
political struggle. Students with whom I spoke cited this as a faulty process of 
media publicity covering the street protests since 2001. One campus leader 
explained that, since the media focuses on those at the forefront, people gain 
publicity based on how many rocks they throw, tires they burn, or how many 
times they get injured or arrested.288 The media does not deliberate over who 
is ideologically sound, who could be a competent leader, or who can organize 
an appropriate political agenda, rather it sensationalizes political spectacle. 
This underscores the structural reality in Nepali politics that the ability to lead 
an agitation is a more valuable political skill than the ability to run a student 
organization, political party, or the government (Snellinger 2007).   
                                                
288 Excerpt from a transcription of a conversation with an ANNFSU (Akhil) campus leader on 
9.26.06. 
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The other way students became informed about the candidates was 
through personal lobbying by individual students, particularly those who 
have a broad influence over groups of students. I was told this lobbying began 
as early as six months before the convention.289 I had witnessed this process, 
and it seemed no different than securing the votes through the patronage 
system that operates during national elections.290 As I observed this, I was not 
expecting people to admit to me that this was how votes were being secured. 
Yet people justified that it was safer than creating open, monitored 
competition because that would officially position the different factions. 
Rather, networking brought things down to the personal level. It was 
unofficial and done in private.  
Furthermore, a number of recognized irregularities occurred, which 
could have cast doubt upon the direct election appeal. Yet neither the 
presidential council nor the losing candidates were willing to officially 
address them. These included unauthorized panel making, direct lobbying by 
the CPN-UML party leaders, and last-minute registration of representatives. 
Panels were forbidden in order to curb factionalism. The CPN-UML leaders 
reasoned that if candidates were only allowed to run individually, then they 
would only campaign for themselves and each candidate would be judged on 
her or his own merits. Nonetheless it unofficially occurred because panel 
making is an efficient way to maximize candidates’ influence; it broadens their 
                                                
289 Translation of an interview with an ANNFSU (Akhil) central committee member on 
10.18.06. 
290 In national elections, historically, it has not been necessary to campaign and reach out to 
individuals; rather, it is a process of patronage. The leaders, the landholders, and business 
owners have to be convinced, typically through favors. Once they are convinced, they can 
guarantee the votes of those they have influence over. But this dynamic changed in the 
Constituent Assembly elections of 2008 whereby the parties were directly targeting voters, 
and the citizens seemed to vote more according to a politically informed personal will than 
according to any social or filial obligations. 
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network. The underhanded process of the CPN-UML party leaders endorsing 
student candidates worked in a similar way. The leaders have a vested interest 
in having students who are within their spheres of influence, holding 
positions of power on the campuses and in the Free Student Union. If they can 
ensure these students’ positions by exerting their own influence, there is 
incentive to do so. In spite of this, lobbying and endorsement are natural to 
the democratic process; they were only irregularities within the context of the 
presidential council’s rules, which from this view, seem to stymie an open 
democratic style.   
The third irregularity was cited as the most worrisome hiccup 
undermining the democratic process. Even though there were fourteen 
hundred representatives chosen in the preparation of the national convention, 
eighteen hundred representatives were registered to vote on the election day. I 
was informed of this by a few losing candidates and it was confirmed by the 
CPN-UML party members who participated in the presidential council. The 
presidential council members warned the candidates not to contest this issue 
because they were wary of the convention disintegrating into chaos. Another 
reason they kept this issue contained was, since inter-organizational 
competition for students’ loyalties was steep, CPN-UML did not want to 
alienate any students who wanted to participate in this process. By cracking 
down, they would have possibly disenfranchised four hundred students from 
future ANNFSU (Akhil) politics. These examples highlight that the external 
perception of a smooth-running democratic exercise was more important than 
democratic integrity itself.  
Participants at this convention claimed that these irregularities 
undermined the convention’s attempt to achieve a sound, unbiased 
   313 
democratic process. Furthermore, many students felt that those who were 
most capable and ideologically sound were not the ones who won. Since the 
process of competition was unmonitored⎯arranged in the back of tea stalls or 
over drinks doling out favors and promises⎯patronage became the 
dominating influence. It was for this reason that some people with whom I 
spoke were questioning the democratic process altogether. They reasoned that 
at the time of the electoral commission consensus, the most capable candidates 
were chosen to lead. Many ANNFSU (Akhil) delegates wondered if the 
student cadres are capable of choosing what is best for the organization, or if 
this is a decision that should be left to the leadership. I was surprised to hear 
such musings from people who had fought so hard to make the 2008 
Constituent Assembly elections possible.  
The considerations of change or maintaining status quo are very much 
a part of how leadership is decided. The masses are typically interested in a 
candidate who can serve them, and can effectuate change in their favor. 
Institutional leaders are attracted to dedication to the party’s ideological 
stance and political mission. Candidates who acknowledge the political 
lineage and their place in it are most appealing or deemed to be ideologically 
most sound in the eyes of the leadership. Through this convention, the 
students came to see the vulnerabilities of a direct election process. They 
realized that ultimately it is a question of which system is more susceptible to 
power and influence. A few of them struggled with this. One student asked 
me, “How can we want democracy for our country when we don’t feel 
comfortable with it in our own organization?”291 This student then admitted to 
me that the hardest reality of democracy is not being able to control the 
                                                
291 Translation of an interview with an ANNFSU central committee member on 11.9.06. 
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outcome, something he admitted that Nepali leaders have a hard time 
accepting. He concluded that it is his generation’s responsibility to become 
comfortable with how electoral politics unfold. This student was coming face 
to face with E. Laclau’s claim that democracy is the “only political form that 
has made undecidablity a constitutive dimension of its narrative on political 
power and authority” (2001:10). Nonetheless, the students have the tools to 
embrace these aspects of democratic form if they put it in the same context 
that they confront their own political position, something that is always 
uncertain, contingent, and ambiguous. When they approach the democratic 
process with the same flexibility they maintain in their political survival, then 
they embody the symbolic resources of the democratic logic, creating new 
political processes within the confines of their historical and cultural context. 
Conclusion: Establishing Mandate  
Through an analysis of the Nepali student organizations’ electoral 
processes, I have revealed pervasive conceptions of democracy in Nepali 
political culture. As I have shown, choosing leadership is an anxiety-ridden 
process for all student organizations; they are caught in an echo chamber 
wherein they cite each other’s blunders and failures as justification for their 
particular political moves. It is a challenge for the student organizations and 
their mother parties to portray active competition within their organizations 
while ensuring that the process does not disintegrate into factionalism. The 
stakes of gaining or the risks of losing political influence in any sector are too 
high. The reality is that democratic competition inevitably results in 
factionalism.292 It is for this reason that the tradition of appointment has been 
                                                
292 Punnett has argued that “other than when a natural vacancy occurs, leadership contests 
should be avoided because they can threaten party unity, provide comfort to the enemy, and 
distract the party from its tasks in government and opposition” (1992: 173). Davies et al. have 
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maintained for so long; dictatorial decisions handed down often secure the 
integrity of a group that is willing to abide the leadership. This consistency in 
leadership also shapes and maintains the identity of the group (Auyero 2001). 
The liberal democratic process, on the other hand, is about everyone’s voice 
mattering; power is supposed to be shared by all, but in practice it often 
results in grabbing by a few and the continual process of convincing others to 
follow (Zakari 1997).   
 
Figure 26: Newly elected campus leaders hoisted during  
an ANNFSU (Akhil) victory rally, Kathmandu 2004 
After observing six national conventions and numerous campus and 
district conventions of the student organizations from 2006 through 2007, I 
constructed a series of questions for the students about the conventions, then 
                                                                                                                                       
referred to this challenge as a “we rather than me in decision-making issue of ancient-modern 
controversy over whether a public-centered perspective can itself be meaningfully separate 
from a private interest” (2005: 607). 
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followed with questions about the Free Student Union elections (FSU) 
(campus-wide elections in which the different student organizations compete 
with each other for seats), and about student organization alliances in order to 
understand how the students make meaning of the inter- and intra-
organizational democratic process. A Maoist student leader reacted to my 
questions by saying,  
Holding the conferences and choosing the 
leadership of the unit committee or the central 
committee are different processes than Free 
Student Union (FSU) elections … Our internal 
election procedure follows a different pattern. The 
election within our organization is the competition 
of those having the same ideology, a common 
program, and they share norms and values. This is 
the competition of a bicycle with a bicycle, a 
motorbike with a motorbike, or car with a car. It is 
an organizational process to determine which bike 
will get us there in the best way. But the FSU 
elections are about how do you prefer to travel, 
bike, motorbike, or car? One should choose 
according to ideological preference. For this reason, 
we think that the two cannot be placed together 
and one cannot draw a conclusion on the basis of 
this comparison.293  
Indeed, how democracy occurs internally is construed very differently than 
what people expect of the larger democratic political system. Yet the 
discrepancies between the two levels elucidate people’s attitudes and 
ambivalent feelings about democratic practice as a societal form. This same 
student leader used this logic to argue in favor of a proportional system as 
opposed to the traditional first-past-the-post system in the FSU elections. This 
was an issue that the Maoists fought for during the People’s War and pushed 
in the constituency assembly election process. Their argument was that it 
                                                
293 Translation of an interview with an ANNISU (R) central committee member on 11.12.06. 
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should be a competition of ideologies, not personalities (or, as it is known in 
liberal democracy, individuals). Furthermore, the proportional system 
encourages all to work with one another rather than have individuals 
squabble over perceived mandates they received for their various positions. 
He argued that a proportional system “will represent all…The representation 
of all the student organizations means collective work; they would work 
together; the programs would be launched after the discussion held in the 
presence of all.”294 His reasoning reveals that the Maoists perceive their 
participation in the constituent assembly as revolutionary. Yet, as I established 
in the first section, the constituent assembly is a post-democratic process, 
which is based on the assumption that they are restructuring the Nepali state 
equally for all citizens. What the Maoists don’t realize is that both the 
proportional and the first-past-the-post system rely on the same premise. 
Everyone is counted in equal fashion, and through that process, the individual 
voices are collapsed into the only decipherable form: a vote. Similar to putting 
all inequalities into the context of class struggle, the voting system removes 
the difference of people’s experience. 
The Maoists chose to embrace the democratic process in the constituent 
assembly elections in order to restructure the constitution, the state and the 
army. Many doubted their sincerity, and everyone underestimated their 
ability to contest successfully. The results were surprising; not even the 
Maoists predicted them. They gained over forty percent of the first-past-the-
post seats and thirty percent of the proportional positions. One activist told 
me that the Maoists won because they used “sam, dam, dhanda, bhed.”295 I 
                                                
294 Translation of an interview with an ANNISU (R) central committee member on 11.12.06. 
295 “Sam (persuasion), dam (economic incentive), danda (coercion), bhed (divisiveness)’ is a 
political proverb that is equivalent to “by hook or crook,” meaning to exhaust all measures for 
a favorable outcome. It has a negative connotation. 
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retorted, “As far as I observed, all the parties attempted ‘sam, dam, dhanda, 
bhed’ in order to win; therefore, the Maoists’ victory must be legitimate.” 
Another student responded, “Sam, dam, dhanda, bhed is the operative style of 
Nepali elections. So I guess you are right, they played by the tradition that 
everyone follows.” He paused, cracked a smile, and continued, “They just did 
it better.”296 It is understandable why people take pause at the prospect of 
direct, internal elections when a proverb such as this describes the operative 
style of politics. Nonetheless, there is a desire to achieve democratic process, 
which has been proven by the rhetorical resonance of the promise made by the 
parties to establish a “pure democracy for new Nepal” after they regained 
power in 2006.  
The Maoist government has attempted to run their government in the 
consensus style that was used by the interim government. As my data has 
shown, this is the style that most Nepali political organizations are most 
comfortable with, at least internally. To attain consensus across ideological 
differences is much more complicated because it involves surplus identities.297 
Yet, within the context of Nepal, it provides a safety measure that direct 
democracy has thus far not provided. “Democratic spontaneity encodes a 
measure of uncertainty and indeterminacy into the operative style of the 
politics” (Connolly 2001: 15). The consensual process, conversely, rules out 
that degree of uncertainty. Most Nepalese would agree that there has been far 
too much uncertainty since the establishment of democracy. Therefore, if this 
                                                
296 Conversation I had with students of various student organizations about the election 
results at a farewell tea party I hosted on 4.15.08. 
297 Rancière posits that the potential for disagreement lies in the fact that consensus is never a 
seeing of eye to eye. The surplus identities inevitably result in the following, “We should take 
it to mean a determined kind of speech situation: one in which one of the interlocutors at once 
understand and does not understand what the other is saying. (it is the conflict of one who 
says white and another who says white but does not understand the same thing in the name 
of whiteness.)” (1999: X). 
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government can make progress, then hypothetical consent of those who are 
not present has been legitimatized through the Constituent Assembly 
elections.  
For this reason, there is some sense to the political actors (including 
UNMIN) reliance upon consensus. The fact that the Constituent Assembly 
was established on a democratic electoral basis,298 which is deeply ingrained 
into the political imaginary of Nepali history, will allow Nepal’s restructured 
state to unfold in the way that has been historically comfortable for all Nepal’s 
leaders. In Nepal’s case, parliamentary politics that attempts to restructure the 
state through consensus-building, looks very attractive after the contentious 
politics of civil war and street protests over the last ten years (Burnell 2006: 
559). Yet during the consensual process of state restructuring people will come 
face-to-face with the following truth again: 
Equality turns into the opposite the moment it 
aspires to a place in the social or state organization.  
Intellectual emancipation accordingly cannot be 
institutionalized without becoming instruction of 
the people, in other words, a way of organizing the 
eternal minority. The two processes must remain 
absolutely alien to each other, constituting two 
radically different communities even if composed 
of the same individuals, the community of equal 
minds and that of social bodies lumped together by 
the fiction of inequality. (Rancière1999: 32) 
Chantal Mouffe articulates the same critique of consensus in liberal 
democracy, arguing that it crystallizes power relations; it is an artifact that is 
produced by and produces hegemony (2000: 49). When Nepali citizens realize 
this, then the political pendulum will swing back into that action of āndolan, 
                                                
298 Although there is popular sentiment that the current constituent assembly no longer 
represents the electoral mandate because the Maoist prime minister resigned and Madhav 
Kumar Nepal of the CPN (UML) was appointed the interim prime minister in the fall of 2009.  
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and people will again question the policing logic and distribution of the 
sensible that is attempting to restructure the Nepali state. For this has been the 
cycle of politics in Nepal. 
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EPILOGUE 
When I returned to Nepal in the fall of 2009, many people asked me if I 
had finished my dissertation. This was a sensible question; I had been gone for 
a year. When I explained that I was finishing up, most people’s next inquiry 
echoed Prabat’s, who at the CPN-UML’s Dasain tea party asked me, “So, what 
is your conclusion? What is the solution for Nepali politics?” Currently many 
people are struggling to find political solutions in Nepal. The constituent 
assembly has had to extend the deadline for drafting the constitution and it is 
common knowledge that the parties have yet to agree on the most basic 
premises. The Maoist prime minister has resigned, and there has been 
palpable fear that the constituent assembly government will fall apart. My 
research spanned the transformation of the Nepali state. My dissertation 
writing process has run parallel to the ongoing constituent assembly. It makes 
sense that my analysis might offer a solution that people are so desperately 
seeking.  
Yet that has not been the intention of this dissertation. I replied to 
Prabat, “I don’t have a conclusion. Can there be a conclusion to Nepali 
politics? Anyway it was never my intention to offer solutions. You are always 
railing against foreign intervention. No, all I have to offer are some theories 
and my view of Nepali political culture.” He looked at me and repeated, 
“Theories…I see. So what is your theory on why politics never moves ahead?” 
I replied, “Well, what I can tell you is that game theory does not exist in 
Nepal.” I then asked him if he knew what game theory was and he admitted 
he did not. I explained it to him, and then extrapolated with the following 
metaphor, “Take Kathmandu traffic as an example. Deadlock is so common 
and people only focus on how to move their own vehicle forward. People 
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don’t consider that giving way to someone else may get traffic flowing and in 
turn they can proceed.” He nodded knowingly. His explanation for this was 
one that I often heard. He explained that no one in Nepali politics is far-
sighted (dūradarshitā) or transparent (pāradarshitā). Therefore nobody knows 
how to give way in a form that will ensure one’s own benefit in the long run, 
let alone the country’s benefit. He continued asserting that everyone yearns 
for consensus but no one knows how to compromise. He stopped to think and 
he said, “You notice that nobody makes eye contact while driving? If you did 
then it would be rude not to give way. In politics, nobody thinks beyond what 
benefits their party; if they considered others then it would be unethical not to 
strive for the benefit of all.” He paused and his eyebrows rose as if he was 
making a connection. “Perhaps that is why they are not far-sighted.” Then he 
sighed and said, “Ke garne? [What to do?]” 299  
The basic assumption of game theory is that there is a certain system, 
rules and institutions, on which one can rely and strategically compromise or 
give way in a manner that moves the process ahead while ensuring one’s own 
progression. Prabat’s final lament, “Ke garne,” reveals why game theory is not 
prevalent in Nepali politics. This phrase is ubiquitous in Nepali culture. It is 
an expression of resignation, recognizing what is outside one’s control. I 
myself am surprised to find how much I use this phrase in Nepal. I rarely 
express such a sentiment in my life in America, where I have the common 
entitled expectation that I am mainly in control; for the most part I can make 
things happen. For many reasons there is a lot less certainty in Nepal. This 
dissertation highlights the basis for the uncertainties that exist in Nepali 
                                                
299 Based on an interaction with an ANNFSU (Akhil) student on 9.27.09 during the CPN-UML 
Dasain tea party. 
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politics. I demonstrate that uncertainty is not a hopeless endeavor but rather a 
fact of political life. Nepali student activists have found belonging in the 
political uncertainty that they experience and have established political modes 
of being like speculation and frame their lives in the metaphor of service and 
sacrifice, as I framed it in chapter two. This analysis highlights that politics for 
the students is not a rational process of liberal democracy but rather one of 
sociality, which provides them a sense of meaning.  
I earnestly meant what I said to Prabat regarding a conclusion. I can’t 
imagine there being a conclusion in or about Nepali politics because it is an 
ongoing, ever-emerging process. Throughout this dissertation I have sought to 
demonstrate how Nepali political actors postpone their endpoint. They 
suspend conclusion because they do not want to foreclose the possibility that 
their political life entails, a life on which their identity and networks are based. 
Their abeyance creates feedback loops, which entrench practices that have 
created a culture, as I demonstrate in chapter six. As new generations enter 
into this culture they are compelled to underscore their own possibility, which 
is defined by their future orientation as tomorrow’s power brokers, as the 
analysis in chapter four indicates. I have attempted to craft an open-ended 
analysis that captures the Nepali political process and its historical 
underpinnings as one of ongoing contestation of what is and ought to be and 
how it informs the lives of Nepali citizens, particularly in chapter three. My 
analysis has been an endeavor to capture the aesthetic form that political 
culture takes in order to ascertain the parameters of Nepali political imaginary 
without foreclosing its own possibility.  
Rather, I have provided a culturally focused study of Nepali politics, 
which I feel is particularly relevant in the current context while Nepal remains 
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on the radar of international monitoring groups. Nepal has had a history of 
aid dependency since the 1960s. But since 2006 it has relied on international 
bodies—such as the United Nations Mission in Nepal, The National 
Democratic Institute, and The Carter Institute—to prevent it from becoming a 
failed state. In a sense the “world police” have been actively present in Nepal. 
It is important that international bodies maintain a nuanced understanding of 
Nepali politics as they continue to negotiate and support particular policies 
and political processes in Nepal—particularly the Nepali political predilection 
for “consensus” and its cultural underpinnings (chapter seven). In this regard 
I agree with Rancière’s conclusion of Disagreement when he posits, 
There is a world of police and it can sometimes 
achieve some good. But there is no world politics. 
The “world” can get bigger. The universal of 
politics does not get any bigger. There remains the 
universality of the singular construction of 
disputes, which has not more to hope for from the 
newfound essence of a globalization more 
essentially “worldwide” than simple identification 
of the universal with the rule of law. We will not 
claim, as the “restorers” do, that politics has simply 
to find its own principle again to get back its 
vitality. Politics, in its specificity, is rare. It is 
always local and occasional. (ibid: 139) 
Anthropology is a discipline that relies upon context, of which the local and 
occasional are major aspects. From this perspective my study informs how 
“global categories” actually play out in Nepal, the way they are perceived and 
the way they are used to support or undermine authoritative norms. 
Anthropology’s origin was framed by the scientific claims Malinowski 
used to define the discipline. Through our trusted methodological form of 
ethnography we have aspired to capture “the native’s point of view, his 
relation to life, to realize his vision of his world” (Malinowski 1984 [1922]: 25). 
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Yet as Gregory Bateson (1958 [1936]) has demonstrated, culture cannot be 
contained by empirical facts; what can be measured, monitored, described, or 
classified does not tell the whole story, as we understand it. For anthropology, 
culture is the extent of the story, but it also expands beyond what we can 
apprehend or represent. For this reason, ethnography is an ever-developing 
form that is grounded in objective observation but tries to also surpass 
empirical boundaries in order to provide a more nuanced picture of our 
analytic.  
This aspect of ethnography is similar to politics: both are 
simultaneously framed by and obviate the real in order to capture the 
relevant. The difference between ethnography and politics is that ethnography 
tries to avoid reifying its analytic in order to avoid limiting its possibility, 
whereas politics continually reifies its focus in order to exploit its possibility—
recall the difference in the way politics and anthropology deploy the category 
of youth (chapter four). Furthermore, as I demonstrated through my analysis 
of politics as a mode of being (chapter two) and the aesthetics of organization 
(chapter six), anthropology is meant to extend our knowledge and politics is 
meant to frame it. In anthropology it is through culture that we see epistemic 
possibilities, and it is epistemic development that allows us to apprehend 
culture in new forms. This is what Hiro Miyazaki has defined as the analytic 
of hope (2004). In politics, hope is both a non-conclusive orientation and a tool 
that envisions the possible horizon, for it is the “category of the possible” 
(Rancière1999: 129). In this dissertation I maintain the tension between 
possibility and undecidability in order to demonstrate the diverse ways that 
my interlocutors envision playing the democratic game.  
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Yet I do not think the abeyance of finality is anything novel to Nepali 
politics (nor is it specific to anthropology). Nepali politics demonstrates the 
implicit paradox of democratic politics.300 Politics is the social aspiration for 
the whole to encompass all of its parts, to create the demos in which all voices 
are heard. But if citizens want to avoid their individual particularities being 
erased into an abstract singular of citizen, then politics can only be a 
contentious pursuit involving the politics of recognition (Rancière 1999: 14). 
Indeed, as I demonstrated in chapter five, “Politics is the art of warped 
deductions and mixed identities” (ibid: 139). It is the venue in which people 
and groups stake their claim, which is continually taking new form in Nepal. 
There is potential for change, because as I argued in chapter seven, 
democracy’s logic embodies the symbolic resources for new political 
processes. Yet as this study demonstrates, the political processes have 
unfolded in an entrenched cultural and socio-historical context, which has 
limited innovation in favor of tradition and the maintenance of group identity. 
This in turn has encouraged ongoing political contestation in the form of 
āndolan, as the means to apprehend new forms sociality and the political. I 
view Nepali politics as the perpetual process of incorporating new symbolic 
resources into the political conversation as an attempt to effectuate change. 
My study focuses on this process as a generational process.  
                                                
300 Chantal Mouffe argues that the democratic paradox exists because politics is a socially 
contingent process of differing between “us” and “them.” This is revealed in the 
incompatibility between the liberal and democratic traditions. Liberalism is based on the rule 
of law that defends human rights and individual liberty.  Democracy is about equality and the 
process of governing according to popular sovereignty.  She argues it has been dangerous for 
proponents of liberal democracy to gloss over the tensions of these two traditions, and cast 
liberal democracy as a rational solution for societal harmony.  Nonetheless, she does not go as 
far as Carl Schmitt who argues that liberal democracy is impossible (1996 [1976]).  Rather, she 
feels that a liberal democratic system is possible if we acknowledge the inherent tensions 
between the two logics and embrace them as agonistic pluralism, in which all the members of 
the demos are equally respected as sharing the same symbolic space. (2000: 4-10)  
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A good example of the students’ potential for inclusive democracy is 
the line from a NSU (K) student leader’s speech during the constituent 
assembly campaign that I analyzed in chapter six: “I do not agree with 
Prachanda’s politics, but I will fight to the death for his right to do politics that 
I don’t agree with.”301 Even though the Nepali Congress is wary of the 
Maoists’ political agenda and institutional culture, they view the Maoists as 
worthy contenders in the political field. This has been the case since the seven-
party unity and the Maoists forged the 2006 joint-agreement, in which the 
Maoists agreed to come into the political mainstream and support constituent 
assembly elections. At that time the relationship between the Maoists and the 
mainstream parties shifted from enemies to adversaries. Chantal Mouffe 
argues that an adversary is different from an enemy, because it is someone not 
to be destroyed, but rather “somebody whose ideas we combat but whose 
right to defend those ideas we do not put into question” (2000: 102). As this 
student’s quote indicates, the Maoists are legitimate enemies, with whom they 
can at least agree on the structure of the political and how it is to be 
contended.302  
This recognition of other parties as necessary competitors in the 
political arena shows that the potential for democracy is strong in Nepal. But 
as my analysis indicates, political actors need to embrace the antagonism 
                                                
301 Translated excerpt from constituent assembly speech given by an ex-NSU (K) student 
leader and current constituent assembly member, 2.23.08. For more analysis of this quote see 
chapter six, section: Differentiating: The Parameters of Political Culture. 
302 When one considers the history of political coalitions and inter-party splits and merger in 
Nepali political history, it becomes apparent that the shift between enemy and adversary is a 
fluctuating one. For instance, the Maoists were the enemies of the state during the People’s 
War from 1996 and 2006. It only became a viable adversary after the joint agreement with the 
political parties in 2006. The relationship with the monarchy has also shifted from enemy to 
adversary and back again. By 2006 the monarchy had become the official enemy of the 
democratic parties when it was apparent that there was no room to safeguard the political 
party system and have an active monarchy.  
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inherent in democratic politics rather than pushing for consensus in order to 
ensure “safe landing,” which only produces negative feedback loops that 
alienate political actors (chapter seven). In other words, it needs to be 
recognized that the constitutive dimensions of democracy cannot be overcome 
but rather need to be negotiated in new ways (Mouffe 2000: 5). One way this 
can be done is by focusing on commonality instead of homogeneity. The 
tradition of the “common minimum program” amongst political coalitions 
contains this potential (chapter seven). Moreover, denying antagonism creates 
enemies, which leads away from the possibility of democratic interaction 
(ibid: 12). 
In closing, Nepali political culture is encompassing; it impacts most 
sectors of Nepali life in varying form. This study is a provisional focus on one 
of the sister organizations to the mainstream parties. Nonetheless, it covers a 
large span. Throughout my fieldwork I struggled with how to balance and 
represent larger Nepali political culture based on my own ethnographic work 
in a way that captures the spirit of Claude Levi-Strauss’s distinction for 
anthropology as a social science discipline. He argued that the anthropological 
task is not to reduce complexity but to make it more comprehensible. This 
dissertation has tried to keep the complexity of Nepali student politics at the 
forefront of its interpretive endeavors; my ambition has been to make that 
complexity comprehensible in order to contribute a nuanced view of Nepali 
political culture.  
   329 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abblemann, N. 1996. Echoes of the Past, Epics of Dissent. Berkeley: University of 
California.  
Abrams, P.1988. “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977).”  Journal 
of Historical Sociology 1: 58-89. 
Ackermann, L., T. Feeny, J. Hart and J. Newman. 1997. Understanding & 
Evaluating Children’s Participation: A Review of Contemporary 
Literature. Report for Plan UK/Plan International 
Adams, V. 1995. Tigers of the Snow and Other Virtual Sherpas. Princeton. NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Adler, P. and P. Adler. 1998. Peer Power: Preadolescent Culture and Identity. New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
Agamben, G. 1993. The Coming Community. Michael Hardt (trans.). 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Ahearn, L. 2001. Invitations to Love: Literacy, Love Letters, & Social Change in 
Nepal. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Alexander, J. 2004. “Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma.” In Cultural 
Trauma and Collective Identity, Jeffrey Alexander (ed.), pp. 1-30. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Altbach, P. 1967. “Students and Politics.” In Student Politics, S.M. Lipset (ed.), 
pp. 74–96. New York: Basic Books. 
Amit-Talia,V. 1995. Conclusion to Youth Cultures: A cross-cultural Perspective, V 
Amit-Talai and H. Wulff (eds.), 223-237. NY: Routledge 
——2001. The Study of Youth Culture: Why it’s Marginal, but Doesn’t Need to 
Be So. EUROPAEA: Journal of the Europeanists 7 (102): 145-154. 
Arendt, H. 1958. The Human Condition: A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing 
Modern Man. New York: Doubleday. 
——[1963] 1965. On Revolution. London: Penguin Books. 
Aronson, R. 1999. “Hope After Hope.” In Hope and Despair, A. Mack, (ed). 
Special issue of Social Science Research 66 (2): 471-494. 
Asad, T. 2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, and Modernity. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Assies, W; Salman, T. 2000. “Re-visioning cultures of politics - An essay on 
social movements, citizenship and culture.” Critique of Anthropology, 20 
(3): 289-307. 
Auyero, J. 2001. Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy 
of Evita. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.   
   330 
Averill, J. R. 1996. “Intellectual Emotions.” In The Emotions: Social, Cultural and 
Biological Dimensions, R. Harré and W.G. Parott (eds.), pp: 24-39. 
London: Sage Publications. 
Bangstad, S. 2009. “Contesting secularism/s: Secularism and Islam in the work 
of TalalAsad.” Anthropological Theory 9(2): 188-208. 
Baiocchi, G. and B.T. Connor. 2008. “The Ethnos in the Polis: Political 
Ethnography as a Mode of Inquiry,” Sociology Compass, 2 (1): 138-55.  
Baral, L.R.. 1995. “The 1994 Elections: Emerging Trends in Political Parties.” 
Asian Survey 35(5): 426-440. 
Bateson, G. 1935. “Culture Contact and Schismogenesis.” Man 35: 178-183. 
——1958[1936]. Naven: The Culture of the Iatmul People of New Guinea as Revealed 
through a Study of the “Naven” Ceremonial. Second edition. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. Battaglia, D. 1997. “Ambiguating Agency: 
The Case of Malinowski’s Ghost.” American Anthropologist 99 (3): 505-
510. 
Baudrillard, J. 1998. “In the Shadow of the Millennium (Or, the Suspense of 
the Year).” Critical Theory online at: ctheory.net/text_file.asp?pick=104.   
Benedict, R. 1934. Patterns of Culture. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Benhabib, S. 1986. Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of 
Critical Theory. NY: Columbia University Press. 
Benjamin, W. 1992 [1973]. “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” In 
Illuminations, Harry Zohn, trans., pp. 253-265. London: Fontana Press. 
Bennett, L.1983. Dangerous Wives and Sacred Sisters: Social and Symbolic Roles of 
High Caste Women in Nepal. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 
Berliner, D. 2005. “An ‘Impossible’ Transmission: Youth Religious Memories 
in Guinea-Conakry.” American Ethnologist 32 (4): 576-592. 
Bista, D. B. 1991. Fatalism and Development: Nepal’s Struggle for Modernization. 
Calcutta: Orient Longman. 
Bloch, E. 1986 [1959]. The Principle of Hope. Volume 1. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
——2000 [1964]. The Spirit of Utopia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
——1998 . Literary Essays. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Bloch, J. Chang. 2005. “Nepal: The End of Shangri-La.” Liberal Democracy Nepal 
Bulletin 1(1): 1-13. University of New Mexico Nepal Study Center. 
Boaz, F. 1962 [1928]. Anthropology and Modern Life. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc. 
Bohara, A., N. Mitchell, and M. Nepal. 2006. Opportunity, Democracy, and the 
Exchange of Political Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(1): 108-
128. 
   331 
Bohman, J. 1996. Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Borgenson, J. 2005. “Judith Butler: On Organizing Subjectivities.” In 
Contemporary Organization Theory. Campbell Jones and Rolland Munro, 
eds. 63- 79. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing. 
Borre, O., Sushil R. P. and Chitra K.T.  1994. Nepalese Political Behavior. New 
Delhi: Sterling Press. 
Bourdieu, P. 2000. Pascalian Meditations, R. Nice (trans.). Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. and J.-C. Passeron. 1979 [1964]. The Inheritors: French Students and 
Their Relation to Culture. Translated by R. Nice. Chicago: University 
Press. 
Boyden, J. (1997) Childhood and the policy makers: a comparative perspective 
on the globalization of childhood. In Constructing and Reconstructing 
Childhood. James, A. & Prout, A., eds., pp. 190-215. 2 ed. London, 
Routledge and Falmer. 
Braungart R. G. and M. M. Braungart. 1986. “Life-Course and Generational 
Politics.” Annual Review of Sociology 12: 205-231. 
Breines, W. 1989. Community and Organization in the New Left, 1962-1968: The 
Great Refusal. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
Bryant, R. 2004. Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus. 
London: I.B. Tauris. 
Brubaker, R. 1996. Nationalism Reframed - Nationhood and the National Question 
in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bucholtz, M. 2002. “Youth and Cultural Practice.” Annual Review of 
Anthropology 31: 525-552. 
Burghart, R. 1984. “The Formation of the Concept of Nation-State in Nepal.” 
Journal of Asian Studies 44(1): 101-125. 
Burnell, P. 2006. “Autocratic Opening to Democracy: Why Legitimacy 
Matters,” Third World Quarterly, 27 (4): 545-62.  
Chalmers, R. 2003. 'We Nepalis': Lanugage, Literature and the Formation of a 
Nepali Public Sphere in India, 1914-1940. PhD Thesis. London: School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
Chatterjee, P. 1993 [1986]. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A 
Derivative Discourse? New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Chuang, YC. 2004. “Democracy in Action - The Making of Social Movement 
Webs in Taiwan.” Critique of Anthropology 24 (3): 235-255. 
Cole, J. 2004. “Fresh Contact in Tamatave, Madagascar: Sex, Money, and 
Intergenerational Transformation.” American Ethnologist. 31(4): 573-588. 
   332 
Cole, J. and D. Durham (eds). 2007. Generations and Globalization: Youth, Age, 
and Family in the New World Economy. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. 
Connolly, W. 2001. “Politics and Vision.” In Democracy and Vision, A. 
Botwinick and W. Connolly (eds.), pp: 3-24. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
Cornwall, A. 1996. “Men, Masculinity and ‘Gender in Development.’” Gender 
and Development 5(2): 8-13. 
Cornwall, A. and N. Lindisfarne. 1994. "Dislocating Masculinity: Gender, 
Power and Anthropology." In Dislocating Masculinities: Comparative 
Ethnographies, Cornwall and Lindisfarne (eds.), pp: 11-47. London: 
Routledge. 
Corrigan, P. and D. Sayer. 1985. The Great Arch: English State Formation as 
Cultural Revolution. London: Basil Blackwell. 
Crapanzano, V. 2004. Imaginative Horizons: An Essay in Literary-Philosophical 
Anthropology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Czarniawska, B. 2005. “Karl Weick: Concepts, Style and reflection.” In 
Contemporary Organization Theory. Campbell Jones and Rolland Munro, 
eds. 267-278. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing. 
Dahal, D. R.  2006. “Social Composition of the Population, Caste/Ethnicity 
and Religion in Nepal.” In Population Monograph. C.B.O. Statistics, Vol. 
1. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Dahl, R.A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University 
Press.  
Dangi, S. K.. 2007.  Sangharshaka Sathi Barsha: Neplai Bidhyarthi Āndolan ko 
Gaurabshali Itihas. Kathmandu: Haidal Press. 
Davies, B.; K. Blackstock and F. Rauschmayer. 2005. ‘“Recruitment,” 
“composition,” and “mandate” issues in deliberative processes: Should 
we focus on arguments rather than individuals?” Government and policy 
(Environment and planning collection), 23 (4): 599-615.  
Davies, B.; K. Blackstock and F. Rauschmayer. 2005. ‘“Recruitment,’ 
‘Composition,’ and ‘Mandate’ Issues in Deliberative Processes: Should 
We Focus on Arguments Rather Than Individuals?,” Environment and 
planning collection: Government and Policy, 23 (4): 599-615. 
Deneen, P. J. 1999. “The Politics of Hope and Optimism: Rorty, Havel, and the 
Democratic Faith of John Dewey.” Social Research 66(2): 577-609. 
Des Chene, M. 1996. “Ethnography in the Janajati-yug: Lessons from Reading 
Rodhi and Other Tamu Writings.” Studies in Nepali History and Society 
1(1): 97-162.  
   333 
Dewey, J. 1892. “Christianity and Democracy.” In The Early Works of John 
Dewey (EW), Volume 4. Carbondale IL: University of Southern Illinois 
Press. 
——1934. A Common Faith. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Dixit, K. 2005. “Nepal’s Terror Alert.” Foreign Policy, 150: 96-98. 
Dixit, S. 2002. “Education, Deception, State and Society.” In The State of Nepal, 
K. M. Dixit and S. Ramachandaran, eds., pp.193-211. Kathmandu: 
Himal Books. 
Djilas, M. 1957. The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System. New York: 
Praeger. 
Doolin, D. and P. Goolas. 1964. “On Contradiction in the Light of Mao Tse-
Tung’s Essay, ‘On Dialectical Materialism.’” China Quarterly 19 (1964) 
38-46. 
Dubin, J. 2004. “Nepal: End of Shangri-la.” Newsweek International Edition 
(November 22, 2004): 54-55. 
Durham, D. 2004. “Disappearing Youth: Youth as a Social Shifter in 
Botswana.” American Ethnologist 31(4): 589-605. 
Edelman, M. 2001. “Social Movements: Changing Paradigms and Forms of 
Politics.” Annual Review of Anthropology 30: 285-317. 
Elias, N. 1978. The Civilizing Process (vol. 1). The History of Manners. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Escobar, A. 1992. “Culture, Practice, and Politics: Anthropology and the Study 
of Social Movements.” Critique of Anthropology, 12 (4): 395-432.  
——1992a. “Culture, Economics, and Politics in Latin American Social 
Movements: Theory and Research,” In The Making of Social Movements 
in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy, A. Escobar and S. 
Alvarez (eds.), pp.62-85. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
——1992b. “Culture, Practice, and Politics: Anthropology and the Study of 
Social Movements.” Critique of Anthropology 12 (4): 395-432.  
Evans, R. 2009. “Innocent Children” or “Frustrated Youth?”: The Impact of 
Political Conflict and Displacement on Bhutanese Refugee Concepts of 
Childhood and Youth. Studies in Nepali History and Society 14(1): 143-
178. 
Evans-Prichard, E.E. 1940. The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and 
Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Faiman-Silva, S. 2002. “Students and a “Culture of Resistance” in 
Provincetown’s Schools.” Anthropology & Education Quarterly 33(2): 198-
212. 
Fearon, J.D. 1998. Deliberation as Discussion: New Directions for Democratic 
Reform. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
   334 
Ferguson, J. 2000. Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Fisher, W. 2001. Fluid Boundaries: Forming and Transforming Identity in Nepal. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Fong, V. (2004) Filial Nationalism among Chinese teenagers with Global 
Identities, American Ethnologist 31(4): 631-648. 
Forbes, A.A. 1999. “Mapping Power: Disputing Claims to Kipat Lands in 
Northeastern Nepal.” American Ethnologist 26(1): 114-138.  
Fornäs, J. 1995 “Youth, Culture and Modernity.” In Youth Culture in Late 
Modernity. Edited by J. Fornas and G. Bolin. London: Sage. 
Fortes, M. 1958. The Structure of Unilineal Descent Groups. American 
Anthropologist IV:17-41. 
——1959. “Decent, Filiation and Affinity: A Rejoinder to Dr Leach.” Man 59: 
193-197, 206-212. 
——1969. Kinship and the Social Order. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard,E.E. 1940. “Introduction.” In M. Fortes and 
E.E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), African Political Systems, pp. 1-23. London: 
Oxford University Press. 
Foucault, M. 1972. The Archeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language. 
A.M. Sheridan Smith (trans.). New York: Pantheon. 
Friedl, E. 2002 Why Are Children Missing from Textbooks? Anthropology News 
43(5):19.  
Fujikura, T. 2001. Discourses of Awareness: Notes for a Criticism of 
Development in Nepal. Studies in Nepali History and Society 6(2): 271-
313. 
——2003. “Role of collective imagination in the Maoist Conflict in Nepal.” 
Himalaya 1: 21-30.  
Fung, A. 2003. “Survey article: Recipe for public spheres – Eight institutional 
design choices and their consequences.” Journal of political philosophy, 11 
(3): 338-67.   
Fung, A. and E.O. Wright. 2002. “Thinking about Empowered Participatory 
Governance,” In Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in 
Empowered Participatory Governance, A. Fung and E.O. Wright (eds.), pp: 
3-42. London: Verso Press.  
Fürere-Haimendorf, C.V. 1964. The Sherpas of Nepal: Buddhist Highlanders. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Gaenszle, M. 2000. Origins and Migrations: Kinship. Mythology and Ethnic 
Identity among the Mewahang Rai of East Nepal. Kathmandu: Mandala 
Book Point.  
   335 
Gellner, D.N. 2003. “From Cultural Hierarchies to a Hierarchy of 
Multiculturalisms: the Case of the Newars of Nepal.” Ethnic Revival and 
Religious Turmoil in the Himalayas. M. Lecomte-Tilouine and P. Dolfuss, 
eds. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 73-131. 
—— 2003b. “Introduction: Transformations of the Nepalese State.” In 
Resistance and The State: Nepalese Experience, edited by D. Gellner, 1-30. 
New Delhi: Social Science Press. 
——2007. “Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal.” Economic and Political 
Weekly 42(20): 1823-1828. 
Gellner, D.N., ed. 2003. Resistance and the State: Nepalese Experiences. New 
Delhi: Social Science Press.  
Gellner, D.N., J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, and J. Whelpton, eds. 1997. Nationalism and 
Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary 
Nepal. Amsterdam: Harwood Publishers.  
Gertz, C. 2000. Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Giri, A. 1992. “Understanding Contemporary Social Movements.” Dialectical 
Anthropology 17 (1): 35-49.  
Gledhill, J. 2000. Power and Its Disguises: Anthropological Perspectives on Politics. 
London: Pluto Press. 
Godelier M. 1986. The Making of Great Men: Male Domination and Power among 
the New Guinea Baruya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Godelier M., Strathern M., eds. 1991. Big Men and Great Men: Personifications of 
Power in Melanesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gramsci, A. 1924. “Against Pessimism” L'Ordine Nuovo: Rassegna 
Settimanale di Cultura Socialista 15 March 1924. Reprinted in Antonio 
Gramsci: Selections from Political Writings (1921-1926), edited and 
translated by Quintin Hoare. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978. 
——1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Translated and edited by Q. 
Hoare and G.N. Smith. New York: International Publishers. 
Greenhouse, C. J. 1996. A Moment’s Notice: Time Politics Across Cultures. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Grossman, J. 2004. “Memory, Youth, Hope: Features of Youth Activism in the 
Last Years of the Apartheid.” Socialist History, special edition: Youth, 
Culture and Politics (26): 59-83. 
Guha, R. 1982. “On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India.” In 
Sublatern Studies 1: Writings on South Asian History and Society, R. Guha 
(ed.) pp: 6-10. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
––––1983. Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
   336 
––––1989. “Dominance without Hegemony and its Historiography.” In 
Subaltern Studies VI: Writings on South Asian History and Society, R. 
Guha, pp: 210-309.  Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Guneratne, A. 2002. Many Tongues, One People: The Making of Tharu Identity in 
Nepal. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Gunther, R. and L. Diamond. 2003. “Species of Political Parties: A New 
Typology.” Party Politics 9(2): 167-199. 
Gutmann, A. and D. Thompson. 1996. Democracy and Disagreement. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap.  
––––2004. Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.  
Habermas, J. 1984. Theory of Communicative Action. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
––––1990. “Discourse Ethics” in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 
pp: 43-116. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Hachhethu, K. 1992. “Nepali Congress: Issues of Inner-Party Democracy.” In 
South Asia: Democracy and the Road Ahead, L.B. Baral (ed.). pp: 40-67. 
Kathmandu: Political Science Association of Nepal. 
––––2000. “Nepali Politics: Political Parties, Political Crisis and Problems of 
Governance.” In Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal, 
Dhruba Kumar ed. Kathmandu: CNAS/TU. 
––––2002. Party Building in Nepal: Organization, Leadership, and People. 
Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 
––––2002a. Party Building in Nepal: Organization, Leadership, and People. 
Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 
––––2002b. “Political Parties and the State.” In Resistance and the State: Nepalese 
Experience, D.N. Gellner (ed.), pp. 133–75. New Delhi: Social Science 
Press. 
––––2009. “The Community Party of Nepal (Maoist): Transformation from an 
Insurgency Group to a Competitive Political Party.” European Bulletin of 
Himalayan Research 33-34: 39-71. 
Hage, G. 2003. Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching For Hope in a Shrinking 
Society. Syndey: Pluto Press. 
Hall, K. D. 2002. Lives in Translation: Sikh Youth as British Citizens. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Hangen, S. 2000. Making Mongols: Ethnic Politics and Emerging Identities in 
Nepal. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin.  
––––2007 Creating a “New Nepal”: The Ethnic Dimension. Washington DC: East-
West Center. 
Hannan MT and J. Freeman. 1996. “Where Do Organizations Come From?” 
Sociological Forum 1: 50-72. 
   337 
Harmel, R. and K. Janda. 1995. “Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party 
Change: An Empirical Anlaysis.” Western European Politics 18(1): 1-33. 
Harper, I. and C. Tarnowski. 2002. “A Hterotopia of Resistance: Health, 
Community Forestry, and Challenges to State Centralization in Nepal.” 
In Resistance and The State: Nepalese Experience, edited by D. Gellner, 33-
82. New Delhi: Social Science Press. 
Harris, J. 2005. “The Ordering of Things: Organization in Bruno Latour.” In 
Contemporary Organization Theory. Campbell Jones and Rolland Munro 
(eds.), pp: 165-77. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing. 
Harvey, D. 2000. Spaces of Hope. Berkeley: University of California. 
––––2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hecht, T. (ed.). 2002. Minor Omissions: Children in Latin American History and 
Society. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Henslin, J. M. 1972. “Studying Deviance in Four Settings: Research Experience 
with Cabbies, Suicides, Drug Users, and Abortionees.” In Research on 
Deviance, Jack Douglas (ed.), pp: 35-70. New York Random  House. 
Herzfeld, M. 1985. The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan 
Mountain Village. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
––––2002. “Uncanny Success. Some Closing Remarks.” In Elites: Choice, 
Leadership and Succession, J Pina-Cabral and P. Lima eds., pp: 227-235 
Oxford: Berg Publications. 
Hirschfeld, L. 2002. “Why Don't Anthropologists Like Children?” American 
Anthropologist 104(2) 611-627. 
Höfer, A. 1979. “The Caste Hierarchy and the State in Nepal: A Study of the 
Muluki Ain of 1854.” Khumbu Himal 13(2): 2-96. 
Hoftun, M., W. Raeper, and J. Whelpton. 1999. People, Politics, and Ideology: 
Democracy and Social Change in Nepal. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 
Holland, D. and D. Skinner. 1996. “Schools and the Cultural Production of the 
Educated Person in a Nepalese Hill Community.” In The Cultural 
Production of the Educated Person: Critical Ethnographies of Schooling and 
Local Practice, B. A. Levinson, D. E. Foley, and D. C. Holland (eds.), pp: 
273-301.  Albany: State University New York Press. 
Holmberg, D.H. 1989. Order in Paradox: Myth, Ritual, and Exchange Among 
Nepal’s Tamang. Cornell NY: Cornell University Press.  
––––2000. “Derision, Exorcism, and the Ritual Production of Power.” American 
Ethnologist 27(4): 1-23 
Holmes, D. and G. Marcus. 2005. “Cultures of Expertise and the Management 
of Globalizaiton: Toward the Re-functioning of Ethnography.” In Global 
Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems, 
A. Ong and S.J Collier (eds.), pp: 235-254. London: Blackwell.  
   338 
Hutt, M. (1997). “Being Nepali without Nepal: Reflections on a South Asian 
Diaspora.” In Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics 
of Culture in Contemporary Nepal. D. Gellner, J. Pfaff- Czarnecka and J. 
Whelpton, eds. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 101-144. 
Huizer, G. 1973. Peasant Rebellion in Latin America. Harmondsworth: Penguin.  
Inoue, MS. 2004. “ ‘We Are Okinawans but of a Different Kind’ - New/Old 
Social Movements and the US Military in Okinawa.” Current 
Anthropology 45 (1): 85-104. 
Jean-Klein, I. 2003. Into committees, out of the house?: Familiar forms of 
organizations of Palestinian committee activism during the first 
intifada.” American Ethnologist 30 (4): 556-579. 
Jordan, T. 2002. Activism! Direct Action, Hacktivism, and the Future of Society. 
London: Reaktion Books. 
Joshi, B.L. and L.E. Rose. 2004[1966]. Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case 
Study of Political Acculturation. Kathmandu: Mandala Press.  
Katz, R. and P. Mair, eds. 1994. How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in 
Party Organization in Western Democracies. London: Sage Publications. 
Kaufman, D. 1997. “Thanks for the Memory: Bloch, Benjamin, and the 
Philosophy of History.” In Not Yet: Bloch Reconsidered, Jamie Owen 
Daniel and Tom Moylan (eds.), pp. 33-52. London: Verso Press. 
Kaviraj, S. 1998. “The Culture of Representative Democracy in India” In Wages 
of Freedom: Fifty Years of the Indian Nation-state, P. Chatterjee (ed.), pp: 
147-178. Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
Kertzer, D. I. 1983. “Generation As A Sociological Problem.” Annual Review of 
Sociology 9: 125-49. 
Khanal, K. 1995. “Party Politics and Governance: The Role of Leadership.” In 
State, Leadership and Politics in Nepal, D. Kumar, eds. Kathmandu: 
CNAS/TU. 
Kitchelt, H. 1993. “Social Movements, Political Parties, and Democratic 
Theory.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
528: 13–29. 
Korht, B. and S. Maharjan. 2009. “When a Child Is No Longer a Chiled: Nepali 
Ethnopsychology of Child Development and Violence.” Studies in 
Nepali History and Society 14(1): 107-142. 
Krämer, K.H. 2002. “How Representative is the Nepali State?” In Resistance 
and the State: Nepalese Experience, D.N. Gellner (ed.) pp. 179–98. New 
Delhi: Social Science Press. 
Krauskopff, G. and M. Lecomte-Tilouine, eds. 1996. Célébrer le Pouvoir: Dasain, 
un Rituel Royal au Népal. Paris: CNRS Éditions, Éditions de la MSH. 
Kürti, L. 2002. Youth and the State in Hungary: Capitalism, Communism and Class. 
London: Pluto Press. 
   339 
Laclau, E. 1985. “New Social Movements and the Plurality of the Social.” In 
New Social Movements and the State in Latin America, D. Slater (ed.), pp. 
27-42. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: CEDLA. 
––––2001. “Democracy and the Question of Power.” Constellations 8 (1): 3-14. 
Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategies: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso. 
Lakier, G. 2007. “Illiberal democracy and the problem of law.” In Contentious 
politics and democratization in Nepal, M. Lawoti (ed.), pp: 251-72. New 
Delhi: Sage Publications.  
Law, J. 1994.Organizing Modernity: Social Order and Social Theory. Oxford: 
Blackwell Press. 
Lawoti, M. 2005. Towards a democratic Nepal: Inclusive political institutions for 
multicultural society. New Delhi: Sage Publications.  
Lawson, K. 1994. How Political Parties Work: Perspectives from Within. London: 
Praeger. 
Leach, E. 1970 [1954]. Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of 
Kachim Social Structure. London: Athlone Press. 
––––1959. Descent, Filiation and Affinity. Man 60: 9-10.  
––––1961. Rethinking Anthropology. London: Athlone Press. 
Lecomte-Tilouine, M. 2006. “Kills One, He Becomes a Hundred.” Social 
Analyses 50 (1): 51-72. 
Lecomte-Tilouine, M., and P. Dolfus, eds.  2003. Ethnic Revival and Religious 
Turmoil: Identities and Representations in the Himalaya. New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press.  
Lefort, C. 1988. Democracy and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Lenin, V.I. 1920. “Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder.” In V.I. Lenin 
Selected Works Volume 1.  New York: International Press, 1971. 
Lesko, N. 2001. Act Your Age!: A Cultural Construction of Adolescence. NY: 
Routledge. 
Lévi-Strauss, C. 1969 [1949]. The Elementary Structures of Kinship. James Harle 
Bell, trans. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode. 
Levine, N.E. 1987. “Caste, State, and Ethnic Boundaries in Nepal.” Journal of 
Asian Studies 46(1): 71-88.  
Levinson, B. A., D. E. Foley, and D. C. Holland. 1996. The Cultural Production of 
the Educated Person: Critical Ethnographies of Schooling and Local Practice. 
Albany: State University New York Press. 
Lichterman, P. 1996. The search for political community: American activists 
reinventing commitment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
   340 
Liechty, M. 1995 “ Media, Markets, and Modernization: Youth Identities and 
Experience of Modernity in Kathmandu, Nepal.” In Youth Cultures: A 
cross-cultural Perspective, V Amit-Talai and H. Wulff, eds., pp. 185-202. 
NY: Routledge. 
––––2002. Suitably Modern: Making Middles Class Culture in a New Consumer 
Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
––––2009. “Youth Problems: An Introduction.” Studies in Nepali History and 
Society 14(1): 35-38.  
Lipset, S. and Ladd, E. 1971. College Generations: From the 1930’s to the 
1960’s. Public Interest 25:99-113. 
LiPuma, E. and Lee, B. 2004. Financial Derivatives and the Globalization of Risk. 
Durham NC: Duke University Press. 
Little, A. 2007. Between Disagreement and Consensus: Unravelling the 
Democratic Paradox. Australian Journal of Political Science 42(1): 143-159. 
Lounsbury, M. and M. Ventresca. 2003. “The New Structuralism in 
Organizational Theory.” Organization (10): 457-80. 
Malinowski, B. 1984[1922]. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. Prospect Heights, 
IL: Waveland. 
––––1929. The sexual life of savages in north-western Melanesia: an ethnographic 
account of courtship, marriage, and family life among the natives of the 
Trobriand Islands, British New Guinea. New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World. 
––––1938. “Introduction” in Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa, 
Malinowski B. (ed.). London: Oxford University Press for International 
Institute of African Languages and Culture. 
Mannheim, K. 1952. “The Problem of Generations.” In Essays on the Sociology of 
Knowledge by Karl Manheim. Paul Kecskemeti, ed., pp. 276-320. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Mar, P. 2005. “Unsettling Potentialities: Topography of Hope in Transnational 
Migration.” Journal of Intercultural Studies: 26 (4): 361-378. 
Marcus, George. 1983. “ ‘Elite’ as a Concept, Theory and Research Tradition.” 
In Elites: Ethnographic Issues, Marcus G. eds., pp: 7-27. Santa Fe: 
University of New Mexico Press. 
––––1998. Ethnography through Thick & Thin. New Jersey: Princeton University.  
Marias, J. 1968. Generations: The Concept. International Encyclopedia of Social 
Science 6:88-92. 
Markides, K. 1978. Disentangling Generational and Life-Cycle Effects on Value 
Difference. Social Science Quarterly 59(2): 390-93. 
Marr, D. and S. Rosen. 1998. “Chinese and Vietnamese Youth in the 1990’s.” 
The China Journal 40: 145-172 
   341 
Marriott, M. 1976. “Hindu Transactions: Diversity without Dualism.” In 
Transaction and Meaning, B. Kapferer (ed.). Philadelphia: ISHI 
Publications (ASA Essays in Anthropology 1). 
Mauss, M. 1967. The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies. 
NY: W.W. Norton. 
McCarthy, John D. 1996. “Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, 
Adapting, and Inventing.” In Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements, D. McAdam, J.D. McCarthy and M.N. Zald (eds.), pp. 141–
51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mead, M. 1928. Coming of Age in Samoa: Psychological Study of Primitive Youth 
for Western Civilization. New York: William Morro. 
Mehta, U.S. 1991. Liberalism and Empire. Chicago: University Press. 
Melucci, A. 1985. “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Social 
Movements.” Social Research 52 (4): 789-816. 
Memmi, A. 1965. The Colonizer and the Colonized. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Merry, S. E. 2005. Anthropology and Activism: Researching Human Rights 
across Porous Boundaries. POLAR 28 (2): 240-257. 
Minkoff, D. and J. D. McCarthy. 2005. “Reinvigorating the Study of 
Organizational Processes in Social Movements.” Mobilization 10: 401-21.  
Mitchell, T. 1991. Colonizing Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Miyazaki, H. 2004. The Method of Hope: Anthropology, Philosophy, and Fijian 
Knowledge. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
–––2007. “Between Arbitrage and Speculation: An Economy of Belief and 
Doubt.” Economy and Society 36(3): 396-415. 
Moffatt, M.. 1989. Coming to Age in New Jersey: College and American Culture. 
New Brunswick: Rugters University Press. 
Monroe, J.P. 2001. The Political Party Matrix: The Persistence of Organization. 
Albany : State University of New York Press. 
Mouffe, C. 2005. On the Political. London: Routledge. —2000. The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso 
Mukhopadhyay C. and P. Higgins. 1988. “Anthropological Studies of 
Women’s Status Revisted 1977-1987.” Annual Review of Anthropology 17: 
461-95. 
Nader, L. 1972. "Up the Anthropologist—Perspectives Gained from Studying 
Up." In Reinventing Anthropology, Dell H. Hymes (Ed.), pp: 284-311. 
New York, Pantheon Books. 
Nairn, T. 1981. “The Modern Janus,” In The Break-up of Britain, 2nd ed. London: 
Verso Press. 
   342 
Nash, J. 1976. “Ethnology in a Revolutionary Setting.” In Ethics and 
Anthropology: Dilemmas in Fieldwork, Michael Rykiewich and James 
Spradley (eds.), pp: 148-173. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Neupane, L. 2005. Akhil Gyan. Kathmandu: Bhijan Prakashan. 
Onta, P., 1996. “Creating a Brave Nation in British India: The Rhetoric of Jati 
Improvement, Rediscovery of Bhanubhakta and the Writing of Bir 
History.” Studies in Nepali History and Society 1(1): 37-76.  
––––1996b. “Ambivalence Denied: The Making of Rastriya Itihas in Panchayat 
Era Textbooks.” Contributions to Nepalese Studies 23(1): 213-254. 
Ortner, S. 1989. High Religion: A Cultural and Political History of Sherpa 
Buddhism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Paley, J. 2002. Toward and Anthropology of Democracy. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 31: 469-496. 
––––2001. Marketing Democracy: Power and social movements in post-dictatorship 
cue. Berkeley: University of California. 
Panday, D. R. 1999. Nepal’s Failed Development: Reflections on the Mission and the 
Maladies. Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Center. 
Panebianco, A. 1988. Political Parties: Organization and Power. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Paramanand. 1982. Nepali Congress Since Its Inception. Delhi: B.R. Publishing 
Company. 
Pellizzoni, L. 2003. “Legitimacy Problems in Deliberative Democracy,” 
Political Studies, 51(1): 180-96.  
Pfaff-Czarnecka, J. 2004. “High Expectations, Deep Disappointments: Politics, 
State, and Society in Nepal after 1990.” In Himalayan People’s War: 
Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, M. Hutt (ed.), pp. 166–90. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Pigg, S. 1992. Inventing Social Categories through Place: Social 
Representations and Development in Nepal. Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 34 (3): 491-513. 
––––1997. “Found in most Traditional Societies”: Traditional Medical 
Practitioners between Culture and Development.” In International 
Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of 
Knowledge, edited by F. Cooper and R. Packard, pp. 259-290. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Pignède, B. 1993 [1966].  The Gurungs: A Himalayan Population of Nepal. 
Kathmandu: Rana Pustak Bhandar.  
Pilkington, H. (1994) Russia’s Youth and its Culture. A Nation’s Constructors and 
Constructed. London and New York: Routledge. 
   343 
Polletta, F. 2005. “How Participatory Democracy Became White: Culture and 
Organizational Choice.” Mobilization: An International Journal 10(2): 271-
288. 
Popielarz, P. and Z. Neal. 2007. “The Niche as a Theoretical Tool.” Annual 
Review of Sociology 33: 65-84. 
Pradhan, R. 2002. “Ethnicity, Caste and a Pluralist Society.” In State of Nepal, 
K.M. Dixit and S. Ramachandaran (eds.), pp. 1–21. Kathmandu: Himal 
Books. 
Prasad, N. 1980. Ideology and Organization in India Politics: A Study of Political 
Parties at Grass Roots. New Delhi: Allied Publishers.  
Punnett, R. 1992. Selecting the Party Leader: Britain in Comparative 
Perspective. London: Wheatsheaf Press.  
Puri, G. 1980. Bharatiya Jana Sangh: Organization and Ideology. New Delhi: 
Sterling Publishers. 
Putnam, R. 1976. The Comparative Study of Political Elites. New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall Inc. 
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. 1952[1935]. In Structure and Function in Primitive Society. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
––––1952[1939]. The Study of Kinship Systems.” In Structure and Function in 
Primitive Society. pp. 49-89. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Rana, G. 1995. Prajaataantrik Āndolanmaa Nepaal Bidhyaarthi Sangh (trans. The 
Nepal Student Organization in the Democratic Movement). 
Kathmandu: Prakshak Press.   
Rancière, J. 1994. The Names of History: On the Poetics of Knowledge. Translated 
by Hassan Melehy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
––––1996. “Eleven Theses on Politics.” Lecture given at Ljblijana, December 4, 
1996. Synopsis available online at:zrcsazu.si/www/fi/aktualI96/ranciere.htm. 
––––1999. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Julie Rose, trans. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
––––2003. ‘Politics & aesthetics: an interview’, with Peter Hallward, in Angelaki. 
Translated by Forbes Morlock. 8 (2):194-210. 
––––2004. The Politics of Aesthetics: the Distribution of the Sensible. London: 
Continuum. 
Randall, V. ed. 1988. Political Parties in the Third World. London: Sage. 
Rapport, N. 1998. The Potential of Human Rights in a Post-Cultural World. 
Social Anthropology 6(3): 381-388. 
––––2003.  I Am Dynamite: An Alternative Anthropology of Power. London: 
Routeldge. 
   344 
Redfield, P. 2006. A less modest witness: Collective advocacy and motivated 
truth in medical humanitarian movement. American Ethnologist 33(1): 4-
26. 
Rice, K. 1990. Attachment in adolescence: A narrative and meta-analytic 
review. Journal of Youth and Adolescence 19: 511-38 
Rigi, J. 2003. The Conditions of Post-Soviet Dispossessed Youth and Work in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan. Critique of Anthropology 23(1): 35-49. 
Riles, A. 2001. The Network Inside and Out. Ann Abor: University Michigan 
Press.  
––––2006. Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the 
Iron Cage. American Anthropologist, Vol. 108, No.1, March 2006. 
–––– Forthcoming, 2010. “Is the Law Hopeful?” In Hope in the Economy, H. 
Miyazaki and R. Swedberg (eds.). 
Robbe, A. 1995. “Seduction and Persuasion.” In Fieldwork Under Fire: 
Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival, C. Nordstrom and 
A.C.G.M Robeen (eds), pp: 81-104. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Roka, H. 2004. “The Emergency and Nepal’s Political Future.” In Himalayan 
People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, M. Hutt (ed.), pp. 261–84. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Rorty, R. 1999. Philosophy and Social Hope. Harmondsworth, England: 
Penguin. 
Rosen, L. 2006. “Expecting the Unexpected: Cultural Components of Arab 
Governance,” ANNALS, American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 603: 163-78.  
Rowlands, M. 2002. “Cultural Heritage and the Role of Traditional 
Intellectuals in Mali and Camroon.” In Elite Cultures: Anthropological 
Perspectives, C. Shore and S. Nugent eds., pp: 145-157, ASA Mongraphs 
38. London: Routledge Press. 
Ryder, N. 1965. “The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change.” 
American Sociological Review 30:843-861. 
Sayer, D. 1994. “Everyday Forms of State Formaton: Some Dissident Remarks 
on “Hegemony.” In Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and 
Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, edited by J.M. Gilber and D. 
Nugent, pp: 367-77. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Schneiderhan E. and S. Khan. 2008. “Reasons and Inclusion: The Foundation 
of Deliberation,” Sociological Theory, 26 (1): 1-24.  
Shade, P. 2001. Habits of Hope: A Pragmatic Theory. Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press. 
Shah, S. 2002. “From Evil State to Civil Society.” In The State of Nepal, K. M. 
Dixit and S. R. (eds.), pp.137-211. Kathmandu: Himal Books.  
   345 
––––2004. “A Himalayan Red Herring? Maoist Revolution in the Shadow of 
the Legacy Raj,” in Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist rebellion, M. 
Hutt (ed.), pp: 192- 225. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Shaha, R. 1982. Essays on the Practice of Government in Nepal. Delhi: Manohar. 
Sharkansky, I. 1999. Ambiguity, Coping, and Governance: Israeli Experiences in 
Politics, Religion, and Policymaking. London: Praeger Press. 
Sharma, P. (2007). Unraveling the Mosaic: Spatial Aspects of Ethnicity in Nepal. 
Kathmandu: Himal Books.  
Sharma, S. 2002. “The Hindu State and the State of Hinduism.” In The State of 
Nepal, K. M. Dixit and S. Ramachandaran (eds.), pp.39-61. Kathmandu: 
Himal Books. 
Sharma, S. and Pawan K. S.. 1999. General Election Opinion Poll: How Voters 
Assess Politics, Parties and Politicians. Kathmandu: Himal Association. 
Sharp, L. A. 2003. “Laboring for the Colony and Nation: The Historicized 
Political Consciousness of Youth in Madagascar.” Critique of 
Anthropology 23(1): 75-91. 
Schmitt, C. 1996 [1976]. The Concept of the Political. G. Schwab (trans.), Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Shneiderman, S. 2009. Rituals of Ethnicity: Migration, Mixture, and the Making of 
Thangmi Identity Across Himalayan Borders. Ph.D. Thesis. Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University.  
Shore, D. 2002. “Introduction: Towards and Anthropology of Elites.” In Elite 
Cultures: Anthropological Perspectives, C. Shore and S. Nugent eds., pp: 1-
21, ASA Mongraphs 38. London: Routledge Press. 
Shrestha, P. L.. 1996. A Short History of the Communist Movement in Nepal. 
Kathmandu: Pushpa Lal Memorial Academy. 
Skylair, L.. 1998. “Social Movements and Global Capitalism.” In The Cultures of 
Globalization. F. Jameson and M. Miyoshi (eds.), pp. 291-311. Durham: 
Duke University Press.  
Sluka, J.. 1995. “Dangerous Anthropology in Belfast.” In Fieldwork Under Fire: 
Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival, C. Nordstrom and 
A.C.G.M Robeen (eds.), pp: 276-291. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Smith, R. 1984. “Anthropology and the Concept of Social Class.” Annual 
Review of Anthropology 13: 467-94. 
Snellinger, A. 2005. “A Crisis in Nepali Student Politics?: Analyzing the Gap 
between Politically Active and Non-Active Students.” Peace and 
Democracy in South Asia Journal 2 (Fall): 14-30. 
––––2006. Commitment as an Analytic: Reflections on Nepali Student Activists 
Protracted Struggle. PoLAR (Political and Legal Anthropology Review) 
29(2): 351-364. 
   346 
––––2007. “Student Movements in Nepal: Their Parameters and Their 
Idealized Forms,” In Contentious Politics and Democratization in 
Nepal, M. Lawoti (ed.), pp: 273-98. New Delhi: Sage Publications.  
––––2009. “Maoist Student Organization’s Notion of Scientific Organization.” 
In The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Dynamics and Growth in the Twenty-
first century, M. Lawoti and A. Mahara (eds.), pp: 73-91. New York: 
Routledge Publications.  
Snow, D. and R. Benford. 1992. Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. In 
Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg 
Mueller, eds. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Spencer, J. 2007. Anthropology, Politics, and the State: Democracy and Violence in 
South Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Srinivas, M.N. 1996. Theory and Method: Evaluation of the Work of M.N. Srinivas. 
A.M. Shah, B.S. Baviskar, E.A. Ramaswamy (Eds.). Delhi: Sage 
Publications. 
Stambach, A. 2002. Lessons from Mount Kilimanjaro: School, Community, and 
Gender in East Africa. NY: Routledge. 
Steiner, J.; A. Bachtiger, M. Sporndli and M.R. Steenbergen. 2004. Deliberative 
Politics in Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Strathern, M. 1988. Gender of the Gift. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
––––1991. “One Man and Many Men.” Big Men and Great Men: Personifications 
of Power in Melanesia, M. Godelier and M. Strathern (eds.) pp: 197-214. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
––––1996. Cutting the Network. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
(n.s.) 2: 517-535. 
––––1999. Property, Substance and Effect. London: Athlone. 
––––2004. “Loosing (out on) Intellectual Resources,” in Law, Anthropology, and 
the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things, A. Pottage and 
M. Mundy, eds., pp. 201-233. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Strauss, L. 1959. What is Political Philosophy? Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Strydom, P. 2001. “The Problem of Triple Contingency in Habermas.” 
Sociological Theory 19: 165-186. 
Sunstein, C.R. 2003. Why Societies need Dissent. Boston: Harvard University 
Press. 
Tamang, M.S. (2008). Himalayan Indigeneity: Histories, Memory and Identity 
Among Tamang in Nepal. PhD Thesis. Ithaca: Cornell University.  
Tamang, S. 2000. “Legalizing State Patriarchy in Nepal.” Studies in Nepali 
History and Society (SINHAS) 5 (1): 127-155. 
   347 
––––2002. Civilizing Civil Society: Donors and Democracy Space. Studies in 
Nepali History and Society 7 (2): 309-353. 
Tarrow, S. 1996. “States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social 
Movements.” In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, D. 
McAdam, J.D. McCarthy and M.N. Zald (eds.), pp. 41–61. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Taussig, M. 1987. Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study of Terror 
and Healing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
ten Bos, R. 2005. “Giorgio Agamben and the Community Without Identity.” In 
Contemporary Organization Theory. C. Jones and R. Munro, eds. 16-29. 
Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing. 
Thapa, B. 2003. “Tourism in Nepal: Shangri-la’s troubled times.” In Safety and 
security in tourism: relationships, management, and marketing C. M. Hall, D. 
J. Timothy, D. T. Duval (eds.), pp: 117-138. Binghamton, NY: Hasworth 
Press. 
Thapa, D. 2004. “Radicalism and the Emergence of the Maoists.” In Himalayan 
People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, M. Hutt (ed.), pp. 21–37. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Thapa D. and B. Sijapati. 2005. A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist 
Insurgency, 1996 to 2004. London: Zed Books.  
Tilly, C. 1995. “Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834.” In Cycles 
and Repertoires of Collective Action, Mark Traugott, ed, 15-40. Durham: 
Duke University Press. 
––––2006. “Afterward: Political ethnography as art and science.” Qualitative 
sociology, 29 (3): 409-12.  
Touraine, A. 1988. Return of the Actor: Social Theory in Postindustrial Society. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Turin, M. (2000). “Time for a True Population Census: The Case of the 
Miscounted Thangmi.” Nagarik (Citizen) 2(4): 14-19. 
Turner, T. S., 1985. Animal Symbolism, Totemism, and the Structure of Myth. 
In Animal Myths and Metaphors in South America. G. Urton, ed., pp. 49-
106. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. 
Turner, V. 1969. The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure. New York: de 
Gruyter. 
––––1957. Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Life. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Upadhya, S. 2002. “A Dozen Years of Democracy: The Games That Parties 
Play.” In State of Nepal, K.M. Dixit and S. Ramachandaran (eds.), pp: 62-
76. Kathmandu: Himal Books.  
van der Veer. 1994. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
   348 
Wagner, R. 1981 [1975]. The Invention of Culture. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
––––1991. “The Fractal Person.” In Big Men and Great Men: Personifications of 
Power in Melanesia, M. Godelier and M. Strathern (eds.) pp: 159-173. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Willis, P. 1977. Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs. 
NY: Columbia University Press. 
Wohl, R. 1979. The Generation of 1914. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Yurchak, A. 2006. Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet 
Generation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Zakari, F. 1997. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76 (6): 22-43.   
Zald, M. N. 1996. “Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing.” In Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements, D. McAdam, J.D. McCarthy and M. 
Zald (eds.), pp. 261–90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Zharkevich, I. 2009. “A New Way of Being Young In Nepal: The Idea of 
Maoist Youth and Dreams of a New Man.” Studies in Nepali History and 
Society 14(1): 67-106. 
Zournazi, M. 2002. Hope: New Philosophies for Change. NY: Routledge. 
 
 
